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Japan’s Northeast Asia Policy

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Presentation on theme: "Japan’s Northeast Asia Policy"— Presentation transcript:

1 Japan’s Northeast Asia Policy
To-hai Liou, Professor of Diplomacy and Director of the Center for WTO Studies National Chengchi University, Taiwan, R.O.C March 11, 2016

2 Reborn as a sovereign state in 1952
Because Japan was defeated in the World War II, it was not reborn as a sovereign state until 1952 after it signed the San Francisco peace treaty to formally end the war in 1951.

3 Cultural factor Geography:
geographic location: gateway to Asia; bridge between the East and the West; frontier Limited raw materials and energy History Nationality: hard working; well-planned; cautious

4 island nation diplomacy
Japan’s foreign policy behavior is characterized with island nation diplomacy. There are several major characteristics that can be identified. First, island nations tend to emphasize international trade.

5 Negative History In the Japan case, due to its intrusion of most Asian countries during the World War II, few countries in East Asia would like to see Japan politically and militarily active. Against this background, Japan had no choice but to rely on economic means.

6 Economic diplomacy Constrained by its constitutional inability to offer full-on military support, Japan has considered economic assistance to be its main diplomatic ``weapon,'' and is therefore one of the world's largest donors to developing countries.

7 Constitutional restraint and A lack of natural resources
A lack of natural resources and energy was another driving force behind this choice. Ninety percent of Japan’s resources and energy are imported.

8 Allying with an outside major power
Second, Japan has a tendency of allying with a major power outside East Asia to counter local dominating land powers such as China and Russia. Representative examples are Anglo-Japan Alliance in 1903 and U.S.-Japan security cooperation since 1951.

9 Pragmatic and flexible
Third, Japanese foreign policy behavior is usually pragmatic and flexible. Japan's national security in the postwar era has depended on a constitutional interpretation of what the nation can or cannot do. Even though Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution renouncing war as a means of settling international disputes has been changed yet, Japanese warships already in the Indian Ocean assisting the U.S. in combating terrorists in Afghanistan.

10 Like to play a bridge Fourth, Japan likes to play a bridge role between Oriental and Occidental; between ASEAN and Indochina; between Europe and the U.S.; between the developing countries and developed countries.

11 Yoshida Doctrine During the Cold War period, the guidelines of Japanese foreign policy were epitomized in the Yoshida Doctrine proposed by Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida in The doctrine laid out three major components.

12 First, Japan’s foreign relations would be based on U. S
First, Japan’s foreign relations would be based on U.S.-Japan relations. Second, Japan should focus all the energy on economic rehabilitation. Japanese also like to keep things ambiguous (aimai), so they are flexible to interpret these later.

13 A response to the US request
Third, Japan would build a modest but efficient armed force. The Self-Defense Force (SDF) thus was formally created in 1954.

14 Yoshida had a unique vision
Yoshida had a unique vision. He believed that China and the Soviet Union was not monolith. He intended to recognized Beijing and sign peace treaty with the PRC but was forced to sign the treaty with the ROC and to establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan by the U.S.

15 Ichirō Hatoyama (鳩山 一郎)
As prime minister in 1955, he rebuilt diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union and Japan then became a member of the UN. The merger of two conservative parties to LDP.

16 Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration (October 1956)
Hatoyama was the first Japanese Prime Minister to visit the SU. The two countries signed the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration.In Paragraph 9 of the Declaration, the two countries agreed to continue negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty, and the SU agreed to hand over Habomai and Shikotan to Japan.

17 As the difference of positions of Japan and the Soviet Union as to the attribution of the islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri did not provide any prospect for the signing of a peace treaty.

18 Kishi and the ratification of US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960
Nobusuke Kishi (岸 信介) is the maternal grandfather of Shinzo Abe.

19 Hayato Ikeda (池田 勇人) was elected president of the LDP and became prime minister in 1960 shortly after the crisis of security treaty with US. Ikeda advocated the "income-doubling plan" and "politics of patience and reconciliation," respectively emphasizing economic development of Japan while minimizing societal conflict.

20 transistor salesman In 1960, then French president Charles De Gaulle famously referred to Ikeda as "that transistor salesman", around the time of Ikeda's premiership, Ikeda started investment in technological fields in order to broaden Japanese Exports from its hallmark of basic consumer goods such as toys, white goods appliances and bicycles towards more technologically based exports in order to extend Japan's long-term growth whilst the era of double digit growth from Japan's post-war miracle from the 50's had began to subside.

21 1973 Nixon Shock plus oil crisis economic security and resources diplomacy
Kakuei Tanaka (田中 角榮)’s Independent foreign policy exemplified by the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with China.

22 Fukuda Doctrine Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda in 1977 while on a tour of the ASEAN member states, he made a speech in Manila in which he articulated Japan's Southeast Asia policy.

23 Japan would never become a military power and would build up a relationship of mutual confidence and trust with Southeast Asian countries in wide-ranging fields, and would cooperate positively with ASEAN and its member countries in their own efforts, as an equal partner.

24 Fukuda promised that Japan would like to enhance economic cooperation with Southeast Asian countries in the wake of the withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam by giving extensive ODA to countries in the region including Vietnam.

25 However, only four months after the Doctrine, Vietnam invaded Kampuchea. This destroyed his efforts to serve as a bridge between Indochina and ASEAN.

26 As one of two world’s economic growth engines with West Germany, Japan was invited to join the Group of Seven in 1976 and thus double its ODA to developing economies. Tied-loan Untied-loan

27 a member of the West In view of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan vis-à-vis Carter’s weak leadership, Japan under Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira (大平 正芳) emphasizing as a member of the West since 1979 Strategic aid:

28 Comprehensive National Security (總和安全保障)
A national security is no longer the traditional national defense” (enhancing US-Japan security cooperation and military buildup) but has economic, environmental, and human dimensions as well (separately known as economic security, food security, and crisis management of large-scale disaster etc.).

29 Japan started to provide ODA to China since 1979
Japan started to provide ODA to China since The Ohira Government provided $300 billion yen to Beijing during

30 Yasuhiro Nakasone ( ): setting a blue print for Japan, to seek a political status equivalent to Japan’s economic capacity. The only Prime Minister so far can maintain positive relations with both the US and Asia neighbors led by China and South Korea at the same time.

31 Conservative Iron Triangle: Ronald Reagan + Nakasone + Chun Doo Hwan
Nakasone: Japan would like to serve as an unsinkable aircraft carrier in the region Japan-US joint producing F-X Jet Fighter for the 21st century The 1st Japan-South Korea Exchange visits of top leaders

32 Huge ODA to China ($470 billion yen or US$2 billion in 1984-1990)
Plaza Agreement and Flying Geese Pattern (Kiyoshi Kojima) Japan emerged as world’s largest debtor in 1989

33 His 1989 book, The Japan That Can Say No, co-authored with Sony chairman Akio Morita (1991 in English), called on the authors' countrymen to stand up to the United States. Mahathir Mohamad and Shintaro Ishihara wrote a book The Voice of Asia: Two Leaders Discuss the Coming Century Hardcover – June, 1996 Shintaro Ishihara (Author), Mahathir Mohamad (Author)

34 LDP lost power to a coalition of minor partiesBut by 1993, the end of the miracle economy and other reasons ( Recruit scandal) led to the LDP losing its majority in that year's general election. Seven opposition parties—including several formed by LDP dissidents—formed a government headed by LDP dissident Morihiro Hosokawa of the Japan New Party.

35 Rightists-Dominate Japan
Murayama became the first Socialist Prime Minister (A big compromise of the Socialist Party to recognize the Japan-US Security Alliance and the decline of the Party)

36 In the post-Cold War era, taking advantage of a series of events, Japan has been able to make a few big steps forward and it is closer to in fulfilling its claimed normal state as well as its ambition to become a political and military power commensurate with its economic clout more than ever before.

37 Iraqi Shock First, the Persian Gulf War. During the war, Japan gave around US$13 billion to Kuwait but was scorned by the West as "checkbook diplomacy".

38 Rightists in Japan thus claimed that to provide economic assistance was no longer enough, the West expected Japan to make international contribution such as sending SDF to attend UN’s Peace-keeping Operations (PKO).

39 They claim that peacekeeping operations constitute a major pillar of the nation's cooperation with the international community. According to Yomiuri Shimbun surveys conducted over the past five years, more than half the respondents said they supported constitutional revision.

40 Changes in Northeast Asian Geopolitics
Ambassador Yukio Satoh discusses the new challenges Japan faces in the light of a rapidly changing power balance in the region. He stresses both Japan's growing sense of insecurity and its commitment to strengthening of the alliance. In the face of rising North Korean belligerence and Chinese military power, defining a new role for the Self-Defense Forces represents a daunting challenge for Japan.

41 The ambassador observes that the strategic triangle among China, Japan, and the United States will be central to regional politics and concludes by cautioning the two allies to work closely in dealing with these challenges. The National Bureau of Asian Research

42 演講人:政治大學外交系教授 劉德海 (liu7249@nccu.edu.tw)
THE END 演講人:政治大學外交系教授 


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