1. Contracts and Moral Hazards
Chapter Twenty
Contracts and Moral Hazards

2. Figure 20.1 Maximizing Joint Profit When the Agent Gets the Residual Profit
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3. Figure 20.2 Why Revenue Sharing Reduces Agent’s Efforts
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4. Figure 20.3 Why Profit Sharing Is Efficient
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5. Table 20.1  Production Efficiency and Moral Hazard Problems for Buy-A-Duck
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6. Table 20.2 Efficiency of Client-Lawyer Contracts
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7. Page 678 Solved Problem 20.1
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8. Application (Page 691) Performance Termination Contracts
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9. Application (Page 692) Performance Termination Contracts
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10. Table 20.3 Firm’s Spreadsheet
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