1. HEMP and ALARP Training
Recover
HEMP
Identify
Assess
Control
HEMP and ALARP Training
ALARP

2. Objectives of HEMP & ALARP Training
Increase Awareness of HEMP Concepts
Develop a common understanding of ALARP Principles
These topics are covered in more detail in:
HSE 0026 – Hazards and Effects Management Process
(HEMP and ALARP)

3. Hazards and Effects Management Process (HEMP)

4. HSE Management System
Heart of the MS.

5. Individual HEMP Responsibilities
All Employees
Responsible and accountable for conducting their work in such a manner which reduces to ALARP or eliminates risk to their own personal health and safety and that of their fellow employees and that ensures the protection of the environment, company assets, and company reputation.
Technical Staff
Participate in HEMP efforts for your Area, including asset integrity
Achieve a competent level of understanding concerning your Area’s HSE Case and Activity Specification Sheets
Comply with strict adherence to the organization’s MOC policy

6. Hazards and Effects Management Process
Four Step , Iterative Process
Most Important - MUST Identify the Hazards. Know what they are, then understand them, in order to control them, to manage HSE risks.
Developing an HSE Database for HSE Critical Activities.
Developing Performance Standards which state what they will achieve

7. Risk Assessment Matrix & Major HazardsB5
Major Hazards are those that have high risk or
high potential consequences

8. Major Hazards & HSE Cases
SEPCo Policies require that operations and facilities with Major Hazards have documented HSE Cases.
An HSE Case is a facility or operation-specific demonstration that the HSE risks from Major Hazards are managed to As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) and a description of how SEPCO’s HSE Management System is applied to HSE hazards.

9. Bow Tie Terminology the loss of control or release of the hazard.
Definition
Top Event
the loss of control or release of the hazard.
Threats
“release mechanisms” of the hazard.
Barriers
prevent the release of a hazard (i.e. top event) and act directly on the threat
are the hardware and procedures in place to prevent the threat from leading to the top event.
appear on the left hand side of the bow-tie.
Consequences
the effects of a hazard once it has been released.
appear on the right hand side of the bow-tie.
Recovery Measures
mitigate a hazard’s potential to cause harm, damage, and environmental impacts.
are similar to barriers, but act on the consequences

10. Consequence: Explosion
Bow-Tie Example
Loss of
Containment
Threat: Corrosion H -
01.06 Hydrocarbon Gas
Threat 2
Threat 3
Consequence 2
Consequence 3
Consequence: Explosion
ESCALATION
FACTOR
ESCALATION FACTOR
CONTROLS
Change in
operating
environment
MOC
Process
Inspection
Program
Corrosion
Management
BARRIER
Installation of
Temporary
Equipment
Standard
Field
Ignition
Source
Control
RECOVERY
MEASURE

11. Best Practice Bow Ties
There will be a single bow tie for each major hazard in SEPCo that sets the minimum required barriers/recovery measures to manage risks.
These are Best Practice Bow Ties.
Each Asset or Operation will:
review applicable best practice bow ties to consider and document any unique threats/consequences that may exist at their location.
benchmark the effectiveness of the barriers at their location against the performance expectation included in the best practice bow ties.
Identify gaps and implement remedial actions to improve the barriers / recovery measures and reduce the risk to ALARP.

12. Hazard Register
The Hazard Register describes hazards, their associated risks, and how the hazards are managed.
Those items with an Environment rating are E-aspects. Those that are Major in the Environment column are “Significant E-aspects”
Those items with in the Health column were identified during health risk assessments, and consider chronic and acute health exposures
Hazard
Description
Potential Consequences
Sources of expsoure
Health
People - Safety
Assets
Environment
Reputation
Overall Risk
Controls
H-01.01
Crude oil under pressure
unignited release fire spill / environmental impact personnel injuries/fatalities loss of asset / asset damage production loss
for health effects of flammable hydrocarbons, see the listings under H-21/22 General Chemicals
Mmajor H M
For locations where this is a major hazard, see the HSE Case. For other locations, see Table 5.1 in SEPCo HSE MS Part 5.
H-19.07A
Carbon monoxide (Gas)
Acute: chemical asphyxiant causing carboxyhaemoglobin Chronic: Category 1 Teratogen, may cause harm to unborn child, unconsciousness, fatality
Power generation unit; engine exhausts, emergency generators, boilers, fired equipment L N
1. CO monitor in temporary quarters where combustion emission may occur.
H-20.01
H2S (hydrogen sulphide, sour gas)
personnel injury / fatality minor environmental impact Health: Acute: Irritant to eyes, skin and respiratory tract. Chemical asphyxiant causing respiratory paralysis, irritant; unconsciousness, fatality Chronic: prolonged contact may lead to dermatitis
Raw Material. Sour crude. Examples include rich and fat DEA, sour water, fuel gas streams, sour hydrogen, acid gas, spent caustic stripper overhead
For locations where this is a major hazard, see the HSE Case. For other locations, see Table 5.1 in SEPCo HSE MS Part 5. For Health, Refer to generic Chemical Minimum Controls in Table 5.1 of SEPCo HSE MS Part MMS Contingency Plan for Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) 2. Local Emergency Response Plan
Another change in this revision of the HEMP Standard is the integration of E-aspects into the hazards and effects register, instead of having a separate listing and e-aspects database.
The new definition of an e-aspect is any hazard that has a rating in the Environment column of the Risk Assessment Matrix.
“Significant E-Aspects” are equivalent to major hazards – those E-aspects that are High or Major in the Environment column of the Risk Assessment Matrix are significant E-Aspects.
This change has been incorporated in the next revision of the HSE MS, and will be incorporated in the HSE Cases as they are updated per their normal schedule.
This is important for ISO

13. HEMP Tools
The most commonly used HEMP tools are highlighted

14. Risk Management Hierarchy
In order of preference:
Recover
HEMP
Identify
Assess
Control
Eliminate – remove the risk altogether
Substitute – use a lower risk alternative
Isolate / Separate – keep the hazard away from where it can cause harm
Engineering Controls – Prevention – design such that the risk of an incident is minimal
Engineering Controls – Mitigation – design such that if an incident occurs, it is mitigated
Procedural Controls – provide procedures to reduce risk
Personnel Protective Equipment – provide protection to reduce potential for injury

15. HEMP Study Interactions
Audits
Incident Investigation
Procedures
Variances
HEMP
Study
Project HSE Plan
Regulations
HSE Case
Designs
It doesn’t matter where you start on this loop - it is continuous
HEMP Studies could be PHA’s, HRA’s, or Dropped Objects
Studies stored in LiveLink® in HSE folder in Asset Area
IMPACT used to track action items and document close-out
HSE Case is the overarching document which describes how all hazards are managed on location and demonstrates through use of bow-ties how major hazards are managed.
HSE Case will be periodically updated and will trigger a review of the associated HEMP studies & hazard management
MOC is the key Work Process for managing changes
A Project HSE Plan will define what HEMP activities are required for the project and who is responsible
HEMP studies kept for the life of field or operation
HEMP studies periodically reviewed to ensure hazards are well understood and for CPI (e.g. changes in codes and standards)
Further Guidance Provided:
Process Safety Information Guidance HSE0047
Establishing Asset Integrity Guidance HSE0049
PHA Execution Guidance HSE0063
MOC
Process

16. Asset Responsibilities for HEMP Studies
The owner of the HEMP study is the accountable party for the asset or operation covered by the study. The owner is accountable for:
Maintaining the study
Updating the study at the requisite frequency
Making sure actions from the study are documented and closed
Studies done for design considerations are kept by engineering.
Studies done for operational considerations are kept by Operations.
Action items resulting from SEPCo HEMP studies shall be tracked and closed out using IMPACT.

17. Human Factors Engineering
The Group Minimum Health Management Standard states:
Human factors engineering principles are to be considered and applied during the early design stage of new facilities projects where design can have a critical impact on equipment usability and user safety or health.
The following picture illustrates how a human interacts with a technical component and the factors that can influence his/her performance.
Organizational Structure
(job design, communication, task)
Work Environment
(lighting, noise, chemical exposures, climate)
Individual Constraints
(age, size, training, skills, intelligence)
Human
Displays
Controls
Sensory Information
Action
TASK
Input
Output
Machine
Interfaces - Displays
Interfaces - Controls

18. As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)

19. ALARP TRIANGLE
The tolerability threshold is the point at which the risk moves from being tolerable to being unacceptable. The Tolerability threshold has been defined in this revision of the Standard.

20. Risk Perception - Types of Fatalities, US, 2001
Match the causes to the listed number of deaths/year
(data from the National Safety Council).
Cause
Accidental Drowning (Non Transport)
Transport Accidents
Contact with venomous animals & Plants
Lightning
Legal Intervention
Falls
Assault
Accidental Poisoning
Exposure to smoke, fire and flames
Number of deaths /year
47,288
20,308
15,019
14,078
3,309
3,281
396 61 44
Answers
Transport Accidents
Assault
Falls
Accidental Poisoning
Exposure to smoke, fire and flames
Accidental Drowning (Non Transport)
Legal Intervention
Contact with Venomous animals & plants
Lightning
Add a new slide with the answers – and calculate the IRPA. US population in divide #/population = IRPA
In UK, they say work-related IRPas should be less than .001, Voluntary vs not. What is the denominator.

21. Increasing Individual Risks and Societal Concerns
Relative Risk
Tolerability
Threshold
Increasing Individual Risks and Societal Concerns
Tolerability
Threshold
Oil and Gas Extraction
Transport Accidents
Assault
Falls
Accidental Poisoning
Drowning
Per Bureau of Labor Statistics, there are 23.1 fatalities per 100,000 employed in “Oil and Gas Extraction” = 2.3 x 10-4
Legal Intervention
Venomous animals & plants
Lightning

22. Actual Vs Perceived Risks
Which “hazard” results in more deaths per year?
45 Deaths in 1996
59 Deaths in 1995
76 Attacks Worldwide
49 Attacks USA
1 Death USA 2001

23. Risk Misperception .. Mountaineering Council for Scotland said
“These two men were very aware of safety issues and did not have a reputation for taking any sort of risks”

24. Problem Framing An outbreak of disease is expected to kill 600 people.
Two alternative programs have been proposed:
Which program would you select?

25. Rephrasing the Problem
Depending on the problem phrasing, people made different decisions:

26. ALARP Definition
To reduce a risk to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable involves balancing reduction in risk against time, trouble, difficulty and cost of achieving it.
This level represents the point, at which time, trouble, difficulty and cost of further reduction measures become unreasonably disproportionate to the additional risk reduction obtained. •
Risk
Cost
Screening Criteria
ALARP ?
From quantitative
risk analysis

27. ALARP: Road Transport Example
When does the cost of further reduction measures become disproportionate to the additional risk reduction obtained?:
No specification
Does not meet legal requirements
No regular vehicle maintenance
Provide recovery measures, e.g. roll-bars, seat belts
Provide mitigation, e.g., speed limiter, 4WD
Provide driver training
Provide safe driving incentives
Journey management system
Road transport management system
Avoid journeys by planning
Build black-top roads
Use aircraft transport only
Automate production facilities - eliminate routine driving
Stop production
Intolerable
SCREENING CRITERIA
ALARP region
ALARP
probably
in this area

28. ALARP and Risk Tolerability – 4 Levels of Risk
The new revision of the Standard defines 4 levels at which risk may be assessed:
Cumulative: the sum of all the risks at a location. This is one area that has often received a lack of consideration in the past e.g. how many risers can be added at a location before the cumulative risk threshold is exceeded?
Hazard level: This is the level at which bow-ties may be created (for Major hazards).
Threat level: This is the level at which adequacy of barriers/escalation factor controls is assessed for bow-ties
Failure mode level: Failure modes are specific causes of a failure that, with others, are collectively treated as a contributor to the threat/consequence or escalation factor. Examples shown in diagram.
The new revision of the HEMP Standard describes Risk Tolerability Thresholds, ALARP Evaluation Requirements and Demonstration requirements for each of these levels of HSE Risk.
The HEMP Standard describes the Tolerability Threshold, Evaluation requirements and Demonstration requirements for each of these levels of risk.

29. ALARP and Risk Tolerability Decision-Making
ALARP and risk tolerability decisions are required when changes affect hazard management.
For example:
Variances to SEPCo requirements
Identification of a new hazard, or a change in risk of an existing hazard
Operating without barriers/recovery measures or operating in a way that deteriorates a barrier
Making a change that impacts an existing barrier
Selecting a new concept
Adding additional risk such that the cumulative risk threshold may be approached

30. Decision Making Framework Outline
Means of Calibration
Decision
Level
Technology
Based
Well established
solution
Codes and Standards
Well understood risks
Verification
Drivers
Peer Review
Benchmarking
Very novel
Higher level of Management
Internal Stakeholder
Consultation
Significant trade-offs
Strong views
and perceptions
Values Based
External Stakeholder
Consultation

31. Decision Making Framework
Level
Higher level of Management
In order to determine the evaluation requirements for a specific HSE decision, the decision type needs to be determined. The SEPCo decision making framework is used for this purpose, and provides guidance on the types of bases needed to make HSE decisions.
A Type A decision is well-understood, nothing new or unusual. When drawing a line across the framework it is indicated that Codes and Standards, Good Practice and Engineering/Expert judgement would be used as the decision bases.
A Type B decision has some uncertainty. The line across the framework indicates Codes and Standards, Good Practice and Engineering/Expert judgement, Risk Based assessment or Company values would be used as the decision bases, depending on whether or not the decision was strongly type B.
A Type C decision is novel or challenging. The line indicates that Company values and societal values would be the most likely decision bases for this type of decision.
The left side of the framework shows the means for calibrating (or checking) the decisions.

32. Following the Decision-Making Process
Define decision
What do you need to decide?
Determine decision type
Type A? Type B? Type C? Use the right-hand side of the framework.
Evaluate
Evaluate at the Cumulative, hazard, threat, and failure mode levels
Calibrate
How to follow the Process???
There are basically 5 steps:
Define the Decision – what do you need to decide?
Determine the Decision Type (A, B, C) using the right hand side of the framework
Evaluate the Decision (at the cumulative, hazard, threat, failure mode levels as defined in the HEMP Standard).
Calibrate the Decision using the means shown on the left hand side of the framework
Demonstrate the Decision as defined in the HEMP Standard.
An example is provided – go through the example.
Use the left-hand side of the framework.
Demonstrate
Demonstrate the decision as defined in the HEMP Standard

33. Type A Decision Example
Define decision
How to design a ladder for accessing a work platform.
Determine decision type
The decision context is Type A because this decision is well-understood.
The decision bases are Codes and Standards (ASME, SEPCo design schedules), Good Practice, and Engineering/Expert judgment of the designer.
You have to design a new ladder to access a work platform.
How are ALARP principles applied?
cumulative risk level – N/A
hazard level - consider whether a new hazard is being added or a change in risk is being proposed for an existing hazard. Consider the risk management hierarchy.
threat/consequence level - verify against the personnel at heights bowtie.
failure mode level – N/A
Evaluate
Calibrate
Since this decision is well understood (Type A), the means of calibration is Codes and Standards, so no additional consultation is required
Since this decision is well understood (Type A) reference is made to the Hazards and Effects Register, and no additional demonstration is required other than the normal project documentation such as as-built drawings and calculations.
Demonstrate

34. ALARP Thinking
The picture shows an example of a ladder and cage. Has it been designed to reduce the risk to ALARP?

35. ALARP Thinking - Risk Reduction Ideas (RRIs)
Consider the Evaluate step.
Evaluate
hazard level - consider whether a new hazard is being added or a change in risk is being proposed for an existing hazard. Consider the risk management hierarchy.
Develop Risk Reduction Ideas for the preceding example.
Remember the Risk Management Hierarchy!
Eliminate
Substitute
Isolate / Separate
Engineering Controls – Prevention & Mitigation
Procedural Controls
Personnel Protective Equipment

36. Ranking Tool for selecting options
Cost multiplier
Benefit multiplier
Effort multiplier
Score = X X
Sample Score assignments
Cost multiplier
Cost of Implementation
Cost 1
Low
<$50k 2
Medium
$50k -$500k 3
High
>$500k
Range
Proposed Action
1-4 Do
6-9
Study
12+
Pass
Benefit multiplier
Benefit
Examples 1
High
Move one or more boxes on risk assessment matrix.
Reduction of likelihood of a magnitude or more (failure goes from 1/10 to 1/100), consequences are reduced significantly (from potential fatality to minor injury), benefit due to lower penalties/cost of absence/injuries, significant positive reputation impact 2
 Medium
Reduction of likelihood less than magnitude (from 1/10 to 1/50), consequences are reduced, benefit due to lower penalties/cost of absence/injuries 3
Low
Limited reduction in likelihood, limited reduction in consequence
Effort multiplier
Effort of Implementation
Activities examples 1
Low
Quick fix, simple to do, applicable to a specific location (no SEPCo wide impact). Little planning required, one person or small team can execute RRI. No shutdown or downtime required. 2
Medium
Simple fix but with Asset or Operation-wide implications. Complex, site specific activity. Some planning required. Involvement of local contractors. Small team to carry RRI out. May extend a shutdown. 3
High
Complex activity with SEPCo wide implications. Major planning involved. May involve larger contracts. Specific SEPCo team required. Requires a dedicated shutdown to implement.

37. Selected Option

38. Type B Decision Example
A pressure vessel has been noted to have a reduction in wall thickness from corrosion. Should it be kept in service? How would you make this decision?
Define decision
Is a pressure vessel fit for service based on changes in wall thickness from corrosion?
Determine decision type
The decision context is Type B since it is a deviation from codes and standards or good practice (API RP 579)
Evaluate
cumulative risk level – N/A
hazard level – evaluate based on the vessel contents for considerations regarding environmental effects, flammability or health hazards. The risk management hierarchy should be used.
threat/consequence level - An analysis should be conducted for overpressure and any other threats that might be impacted by reduced wall thickness (corrosion, vibration, etc.).
failure mode level – conduct a detailed analysis for each failure mode.
Calibrate
The means of calibration is peer review, so consultation is made with:
Technical Authorities
Regulatory Affairs
Workforce
Senior Leadership
Demonstrate
Consult the HEMP Standard for demonstration requirements!
Since this is a Type B decision, demonstration shall be made using the report format in Attachment B of the HEMP Standard. Reference the hazard management hierarchy and the Engineering Analyses from Fitness for Service reviews.

39. HEMP Web Site Available via the HSE in SEPCo Web Portal or directly at

40. Summary of HEMP & ALARP Training
You should now be aware of HEMP Concepts
We all should have a common understanding of the ALARP Principle