1. Eurosceptic forces in British politics
Britain and European Integration
Week 5
Dr Isabelle Hertner

2. Euroscepticim
A growth in comparative research into the phenomenon of Euroscepticism.
Most studies distinguish between public and party-based Euroscepticism.
But there are other relevant actors that express views on the EU, such as the media, NGOs, business lobby groups, rich businessmen, etc.

3. The issue
Across the EU, Euroscepticism has risen since the early 1990s. Eurosceptics have won seats in first & second-order elections:
In national parliaments (& govts.), e.g: Austria, Finland, Poland, Hungary, Italy, Germany, France, The Netherlands, etc.
In the European Parliament: about 1/3 of MEPs in the EP are Eurosceptics (approx. 140/751 MEPs).

4. Data from an MEP survey (self-placements on anti/-pro-EU spectrum)
See: MEP survey by Whitaker, Hix, Dreyer.

5. Britain: outlier and trendsetter?
British mainstream parties are/have been divided on EU membership.
In most other countries, Euroscepticism was traditionally found on the far-left and far-right margins (French Communist Party, Front National, etc.). See Liesbeth Hooghe et al
But Euroscepticism is becoming more mainstream across EU, the lines more blurred.
Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz (ÖVP) >

6. Paul Taggart’s initial definition
Taggart (1998: 366) defined Euroscepticism as ‘the idea of contingent, or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration’.
Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008: ) have refined the concept and now distinguish between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Euroscepticism. > Do you know the difference?

7. Hard vs soft Euroscepticism
Hard Euroscepticism
Soft Euroscepticism
‘Principled opposition to the project of European integration as embodied in the EU, in other words, based on the transfer of powers to supranational institutions such as the EU’.
‘When there is no principled objection to the European integration project of transferring powers to a supranational body such as the EU, but there is opposition to the EU’s current or future planned trajectory based on the further extension of competencies that the EU is planning to make’

8. Criticism
‘Soft’ Euroscepticism, in particular, has been criticized for being defined “in such a broad manner that virtually every disagreement with any policy decision of the EU can be included” (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002: 300).

9. What is Euroscepticim not? Taggart and Szczerbiak specify.
A party criticizing the EU for failing to properly reflect its country’s national interests in, for example, EU budget or EU accession negotiations, cannot be described as Eurosceptic.
Euroscepticism does not apply to a party that is broadly in favour of European integration but opposes one or two EU policy areas. But this depends on the ‘quality of these policy areas being opposed rather than the quantity’:
A party opposing a core policy area such as the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is more likely to be categorized as Eurosceptic than a party opposing a peripheral EU policy area.

10. How to measure Euroscepticism?
Party-based: Comparative Manifesto Project.
Content analysis of manifestos: coding of texts.
Covers over 1000 parties from 1945 until today in over 50 countries on five continents.

11. Party-based Euroscepticim in the UK (CMP data)

12. Party-based Euroscepticim in Germany (CMP data)

13. Explaining party-based Euroscepticism
Often, Euroscepticism is not the raison d’être of Eurosceptic parties. It is often part of a whole package of ‘scepticisms’: against capitalism (left) or against immigration, multiculturalism (right).
Thus, parties’ EU positions are integrated into two pre-existing dimensions: Culture & the economy (Kriesi et al., 2006). > Who are the winners of cultural & economic globalization (supporting “integration”) who the losers (supporting “demarcation”?)

14. The share of citizens seeing the EU as a bad thing, 2001-2011 (Eurobarometer data, see Werts et al.)

15. Explaining public Euroscepticism
Economic explanations, incl. people’s level of education (Kriesi and Lachat, 2002).
Trust in the functioning of political institutions at the national level (eg Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000; Kritzinger, 2003).
The issue of national identity vs European identity (eg Carey, 2002).In UK: British vs English identity!
National differences shaping people’s preferences towards the scope and content of EU policy-making (eg Vössing, 2005).

16. UK media & Euroscepticism
Press: the most widely read newspaper (Daily Mail) is overwhelmingly Eurosceptic. The editor is, too: Paul Dacre.
Rupert Murdoch (The Sun, The Times) has also pushed an anti-EU agenda.
As the British public has been/is amongst the least informed about the EU, these ‘cues’ matter!
TV: very little reporting on EU. BBC has to be balanced – but was still attacked in 2016.

17. Some concluding thoughts
Research into Euroscepticism has become a “growth industry” across Europe.
From the margins into the mainstream.
In Britain, not driven by a single actor or factor. A complex interplay between the political elites, media, public (see Copeland and Copsey, 2017). Rise in English nationalism > rejection of the EU.

18. Readings
Smith, Julie (2012) ‘The European Dividing Line in Party Politics’. International Affairs 88, pp. 1277–1295.
Kriesi, Hanspeter et al. (2006) ‘Globalization and the transformation of the national political
space: Six European countries compared’. European Journal of Political Research 45, pp. 921–956.
Kopecký, Peter and Cas Mudde (2002) ‘The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe’. European Union Politics 3 (3), pp
Sanchez-Cuenca, Ignacio (2000) “ The Political Basis of Support for European Integration’. European Union Politics 1(2), pp
Usherwood, Simon and Nick Startin (2013) ‘Euroscepticism as a Persistent Phenomenon’. Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 51, no. 2, pp
Taggart, Paul (1998) ‘A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems’. European Journal of Political Research 33, pp
Taggart, Paul and Aleks Szczerbiak (2008) ‘Theorizing Party-Based Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition, Measurement, and Causality’, pp In Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak (eds.) Opposing Europe: Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism. Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Steenbergen, Marco et al. (2007) ‘Who’s Cueing Whom? Mass-Elite Linkages and the Future of European Integration’. European Union Politics 8 (1), pp
Whitaker, Richard, Simon Hix, Philipp Dreyer: MEP survey data.
Carey, Sean (2002) ‘Undivided Loyalties. Is National Identity an Obstacle to European Integration?’ European Union Politics 3 (4), pp
Copeland, Paul and Nathaniel Copsey (2017) “Rethinking Britain and the European Union: Politicians, the
Media and Public Opinion Reconsidered”. JCMS 55 (4) pp

19. Seminar exercise 1
Please read Nigel Farage’s speech. How does he “frame” his/his party’s opposition to the EU?

20. Seminar exercise 2
How can we explain the rise of UKIP? Has the party reached its peak?