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Institutionalized Norms versus Patron-Client Ties

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Presentation on theme: "Institutionalized Norms versus Patron-Client Ties"— Presentation transcript:

1 Institutionalized Norms versus Patron-Client Ties
Elite Politics Institutionalized Norms versus Patron-Client Ties

2 October 1, 1949 The People’s Republic of China was founded Mao Zedong
Chairman of the state Chairman of the Party Chairman of the Party’s Central Committee Chairman of the Party’s Central Military Commission ...

3 Mao’s Charismatic Rule
``Collective leadership” was discarded after Peng Dehuai’s purge in Lushan Meeting in 1959 Mao’s personal authority reached its peak during the Cultural Revolution

4 Mao’s successor Hua Guofeng
Mao: “With you in charge, I am at ease.” Hua Guofeng was Chairman of the state Chairman of the Party Chairman of the Party’s Central Committee Chairman of the Party’s Central Military Commission Premier of the state

5 Deng Xiaoping Power struggle and policy conflict between Hua and Deng in late 1970s Deng’s pragmatic slogans: ``Practice as the sole criterion of truth” ``Seeking truth from facts” ``Yellow cat, black cat, whichever catches mice is a good cat”

6 Deng’s other cards Standing in the military Seniority in the Party
Since the Long March (1935) Seniority in the Party Joined the Party in 1924 High-level administrative experience CCP General Secretary Party veterans had high opinion in him Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai

7 Toward a “ruling party”
On-and-off reform toward legal-rational authority 1982 State Constitution: “All state organs, armed forces, political parties, social organizations, enterprises must abide by the Constitution and laws” Separation of Party and government under Zhao Ziyang Departure from Maoist revolutionary party

8 Intra-Party Policy conflicts
Reformists versus conservatives Deng Xiaoping and reformists: Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, etc. Chen Yun conservatives Li Peng

9 Party norms in the reform era
``Collective leadership” in the 1950s, before Lushan Meeting Inner-Party policy differences The recognition of the negative consequences of power being concentrated in the hands of one person

10 18th Party Congress (2012) Politburo Standing Committee (7)
Central Committee 205 full members 171 alternates

11 Election versus Black Box
Multi-candidate election for membership of the Central Committee Selection of the most important leadership bodies, namely the Politburo and its Standing Committee, is still through “black-box” manipulation by departing Politburo Standing Committee members powerful retired leaders such as Jiang Zemin

12 Age Limits and Turnover Rates
All full and alternate members of Central Committee who were born in or before 1944 were replaced.

13 Age Limits and Turnover Rates
However, the new Politburo Standing Committee is slightly older on average (63) than the previous one (62). 5 of the 7 members of the Politburo Standing Committee will retire at the 19th Party National Congress in 2017.

14 Regional Representation
Regional representation on the Central Committee of the CCP has become more institutionalized since the 15th Party Congress in 1997 Each provincial-level administration obtains two full membership seats Party secretary Governor (province), mayor (municipality), or chair (autonomous region)

15 Birth Places of Pb Members
Most Politburo members were born in eastern provinces. Jiangsu Shanghai Anhui Shandong

16 Provincial Leader Experience
6 of the 7 members of Politburo Standing Committee have served as provincial party secretaries, governors, or mayors.

17 Politburo Members with Provincial Leader Experience

18 The Rise & Fall of Technocrats
Political elites who received higher education in engineering (or the natural sciences) practiced as engineers (or engaged in scientific research) Technocrats in the Central Committee 2% in 1982 25% in 1987 52 % in 1997

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20 Factions of Politburo Members
Both factions are well represented in the 18th Politburo Former General Secretary Jiang Zemin’s protégés: princelings and Shanghai Gang Former General Secretary Hu Jintao’s protégés: Communist Youth League faction

21 Factional Balance of Power?
The “elitist coalition” (or the Jiang Zemin camp) General Secretary Xi Jinping “princelings” from families of veteran revolutionaries or high-ranking officials The “populist coalition” (or the Hu Jintao camp) Prime Minister Li Keqiang Communist Youth League faction


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