1. GHANA ARMED FORCES APORA PRESENTATION

3. INTRODUCTION

4. INTRODUCTION 1. GAF KEY PLAYERS IN GHANA’S PREPAREDNESS PLAN
2. GAF DEPLOYED IN LIBERIA (UNMIL) AND MALI (MINUSMA) GHANCOY AND GHAV
3. PARTICIPATE IN INTER-MINISTERIAL MEETINGS ON EBOLA PREPAREDNESS
4. ROLE OF MILITARY HEALTH SERVICE IN
SUPPORTING CIVIL COUNTERPARTS

5. AIM To give an overview of the role of the Ghana Armed Forces
in the national disease
outbreak response.

6. SCOPE ROLE OF GAF IN NATIONAL OUTBREAK RESPONSE
GAFMS STRUCTURE FOR OUTBREAK RESPONSE
COUNTRY SPECIFIC OUTBREAK RESPONSE
OBSERVED GAPS AND WAY FORWARD

7. ROLE OF GAF IN NATIONAL OUTBREAK RESPONSE

8. ROLE OF GAF AN INTER-MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE FORMED
INVOLVING DEFENCE, INTERIOR, COMMUNICATIONS, HEALTH AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
HON DEP MIN OF DEFENCE REPRESENTS
MINISTRY AT INTERMINISTERIAL MEETINGS
ROLE OF MOD – DEPLOY ENGINEERING
AND MEDICAL EXPERTISE AROUND GHANA
POSSIBLY PROVIDE AIR TRANSPORT AND
SECURITY, MOVE LOGISTICS AND PERSONNEL
One of the major drawbacks so far in the isolation of the Ebola virus and the search for a cure, has been the inability to identify the reservoir species.
It is evident that this reservoir species has its home somewhere within the rainforest and has only in recent times come into contact with man. This also indicates the possibility that the species is not yet a recorded one.

9. ROLE OF GAF
Operations
DG GHS

10. ROLE OF GAF 1. DEPUTY INCIDENT MANAGER FOR LOGISTICS
AND COORDINATION AT EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTRE IS A MILITARY OFFICER
ENGINEER REGIMENT INVOLVED IN PLANNING AND CONSTRUCTING TREATMENT CENTRES
3. GAF MEDICAL SERVICE – DEPLOY MEDICAL
EXPERTISE TO SUPPORT NATIONAL RESPONSE
One of the major drawbacks so far in the isolation of the Ebola virus and the search for a cure, has been the inability to identify the reservoir species.
It is evident that this reservoir species has its home somewhere within the rainforest and has only in recent times come into contact with man. This also indicates the possibility that the species is not yet a recorded one.

11. GAF PARTNERS
1. NAMRU-3 GHANA DETACHMENT 2. WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION 3. MINISTRY OF HEALTH

12. GAFMS SETUP FOR DISEASE OUTBREAK RESPONSE

13. GAF Medical Facilities
TAMALE 6MRS
SUNYANI 3MRS HO
7MRS
KUMASI 4MRS
ACCRA 37 MIL
TAKORADI 2MRS
TEMA
1MRS

14. 37 MILITARY HOSPITAL

15. ORGANIZATION OF RESPONSE
1. GAF HAS AN EBOLA TASK FORCE TO
CREATE AWARENESS & DIRECT OUTBREAK CONTROL EFFORTS
2. PUBLIC HEALTH DIVISION COORDINATES
SURVEILLANCE AND PREVENTION EFFORTS
3. EACH GARRISON AND UNIT HAS LOCAL
TASK FORCE
One of the major drawbacks so far in the isolation of the Ebola virus and the search for a cure, has been the inability to identify the reservoir species.
It is evident that this reservoir species has its home somewhere within the rainforest and has only in recent times come into contact with man. This also indicates the possibility that the species is not yet a recorded one.

16. PUBLIC HEALTH DIVISION

17. GAF CAPABILITIES
1. ON-THE- SPOT INVESTIGATIONS, HANDLING OF DANGEROUS PATHOGENS AND CASE DETECTION
PATIENT MANAGEMENT, CONTAINMENT
3. PROVISION OF LOGISTICS IN THE FORM OF STAFF AND SUPPLIES
4. RISK COMMUNICATION

18. GAF CAPABILITIES
5. TRANSPORTATION OF ASSETS FOR MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND/ OR PATIENTS IN OUTBREAKS
6. SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
SAFE BURIAL
8. DISEASE SURVEILLANCE OF HUMAN AND ZOONOTIC DISEASES

19. STATE OF PREPAREDNESS
1. A TEMPORARY ISOLATION TENT IN MIL HOSP 2. LOGISTICS FROM MOH, NGOs, WHO 3. TRAINED PERSONNEL PUT ON STANDBY 4. AWARENESS CREATION WITHIN GAF 5. PPEs AND OTHER LOGISTICS POSITIONED IN GARRISONS 6. CONSTANT SURVEILLANCE FOR EVD AND OTHER THREATS

20. TEMPORARY ISOLATION

21. TEMPORARY ISOLATION

22. TEMPORARY ISOLATION

23. RISK COMMUNICATION

24. TRAINING
PERSONNEL OF GAF TRAINED IN THE FIRST NATIONAL TRAINING FOR EBOLA CASE MANAGEMENT
2. EXPERTS FROM WHO AND MOD-GHS CONDUCTED HANDS-ON TRAINING
3. AMETHYST TECHNOLOGIES TRAINED 82 PERSONNEL ON INFECTION CONTROL AND PPE DONNING AND DOFFING
4. SCREENING EXERCISE AND LECTURES
One of the major drawbacks so far in the isolation of the Ebola virus and the search for a cure, has been the inability to identify the reservoir species.
It is evident that this reservoir species has its home somewhere within the rainforest and has only in recent times come into contact with man. This also indicates the possibility that the species is not yet a recorded one.

25. TRAINING SESSIONS

26. TRAINING SESSIONS

27. COUNTRY SPECIFIC OUTBREAK RESPONSE

28. EVD RESPONSE STRUCTURE
Operations
DG GHS

29. CONCEPT AND TOR OF THE EBOLA EOC
MODELED ON SUCCESSFUL NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE AND MODIFIED TO GHANAIAN CONTEXT
TORS:
1. PREVENT AND PROTECT AGAINST INTRODUCTION AND SPREAD OF THE EVD IN GHANA
2. IDENTIFY, ISOLATE AND MANAGE INCIDENT OF EBOLA IN RAPID RESPONSE TIME AND COORDINATE ALL ACTIVITIES REGARDING THE CONTROL OF THE INFECTION

30. CONCEPT AND TOR OF THE EBOLA EOC
3. LIAISE WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS TO MANAGE PUBLIC INFORMATION AND COORDINATED COMMUNITY ACTION
4. IDENTIFY RESOURCES NEEDS AND LIAISE WITH GOVERNMENT AND DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS TO FILL GAPS
5. BRIEF GOVERNMENT OF ON-GOING ACTIVITIES TO CONTROL THE INFECTION.

31. COUNTRY PLAN 1. NATIONAL PANDEMIC RESPONSE PLAN DEVELOPED 2005
REVISED IN 2009
3. PLAN REVISED AND EXERCISED IN 2009 IN ELMINA (USAFRICOM)

32. COUNTRY PLAN 1. GHANA ADHERES TO WHO GUIDELINES A. CASE DEFINITION
B. PATIENT MOVEMENT
C. CLINICAL AND EPIDEMIOLOGICAL PROCEDURES
D. LABORATORY PROCEDURES

33. COUNTRY PLAN
1. DISEASE SURVEILLANCE UNIT COORDINATES OUTBREAK RESPONSE 2. SYSTEM IS BOTH PAPER BASED AND ELECTRONIC 3. CASES REPORTED TO PUBLIC HEALTH AUTHORITIES DAILY, WEEKLY AND MONTHLY PER GUIDELINES 4. GOOD COLLABORATION BETWEEN MILITARY AND NATIONAL SYSTEM

34. OBSERVED GAPS

35. GAPS
1. LACK OF A MULTI-DISCIPLINARY TEAM FOR OUTBREAK RESPONSE (HEALTH, SECURITY, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS)
2. WEAK INDEPENDENT MILITARY DISEASE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM
3. INFECTION PREVENTION AND CONTROL TRAINING AND LOGISTICS SHORTFALLS
4. LACK OF DEFINITE OUTBREAK COMMUNICATION PLAN
5. LACK OF GENERAL PROTOCOLS AND PROCEDURES FOR COODINATING RESPONSE AMONG DISCIPLINES INCLUDING SOCIAL DISTANCING IMPLEMENTATION

36. GAPS
5. INADEQUATE ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH FACILITIES FOR WASTE SEGREGATION, INCINERATION
6. INADEQUATE INFECTION PREVENTION EQUIPMENT SUCH AS AUTOCLAVES IN ALL MILITARY HEALTH FACILITIES.
7. LACK OF A PROPER ISOLATION FACILITY
8. LACK OF LABORATORY CAPACITY FOR PCR, MOLECULAR ASSAYS, SOME SEROLOGICAL ASSAYS, TISSUE CULTURE
MORE STAFF TRAINING FOR RISK COMMUNICATIONS
10. NEED FOR TOPIC-SPECIFIC AND MILITARY HEALTH PROMOTION MATERIALS.

37. CONCLUSION

38. THANK YOU