Agenda Part 4 Part 4 New POI How to look at the POI The Program

Agenda Part 4 Part 4 New POI How to look at the POI The Program
Education Training Evaluating Conclusion Bottom line: ”We pay now, or the nation pays later.” Some might say that Mark Shields is not fair in comparing Iraq to WWII, which was an all out war. Well, consider a comparison of our adventure in Iraq to Vietnam, which was also a "limited" war. During Vietnam, the defense budget reached a peak of $439 billion (in inflation-adjusted FY 2005 dollars). This budget supported about 550,000 troops in Vietnam, but it also kept hundreds of thousands of other troops forward deployed in Europe, Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Okinawa, and Guam; it funded a rotation in base in US to support these forward deployments, and funded hundreds of nuclear warheads on alert in missile silos, submarines at sea, and airplanes in the air. Now compare this commitment to that of Iraq: To support the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States will have a larger budget than at the peak Vietnam year, even if one removes the effects of inflation. The FY 2005 budget will reach between $480 and $500 billion (in comparable FY 2005 dollars), once you factor in the $80-$100 billion supplemental now in preparation, yet our military is only about one-third the size of that fielded during Vietnam. Weapons are projected to age even faster than during the Clinton Administration as the Bush Administration contemplates more cutbacks in future production (e.g., Joint Strike Fighter). Army forces are clearly overstretched by a deployment of only 150,000 troops deployed to Iraq and about 15,000 deployed to Afghanistan, as evidenced by the coercive personnel retention policies, like "stop-loss." Militarily, America's forces are stretched too thin in Iraq, where they are showing signs of getting bogged down in a self-protection mode much like the Turks did in the Middle East during WWI. Mark Shields “Our Best Equipped Army? Baloney!”, Washington Post , (December 18, 2004); Page A27 Sen. Robert C. Byrd (D - WV), “High Price for a Hollow Victory”, November 4, 2003 discussions with Mr. Franklin Spinney, December 2004. “If the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the unforeseen [in war], two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead.” Carl von Clausewitz On War © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

How to Look at POI Defining the end state
Future LTs must be adaptive and have intuition: Commanding units that operate dispersed, but cannot rely on technology Leading more powerful units at all levels! Influence decisions at all levels of war Transition from complex unit fighting to humanitarian tasks demanding different skills, based on decision making skills => Both are Key to Success Bottom line: Rapid decision-making cannot solely be taught in blocks of instructions Having Army leaders that are adaptive and have intuition is not sufficient to win wars, campaigns, or battles. Like other cognitive qualities, both are beneficial only when accompanied by two other characteristics: effectiveness and feasibility. Having the ability to and change things rapidly is not very helpful if those decisions lead to defeat. So adaptability and intuition—these create agility in the ability to make rapid decisions—have to be tempered by the fact that the new action must not only be helpful but will not cause greater difficulties than would have resulted if no changes were made. Similarly, rapid decisions are not a good idea if the other elements of the enterprise cannot do what is wanted. Both have to be limited by what is possible in terms of time, space, resources, and human potential. Many people are not predisposed to be adaptive and have intuition. They like to be comfortable prescribing to set patterns and stay with activities that are familiar. The Army personnel system molds most Soldiers into a set of behaviors that prescribe to a set way of doing things through how we manage career timelines, how we award and promote. We have a culture that unknowingly and unintentionally teaches bureaucratic behavior. It would be good if we could only have personnel that naturally make rapid decisions (we know it as common sense), but there may be too few of them to fill the force structure, and in any case we don’t know very well how to identify these people ahead of time. So what we have to do is to teach people how to make rapid and sound decisions in their responses to sudden changes in the situation. We have to teach not only people as individuals to be agile but groups of people. This is not going be easy. COL John Brinkerhoff, U.S. Army ret., “Training for Agility,” unpublished paper (Dec 2004) discussions with COL Brinkerhoff and Mr. John Tillson “The US military must overcome the way it has trained and educated leaders. Defense officials are moving ahead to overcome Cold-War era training to create a new generation of leaders who aren't constrained by what the doctrine says.” General Richard B. Myers, CJCS September 2004 © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

How to Look at POI Defining the end state “Adaptability”
What is Adaptability? Adaptability refers to the process of adjusting practices, processes, and systems to projected or actual changes of environment, e.g., the climate or the enemy. Adaptability includes the creation of innovative combined arms organizations, doctrine, systems, and training concepts as demanded by the environment, allies, and the enemy. Adaptive solutions to complex problems in chaotic, unpredictable situations are based more on intuition than on analysis, deliberate planning, and doctrine. Bottom line: “Fingerspitzengefühl” Today cadets are taught Analytical decision-making, which involves collecting and analyzing information to generate, compare, and select an optimal course of action. This method is largely based on a logical analysis of a situation. As shown in part 1, this is the Army’s Military Decision-making Process. Such analytical processes are extremely effective if given accurate information, a clearly defined goal, and a capable decision-maker. Most cadet training with decision making is on the analytical approach. In contrast, we also create Adaptability. It is defined as the process by which individuals and groups decide rapidly, almost instinctively, to changes in their situations. Adaptability and agility are closely related. Both lead to changes in missions, plans, procedures, and outcomes, but adaptability is not constrained by a time dimension. Individuals, groups, and institutions can and most often do adapt slowly to changes. Agility, on the other hand, implies a rapid adaptation to changes in the situation. It is this need for rapid, almost instantaneous changes that govern military operations. Adaptability is a cognitive quality. It cannot be assured by technology alone. Modern technology increases the tempo of war, but it does not assure Adaptability. Adaptability has little to do with weapons, munitions, vehicles, platforms, or the things upon which war ministries have labored so long and lovingly. Adaptability has to be the product of people who can face the unexpected with calm resolve while finding ways to turn the tables. Brad Bergstrand, “Situating the Estimate: Naturalistic Decision-making as an Alternative to Analytical Decision-making in the Canadian Forces,” online at <wps.cfc.dnd.ca/irc/nh/nh9798/0021.html>, 11 October 2004. discussions with Mr. John Tillson, COL John Binkerhoff, Dr. Stephen Stewart “Sun Tzu’s theory of adaptability to existing situations is an important aspect of his self thought. Just as water adapts itself to the conformation of the ground, so in war one must be flexible; he must adapt his tactics to the enemy situation.” John Poole, The Last Hundred Yards © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

How to Look at POI Defining the end state “Intuition”
From “Learning To Adapt To Asymmetric Threats” The Institute of Defense Analysis (Nov 2004) What is Intuition? Intuition is the way we translate experience into action Training and education can provide experience that builds intuition Intuition enables rapid decision making without conscious awareness or effort Intuition enhances decisions at all levels Three elements of intuition training: Identify decision requirements of the job Practice decision making in context Review and obtain feedback on decision making experiences Bottom line: “Coup d’oeil” History and Army doctrine says that intuition is a critical skill for future strategic leaders. Carl Von Clausewitz in On War uses the term “coup d’oeil” to describe intuition, calling it a high level of situational awareness that the mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study and reflection. Clausewitz also termed this ability “genius,” with “appropriate intellect and temperament.” Sun Tzu uses similar descriptions, and Army Field Manual (FM) tells leaders to understand this principle in order to have success in command. Psychologist Carl Jung called intuition one of the four basic psychological functions: “(the) function that explores the unknown, and senses possibilities and implication which may not be readily apparent.” The Army, in pursuit of transformation, need to develop and reward intuition. Intellectuals from a variety of other professions highlight it as valuable and important. Intuition is a building block for a number of critical traits. Daniel Goleman record that these traits range from self-awareness to social and relationship management. John Maxwell writes in his book, The 21 Irrefutable Laws of Leadership , that intuition is the result of a combination of natural ability, learned skills, and broad experience. Leaders with intuition become readers of certain “intangibles”, recognized as critical to battlefield success. To build intuition cadets, they will be exposed to situational awareness, trend analysis, systems thinking, and consensus building. Cadets will also be introduced to socially-oriented techniques, like developing shared vision, to ensure that culture and values prevail amongst the organizations members. In the end, this establishes a foundation in toward building strategic leaders. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976) Department of the Army, Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do, Field Manual (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 31 August 1999) Daniel Goleman, “Emotional Intelligence: Issues in Paradigm Building,” 30 June 2003; available from < Internet; accessed 29 Nov 04. Gary Klein, Sources of Power, the MIT Press, February 1999. “Defining intuition: As Army officers, we are primarily decision makers. Our weapon is the unit we command. We decide on a course of action and then clearly communicate that decision to our unit. Our Soldiers translate that decision into action.” ”Combat Squad Leader’s Course,” Syllabus for MLSC 113, Georgetown University ROTC (Spring 2005) © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

How to Look at POI Principles in Education
Theme: Develop adaptability and intuition Take people out of their comfort zones Training with stress “Experience the thing before you try to give it a name” teaching approach Knowledge and abilities to be learned Mental processes to be developed Experience Real or virtual in the broad spectrum of missions associated with asymmetric war Exposure to problem solving processes Bottom line: Education sets the conditions, understanding adaptability and agility In the past, the Army relegated leader training, which was often not professionally challenging to all involved, to second place to other events. We cannot confuse adaptability with agility. According to the Center of Army Leadership, an adaptive leader is "A leader who can influence people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating in a complex, dynamic environment of uncertainty and ambiguity to accomplish the mission and improving the organization.” Agility is defined as quickness, adaptability, and ease of movement. a core competency, being the ability to change and cope with massive uncertainties. Change competency is measured in terms of five performance metrics - time, cost, scope, stability and frequency. What better description is there for junior officers operating in today’s 4GW environment? Like skilled athletes, leaders will be called upon to adapt to changing conditions quickly and smoothly. Agility has also been described as “operating inside the opponent’s OODA loop.” We have to teach cadre and MS IVs the Hegelian Dialectic in which two opposite views can be synthesized into a superior response. In order to organize the energy of a conglomerate group into purposeful action, it is necessary to provide some “principles in education.” Otherwise each individual or subgroup will do different things. This may or may not be good in general, but when the focus of activity is on “making-mission,” it is bad. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, states, "Agile commanders, both mentally and physically, quickly comprehend unfamiliar situations, creatively apply doctrine, and make timely decisions.“ Some thoughts when educating and training cadets: “Empowerment. Junior leaders must be empowered to plan and execute more training events on their own.” “The Army requires junior leaders to accept significant increases in responsibility, with combined arms forces migrating to the lowest levels of the organization.” Author note: I am indebted to COL John Brinkerhoff for his insights and unpublished paper “Training Agility” Also, to Mr. John Tillson of the Institute of Defense Analyses (IDA) on trying to define the difference between agility and adaptability. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 14 June 2001). From “Learning To Adapt To Asymmetric Threats” The Institute of Defense Analysis (Nov 2004) “Finally, ‘Duty, Honor and Country’. Those intangible things must still be taught but over the length of the 4 years.” Major Darryl M. Perry Morgan State University, Nov 2004 © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

How to Look at POI Principles in Education (EPIC)
Encourage Self-awareness Elements: Self-awareness; character; self-leadership “Self-aware and adaptive leaders are the basis for success in full spectrum operations. The greater self-awareness gained by assessment against measurable standards, the more adaptive the leader” (ATLDP, 2004) Promote Critical and Creative thinking Elements: Critical thinking/creativity & innovation; risk-taking “Critical thinking skills are becoming especially important now as our world is changing at an ever-accelerating rate … Critical thinking skills are needed to adapt to a changing environment …” (ARI) Insist on Courageous Communication Elements: relationship management; effective listening Create an environment for continuous learning Elements: The learning organization; Owner/Coach mentoring; Effective Feedback (360 degree—”safe “two-way” feedback) Bottom line: Introduce the use of 360 degree assessments 360-degree feedback occurs throughout a cadet’s evolution in order to provide a continuous feedback loop for optimal self-awareness and leader development. The feedback consists of subordinates (lower cadet classes), peers, and superiors (two-way assessments of and by seniors and cadre). Cadre will not be able to include 360-degree feedback comments into cadet evaluation reports. By adding these tools to Cadet Command’s leader development system, the Army will ensure a successful transformation of leaders for the Future Force. Future Leaders of the Army must be adaptive and self-aware. Self-awareness is a foundational element of successful leadership. 360-degree feedback provide the cadet with increased self awareness, which provides significant potential for growth and development. This is how we have implemented them into the current system to achieve results. Implementing 360-degree feedback takes a lot of work. We use it as a leader development tool using trends, and comments to assist the cadet to self develop. Under our program, each cadet receives 360-degree feedback at the end of the Fall and Spring semester (for those with quarters, the same can apply). I believe feedback received by fellow cadets, by all class levels, is equally valuable in identifying leader strengths and weaknesses. There are many ways to implement, we do it with fellow classmates in the same platoon rating each other using leader dimensions, then they rate a few cadets of the classes above and/or below. They are also allowed to evaluate their MS instructor. The purpose here is to build trust in the organization. The work begins with the instructor having to do “roll ups” and to look for trends in evaluations, write them on a counseling form, and give feedback to each cadet (without disclosing the names of the ratees). The intent of the program – is that cadre are armed with an additional tool, one of many in the evaluation tool kit, to enhance self-awareness and leader development. Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., Military Leadership into the 21st Century: Another “Bridge Too Far?”, Parameters, Spring 1998; available from Army.mil/usawc/parameters/98spring/ulmer.htm ; Internet; accessed 21 November (also based on and interviews with General Ulmer). From “Learning To Adapt To Asymmetric Threats” The Institute of Defense Analysis (Nov 2004) © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

How to Look at POI Principles in Education
Learning adaptability requires Education in how to think Multiple training events with widely varying and frequently shifting tasks and conditions Recognition of the need to change Encourage experimentation with doctrine, task organization, etc. Focus feedback on adaptability, innovation and outcomes rather than on performance to standard Training environment that acknowledges failure as a possibility Adaptability Is a cognitive skill, e.g., intuition Must be inculcated across Cadet Command in all aspects of training Requires trust and cohesion – human interpersonal dynamics trump technical solutions Requires a climate that accepts and rewards adaptable and creative individuals Bottom line: Challenge! Move from a bureaucratic to a trust-based culture Cadre must consciously work to develop adaptive leaders. However, cadre currently have an opportunity to help develop adaptive leaders and adaptive thinking through imaginative use current resources. Adaptiveness requires leader versatility. Unfortunately, ROTC battalions often do not spend time developing versatility. Rather, cadre often intentionally narrow their training focus. The drive toward task training and task masterly—perhaps overspecialization—is strong, particularly when so many of cadre are trainers, not educators, and come from units where snapshots are developed on task proficiency. The Army does a great job of developing leaders within these particular niches—so much so that leaders often see themselves as specialists rather than gaining the breadth required of a professional. Often junior officers perceive themselves as becoming specialists based on their degree backgrounds and their own desires (perceived strengths that were only enhanced by their ROTC unit in order to retain them). Yet, we must develop leaders who are familiar with the broad range of skills expected in a 4GW environment. Education in classrooms, and training in Labs and FTXs do not need to be resource-intensive exercises. One technique that is used successfully in the Initial Brigade Combat Team at Fort Lewis is to have a series of seminars and discussion periods based around vignettes that challenge the leader's ability to develop adaptive thinking. The vignettes are not focused on one rank or level of command. Rather, they are geared to simultaneously engage multiple levels of command. Mentorship and coaching play a key role in developing adaptive thinking. In developing adaptive leaders, mentor involvement must go beyond conducting after-action reviews and evaluating post-event performance. To maximize effectiveness, mentors must not only provide information and traditional feedback but also take on the role of coach and even fellow learner. This role is enhanced by the use of techniques such as “scaffolding” to introduce new concepts. Scaffolding is the selective and incremental insertion of information at critical times during the problem-solving process. The effect is a continuum of feedback during the training event that leads the audience in working through the dilemmas encountered. From “Learning To Adapt To Asymmetric Threats” The Institute of Defense Analysis (Nov 2004) © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

How to Look at POI Development-Education vs. Training
Resources In sum: Educate early, task-train as necessary to enhance decision making, as cognitive skills established plug in task training Education: “How to think” Task Training Bottom line: Hard to acquire cognitive skills are easier done on campus and early The above simplified graph demonstrates that the current operating environment of Cadet Command provides an opportunity to take advantage of the learning environment of college campuses, while “massing” more expensive tangibles to train tasks at Army bases. Educating a future officer in “how to think” takes longer and is intellectually far more expensive than industrially-based task-training, while training tasks requires resources like weapons, ranges, equipment and special facilities that must be done at established locations requiring centralization. The good news, is that task training can be done anytime in an officer’s development. Behavior changes are not lasting if we fail to strike at their antecedents. Until relatively recently, these causes were not well understood, so there was little the Army or Cadet Command could do to influence the way they developed cadets in meaningful ways. This can began to change based on research done since about Today, Cadet Command must start thinking in Quantum, rather than Newtonian terms That is to say, we have to account for the fact that the actions we take at the earliest points in a career and thereafter, in a sequential and progressive fashion, manifest themselves much later. Author note: These thoughts are based on my collective notes taken during Army ROTC Curriculum Review Board 4-7 January 2005. Complexity Task Training Baseline Cognitive Skills education © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

How to Look at POI Development A Better BLOC
Task Training Baseline Cognitive Skills education Academic Rigor begins here First tough cut comes here First unit Ft Benning Ft Bliss Ft Knox Ft Sill SC MI QM OD FI AG TC MS FA AV AD IN AR EN MP CM Functional Training (ABN/Ranger, Scout Leader) Begins with tough screening Rite of Passage These may be offered earlier Bottom line: Developing adaptability and intuition provides the foundation In both educational and unit training contexts, a mountain of evidence from both how the U.S. Army, but also the German and Israeli armies, tells us that to create a “Culture of Innovation in the United States Army,” that is, to create “adaptive leaders,” we must start in the with our cadet curriculum as early and as intensely as possible, in accordance with current Army plans, and take a different focus on what it is we think we are developing. As I laid out in my introduction, the best plans will not produce the effects intended, unless at least two things and all that they portend happen. First, we must adopt a view of what we are growing, as we suggest below; second, we must develop metrics, and measure our progress systemically across time, integrating the behavioral measures we now have. To begin doing this, I will outline a model of perception, learning, and development constructed on the basis of the best available historical and theoretical evidence I could find over the last few years. I will explain and describe what works as the foundation of guidelines that should be used to develop a curriculum to create adaptive leaders. This focuses us squarely on what and suggests how the leader development process might work better. Of course this must align and evolve with other changes Fastabend, D. A., & Dimpson, R. H) “The Imperative for a Culture of Innovation in the United States Army,” Army Campaign Plan (2003) at Donald E. Vandergriff, “The Revolution in Human Affairs,” unpublished briefing (October 200), available at Based on five years of research on examining how the U.S. Army and other armies create leaders to practice the theories of Maneuver Warfare, which calls for initiative and adaptability. discussion with Dr. Stephen Stewart and discussion with Dr. Stewart on 13 January 2005 BLOC I BLOC II BLOC III “Culturalize” Brings together those who passed through the “gate of commissioning,” creating bonds Establishes the foundation in cognitive skills “how to think” sets the foundation Specialized training, and administrative tasks © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

How to Look at POI Development-Lots of Tools
STX (LDX, LTX-Free play, force on force) Vignettes Mentors/Coaches “What if? What then?” Combat Land Navigation Distributed Learning Standards 360 degree evaluations (for Everyone, Even Cadre) Ownership of Program by Cadets Positions of Responsibility mirror the Army’s Complex learning scenarios Grey area situations Volatility, ambiguity, uncertainty Non-Combat Problems Tactical Decision Games (TDGs) Innovative Physical Training OEF/OIF LL Scenarios ARI/SCP “Best Practices” Internet War Games TEWT Staff Rides (virtual?) Reading lists Timed Essay Exams Competitions like improved Ranger Challenge Leadership Development Program Bottom line: Are we using all the tools and resources to prepare our cadets? First, what should the School of Cadet Command be? It should not teach administrative minutia if the command would make those areas that deal with administration “user-friendly.” Well, it should consist of mobile education teams that travel to programs, and demonstrate to cadre how to educate cadets on “how to think.” At present POI is technology-poor. In the future, and if the private sector is encouraged, it could have powerful technologies which could create different virtual realities and use resident POI as the crucible for learning experiences that may not be duplicated in or provided to the field. For example, we might want a cadet to experience operating in a known environment such as Iraq or Afghanistan. But we may also want to create a less certain or future environment. POI is discontinuous and episodic. Resident and non-resident programs in the future may find future officers engaged in a deliberate life-long learning process. Whereas today many civilians at institutions with ROTC programs may have tenure, tomorrow they may be contract employees, visiting scholars, and former warriors. Today, curricula are built around Clausewitz and the great captains focused on the Industrial-Age. Tomorrow, curricula may provide stressful experiences in virtually real leadership situations and use joint doctrine and combined arms in coalition war games, along with instruction on ethics and area studies. Envisioning, creating, and teaching such curricula requires competent educators. M. St. John, J. Callan, and S. Proctor, “Tactical Decision making under Uncertainty: Experiments I and II,” Technical Report 1821, April 2000, Pacific Science and Engineering Group, Inc., SSC San Diego, California. Compare their findings with those of Bergstrand and with Dahl’s thesis, “Command Dysfunction: Minding the Cognitive War,” (School of Advanced Air Power Studies, Air University, 1996), online at < 13 October 2004. © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

The Program The Future Program New Name
What do people think when they hear “ROTC?”: “Extracurricular activity,” “A club”? “Drill and ceremony?” “Lieutenant lost with map? can’t spell lost without LT” “It’s a dead end assignment!” Increased demands for professionalism warrant a new name, OEP: Officer Education Program Bottom line: Words carry so much in the minds of the novice. Cadet Command’s customers are the Army, the citizens of the nation, and Soldiers. I am still amazed, as I sit here and type these words, as I plow through piles of notes, of peoples’ perceptions of what ROTC means, and of the Army culture’s perception of duty in Cadet Command. James Kitfield has referred to a "nearly unbridgeable cultural divide" between American society in general and the US military. Some of this seeming social irrelevance of the military may flow from popular entertainment which many times do more harm than good in the image they paint. Public demand for novels and movies that examine the contemporary military seems slight. The last large crop of serious works in this vein came in the wake of the Vietnam War. Subsequent American military involvements overseas were much shorter and more successful, and, whatever their ambiguities, did not lead to the kind of soul-searching that might inspire great novels and films, or to a rising public appetite for accurate portrayals of the junior officer or ROTC. Unfortunately, recent popular films which have focused on military affairs have not been historically accurate (either in the past or in the future) and as such portray junior officers and ROTC in a less than favorable way. I reviewed over 30 films that talk about ROTC, such as Saving Private Ryan, The Thin Red Line, Soldier, Heartbreak Ridge, See Wore a Yellow Ribbon, Platoon and Starship Troopers. These films on the military here and now emphasize social imperatives and the very forces which marginalize the military function at the expense of social interests. Other films suggest that the Army is out of touch with social values, as in Courage Under Fire and G.I. Jane. In time, it will be possible to better gauge the importance of such recent films as Three Kings and Rules of Engagement. The Army and Cadet Command have to sell the new professional programs with what people think when they see the new title—renewed professionalism. This will also assist in recruiting and retention. James Kitfield, "Standing Apart," National Journal, 13 June 1998 Howard Harper, "Reaching and Reflecting Audiences in Fiction and Film: The Situation Now ( )," unpublished paper prepared for Triangle 1999 © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

The Program Keystone the right people
More of a personnel investment Rotate successful commanders at company and battalion into PMS and APMS jobs PMS job becomes second battalion command (to consolidated programs), i.e., like training battalion Identifier for those who instruct, can return PMS as combat arms only As educators and trainers Establish a new career track as educator Give those who teach a masters degree in leadership School of Cadet Command focus on “how to teach” Non-deployable combat veterans as cadre NCO schools teach more NCO/officer relationships, and mentorship Bottom line: The investment is with good leaders who know how to teach Cadet Command must be staffed with the “best and brightest” to ensure the highest caliber of intellectual power, energy, and vigor is applied to educational and training evolution. Furthermore, these individuals should primarily be military professionals with an understanding of operations and also with the ability to teach. Successful transformation requires critical thinkers demonstrating exceptional “agility of the mind.” At present, it remains highly questionable whether the Army is willing to change the paradigm and staff Cadet Command with the proper intellectual capital. Are the contemporary intellectual peers of Robert E. Lee ( ), George C. Marshall, Lawton Collins, and Emory Upton in residence at University of Tennessee or on the staff of TRADOC or Cadet Command working leader development issues? They are not, because the system resists assigning them to duties presently considered “non-career enhancing.” Additionally, a concerted effort is required to identify and employ young officers of exceptional intellectual talent as demonstrated by the personnel selections of Upton and Collins. Intellectual renewal and avoidance of orthodoxy are only possible when the system empowers young critical thinkers such as William Sherman, Emory Upton and William Carter to temper the experience of conventional thinking officers and academics on campuses and press the envelope of convention. Again, in the absence of our best intellectual capital (of all ranks), transformation of how we access our officers will prove chimerical. Richard Hofstadter, Anti-intellectualism in American Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963) Lloyd J. Matthews, “The Uniformed Intellectual and His Place in American Arms, Part II,” Army Magazine, August 2002, 40. Leonard D. Holder, Jr., and Williamson Murray, “Prospects for Military Education,” Joint Forces Quarterly, (Washington, D.C., National Defense University, Spring 1998) © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

The Program Keystone the right people
More of a personnel investment Expand the Army’s stabilization program where Divisions (or Brigades) throughout the nation sponsor programs Enables personnel to rotate from units to programs and back Will further to enhance stabilization of families Example, 82nd Airborne Division sponsors schools in NC, SC and VA Units will have a more vested interest in quality of lieutenants Can host cadets to unit visits/participate in training Bottom line: Experience allows the best teachers to continually “tweak” POI The popular statement can teach the wrong lessons as much as well-balanced experience can reinforce success. Enhancing the strength of each cadre and how they impact the larger organization—the Army—is the core to “effects-based” approach to career management. Instead of the focus on short-term measures on how officers and NCOs have served the organization to accomplish short-term objectives they are currently serving in, a new measure of educational and experienced-based learning success needs to be emplaced. Seniority, rank, and position are out-dated measures of success and undermine effectiveness. What does that individual bring? New ideas on old negative notions of officer and NCOs “homesteading” can be resolved through the new Stabilization program and unit ownership of ROTC programs. Longer tours at a particular station or post could add the degree of officer stability needed from which short-and-near term “with assignment at . . .” opportunities can blossom. The Army has been considering ways of stabilizing the force for efficiency and quality of life reasons. Stabilization can also be a ways towards increasing the experienced-based learning of officers in holistic war policy. A more ambitious approach could be the selection of cadre by name, or identifying them as “teachers” with a skill identifier. Innovation in pre-commissioning education can only progress as far as the assignments process will allow. Fixing the latter is a prerequisite to fixing the rest. James M. Smith et al., Educating International Security Practitioners: Preparing To Face the Demands of the 21st Century International Security Environment (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001) The author is indebted to Dr. Williamson Murray and Dr. Richard Kohn for their insights. “Outside command, officers sought instructor assignments as the only valuable place to be if they could not lead soldiers.” Bruce Gudmundsson Stormtroop Tactics (1989) © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

The Program The Future Program Recruits and Retains
Good programs sustain themselves: Cadets will sell “their” program Conduct a strengths, weakness, opportunity and threat (SWOT) analysis every six months An analysis into “their” strategic value target (SVT) based on the SAL. Conduct a positioning analysis Determine the points of differentiation Reasons to believe those points will impact a programs success Marketing campaigns centered around the individual school, not a canned CC campaign Incentivize a program for success. Instill an entrepreneurial spirit within a battalion Stop using Neo-Taylorism language in speaking about people Bottom line: What are “Gen-Y” saying? What do they expect? The global research firm RoperASW asked them how they felt about their education and what they look for in leadership. They have seen trust rise to the top of the student and employee priority list. Supplement studies of Randstad (a temporary services company) last fall found a further shift in the trust paradigm. Not if the teacher or boss is capable, but students and employees in droves now wonder if the teacher or boss is honest. Harvard Business Review points out further evidence that “Gen-Y” expects trust and they want to be challenged. Skepticism puts a damper on innovation. Trust is even more critical in the future Army because of the strong tie trust has to innovation. The Army will depend on innovation for its future. But research shows that if employee’s don’t trust, they don’t innovate. Another reality of the times is that “Gen-Y” closely associate loyalty with honesty. Mistrust is pervasive, and it impacts the Army. Today’s cadets and potential cadets see it in sports, the corporate world and in government . They see it coming out of the current war, who is telling the truth about what? In the Army, they see double standards from the magnified pressure to attain immediate results is a holdover from the obsession with mission. My studies of effective armies and units has shown that those who balance competitive zeal with a passion for trust and reputation are those that win. What those armies and units understand is that the train must move on two tracks – competition and collaboration. Innovation is tied to collaboration. And collaboration is tied to trust. You can’t achieve that by taking moral shortcuts. Without trust, the train is going to derail. I am indebted to Major Marty Klein for spending hours with me teaching me about marketing. Major Klein is a former marketing executive with Kraft Foods. He resigned from Kraft Foods and rejoined the Army after 9/11 September taking a considerable pay-cut. “Build it and they will come” The Field of Dreams © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

The Program Future Program Recruiting and Scholarships
Theme of marketing: Sell the army on its true merits Standards and academic rigor will sell over time (patience) Scholarships are a thing of the past MS I (freshman) does not get benefits, transitions into the program Beginning their MS II (upon contract), A low interest loan to pay for their entire education (including room and board; minus stipend) Army loan is paid and forgiven upon commissioning (including freshman year, exception is disenrollment or medical reasons) Bottom line: Competition for talent is going to get tougher The demand for innovation is not going away, particularly in the nation’s knowledge economy. Innovation will fuel an ever-increasing demand for workers with the right skills to make innovation pay off. It means that long-term, the job market is expected to be strong. Fact is, when the demand for services accelerates, we’re going to be facing a sustained labor shortage, due in large part to a seismic demographic shift on the horizon Some 76 million baby-boomers – the largest generation in the workforce today – are gearing down for retirement. Their departure is expected to drive down the unemployment rate to a new 30-year low of 3.9 percent … or lower. The Department of Labor projects that by 2010, there will be 10 million more jobs than there will be workers to fill them. And that’s factoring in the nearly 7 in 10 “Mature” workers who, according to studies by the AARP and USA Today, CNN and Gallup plan to stay in the workforce and at least work part-time past traditional retirement age. By 2030, the American workplace may be 35 million short of the 57 million new employees it will need to maintain current annual growth in per capita Gross Domestic Product. Many who remain in the workforce will lack the basic, as well as specialized skills, to perform digital-era work. 70 percent of the fastest growing jobs will require more than a high school education, and 60 percent of jobs will require skills that only 20 percent of workers currently have. So not only will there be a labor shortage, but there will be a skills shortage as well. The Army will be an all out war for talent. Charles Goldman, et.al, “Allocating Scholarships for Army ROTC,” RAND, (Washington, D.C., 1999) Astin, Alexander W., et al., The American Freshman: Thirty Year Trends, Cooperative Institutional Research Program, (University of California, Los Angeles, 1997) “Problem: Officers entering [active duty] (OCS/ROTC non-scholarship) often have debt associated with educational costs without access to debt repayment plan such as exists for enlisted personnel.” “State of Command” Brief (Fall 2002) U.S. Army Cadet Command © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

The Program Future Program Recruiting and Scholarships
Green to Gold receives loan under same conditions as stated Other incentives: Cadet completes each year given an increased bonus 1k for MSI, 2k for MS II and 3k for MS III Like USMA graduates, new officers get a low interest loan Cadets get bonuses for completing hard to find Foreign language skills such as Chinese or Arabic Skills that lean toward specialties in need Completion of a graduate degree Bottom line: We have to “think out of the box” to get and retain future’s leaders Surveys show a swing in how today’s and future cadets feel about the careers. First, job-hopping is out and staying put is in. Now is the time for the Army to build relationships and loyalty with their cadets. The U.S. is headed for a sustained labor and skills shortage. And potential cadets and cadets (as well as junior officers) will inevitably have choices when it comes to changing careers. Building strong relationships with talented cadets and our officers now is the Army’s smartest move for the future. Second, if the Army wants to truly connect their future leaders to their duties and to the Army, listen to what they say is really important to them – what makes them feel truly valued and successful – like trust. Convey trust in explicit and implicit ways. Cadets today want open, honest and complete information. Demonstrate trust by communicating with cadre and cadets fully and candidly about how they are doing and how their unit is doing. And don’t just tell them; show them that they are valued as current and future professionals, trusted to get the mission done. Micro managing and second-guessing say just the opposite. Third, one of the main findings in my research was that potential cadets, cadets, and cadre want the Army to understand that personal lives are important. The Army is always looking for ways to incorporate family as a value—but it is one thing to say it, we must do it—and the future leadership will reward the Army for it. “Walk the talk” by finding innovative ways to bring flexibility into the Army’s culture, which still relies on adherence to an Industrial-age work-to-time mentality instead of using trust tactics, “when you have your mission done, check in.” Cadets who view that cadre, and officers have some flexibility – who feel they have some control in their lives – will be more satisfied with their duties, more effective and more likely to stick around. “…the October 2004 survey at Northwestern specifically asked how many of the students would consider serving as a prison guard in places like Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo. In return, they would have their student loans forgiven and be given G.I. Bill benefits for graduate school. A remarkable 11 percent that this would be a ‘very likely’ option and another 18 percent would ‘seriously consider’ such an option.” Dr. Charlie Moskos “The Citizen Soldier: The Ideal and Reserve Culture” (October 2004) © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

The Program The Degree in Decisive Leadership
Commissioning BA Decisive Leadership Army loan forgiven LDAC Evaluation Attends Army schools Or cultural experience MS IV Foreign language MS III MS II Bottom line: It is time to devote an undergraduate degree to Decisive Leadership Perhaps at no other time in modern history has more been asked of our junior officers. The professional officer education system needs to accurately and effectively reflect and affect the prevailing epoch of warfare. There are indications (empirical and anecdotal) that the current U.S. Army cadet education system is antiquated; more an example of the past (2nd Generation Warfare) strategic times than the present and future (4GW) strategic environment. The modern officer accessions approach, a derivative of the 2nd Generation Warfare, is typified by separate approaches: as a student earning a college degree, while as a cadet, they receive a military education and training focused on process, task-training, and accessed with a leadership evaluation system reminiscent of industrial-age concepts derived from Frederick Taylor, the early 20th-century father of “scientific management.” But the education of future leaders is not an endeavor suited to an “assembly-line approach.” The 2005 complex strategic environment calls for a synthesis of Cadet Command into a “Learning Organization.” To meet this educational end, the current educational ways and means must be assessed, evaluated. Weak spots and points of failure must be identified – all on behalf of retooling the system in ways that facilitate the development of officers that are adaptive and have intuition. In order for the profession of arms to regain the sense of purpose it once had when it was focused on fighting the Second Generation, it must move away from outdated orthodoxies and reflect a more nuanced picture of the world in all its complexity, blurring integration, lurking danger and technological revolution. History, Cultural, and Leader requirements MS I Open to any person admitted to school and passes DOPMER Contracts at end Of first year, begins Army loan Prior service/ Green-to-Gold © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

The Program The Future Program Summary
Course Semester 1 Semester 2 Summer Training MS I Soldier First MS I, Science, Writing, Communications, Foreign Language MS I, History, Literature, Foreign Language; Contract Army Schools Or, cultural studies MS II Squad Ldr MS II, Ldr theory, History, culture MS II, Grp Dynamics, History, Foreign Language MS III Innovative MS III, Sociology, Cultural studies, Foreign studies MS III, Cultural studies, mil-history, Foreign Language LEC Army schools MS IV Transition MS IV, Security studies, mil-history, Foreign Language MS IV, Strategic studies, mil-history, Foreign Language 2LT TAC at LEC or Goldbar Other Reqs. Orientation Course, FTXs, Labs, PT, BDE FTX, Counseling FTXs, Labs, PT, BDE FTX, Counseling Bottom line: Establishing a foundation in decision making ability Decisive Leadership will depart significantly, but not completely, from management-heavy and business traditions in most civilian leadership core programs in order to (in hopes of) better accommodating the peculiar needs of warfare and nation-based politics of the twenty-first century. The core of the course will be educating the cadet in cognitive skills and building their confidence in leadership (decision making). Stronger emphasis is given throughout a cadet’s four-year experience, in this newly proposed curriculum, to issues of comparative politics, culture-based studies, info-tech studies, history, and international relations. The cadet will also have to become proficient in a foreign language. If it is a hard and critical language like Arabic, the cadet will qualify for incentive pay as he or she passes courses. Of particular note, the new approach recognizes the importance of cognitive skills as a foundation of success for future Army officers no matter what their later branch. During the summers between the MS I and MS II, and MS II and MS III years, the cadet will be expected to attend either Army schools or conduct their cultural studies where they will live within another culture for two-three months. ‘Integrative Experience’ the curriculum change currently under consideration cordons off time, space and resources within the four-year program dedicated to teaching the cadets how to “integrate” all that they have learned and experienced together. This ability to think and adapt serves as the bedrock upon which the learning experience of the officers will be built, inculcating every stage of an officer’s broad education experience. © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

The Program BA in Leadership
A better education for all cadets Over time, the curricula of Future Program merges with other existing on-campus leadership programs Cadets still have option for “minor,” while enrolled and advancing in other disciplines, especially in sciences Focus is “how to think” and “decision-making” as the foundation all officers Understands their role in the “larger picture” Additionally Proficiency in foreign language Establishes cognitive skills Cultural studies Military history Physical fitness is stressed and greatly improved Bottom line: A BA in Decisive Leadership? Inculcating future officers in the holistic nature of war needs to begin at the pre-commissioning and undergraduate education stages of officer development. One of the arguments made in this briefing is that while some familiarization with the various martial and non-martial aspects of war as policy is provided to the generalist population, the Army as an institution remains remise in developing and supervising a standard set of core competencies by which to guide future and continuing (career lifecycle) officer education. The Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service’s National Security Studies at Georgetown University provides parallels to what a degree in Decisive Leadership would look like. It has added courses on low-intensity conflict, conflict resolution and peacekeeping, transnational relations, and economic aspects of national security to the standard fare on defense and military policy. While the BA in Leadership would not center around National Security studies, it would involve similar subjects. The core would be how to develop cognitive skills, how to be decisive, seeking and taking responsibility—the demonstration of strength of character—and accepting responsibility for one’s actions would be at the core of the studies. The major goes beyond study of the military science—the traditional subject matter of ROTC—it also address themes in social, foreign cultural, and intellectual history. The major exposes students to a range of theoretical tools and methodological approaches to leadership and decision making analysis, and places special emphasis on the development of critical thinking, argumentation and writing skills, all key in leading people and organizations in the complexities of war. © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

The Program BA in Leadership
Understand other cultures (part of contract to commission) Bonuses for languages such as Arabic, Russian, Chinese, Urdu, Pashtun, Farsi, Tagalog, etc… No bonuses for Spanish, French and German, but meets requirement Must take some type of foreign cultural studies prior to commissioning Assist cadets who qualify for Scholarships and Fellowships After commissioning, 2 years of graduate school before returning funds to study abroad and learn about other cultures Bottom line: T.E Lawrence provides examples to the extreme, but… Provide us insights into to creating a branch of future education reforms for our up coming junior officers. These officers need to be more diverse in this multiracial, multi-ethic, and multi-cultural world. Part of this equation means that we must expect, demand that as part of their road to commissioning that they take, and are paid for, and become proficient in a foreign language. We should want all officers to have a second language, particularly in those regions of the world that the U.S. will be most challenged, particularly in the Middle East. Major General Robert Scales is on target when he says, “Every young soldier should receive cultural and language instruction, not to make every soldier a linguist but to make every soldier a diplomat with enough sensitivity and linguistic skills to understand and converse with the indigenous citizen on the street. The mission of acculturation is too important to be relegated to last-minute briefings prior to deployment. Acculturation policy should be devised, monitored, and assessed as a joint responsibility. Today’s e-learning technologies will permit such a program to be distributed over the Web. Soldiers should be able to achieve proficiency at home and demonstrate their knowledge using assessment tools administered by DoD or the Joint Staff before any overseas deployment” With this type of calls, it should be obvious that we should do something. Time is running out. “In the late 19th century, the British Army ‘seconded’ bright officers to various corners of the world to immerse them in the cultures of the Empire and to become intimate with potentates from Egypt to Malaya. Names such as China Gordon and T. E. Lawrence testify to the wisdom of such a custom.” “Culture-Centric Warfare” Major General Robert Scales, Jr. U.S. Army (Retired) Proceedings, September 2004 © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

Education The military curriculum
The principles of education and the tools just mentioned are embodied in: Academics: MS I-Laying the Foundation: The Soldier MS II-The Combat Squad Leader’s Course MS III-Innovative Tactical Thought MS IV-Transition Toward Officership Training: Physical training must be challenging and innovative Labs centered around individual and unit tasks FTXs focus on free play force on force scenarios Bottom line: Challenging the mind and the body The future POI introduces, but does not indoctrinate, fundamentals in Army leadership doctrine and decision making. In the spirit of classical education, blocks of instructions will not be given. For example the OPORD or the Troop Leading Procedures will be introduced while using a tactical decision game, or mentioning them while presenting a case study. The spirit is to leave the cadet to ask “what is it?” then, seek the answer. Courses also include emphasis on reading assignments to expand the students' understanding of the factors that go into innovative tactical thought, decision making and planning at the tactical level. The courses avoid the use of fill in the blank or true and false examinations. There are also papers and exams that force the students to come to grips with wider issues. The purpose of Tactical Decision Game based examinations and essays is to develop and hone the analytical skills of the students, rather than to just grade them. The cadets are also allowed to choose to participate in extracurricular activities such as the Maneuver Warfare Club (introduction to the theories of Maneuver Warfare and Military history) and the Ranger Club (advanced PT and advanced tactics). In both the MS IV year and Maneuver Warfare Club participate in staff rides reflecting a belief that a close study of the documentary and historical evidence in combination with walking the ground allows cadets to understand the issues that will confront them in the future. The classroom work is evolutionary from freshmen to senior year, for example the MS IIs take an exam where the TDG deals with a humanitarian mission at the squad level. The juniors get a similar exam, but they must deal with the problem at the platoon and company level. Cadets move with their experiences in the classroom to labs where tasks, such as land navigation and small unit drills are taught and practiced. FTXs are free play force on force exercises dealing with many variables. Physical training also carries the spirit of innovation with sessions going beyond mere doing the threes-push and situps and a run. Leonard Wong, "Stifled Innovation? Developing Tomorrow's Leaders Today" (Carlisle, PA: The Institute of Strategic Studies, April 2002). “The advantage which a commander thinks he can attain through continued personal intervention is largely illusory. By engaging in it he assumes a task that really belongs to others, whose effectiveness he thus destroys. He also multiplies his own tasks to a point where he can no longer fulfill the whole of them.” Helmuth von Moltke, papers of von Moltke © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

Know the tactical and operational doctrine manuals The “Future Program” text books by John Poole The Last Hundred Yards: The NCOs contribution to Warfare Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods The Tiger’s Way: A U.S. Private’s Best Chance for Survival Phantom Soldier: The Enemy’s Answer to U.S. Firepower Other Core Books William S. Lind, The Maneuver Warfare Handbook Anton Myrer, Once an Eagle Alister Horne, A Savage War of Peace Bottom line: These are not prescriptive, and can evolve as war evolves. Offer an intellectual framework of the tactical level of war, a construct cadets can use to make sense of events and discern larger patterns in them (especially in the books chosen by the MS IV instructor). But without a framework of some sort, both history and current developments in war tend to appear chaotic. Maneuver Warfare Handbook, Bill Lind (with exercises by Col Mike Wyly, USMC.) outlines how maneuver warfare, or tactics and operational art on trust, works. John Poole is one of the most innovative and practical modern writers on military tactics. The Last Hundred Yards, is the best small unit tactics manual published in many years. Now, just in time for cadets to use in Iraq, Afghanistan and where ever our missions, he is offering his take on how Islamic non-state forces fight. Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods should be in the backpack of every cadet. Anton Myer’s Once an Eagle, and Alistor Horne’s A Savage War of Peace, are diverse, but essential in rounding out a cadet’s foundation in character. Myer’s contrast selfless and selfish service that deals with the culture of the U.S. Army. Alistor Horne’s A Savage War of Peace shows cadets what not to do when a 2GW force fights a 4GW enemy. It was a tragedy rife with lessons Americans are learning again in Iraq. These books will start the cadet to see what it means to confront an enemy that really understands Sun Tzu. They also could also be read as a manual for 4GW at the tactical level, where tunneling, as we're re-discovering in Afghanistan, is an Eastern art form. Poole’s books in particular contain vivid illustrations of how Boyd's "asymmetric fast transients" or put another way, “operating inside an opponent’s OODA loops’ would appear to a soldier in land combat. Based on discussions with John Poole and discussions with William S. Lind. Finally, numerous discussions with my commander, Lieutenant Colonel Allen Gill defined and sharpened my ideas. “The Last Hundred Yards was the best small unit tactics manual published in many years. Now, just in time for Iraq, Afghanistan and wherever else the neo-cons want to send American soldiers to die, he is offering his take on how Islamic non-state forces fight. Tactics of the Crescent Moon, should be in the backpack of every American soldier and Marine.” Book review by William S. Lind © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

Tactical decision games (TDGs) develop adaptability and intuition Johann Pestalozzi’s methods adapted by Prussians “Experience the thing before you try to give it a name” Use as quizzes or exams (oral or written) Vary conditions Solve TDG under time limit With loud music playing Feed changing intelligence Brief decisions to instructor, peers and subordinates Bottom line: An inexpensive tool, offering many variables, to teach “how-to-think” TDGs introduce cadets to the unknown, with the result that students want to know more and ask questions. They also seek to answer for themselves what they do not know. Cadets can be given orders that conflict with the situation on the board and are forced to resolve the conflict between the two. Another technique we use to teach decision making is to change the original situation or the orders while the cadet is preparing their solution to the initial problem. This forces the student to either challenge the original order due to it being out of date, or accept the old order and live with the consequences. The TDG is also presented under limited time, creating even more stress. When the cadet briefs their solution the major learning takes place not only for the briefer but for also for his peers. As cadre get comfortable with TDGs, and get a feel of how their cadets are evolving into them, the cadre can adjust all aspects of the TDG to teach critical cognitive skills. For example, they can be vague in certain areas of the OPORD. This forces cadets to make assumptions or educated guesses. Also teach cadets how to ask questions and not to ask dumb questions. Asking dumb questions generally means that they need to learn how to listen the first time and how to take concise notes quickly. Not much time for questions over the tactical radio. Everything we do falls back to teaching the cadet how to deal with the stress of combat. Encourage cadets to seek more knowledge when they ask pertinent questions. The instructor will do this through the cadet brief back of their solution. Cadets give their solutions to their peers who will in turn evaluate the cadet's decision. The instructor is there to “guide” the discussion. He is also there to encourage the theme of classical education. As a result of this session cadets will seek on their own to gain more knowledge. Based on discussions with Mr. Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Nov-Dec 2004. “A subordinate's failure to act in the absence of orders was ‘illegal’ and inexcusable in the eyes of his superiors and peers. An officer was expected to act on the situation as he saw it, and he knew his action would be supported. As a result, action in the face of uncertainty and responsibility for that action was developed into a social norm.” LTC John Silva “Auftragstatik: Its Orgin and Development” Infantry Magazine (Sept-Oct 1989) © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

MS I: “Laying the Foundation—The Soldier” Revolves around The Tiger’s Way: A U.S. Private’s Best Chance for Survival & The Maneuver Warfare Handbook Two-day course introducing them to the US Army Riflemen in same squad, platoon and company entire time as cadet Land navigation, physical training; intro to orders process Semesters, consisting of four core blocks: “A Growing Threat at 75 Yards” “The New Basics” “What The Eastern Soldier Does” “The Winning Edge” Includes historical case studies for examples Army values are presented as part of case studies, not as separate classes or as dog tags Bottom line: Don’t assume that ignorance means not wanting to seek challenges “Laying the Foundation” introduces the cadets to tactical innovation, which begins them to pose perhaps the most important doctrinal questions currently facing the conventional military forces of the U.S. Its purpose is to introduce cadets to how to defeat the enemy by disrupting the opponent's ability to react, rather than by physical destruction of forces. Part of this course develops and explains the theory of maneuver warfare and offers specific tactical, operational, and organizational recommendations for improving ground combat forces. The course then shows how to use better tactical techniques at the individual and small-unit level, how U.S. forces can project minimal force. Without minimal force, they cannot win the hearts and minds of the people. Without winning the hearts and minds of the people, they cannot win a guerrilla war. This course reveals—for the first time—the state of the art in technique for every category of short-range combat. Intertwined with this approach, the cadet is shown the importance of discipline, while serving as a rifleman in the corps of cadets during labs and FTXs. Their introduction to the program begins with a two day course at the beginning of year to introduce the cadet to the how-to of drill and ceremony, wear of the uniform and equipment, and the basic tasks they will need throughout the program. Author’s note: This course has not been implemented. Elements of this course will have to be used in the infusion course to bring “lateral entry” Green to Gold cadets aligned with progressive cadets. Encourage “how to think” © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

MS II: “The Combat Squad Leader’s Course” Revolves around Phantom Soldier: The Enemy’s Answer to U.S. Firepower , Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods & The Maneuver Warfare Handbook Team and squad leaders More land navigation and physical training TDGs Focuses on squad level missions Semesters four core blocks: “The Eastern Way of War” “The Differences in Tactical Technique” “The Next Disappearing Act” “Strategies for Deception” Includes historical case studies for examples Army values are presented as part of case studies, not as separate blocks of instruction Bottom line: To defeat the threat, you must study it “The Combat Squad Leader’s Course” exposes cadets to Oriental and Islamic warfare. The cadets learns: (1) alternate between guerrilla, mobile, and positional warfare; (2) use “ordinary forces” to engage and “extraordinary forces” to beat an opponent; and then (3) run away when fighting holds no more strategic import. Phantom Soldier reveals how Eastern soldiers could hold their own without resupply, tanks, or air support, the course shows what cadets must do to survive the more lethal weaponry of the 21st century. Using the Tactics of the Crescent Moon, the cadet studies the battlefield exploits of their subsidiary guerrilla movements: the Palestinians, Iraqis, Chechens, and Afghans. Cadets discuss how they use techniques with collateral psychological and media value. The cadet learns how they would inflict enough casualties to erode the foe’s popular support, while being safe enough to bolster friendly morale. Cadets see how guerillas are involved thorough planning, a quick strike with limited objectives, and a rapid pullback. Cadets will understand that to keep from playing into the guerrillas’ hands, the U.S. will have to carefully measure each military response and then use a nonmilitary means to remove the root causes of the discontent. This course attempts to make some sense of the thousands of recent media glimpses into combat as practiced by radical Islamic organizations. While the U.S. government may have access to more intelligence, it seldom tries to assess that intelligence from a tactical standpoint. It is generally more interested in the foe’s technological profile. Many of its analysts are not even aware that the Eastern thought process differs from their own. As is the case with most Oriental methods of war, the people of Asia Minor will only show a Western opponent what they want him to see. Thus, the news from Iraq and Afghanistan must be carefully analyzed to determine enemy method—the course’s ultimate goal. Author’s Note: This course has been implemented during the SY year and is very popular among the 22 cadets, half of which are on scholarship. Elements of this course will have to be used in the infusion course to bring “lateral entry” Green to Gold cadets aligned with progressive cadets. Encourage “how to think” © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

MS III: “Innovative Tactical Thought” Revolves around The Last Hundred Yards: The NCOs contribution to Warfare & The Maneuver Warfare Handbook Initially squad leaders and platoon sergeant, evolve to PLs/CO Land navigation and physical training Briefing OPORDs and TDGs to peers and instructors Officer and NCO relationships Consists of three core blocks: “The Shortfall in Recorded Knowledge “Techniques from the NCO Corps” “More Complex Problems” Includes historical case studies for examples Army values are presented as part of case studies, not as separate blocks of instruction Bottom line: Tactics are used as a foundation to teach decision making and warrior ethos “Innovative Tactical Thought” is a course about making tactical decisions, as well as employing effective, modern techniques. Most important, it is a book about integrating tactics and techniques. Techniques are the “tools” a cadet has at his disposal; tactics is the art of selecting the right tools for the particular job at hand. While the techniques themselves may be formulas, the art of selecting the right techniques can never be done by formula, because each situation is different. This course shows the cadet how to understand the right way to use techniques in his tactics, and makes clear the distinction between the two. Just as automotive mechanics become highly skilled at diagnosing car problems, cadets can become adept at assessing tactical situations. They will experience many circumstances—at the squad, platoon and company levels—to understand their role in the larger picture. They will come to realize the cost of ignoring subtle differences in each. They will learn that stormy nights can either hinder tactical coordination or enhance surprise. They will develop a unique appreciation for micro-terrain. Having themselves filled the shoes of riflemen, fire team and squad leaders their first two years or from prior service, they will have insight into the training status of the “troops-available” aspect of the “combat situation.” They will begin to build the intuition that they will need to succeed in combat. This course will stress decision making in the class room using TDGs and case studies, how to communicate decisions, both written and orally to subordinates using time constraint, train and practice techniques and tasks at labs and in PT, experience larger and difficult operations on brigade FTXs, all to prepare them for their evaluation at LDAC. Author’s note: This course has been taught for 4 years now and is also very popular among cadets. Naval ROTC cadets from George Washington University NROTC have audited. Encourage “how to think” © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

MS IV: “Transition toward Officership” Updated reading lists based on “Canon” Two-day duties and responsibilities course “Extension of Cadre” positions based on campus OML Plan and execute labs (task training) and field training exercises are variables in free play force on force environments OPORDs to PMS and cadre for each major event Two Semesters, Consisting of: “News Briefings” & “Leadership Briefings” “Discussions from Readings” “Essays Based on Assigned Readings” Quizzes, Tests and Final Exams Army values are presented as part of case studies, not as separate classes Bottom line: Taking ownership in their program “Transition toward Officership” does not include blocks of instruction on how to fill out an OER or NCOER, UCMJ, how to make a ditty move, or how to counsel, or given a block of instruction on ethics or sexual harassment. Seniors’ first experience and mission is to take charge of the cadet battalion and lead, plan and execute training for the corps of cadets with cadre oversight. They become an extension of the cadre, and greatly assist the small body of cadre in the mentoring and evaluation of underclassman. To aid them to a fast start, they will attend a two day course that covers their duties, responsibilities and a refresher on how to develop and evaluate rapid decision making just before the start of the school year. Course content centers around assigned readings with students giving news and leadership briefings each class where discussion is encouraged on national aims and strategic conditions, but all stress theory and history. Instruction begins on a higher plane, though every student has to arrive prepared for discussion (pop-quizzes are used to enforce the reading). Curricula use classroom time to stretch the horizons of cadets by forcing them to think and discuss problems several levels above their rank and to think about the full spectrum of operations. As with all the courses, our POI is flexible and overcomes the tendency to remain close to the familiar, wherein we would teach predictable situations. One of our guiding principles is to continually evolve what we teach so we always challenge the cadets. Finally, staff coordination, planning and communication skills are also enforced as MS IVs must brief the cadre periodically on planned training and major events. Here the PMS assumes the role of the commander and evaluates their decision making process. Author’s note: This is the second year that this course has been taught. The majority of MS IVs state that this is the best course they take at Georgetown and their consortium universities. Encourage “how to think” © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

Training Train the mind as well as the body
PT must be challenging and fun “By the time APFT is given, it is seen as a break” Three days is not enough Not punishment—it becomes a way of life Cadre and cadets must be innovative as well “Get that wounded member to this location” Weekly foot road marches Reference, “Physical Training Programs for light infantry units: are they preparing soldiers for the rigor of combat?” by Major Frank O’Donnell Bottom line: Physical training presents another opportunity to develop the mind “If we fail to prepare our soldiers for their physically demanding wartime tasks, we are guilty of paying lip service to the principle of ‘Train as you Fight.’” Unfortunately, this principle is to a much lesser degree successfully integrated in its application to Cadet physical fitness programs. Physical training must be leader—cadre and MS IV—supervised, and an interest and desire must exist within the leadership to develop an effective program. Leaders that are not physically fit are less likely to push themselves, or their units, during physical fitness training. Like any other form of training, physical fitness training, and especially combat focused physical training, requires planning and resources. The ultimate goal is that a love of physical fitness will accompany the cadet past commissioning and into the rest of his or her career and indeed his or her life. To achieve the desired end states, leaders must carefully assess weaknesses, then deliberately target those weaknesses with a program designed to improve performance over time, and later the infusion of training tasks such as litter carry races, IMT drills, or plan tactical foot road marches require experience. This strategy cannot be successful when the PT session is planned minutes before the morning PT formation. In programs where this happens, soldiers are usually subjected to a daily regimen of push-ups, sit-ups, and a moderate run. Over time, it leads to lack of interest and apathy. One of largest values of adding combat focus to a physical-training program is simply the creativity that can result (sometimes, due to their experience, cadre need to step in and lend ideas to combat PT). This alone can do wonders for a program. Often, the responsibility for the conduct of PT is pushed to the MS III level in order to gain a leadership evaluation. They generally lack the experience, education, or maturity to effectively plan or execute a challenging physical fitness program. Major Mark P. Hertling, “Physical Training for the Modern Battlefield: Are We Tough Enough?” (School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1987) Author note: Thanks for the hard work of Master Sergeant Rob Frye, operations NCOIC of Georgetown Army ROTC, this course would not have evolved to the point it is now. “FM 21-20, Physical Fitness Training, is a good manual that emphasizes combat readiness and train as you fight but does an equally poor job of explaining how to do this, and the Army physical fitness test (APFT) does not adequately correspond to the actual physical readiness of a soldier in the performance of his combat tasks.” Frederick O’Donnell, MAJ, USA, “Physical Training Programs” © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

Training Labs (see back ups-approach to training)
Move from the classroom to practice Decentralize as much as possible Individual tasks up to squad Buddy team drills Individual movement techniques (IMT) Land navigation Train as cohesive squads as much as possible Let MS IVs and MS IIIs serve as trainers Must rehearse classes before cadre Must recon, calibrate and walk through each lab Bottom line: Prioritize the training that assists cadets in decision-making Lab training should revolve around the squad. As much as possible, MS IIIs are the trainers, with MS IVs evaluating (with cadre oversight; if the program is planning training right, MS IVs and cadre are overseeing training, while others are calibrating for an FTX, or picking up resources). Cadets need to experience the chaotic challenges of combat hundreds of times. Repetition. In order to understand and identify patterns, cadets need simulated examples. In order to internalize lessons, cadets need (whenever possible) to fight an active enemy and suffer from their own tactical mistakes (good time for STX). Through repetition, the basic lessons become so well known that advanced tactics and experimentation can be attempted. Only with the experience of fighting through a hundred enemy positions can a leader look for weaknesses in a given position and initiate creative ways to exploit that weakness. This is also building the intuition they will need in combat. Reading the subtle aspects of a tactical situation is a learned skill that requires far more practice than is currently available outside of a simulation. Efficient use of time: Schedule lab time in the summer based on lesson learned from combat, and identified strengths and weaknesses from LDAC and previous semester. Far more time is typically available to squads in the ‘gaps.’ Labs can be decentralized as long as cadre are available. Lab time can be scheduled several times. This time is usually far more plentiful than that allocated to formal learning environments. Peer competition. Competitions should be used whenever possible to highlight training. These tactical learning experiences, heightened by professional rivalry, can serve as a catalyst for doctrinal discussions, an opportunity to build leader cohesion, and a chance to compare tactics and techniques among professionals. Author’s note: It took 4 years of evolution, but labs are now being fully planned and executed by the MS IV seniors with cadre oversight. “Our labs train cadets on ‘the how to’ with tools which they can chose when making decisions during free play exercises.” c/LTC Dan Feehan (Nov 2004) © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

Training Field Training Exercises (see back ups-approach to training)
Evaluation of leadership dealing with complex unit problems Center around force-on-force free play exercises Involve latest lessons from war, Cadet Command creates mobile training team Continually develops new scenarios Cadre evaluate how people change under stress Brigades host two major FTXs, one fall and one spring: Multi-echelon free play force-on-force exercise fire team through company Masses limited resources such as MILEs and blanks Create TAC teams for continual assessment and mentorship TAC Teams rotate for 12 hours, in order to maintain continual observation Bottom line: FTXs revolve around preparing the cadet for and evaluating the cadet on decision making through free play, force-on-force exercises. Free-play force-on-force FTXs highlight a cadet’s education and training. Cadets will be given the opportunity to practice their judgment. There are two approaches to FTXs guided by the factors of time and resources. One FTX trains a cadet in problem solving. A specific mission is given to test the subordinate's technical proficiency. The other FTX evaluates decision making. In both, a cadet is given a mission order, and a course of action is decided upon and executed. The reasons behind that action are then evaluated. Both FTXs are designed to develop adaptive and intuition. Free-play, force-on-force exercises increase realism. Cadets apply their skills against an active threat. Free-play exercises are adaptable to all scenarios and echelons. Whenever possible cohesive squads and platoons should be used. This then demonstrates the power of cohesion to cadets, and allows them to build upon previous training. But programs must make an effort to maintain unit cohesion throughout the school year. FTXs should culminate in a AAR in order to examine the causes and effects of decisions and actions. The standard approach for AAR should promote adaptability and build intuition. There should be no ideal tactic, checklist, “go” or “no-go” or “school book solution.” The AAR should focus on the rationale behind a decision. What factors did the cadet consider? Were the orders communicated clearly? The idea is to expand the cadets’ creative ability to solve difficult problems. AARs should be open-minded and understanding. Cadets should learn from their mistakes. Do not damage a cadet in public, it will squander their self-confidence. This will also inculcate the cadets in the importance of conducting such AARs at all levels of command in their subsequent careers. Author drew on his own personal experience as an Observer Controller and Chief of OPFOR reconnaissance at the National Training Center, Feb 87-June 90; and from participating in and observing 100s of force on force free play exercises from squad to brigade level as a player and as a TAC “MS IIIs and MS IVs stated that they learned the most during FTXs” MS3 & MS 4 Survey SY02-03, U.S. Army Cadet Command, 11 Nov 2004 © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

Training LTC becomes an “Infusion Course,” for “lateral entry” cadets to catch up with progression cadets Summer training not limited to Army schools/units Send cadets to other cultures Open up Army schools: scout leaders, mortar leaders, etc Eliminate 2 and 3-year ROTC contracts/cadets (except Green-to-Gold) Military education demands this in the 21st Century Applicants with prior service at least two years, and pass screening may advance to MS III year if academically aligned Bottom line: Professional development for the future necessities going out of bounds We have created several “efficient” routes—based on job union templating from the early 20th Century—into the officer corps in order to alleviate the need to “make-mission.” The 21st Century is going to demand officers with a broad education experience. In the past, during the Cold War and before, there was time for officers to gain experience outside the normal and prescriptive career tracks. This is not the case anymore. Several lessons learned reference how junior officers were prepared for the on going war are starting to come out. A graduate of Harvard and a First Lieutenant, after reviewing the syllabus “The Combat Squad Leader’s Course” stated that “Wow, I wish I had that kind of education and training. All my ROTC unit cared about was minimizing the impact ROTC had on my regular education, which did little for me once I went to Iraq. This is the kind of education most lieutenants and cadets need and want. I just don’t understand why we don’t implement what you recommend?” Today’s generation want to be prepared and challenged by the profession of arms. We need to break out of date paradigms and send cadets to study and live in other cultures, and I don’t mean studying abroad in Paris or London. I have had cadets that were in the Peace Corps and that studied abroad in Chile and in the Middle East. We need to encourage and reward this behavior, and stop accepting it as something “that was nice” the cadet did as part of his academic studies. If we want the best and brightest in the future, we should be able to sponsor them studying abroad in many emerging cultures with a promise of returned service to the nation. Author note: Many of these insights come from discussions with COL T.X. Hammes, author of The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century, regarding reforming the officer education system. COL Hammes is a popular speaker with the Georgetown Corps of Cadets, having spoken to them four times in the last year. I would also like to think the input of cadet Dan Feehan and former cadets Lieutenants Jordan Becker, Pat Fagan, Abby Taylor and Wyatt Cavalier for their thoughts. Nothing is more difficult, and therefore more precious, than to be able to decide.” Napoleon Bonaparte, ”Napoleon’s Maxims” © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

Training Leadership Evaluation Course (LEC), a “Ranger course (with sleep)”—28 Days. Replaces LDAC (“summer camp”) No “make ups” (unless injured) on APFT or Land Nav Is “a test”: exceeds standards, standards, or fails Focus on evaluation of leadership, not training tasks Evaluations during free play force on force exercises: LDP as used on campus (focused on decision making) Complexity of problems grows throughout exercise Programs assess cadets who can handle more prior to arrival Three TAC Teams throughout rotation => 24 hour observed Emphasis on the Warrior Ethic: Garrison for in-processing, APFT, and clearing (4 days) Cadets live in field as in combat environment the entire time Will continue to do land navigation and BRM (tactical) Foot road march everywhere Bottom-line: This is one evaluation of cadet leadership abilities The education and training of the cadet is displayed at Leadership Development Accession Course (LDAC). Cadets will be evaluated on their ability to solve tactical problems in varying conditions over the course of 28 days. If they graduate, the course provides 1/3 of their accessions evaluation. 28 days allows for the use of NG/Reserves annual training Cadets enter a stressful environment and must form and bond with a completely new set of peers within the first two days. They will conduct their Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) on day three. If they do not pass the first time, they fail the course. On day 4, cadets will then conduct a tactical foot march to a tactical assembly area and establish a base camp. From there, over the next 11 days (days ), they will foot road march and conduct Basic Rifle Marksmanship (BRM), day and night land navigation, call for fire, High Confidence Course, Obstacle Course, Rappelling, Slide for Life, Log-walk-Rope-Drop, and Leader Reaction Courses and be trucked to perform Combat Water Survival Test (CWST), all to and from a tactical assembly area. Over the next 11 days (days 16 – 26 inclusive), the cadets conduct the tactical phase in a simulated insurgency environment. They will conduct an array of missions in a free play force on force exercise. Missions will be conducted in day and at night. Security will always be emphasized. Cadets will receive a read-ahead packet back on campus that covers their overall mission and a detailed analysis of the enemy (that will aid them in their problem solving). At the end of the 11th day (day 26 of the LEC) the cadets foot road march into an awaiting graduation ceremony. Afterwards they will spend the final two days out processing. Cadets who fail to graduate LEC have the option of simply paying back their Army loan after graduation the same as any other educational loan while separating from the service. Or, they can serve a tour as a Soldier, or serve in some other national program of service to repay their loan. Higher standards should also diminish the stigma of not getting commissioned. Author note: This is a based on the input of cadre and cadets. The vast number of cadets have talked to would look forward to this type of evaluation. This includes lieutenants returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

Evaluating Core of the Leadership Evaluation Approach (LEA) is:
Uses “double looping” Provides different perspectives to develop leadership Clarifies assumptions across the frame work of leadership Uses 360 evaluations, peer, subordinate and cadre At heart of assessment, is “did the cadet make a decision,” then ask, “in a timely manner,” in the spirit of: “Commander’s intent” (two levels up) “Mission statement” (given the conditions at that time) If no decision, then failure From dimensions of 15 To 3 “guiding-actions”: Problem solving Social judgment Knowledge Bottom line: Leadership Evaluation Approach (LEA) is a “double loop” “Double-loop” “ is the knowledge of several different perspectives and forces the organization to clarify differences in assumptions across frameworks, rather than implicitly assuming a given set.” Be it on an exam employing TDGs, or during training, cadre uses multiple tools to give the cadet continual and detailed evaluations to allow the cadet to evolve, improve, and prepare them for their graded field evaluations (GFEs). During these tests, cadets will be evaluated on their ability to lead, demonstrate adaptability and intuition in making decisions under varied scenarios. First and foremost was a decision made? If so, we jump to: second, was it communicated to their subordinates effectively? Then, we ask was the decision made in support of the commander’s intent (long-term contract), and mission (short-term contract). From there, if it was not, then the instructor asks himself was the cadet solution based on changing conditions that made it a viable decision even if it violated the original mission, but supported the intent? Five “guiding actions” are intertwined with the Army’s values when evaluation potential (the art of developing leadership), and they are also used when evaluating leadership. This has to be distinctive. Too often, cadre and cadets cannot tell me the difference. There is a difference, one prepares, allowing cadets to improve (hopefully), the same is used to “grade.” Cadre must set up scenarios, based on where they access the cadet’s current and potential abilities are, then they identify the potential critical points based on the mission, commander’s intent, and how they adjusted to changes. There is a need to take cadre tactical officers from being in the field administrators to accessing potential or evaluating leadership. Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., Inside View: A Leader’s Observations on Leadership (Greensboro, NC: Center for Creative Leadership, 1997) Paul A. Sabatier, Theories of the Policy Process: Theoretical Lenses on Public Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999) Author’s note: We have been implementing the 360 aspect of this system for two years now with astounding success. All instructors including the PMS receive assessments. © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

Evaluating Other aspects of “double-loop”: In task performance:
APFT Land Navigation To briefings: OPORDs, Training, Leadership, News, TDGs With exams and quizzes, which revolve around essays under timed conditions for example: Cadet receives a “higher OPORD” with instructions “given the company OPORD, a map, cadet will write a platoon OPORD, and then be prepared to respond with actions (in writing) to a series of questions pertaining to this mission, under a time restriction” Instructors continually “tweak” character through feedback on evaluations Bottom line: Several tools in developing leadership. The evaluation of cadet performances in the classroom or on tasks provides more perspectives in developing potential and evaluating performance. But, this does not mean the use of traditional, industrial-age testing techniques. These techniques only reinforce rote memorization. This includes “true or false,” “fill-in the blank” or “multiple choice” examinations. Sometimes Cadre use these grading techniques due to ease of grading, quick feedback to the tested cadet and administration. Since “knowledge” and “social judgment” gauge leadership, how a leader chooses to communicate decisions to their subordinates, or inform their chain of command, must be continually practiced and evaluated. If leaders do not communicate decisions well to their subordinates or units, decisive and timely decisions make no difference. As a result, as often as possible cadre should use essay-based evaluations in the class room. The use of essays requires that the cadre understands the English language and grammar. Essays also take a lot of time to “grade.” But well placed comments can provide another aspect in the education of the cadet. If the cadet changed his original decision in order to go along with the instructor recommended solution, he was seen as a failure, as having weak character. Weak character was also demonstrated if the cadet stayed with a poor or out of date decision from higher because that is what “higher” told him to do. And lastly, the worst thing a cadet could do was make no decision at all Evaluations are also used to award and highlight performance. They also serve as a record on which the cadre must decide that the individual does not have the abilities to become an officer. An effective organization awards as well as enforces standards. Failure in one or the other degrades the effectiveness of the organization, and undermines trust. © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

New POI Conclusion Establishing and sustaining a reputation
“Making-Mission” is subordinated to quality Using “Goals” instead of “mission” when talking “numbers” Flexibility to get within a percentage below or above “Goal” It is subordinated to how well a program prepared cadets LEC becomes a “test,” measure of program as well How do cadets do at other evaluations and training as well Positive, vice negative, view: programs will build “credibility points” for: Honor and distinguished graduates of OBCs and Army schools Or, finishing difficult schools like Ranger school Sending a number of cadets and finishing summer training Percentage of cadets finishing DMG Inspections adhere to principles in education, bde/Rgn sit in on classes, watch instruction or training. Bottom line: Reputation can work two ways Today, building trust, two-way loyalty and good communication are essential to retaining and attracting top talent-both cadre and cadets And in a world of near perfect information, who can process it all alone? An environment of trust and collaboration inspires and challenges people. It makes duties more enjoyable. Instead, we are bombarded with s demanding constant information and data, we are questioned about our word on disenrollments, on our assessments of cadets, when asked to submit ideas back up, we get nothing in return, demands for numbers are and will go up, but resources go down. So what news are cadre receiving from Cadet Command? The best plan is to communicate fully, accurately and plainly how the Army and Cadet Command is doing and how cadre are doing, even if the picture isn’t always rosy. The Army culture equates arguing or questioning established ways of doing things as disloyalty. “I argue with you because I care.” My research shows that when loyalty is a “two-way street,” officers and soldiers have faith in their senior leaders, more are optimistic, and more are loyal. Similarly, when leaders and led receive regular information about the unit’s performance, they say it’s important to them. If they do receive that information, they’re satisfied; and they’re less likely to leave. Cadets and cadre engaged in a regular dialogue with the chain of command about their own and the Army’s and the command’s performance are more satisfied with virtually every aspect of their duties and future. They’re more loyal. They’re more effective. They’re more innovative. We need to make cadre and cadet communications a priority. © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff

Agenda Part 4 Part 4 New POI How to look at the POI The Program

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Agenda Part 4 Part 4 New POI How to look at the POI The Program

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