1. Spatio-temporal information in society: evolution of cooperation
Gilberto Câmara
Licence: Creative Commons ̶̶̶̶ By Attribution ̶̶̶̶ Non Commercial ̶̶̶̶ Share Alike

2. Everybody’s property is nobody’s property (Hardin)
Tragedy of the Commons?
Everybody’s property is nobody’s property (Hardin)

3. Preconditions for the tragedy of the commons
Lack of restraint on pursuits of self-interest Consequences are externalities (I don’t have to pay)

4. Externalities in the global commons
Activity of one person has an impact on the well-being of another. Positive externalities (or external benefits): Benefits realized by those who didn’t pay for them. Negative externalities (or external costs): Costs borne by those who didn’t generate them. Byproducts that harm others.
SUVs in USA  Climate Change in Africa

5. Is the tragedy of the commons inevitable?
Experiments show that cooperation emerges if virtuous interactions exist
source: Novak, May and Sigmund (Scientific American, 1995)

6. Repeated prisioner´s dillema
Four different strategies for repeated prisioner´s dillema
source: Novak, May and Sigmund (Scientific American, 1995)

7. Repeated prisioner´s dillema
Evolution of prisioner´s dillema comparing different strategies
source: Novak, May and Sigmund (Scientific American, 1995)

8. How can cooperation happen?
Nowak MA (2006). “Five rules for the evolution of cooperation” Science 314:
(most highly cited multidisciplinary paper – ISI, 1st quarter 2010)
"I would lay down my life for two brothers or eight cousins“ (J.B.S. Haldane)

9. Five rules for evolution of cooperation
b = benefit for the recepient c= cost for the donor

10. Common pool resources (Elinor Ostrom)

11. The ultimate common pool resource

12. Governing the commons
[Ostrom, Science, 2005] 7

13. Governing the commons: Ostrom´s conditions
Clearly defined boundaries
Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions
Collective-choice arrangements:
Monitoring and graduated Sanctions.
Conflict-resolution mechanisms
Minimal recognition of rights to organize.
Organized governance activities. 7

14. Ostrom on governing the commons
“The challenge is how best to limit the use of natural resources so as to ensure their long-term economic viability.” “Neither the state nor the market is uniformly successful in enabling individuals to sustain long-term, productive use of natural resource systems.” “Optimal equilibrium with centralized control is based on assumptions concerning accuracy of information, monitoring capabilities, sanctioning reliability, and zero costs of administration.”