1. Armed Groups and Societal Networks
Will Reno
Northwestern University

2. Armed groups & society: cohesion or fragmentation?:
Variation in armed group—community relationships
What are the impacts of these relationships for armed group recruitment and organizational cohesion in war zones?
Prop 1: Armed groups use coercion and information to establish control over people and territory, leading to a threshold of collaboration over time (Kalyvas).
I.e., Abu Musab al Zarqawi & the Omar Brigade – Iraq practitioners of territorial control (via targeted assassinations). This is how those armed groups managed their local environment.

3. Prop 2: Prewar community institutions shape variations in rebel governance (Arjona)
Weak local institutions -> culus regio, eius religio; the people obey the strongest force
Strong local institutions -> keep rebels (and state) at bay. Institutions matter more than resources & armed group goals.
Prop 2.1: Pre-existing networks (political parties, religious associations, student & veteran groups, etc.) shape the organization and methods of armed groups as they form (Staniland).
Networks, even if re-purposed for war, shape the organizational options for armed groups to recruit, discipline and motivate members.

4. A Puzzle: Why would armed groups that face weak state institutions and dominate local communities fail to utilize these advantages to increase internal cohesion?
Or why do some Terrorist Groups™ have such a hard time setting up in Ungoverned Spaces™ (and others do not)

5. No holiday from history: State & society matters
Early nation-states  guerrilla rebels
Industrializing states  urban insurgency
Periphery state-builders  Maoist “liberated zones”
Periphery Patronage states  fragmented rebels
If armed group fragmentation is the dominant mode, why do cohesive armed groups appear in some cases?

6. The Distinctive social environment of state collapse (Look carefully: Not all states are alike)
*Field vacation. Not field research.

7. Pre-conflict states, reciprocal infiltration & violence
Patronage state networks infiltrate other social networks as an alternative way to exercise authority Patronage politics supplemented with violence: “creative tension” to undermine collective action Reverse infiltration of networks of violence into the state regime; workable if the original hierarchy is maintained Disruption, often externally induced, fragments the state patronage and other social networks, leading to civil war

8. The Desert of the Real

9. Two Kinds of Armed Groups
Town Rebels: Vice President Riek Machar, political insider, at his “rebel” HQ, April 2014
Bush Rebels: I don’t know who he is, but he is appears to be outside the establishment
* R.M. reads: Ashraf Ghani, Fixing Failed States, Acemoglu & Robinson, Why Nations Fail, Kevin Mauer, No Easy Day
* Sheikh Munajjid ruled that creating a snowman is a sin

10. Data & Measurement
Counting conflicts: If the character of warfare changes, what should we count? There is no consensus on how to count, many ignore non-state dimensions of organized violence.
Collecting Data: Where should data come from?
Conceptualization: Are state-centric data collection / approaches increasingly unhelpful? A “non-state realm”, even within formal parameters of states, and its interactions may provide more useful insights for understanding contemporary patterns of conflict.
I’m on board with GIS and the Armed Conflict Event Location Data Project (ACLED),

11. Armed Group Cohesion
Measured in terms of the degree of autonomous capacity to manage social relationships and obligations of group members. High cohesion is manifest in capacities to recruit selectively, discipline effectively, and promote a program.
Low cohesion: Symmetrical irregular warfare of clan-based militias in the South Sudan slide
High cohesion: Rebels sustaining “liberated zones”, such as Al-Shabaab, ISIS, etc.

12. Cohesion  Control
Cohesion can be a consequence of different pathways of armed group—societal relationships
 Information & violence
 Collusion and collaboration

13. A model of armed group control in collapsed states
The Neighborhood 
Armed Group Leadership ↓
Networked [into old regime networks]
Excluded [from old regime patronage]
Town Rebels
Criminal Pluralism: Leaders capitalize on local tensions to fulfill group goals while unable to master information.
Bush Rebels
Strongman Dominator: Leaders manage local solidarities to master information
Nasty Rebels: Leaders capitalize on local tensions and struggle to master information
Mobilizers: Leaders master information to manage local solidarities

14. The Stark Fist of Reality
Networked:
[into old regime patronage]
Excluded:
[from old regime patronage]
Town Rebels
Jajab & Hodon, Kamaliyah
Criminal mosques and extortion rackets
Shebelle enclaves
Beladiyat & Mashtal
Warlords of ethnic & sectarian territorial fiefdoms
Bush Rebels
Shibis
Fallujah
Extreme armed group violence
Shebelle valley
Fedaliyah? Shawra?
Mobilizers from within

15. Ground checking concepts
For more on these coordinates:

16. Somali Rabbit Hole

17. Mesopotamian Rabbit Hole