1. Conditions for Using Negotiation
Two or more parties
Conflict of interest such that what one party wants is not what the other party wants
Both willing to negotiate for a good outcome
Preference to work together rather than fight, give in, break off contact, or take the dispute to a higher authority

2. Choose the Best Conflict- Handling Style
Collaborate if: issues are important to both parties power is fairly equal and candor is possible there is potential for mutual benefits you have adequate time to fully discuss the details * most likely to maximize everyone’s outcomes *
Accommodate or Compromise if: you lack time or ability to collaborate * can have positive or negative consequences *
Force/Compete or Avoid if:
other options aren’t feasible
* can create negative feelings *

3. The Two Types of Bargaining Strategies
Characteristics
Distributive
Bargaining
Integrative
Bargaining
Available Resources
Primary Motivations
Primary Interests
Focus of Relationships
Fixed Amount
I Win, You Lose
Opposed
Short-Term
Variable Amount
I Win, You Win
Congruent
Long-Term
Two negotiation methods are distributive bargaining and integrative bargaining.
When negotiating the price of a used car, the buyer and seller are engaged in distributive bargaining. This type of bargaining is a zero-sum game: any gain that one party makes comes at the expense of the other party. So, the essence is negotiating over who gets what share of a fixed pie.
The next technique assumes that more than one “win-win” settlement exists. Generally preferable to distributive bargaining, integrative bargaining builds long-term relationships because each negotiator can leave the table feeling victorious. For integrative bargaining to succeed, negotiators must be open, candid, sensitive, trusting, and flexible.
All things being equal, integrative bargaining is preferable to distributive bargaining. The former builds long-term relationships and facilitates future cooperation. The latter, on the other hand, leaves one party a loser; so it can build animosities and deepen divisions when people have to work together on an ongoing basis.
Prentice Hall, 1999
Chapter 12

4. Preconditions for Integrative Negotiation
Common goal
Faith in one’s own problem-solving ability
Belief in validity of other party’s position
Motivation to work together
Mutual trust
Clear communication

5. Decision-Making Biases That Impede Negotiations
Escalation of commitment
The mythical fixed pie
Anchoring and adjustments
Framing negotiations
Availability of information
The winner’s curse
Overconfidence
Irrational escalation of commitment occurs when people continue a previously selected course of action beyond what rational analysis would recommend. Such misdirected persistence can waste a great deal of time, energy, and cash.
The mythical fixed pie. Bargainers assume that their gain must come at the expense of the other party. By assuming a “zero-sum game” they exclude any opportunities for finding “win-win” solutions.
Anchoring and adjustments. People often anchor their judgments on irrelevant information, such as initial offers. Effective negotiators do not let an initial anchor minimize the amount of information and depth of analysis they use to evaluate a situation.
Framing negotiations. People are affected by the way information is presented to them.
Availability of information. Negotiators often rely too much on information that is readily available while ignoring more relevant data. They should learn to distinguish between what is familiar and what is reliable and relevant.
The winner’s curse is the regret one feels after negotiation. Since your offer was accepted by your opponent, you become concerned that you offered too much. You can reduce the “curse” by getting as much information as possible and putting yourself in your opponent’s shoes.
Overconfidence. When people hold certain beliefs and expectations, they tend to ignore any information that contradicts them. The result is that negotiators tend to be overconfident, which can lessen the incentive to compromise.
Prentice Hall, 1999
Chapter 12

6. Ugli Oranges What will you do? What price will you offer?
To whom and how will the oranges be delivered?

7. Ugli Oranges
Info sharing
Assess “orange options”
Guarantee trust