1. Availability: Public OMA Confidential
OMA-BCAST RD Comments Issues not addressed in BCAST Requirements
Comments to slides #3 and #4 by Lucent
Submitted To: BCAST
Date: 4th November 2004
Availability: Public OMA Confidential
Contact: Arieh Moller
Arjen van der Vegt
Herve Brugal
Ilan Mahalal
Source: NDS, Irdeto Access, Gemplus, Axalto X
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2. Key Issues
We believe that the current version of the BCAST requirement contain some serious security flaws.
The area that we believe need requirements added is Service & Content Protection

3. Service & Content Protection
The issues that we still believe needs to be addressed are as follows:
There needs to be a mechanism to allow for the application of “bug fixes” to deployed devices
There needs to be a mechanism to allow for upgrading the key management systems if new business models are required to be supported
There needs to be a method to allow for the key management system to be replaced if (and when) it gets compromised.
There needs to be a mechanism that can complement device revocation, as revocation has many negative operational implications e.g. an annoyed user base
the requirement as formulated calls for a specific solution to a potential problem (there is no business requirement that would call for replacable modules; the business requirement is to have a secure solution that supports mobility and interoperability)
Conclusion:
if experts in the DRM group conclude that a mechanism such as the proposed one is needed, this mechanism can and will be specified

4. S&CP requirements
Therefore we suggest that the following requirement be added:
The system SHALL support the defined key management system, and SHALL allow for an open standard secure mechanism to allow for system recovery, upgrades, and bug fixes.
In light of preliminary comments we wish to stress that by no means does the above conflict with the following requirement:
SPCP-2 Openness - All functions needed for service and content protection, including e.g. the key management, the delivery, and encryption and decryption operations of keys and content, and interfaces, SHALL be fully specified so that no proprietary extension to any part of the system are required.
The above does not require any extension, but rather ALLOWS it.
DO NOT VIEW IN SLIDE SHOW MODE.
SEE BELOW FOR NOKIA and LUCENT COMMENTS
NOKIA COMMENT
upgrades shall be covered by device management
if security of the upgrade mechanism is of concern, this can be brought into DM
we need no standardized mechanism to distribute bug fixes
bugs in the mechanism need to be eliminated in the specification and IOP phase
bugs in the implementation are under the responsibility of the vendors
what does system recovery mean?
there can’t be a requirement for something we don’t know what it is
Conclusion:
the mechanisms that make up a secure service and content protection system, as well as the mechanisms that are required to keep it secure, shall be specified during specification work, but there is at this moment in time no genuine requirement that calls for a particular solution such as the proposed one.
LUCENT COMMENT:
To allow for an Open Standard Secure Mechanism for system recovery, upgrades or bug fixes. This standard does not exist and we should like to see evidence of work in progress for this if we are to support placing a requirement upon this Open Standard.
SHALL, as discussed in the call 15th Dec, will mandate operators to pay for a costly and complex to manage feature. If this requirement stands, we feel this needs to become SHOULD.
To call up the defined key management system is outside of requirements work and shall be left to stage 2/3 work. The call already agreed to remove the text up to the comma, that was my understanding.
Device Management is now covering capabilities to download potential upgrades so this requirement becomes subsumed into a broader work. Bug fixes can be classed as maintenance work and not a security specific issue. System recovery, as mentioned in the call by several, appears to address system wide issues, not specifically security.

5. Thank you!