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Unmanned Systems for Critical Infrastructure Monitoring
References used: 3DR. (2016). Solo. Retrieved from 3DR: ASV. (2015 a). C-Worker 6. Retrieved from ASV: ASV. (2015 b). C-Sweep. Retrieved from ASV: Department of Homeland Security. (2015, 10 27). Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved 2016, from Homeland Security: Georgia Ports Authority. (2016 a). Savannah. Retrieved from Georgia Ports Authority: Georgia Ports Authority. (2016 b). NORTH AMERICA’S BUSIEST SINGLE-CONTAINER TERMINAL. Retrieved from Georgia Ports Authority: Smalley, D. (2014). The Future Is Now: Navy’s Autonomous Swarmboats Can Overwhelm Adversaries. Retrieved from ONR: SMP Robotics. (2016 a). S5 PTZ. Retrieved from SMP Robotics: Southern Company. (2016). Plant Vogtle. Retrieved from Southern Company: Southern Nuclear. (2016). Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant. Retrieved from Southern Company: Stephen M. Cigal Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
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Why? What’s the Concern? Critical Infrastructure is used every day in modern society Very little of this infrastructure is protected Access to these facilities can be reached by: That’s right, $8.18 on amazon with free 2 day shipping! The Department of Homeland Security (2015) identifies “sixteen critical infrastructure sectors whose assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, are considered so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety…” Pictures taken from: Picture of wire cutters from: Most facilities have just a simple chain-link fence with a barbed wire topper. Even the lightest of duty bolt or wire cutters can access the facility in under a minute.
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Lets put this into perspective
Metcalf Substation Attack Federal Energy Regulation Commission, John Wellinghoff, stated that this attack was “the most significant incident of domestic terrorism involving the grid that has ever occurred” Picture from CNN.com The attack almost wiped out power to the majority of Silicone Valley. Repairs took 27 days to complete.
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Solutions Utilizing Unmanned Systems (UXS) to provide constant surveillance, inspections, threat identification, and information relaying National level control stations always monitoring UXS operations Local control stations activated to confront specific threats Most knowledgeable of location Able to interface with local authorities Maintains ultimate control in event of communications loss The Central Control Station (CCS) is the national level control station in charge of monitoring 24/7 and providing the initial alert that there are identified threats The Local Control Stations (LCS) will be activated from the CCS. The LCS has all the infrastructure and ultimate control for its sites operating UXSs.
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Central Control Stations (CCS)
Four Locations Each location assigned ~1/4 of operating UXSs Ability to assume control of other locations UXSs in emergencies Each station fuses all available information to identify a threat Transfers control to LCS when needed Picture taken from Google Maps The Central Control Station (CCS) has control over all UXSs during routine operations. It controls the flight patterns, patrol areas, timing of activities, as well as the random detailed inspections. The CCS is also tasked with the requirement of around the clock monitoring for threats, monitoring of UXS performance and the notification to a local control station (LCS) and authorities if a threat is suspected or a systems performance is degrading. These four CCSs are in constant satellite contact with each locations LCS, while each UXS will communicate with the LCS. The CCS has the capabilities to fuse all the information required to not only keep a fleet of UXSs operating, but also determine a threat level. It serves as the brain of the operation while putting the majority of the raw computing power closer to the deployed UXSs, in the Local Control Station. Operators are alerted from the LCS of the possibilities of a threat and trained personnel at the CCS work to identify, quantify and determine the correct course of action. The operators are aided by digital checklists, alarm management software and integrated communications to national level organizations
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Local Control Station (LCS)
Situated at a site or local to a group of sites Contains all the hardware and software to control UXSs Performs majority of analysis for threat detection, CCS makes ultimate call Interfaces with local authorities and acts as an on site command center Picture taken from Picture is a representation of what a typical ground control or LCS will look like The Local Control Station (LCS) serves a dual purpose. During times of routine patrol and inspections, the LCS will act as a relay station to the field UXSs, receiving the high level commands from the CCS, and dispersing those orders to the systems on site. The LCS also has the processing power to receive the information transmitted from the UXSs, compute this information for threat identification, and alert the CCS for further analysis if needed. During these routine operations, the LCS will not be staffed, but will have a trained operator on site. Once a threat is identified however, the LCS will have the priority command, communication and control (C3) for it’s site UXSs. This shift of control during times of uncertainty is established to allow the local station with the most knowledgeable people of that particular location’s needs, weaknesses and resources, to command the surveillance equipment.
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Case Study: Seaport, Electrical and Chemical Facility
Seaport: acres capable of 9 ship simultaneous offloading UAS, UGV and UMS selected Electrical Facility: 600,000+ homes receive power from this one site 3100 acres of rural woods, UGV selected River boundary upstream of Seaport Chemical Facility: 15 acres with railroad access Produces industrial bleach products UGV and UAV selected The seaport selected is stated by the Georgia Ports Authority (2016 a) as “the largest single-terminal container facility of its kind in North America”. This location is critical not only as defined by DHS, but also in the fact that it acts as a gateway to two major railroad lines and two major interstates with only a few hours drive from three of the Southeast’s major metropolitan areas. The selected terminal is approximately 1200 acres in size and has the capability to offload nine of the worlds largest ships at the same time (Georgia Ports Authority, 2016 b). The proposal for surveying this port includes Unmanned Maritime, Aerial and Ground Systems. The large electrical generating facility produces enough power for 600,000 homes. This site is situated on 3100 acres with a highly protected 100 acre area housing the actual electrical generating facility. Armed security guards patrol inside the 100 acre protected area around the clock (Southern Nuclear, 2016). The larger owner controlled area is rural, mostly covered with woods and crossed with small country roads. The north side is bounded by the same river that flows to the seaport from inland. For monitoring of this facility, Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV) will be used. The chemical facility has the smallest footprint at only 15 acres. The facility has a standard chain-link fence with barbwire topper around the perimeter with numerous railroad access points. The facility is located further upstream, on the same river as the two other sites. The facility produces bleach for industrial and household cleaning as well as for water treatment facilities. A combination of UGV and UAV are selected at this location with the UAV providing not only surveillance but also monitoring in the event of a chemical leak.
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What the C3 looks like Specific Capabilities Site Specific Local Level (LCS) National Level (CCS) Southeast Central Control Station Seaport UMS Patrol incomming traffic SWARM capabilities UAS Aerial survalence and event construction UGV Perimiter Patrol & Inspections Chemical Plant UAV Aerial Survalence Aerial chemincal monitoring Electrical Power Plant Inside Protected Area UGV Site UGV Control commands are initiated from the CCS, but requires the LCS to execute commands to the UXSs UXSs perform specific tasks, gathering information Information is passed back to LCS for processing of raw data Site information sent to CCS for final determination Information The CCS is staffed with trained UXS operators. The daily operations include programming the autonomous UXS in the field with patrol requirements, troubleshooting of faulty UXSs with telemetry data, and sequencing back into operation those systems that have come back from maintenance. This site takes status reports of all UXSs daily, reviews and challenges any possible threats identified from the previous day’s operations to ensure corrective actions have been taken. They are in communication with federal agencies like the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigations if assistance is needed. The design of the CCS provides high level supervisory control, thus allowing hundreds of UXSs to be monitored and controlled at one time (Chen, Barnes, & Harper-Sciarini, 2010). The CCS channels all commands and communications to the UXSs via the Local Control Station. This ensures that no one location has complete control over a group of UXSs for security concerns. Constant communication links are provided by satellite with a secure internet connection as a backup. The LCS is ultimately in control of it’s Unmanned Systems. Permission is required from the LCS to allow the CCS to provide direction during routine operations. The LCS will be in constant contact with its specific UXSs. All commands from the CCS must be routed via the LCS. If at any time control communications are lost with the LCS, the UXSs are programmed to complete their last command, unless an internal fault prevents them, and return to their base stations.
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UGV SMP Robotics S5 PTZ Security Robot PTZ camera
360° surrounding cameras Infrared camera WIFI connected and RF transponder Picture taken from: The model S5 PTZ Security Robot is outfitted with a high power pan, tilt and zoom camera as well as omnidirectional cameras generating a 360 degree view of the surroundings. Additional upgrades include a nighttime infrared main camera, an infrared LED headlight for nighttime off-road driving and a radio frequency transponder as a backup to the standard WIFI connection. The unit itself is designed to travel completely autonomously along a predetermined patrol area or path. A live video stream is fed to the Local Control Station for processing. This processing occurs almost real time when a sufficient data connection exists. In areas where little WIFI coverage is available, a lower bandwidth RF transponder will feed critical data to the LCS such as the presence of a person in a restricted area or a vehicle traveling at abnormally high speeds. When operating on RF communications, the threat determination occurs on the UGVs computer, but will shorten its operational time due to the additional power demand. An advantage of the SMP S5 is it’s ability to operate under all environmental conditions, even without GPS coverage. This allows the UGV to successfully navigate and record in site locations without any external communications support or in storage buildings where GPS may be unavailable. The unit has the capability to feed it’s live data stream to a security guard equipped with a tablet style computer. Because this site has armed guards, this capability allows for quick threat confrontation by actual security guards, giving them the surveillance and situational awareness they require when out in the field.
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UAV Chemical Seaport Small, lightweight Dual purpose:
Monitor facility and operators when working off the ground Ability to inspect for chemical release Site requires additional ‘hot swap’ capabilities for additional battery packs Lighter than Air (LTA) ship Large payload capabilities for extensive communications LIDAR and RADAR equipment Very long loiter times (weeks) Ability to act as a communications hub for other UXSs and LCSs Already proven in a military environment Pictures taken from Google Images from BestBuy and Business Insider for 3DR and LTA craft respectively The chemical facility includes seven stories of exposed piping and chemical batching tanks. While the majority of the plant operations occur at the ground level or inside the control room, there are manipulations that need to occur outside at elevation. Utilizing an UAV that has the capability to not only perform inspections but also monitor workers can reduce the chance of worker accidents as well as perform routine inspections of the facility. 3DR Solo UAV is a compact, user friendly quadcopter that has the ability to not only perform a pre-programmed flight, but also follow a worker with it’s Follow Me function (3DR, 2016). These features make air surveillance capabilities during emergencies possible, providing for increased worker security when working aloft all in an inexpensive package. Two modifications are required to make this commercial UAV ready for operation at this facility. First the controller will have to be connected to the LCS and second a method of quick battery swap and recharge will be incorporated into a landing pad. Aerial surveillance over a large area would rule out the small quadcopter used at the chemical facility. A lighter than air (LTA) ship however can maintain a fixed location while monitoring the ground and incoming sea traffic with minimal power requirements. Comparing airships to a fixed wing UAV, for the same payload carried, the airship has between a 100 and 300 percent increase in loiter time and is times more economical to operate (Sanswire Corporation, 2010). Another method to monitor a fixed location like the seaport includes tethering the airship to the ground. This has the benefit of supplying power and communications via it’s tether, allowing for a heavier payload and increasing it’s endurance up to 30 days. With this large platform at 8,000 feet, the communication and surveillance capabilities are almost unlimited.
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UMS C-Worker C-Sweep 15 foot long @ 6 knots Up to 30 day endurance
Visual, infrared & RADAR above surface SONAR profiling below surface Can be outfitted with specialized CBRN detection boom 33 foot 25 knots Ability to deploy lethal and non-lethal measures Ability to launch and recover a tethered ROV for subsurface inspections Pictures taken from: The Unmanned Marine System C-Worker 6 is a fifteen-foot long diesel powered ship capable of speeds up to 6 knots and an endurance up to 30 days. It is designed to perform subsurface acoustic profiling and monitoring as well as above surface inspections with infrared and visual cameras (ASV, 2015 a). This dual purpose vessel is deployed as the constant surveillance UMS, monitoring incoming and outgoing traffic. It is also deployed to perform routine ship inspections prior to entering port with it’s optical and acoustic sensors. Routine sweeps of the vessel are performed using a telescoping boom with capabilities to detect nuclear, chemical and biological contaminants using a portable mass spectrometer. This detection equipment has already been tested and proposed for a nationwide program with monitoring stations (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 2002). When a threat is determined by the C-Worker, the capability exists to deploy a larger UMS for inspection or determent. The C-Sweep by the same company is a 33-foot patrol boat capable of 25 knots and a range of over 230 nautical miles. The C-Worker is designed to directly confront an intruder, and with it’s capability to launch lethal and non-lethal measures, is able to stop an advancement. If undersea inspections are required, the C-Worker is equipped with an autonomous remotely operated vehicle (ROV) launch and recovery system. Operators at the LCS or CCS can deploy a tethered ROV from the aft section and perform underwater inspections of ship hulls and the pier structures (ASV, 2015 b). Both the C-Worker and C-Sweep have swarm capabilities, or the capability to work together and overcome a much large adversary. This technology was first developed by the Office of Naval Research, and allows almost any UMS to be outfitted with this technology called Control Architecture for Robotic Agent Command and Sensing. This software, communications and sensor suite allowed for thirteen vessels to escort a ship, detect a threat and coordinate an offensive determent (Smalley, 2014). BOTH craft can swarm together to challenge and deter craft much larger than themselves.
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Conclusions During a simulated attack exercise involving remotely piloted boats and an explosive device, this team of UXSs were able to prevent loss of life or private property Great success was noted in the quick identification by the LTA craft All 3 UMSs swarmed as needed to deter two attacking boats I look forward to final bids from 4 contractors for a full size test facility
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