1. DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF THE TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE BASE NECESSARY FOR TSO

2. THE ROLE OF TSOs IN THE NATIONAL SAFETY ORGANIZATION
(French example)
KNOWLEDGE BASE NECESSARY FOR THE QUALITY OF THE SUPPORT PROVIDED BY TSO FOR EXISTING FACILITIES AND FACILITIES UNDER CONSTRUCTION
KNOWLEDGE BASE NECESSARY FOR FUTURE FACILITIES

3. MAIN TECHNICAL SUPPORTS IN FRANCE
INSTITUTE FOR RADIATION PROTECTION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY (IRSN)
Public expert body in charge of the technical assessment and research related to nuclear and radiological risks
Supporting the French Public Authorities in the field of safety, security and radiation protection
NO PROMOTION OF NUCLEAR APPLICATIONS
(Technical Safety Organization)
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (CEA)
National organization in charge of technical assessment and research related to nuclear and radiological applications
Supporting the French Government (Energy Policy) and the Industry
PROMOTION OF NUCLEAR APPLICATIONS
(Technical Support Organization)

4. Designers, Constructors
POSITION OF IRSN IN THE FRENCH SAFETY ORGANIZATION (Technical Safety Organization)
Technical assessments to support regulatory decisions
Authorizations Controls
Safety Authorities
Utilities
IRSN
Designers, Constructors
Research on - process
- risk
Research on risks
Technical relations

5. POSITION OF IRSN IN THE FRENCH SAFETY AND SECURITY ORGANIZATION
Safety Authority for civil application
Safety Authority
for civil
applications
Safety Authority
for Defense
Applications
Safety Authority for Defense applications
Security Authorithy
Security
Authority
Civil Security Administration (Emergency preparedness)
Civil Security
Administration
(Emergency
Preparedness)
Labor
Authority
Food Agency
Food
Agency
Drugs Agency
Drugs
Agency
Food
Agency
IRSN
IRSN
Consistency
Memory
Civil
installations
Defense
installations
Sources
Industrial
applications
Medical
applications
Workers
Food
Environment
Environment
Civil
installations
Defense installations
Sources

6. IRSN RESEARCH (1)
IRSN responsible for the research needed for the quality of its assessments (Regulatory research)
Research performed by IRSN itself
External institutions under
IRSN financial support
Part of the research performed in cooperation with Industry.
Respect of : Independence of IRSN Responsibility of operator

7. Interest of research performed by TSO :
IRSN RESEARCH (2)
Interest of research performed by TSO :
Easier to focus research on assessment needs and to reach a good appropriation of results
Helps to understand research processes in general and to manage external research adequately
Enhance scientific credibility of the TSO and its position with respect to he Industry and the public
Provides opportunity to hire high level young people and to offer them a career within the TSO

8. FACILITIES AND FACILITIES UNDER CONSTRUCTION
KNOWLEDGE BASE NECESSARY FOR THE QUALITY OF THE SUPPORT PROVIDED BY TSO FOR EXISTING
FACILITIES AND FACILITIES UNDER CONSTRUCTION

9. ASSESSMENT PROCESS (Technical Safety Organization)
Objective of assessment = provide authority with a technical advice about a practical decision to be made in a limited time scale
ANALYTICAL PROCESS INTEGRATION PROCESS
Knowledge of installations
Design
Modifications
Operating Experience Feedback
Specialized knowledge
Final advice
Thermohydraulics
Mechanics
Metallurgy
Fire
Neutronics
Criticality
Fuel
Radiation protection
Human factors
Environment …

10. CONDITIONS FOR QUALITY OF ASSESSMENTS (ANALYTICAL PROCESS)
TSO should be in close contact with installations and aware of Operating Experience Feedback (National and International)
TSO should be aware of latest technical and scientific results
Strong connection with R and D
TSO should have efficient data bases (installations, sites, events, previous assessments, technical data, regulation …) with efficient knowledge management systems

11. NECESSITY TO EXTEND PRESENT KNOWLEDGE BASE
Initiatives from Industry
ex : Fuel
Reduction of uncertainties
Sump clogging, source term
Aging
ex : cables, materials
Human and organizational factures
ex : assessment of organizations
New requirements
ex : severe accidents for generation III reactors
Public expectations
ex : effect of chronic exposures
IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
(NEA)

12. CONDITIONS FOR QUALITY OF ASSESSMENTS (INTEGRATION PROCESS)
Appropriation of Safety Fundamentals (as defined by IAEA)
Working procedures and strong common culture allowing :
Discussion between experts having different backgrounds
and specialties
Proper weighting of the different aspects
Technical basis for the integration process :
Defense in depth
Operating experience feedback
Probabilistic Safety Assessment
Radiation protection principles

13. KNOWLEDGE BASE NECESSARY FOR FUTURE
FACILITIES

14. GENERAL APPROACH TO PREPARE THE ASSESSMENT OF FUTURE INSTALLATIONS BEFORE THE CONCEPTS ARE DEFINED
Follow-up of orientations and concepts discussed at national and international levels (ex : GEN IV)
Gathering of existing knowledge, particularly on installations which were already built
Design experience
Operational experience
R and D
Follow-up and participation to the efforts devoted to the definition of safety and security of future installations as well as assessment methods (INPRO, MDEP,…)
Difficult to perform efficient work if no choice of type of installation
Huge domain
Limited resources

15. FOURTH GENERATION REACTORS FRENCH DECISIONS (1)
Engage conception of fourth generation of nuclear reactors with possible industrial operation in 2040
Requirements :
Reduction of wastes
Saving of uranium
Increase of safety and security
Reduction of proliferation risks
Three steps defined :
Experimental reactor ( ± 50 MW)
Prototype reactor
Industrial reactor

16. FOURTH GENERATION REACTORS FRENCH DECISIONS (2)
Main option SFR
2012 : definition of design options
decision to construct a prototype
2020 : start of prototype
Second option GFR
2012 : possible decision to construct experimental reactor
2020 : start of experimental reactor
Possible development of HTR or VHTR by Industry

17. TASKS OF TSO AFTER CONCEPTS ARE DEFINED
Follow-up of development of concepts by Industry
Support the Safety Authority to define the safety requirements for new installations
Discuss with Industry on potential and proposed orientations for safety demonstration (with preservation of independence of TSO)
Complement or develop the necessary knowledge base inside TSO
Identify the critical subjects needing knowledge development and possibly research performed by TSO
Participate to international exchanges

18. EXAMPLES OF NECESSARY DEVELOPMENT OF KNOWLEDGE BASE
Core Neutronics (SFR and GFR)
In-service inspection of internal structures (SFR)
Management of loss of coolant accidents (GFR)
Accidental behavior of high temperature fuels
(GFR and possibly SFR)
Risk of propagation of a local fusion in the core
(SFR and possibly GFR)
Radioactive transfers within the circuits in case of an accident (GFR)
 Schedule might be very tight !

19. Underground waste repository Tightness of seals Fusion reactors
EXAMPLES OF NECESSARY DEVELOPMENT OF KNOWLEDGE BASE FOR OTHER FACILITIES
Underground waste repository
Tightness of seals
Fusion reactors
Solicitation of structures due to plasma
disruption

20. CONCLUSIONS Difference exists between Technical Safety Organization
Support to Regulatory Authority
No promotion of nuclear applications
Technical Support Organization
Support to Government (Energy Policy) and Industry
Promotion of nuclear applications
Existing facilities and facilities under construction
Necessary knowledge base for TSO
Installations
High level technical subjects
Working methods and concepts to perform integration of the different aspects of the assessments
Further development of knowledge base and research still necessary
Future facilities
Choice of concepts allows to start to define the necessary knowledge base developments
Research will be necessary
Schedule might be tight