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1 microeconomics spring 2016 the analytics of
session eight dynamic pricing (I) airline pricing - introduction ………….1 airline uniform pricing ………….2 airline pricing - dynamic approach ………….4 airline myopic pricing ……..…...5 airline strategic pricing ………….9 airline pricing - key points ..……….11 retail pricing - introduction ………...12 retail uniform pricing ……..…13 retail pricing - dynamic approach ………..15 retail myopic pricing ……..….16 retail strategic pricing ………...20 retail pricing - key points ..……….24 spring 2016 microeconomics the analytics of constrained optimal decisions

2 microeconomics setup assumptions airline industry lecture 8
dynamic pricing (I) the analytics of constrained optimal decisions airline industry setup  We observe an increase in airline ticket price as the date of take-off approaches  Clearly the static/uniform pricing monopoly model is too simple to capture and explain this behavior  We have to develop a dynamic model that would capture: - the market participants in each time interval - the optimal behavior of the monopolist assumptions  The market: consists of many buyers (more than the capacity of the plane) with different willingness to buy the airline ticket, each buyer will buy at most one ticket when the price for the ticket is below buyer’s willingness to pay  Time frame: there are two periods considered such that - in the first period a certain fraction of the total buyers are searching for an airline ticket and these buyers are those with the lowest willingness to pay - in the second period the remaining fraction of the buyers (that either did not get a ticket in the first period or did not participate in the first period) are searching for an airline ticket  No arbitrage: buyers with low valuation that buy a ticket in the first period are not able to re-sell the ticket in the second period.  2016 Kellogg School of Management lecture 8 page | 1

3 microeconomics uniform pricing key points airline industry lecture 8
dynamic pricing (I) the analytics of constrained optimal decisions airline industry uniform pricing ► Demand: P(Q) = 500 – Q ► Marginal revenue is obtained as MR(Q) = 500 – 2Q ► Marginal cost is MC(Q) = 0 ► Optimal output (A) and price (B) Qm = 250 and Pm = 250  With uniform pricing tickets are sold at the same price and the whole market is served at once.  Notice that 50 seats will be empty (airplane capacity is 300).  Total revenue (and profit since costs are assumed to be zero) is in this case: TR = Pm∙Qm = 250∙250 = 62,500 500 demand capacity = 300 MR key points (B) 250 (A) 250 300 500  2016 Kellogg School of Management lecture 8 page | 2

4 microeconomics uniform pricing - model airline industry lecture 8
dynamic pricing (I) the analytics of constrained optimal decisions airline industry uniform pricing - model ► How would you formulate the problem of finding the optimal solution for the uniform pricing case? ► “Ingredients”: demand P = 500 – Q objective maximize profit  = PQ = (500 – Q)Q for 0  Q  300 ► From an algebraic perspective, just take the first derivative of the objective function (with respect to Q), set that expression to zero and solve for the Q; this will give you 500 – 2Q = 0 with solution Q = 250. ► From a modelling perspective the analyst is considering a “one-shot” market even though the market may be functioning several periods. In other words, say the market is open for two days, this formulation of the problem implies that the same price is offered in both periods.  2016 Kellogg School of Management lecture 8 page | 3

5 microeconomics dynamic approach - introduction airline industry
lecture 8 dynamic pricing (I) the analytics of constrained optimal decisions airline industry dynamic approach - introduction high value low value ► Let’s assume that there are 250 buyers that are searching for a ticket in the first period (and these are the buyers with the lowest valuation) ► The remaining 250 are entering the market only in the second period. ► The buyers that entered the market in the first period but could not buy a ticket could potentially re-enter the market in the second period, however they will not get a ticket in the second period for sure (since they’ll have a valuation far below the valuation of all others present in the market) 500 demand 250 500 second period market first period market  2016 Kellogg School of Management lecture 8 page | 4

6 microeconomics myopic pricing key points airline industry lecture 8
dynamic pricing (I) the analytics of constrained optimal decisions airline industry myopic pricing ► First period market ► We can think of the first period market as a “stand-alone” market with a demand P1(Q) = 250 – Q and a corresponding marginal revenue MR1(Q) = 250 – 2Q ► Optimal output (C) and price (D) Q1= 125 and P1 = 125  Only 125 tickets are sold in the first period which means there are another 175 seats available for the second period market.  Of course this means that there are 125 persons (250 total trying to buy a ticket in the first period, but only 125 got a ticket) still being in the market in the second period first period market 500 demand key points 250 ticket 125 (D) move to second period MR1 (C) 125 250 tickets sold first period  2016 Kellogg School of Management lecture 8 page | 5

7 moved from first period
microeconomics lecture 8 dynamic pricing (I) the analytics of constrained optimal decisions airline industry myopic pricing ► Second period market ► We can think again of the second period market as a “stand-alone” market with a demand P2(Q) = 500 – Q for Q ≤ 250 and a corresponding marginal revenue MR2(Q) = 500 – 2Q for Q ≤ 250 ► Optimal output (E) and price (F) Q2 = 175 and P2 = 325  All remaining 175 tickets are sold in the second period since the profit maximization is constrained by the available capacity.  The buyers moved fro m first period have their willingness to pay too low to count in the second period. second period market 500 demand residual capacity = 175 MR2 (F) 325 key points (E) 125 moved from first period 175 250 375 tickets sold second period  2016 Kellogg School of Management lecture 8 page | 6

8 microeconomics myopic pricing airline industry lecture 8
dynamic pricing (I) the analytics of constrained optimal decisions airline industry myopic pricing second period market first period market ► Conclusion: the ticket price increases as we approach the “take-off” date, i.e. we move from period one to period two. ► The total revenue (and since costs are zero this is also the profit) is: TR = P1∙Q1 + P2∙Q2 = = 125∙ ∙175 = 72,500 ► No surprise that the airline is doing far better than the case of uniform pricing (total revenue of 62,500) 500 ticket residual capacity residual capacity total capacity MR2 325 (F) 250 ticket (E) 125 (D) MR1 (C) 175 250 125 250 300 tickets sold second period tickets sold first period  2016 Kellogg School of Management lecture 8 page | 7

9 microeconomics myopic pricing - model airline industry lecture 8
dynamic pricing (I) the analytics of constrained optimal decisions airline industry myopic pricing - model ► How would you formulate the problem of finding the optimal solution for the myopic pricing case? ► “Ingredients”: demand period 1: P1 = 250 – Q1 for 0  Q1  300 period 2: P2 = 500 – Q2 for 0  Q2  300 – Q1 objective maximize per-period profit period 1: 1 = P1Q1 = (250 – Q1)Q1 period 2: 2 = P2Q2 = (500 – Q2)Q2 ► From an algebraic perspective, the solution is fairly straightforward: period 1: (first derivative = 0) 250 – 2Q1 = 0 gives Q1 = 125 (less than 300, ok solution) period 2: (first derivative = 0) 500 – 2Q2 = 0 gives Q2 = 250 (more than 300 – 125 = 175, constrained solution to 175) ► From a modelling perspective the analyst is considering now a “two-shot” market, i.e. charging different prices in the two periods; however, the current formulation maximizes the “per-period” profit not the sum (overall) profit.  2016 Kellogg School of Management lecture 8 page | 8

10 microeconomics strategic pricing - model airline industry lecture 8
dynamic pricing (I) the analytics of constrained optimal decisions airline industry strategic pricing - model ► The myopic pricing does improve upon the uniform pricing as at least it charges different prices in the two periods to take advantage of the higher willingness to pay of buyers in the second period. The big short-coming is though that the profit maximization is performed “per-period” not looking at the sum of the profit over the two periods. ► This is the next step taken here: maximize the sum of the profit over the two –period. ► How would you formulate the problem of finding the optimal solution for the strategic pricing case? ► “Ingredients”: demand period 1: P1 = 250 – Q for 0  Q1  300 period 2: P2 = 500 – Q for 0  Q2  300 – Q1 objective maximize overall profit  = P1Q1 + P2Q2 = (250 – Q1)Q1 + (500 – Q2)Q2 ► From an algebraic perspective, the solution is fairly straightforward: try first a solution for which all 300 tickets are sold, then Q2 = 300 – Q1 which is plugged into the profit function:  = P1Q1 + P2Q2 = (250 – Q1)Q1 + [500 – (300 – Q1)](300 – Q1) = Q1 – 2Q12 Taking the first derivative and set it equal to zero you’ll get 350 – 4Q1 = 0, Q1 = Use this to find Q2 = 300 – Q1 = 212.5 ► From a modelling perspective the analyst is considering now a “two-shot” market and in the current formulation the analyst maximizes the overall profit.  2016 Kellogg School of Management lecture 8 page | 9

11 microeconomics strategic pricing airline industry lecture 8
dynamic pricing (I) the analytics of constrained optimal decisions airline industry strategic pricing second period market first period market ► Two-period market ► If the effect of period 1’s decision on period 2’s outcome is taken into account the solution is different: Q1 = and P1 = 162.5 Q2 = and P2 = 287.5 ► The total revenue (and since costs are zero this is also the profit) is: TR = P1∙Q1 + P2∙Q2 = 75,312.5 ► This is the highest profit that the airline can obtain! ► Notice that the marginal revenue is the same (and equal to 75) in both periods … ► Just a coincidence? 500 residual capacity residual capacity total capacity ticket MR2 287.5 (J) 250 ticket 162.5 MR1 (H) 75 75 (I) (G) 212.5 250 87.5 250 300 second period first period  2016 Kellogg School of Management lecture 8 page | 10

12 microeconomics dynamic pricing – key points airline industry lecture 8
dynamic pricing (I) the analytics of constrained optimal decisions airline industry dynamic pricing – key points ONE PERIOD MODEL TWO PERIOD MODEL UNIFORM PRICING MYOPIC PRICING STRATEGIC PRICING  one demand function  maximize one period profit  one price for all buyers  two demand functions  maximize per-period profits  per-period price discrimination  two demand functions  maximize sum of periods profits  per-period price discrimination single period market second period first period second period first period 325 287.5 250 162.5 125 250 175 125 212.5 87.5 single period second period first period second period first period ► The shaded areas represent the profit made by the airline (one-market on the far left and two-market case for the two diagrams on the right)  2016 Kellogg School of Management lecture 8 page | 11

13 microeconomics setup assumptions retail industry lecture 8
dynamic pricing (I) the analytics of constrained optimal decisions retail industry setup ► We observe a decrease in price for units sold as the time passes (the all familiar and enjoyable discount sales…) ► Again, the static/uniform pricing monopoly model is too simple to capture and explain this behavior ► We have to develop a dynamic model that would capture: - the market participants in each time interval - the optimal behavior of the monopolist assumptions ► The market: consists of many buyers (more than the inventory availability) with different willingness to buy ► The buyers: we assume that desire to be the first to have the “coolest” and “newest” clothing induces a buyer to acquire the “piece” immediately if the price is below his/her willingness to pay (no strategic waiting) ► Time frame: there are two periods created by the retailer as follows - in the first period the retailer sets a price P1 and all buyers with a willingness to pay higher than P1 will buy immediately and remove themselves from the market - in the second period is defined as the period for which the retailer changes the price to P2 and all buyers with a willingness to pay higher than P2 will buy immediately  2016 Kellogg School of Management lecture 8 page | 12

14 microeconomics uniform pricing key points retail industry lecture 8
dynamic pricing (I) the analytics of constrained optimal decisions retail industry uniform pricing ► Demand: P(Q) = 500 – Q ► Marginal revenue is obtained as MR(Q) = 500 – 2Q ► Marginal cost is MC(Q) = 0 ► Optimal output (A) and price (B) Qm = 250 and Pm = 250  With uniform pricing units are sold at the same price and the whole market is served at once.  Notice that 50 units will remain unsold (inventory is 300).  Total revenue (and profit since costs are assumed to be zero) is in this case: TR = Pm∙Qm = 250∙250 = 62,500 500 demand capacity = 300 MR key points (B) 250 (A) 250 300 500  2016 Kellogg School of Management lecture 8 page | 13

15 microeconomics uniform pricing - model retail industry lecture 8
dynamic pricing (I) the analytics of constrained optimal decisions retail industry uniform pricing - model ► How would you formulate the problem of finding the optimal solution for the uniform pricing case? ► “Ingredients”: demand P = 500 – Q objective maximize profit  = PQ = (500 – Q)Q for 0  Q  300 ► From an algebraic perspective, just take the first derivative of the objective function (with respect to Q), set that expression to zero and solve for the Q; this will give you 500 – 2Q = 0 with solution Q = 250. ► From a modelling perspective the analyst is considering a “one-shot” market even though the market may be functioning several periods. In other words, say the market is open for two days, this formulation of the problem implies that the same price is offered in both periods.  2016 Kellogg School of Management lecture 8 page | 14

16 microeconomics dynamic approach retail industry lecture 8
dynamic pricing (I) the analytics of constrained optimal decisions retail industry dynamic approach high value low value ► Let’s assume that the retailer sets a price P1 for a new line of clothing – all buyers with willingness to pay greater than P1 will buy at this price ► The retailer sells Q1 units. ► The retailer basically created two markets: the starting market at price P1 and quantity Q1 and then for the remaining buyers there will be a new price P2 500 demand P1 Q1 500 first period market second period market  2016 Kellogg School of Management lecture 8 page | 15

17 microeconomics myopic pricing key points retail industry lecture 8
dynamic pricing (I) the analytics of constrained optimal decisions retail industry myopic pricing first period market ► First period market ► Since at the start of the “game” the retailer serves all the market the first period demand is actually P1(Q) = 500 – Q and corresponding marginal revenue MR1(Q) = 500 – 2Q ► Optimal output (C) and price (D) Q1= 250 and P1 = 250  Only 250 units are sold in the first period which means there are another 50 units available for the second period market. 500 demand capacity = 300 MR1 (D) 250 key points (C) 250 300 500 first period market residual capacity  2016 Kellogg School of Management lecture 8 page | 16

18 microeconomics myopic pricing key points retail industry lecture 8
dynamic pricing (I) the analytics of constrained optimal decisions retail industry myopic pricing second period market ► Second period market ► The remaining buyers represent now the second period market with demand P2(Q) = 250 – Q and corresponding marginal revenue MR1(Q) = 250 – 2Q ► Optimal output (E) and price (F) Q2= 50 and P2 = 200  All remaining 50 units are sold in the second period; the profit maximization is constrained by the available capacity. 500 demand residual capacity = 50 MR1 250 key points (F) 200 (E) MR2 50 250 first period market second period market  2016 Kellogg School of Management lecture 8 page | 17

19 microeconomics myopic pricing retail industry lecture 8
dynamic pricing (I) the analytics of constrained optimal decisions retail industry myopic pricing first period market second period market ► Two-period market ► Conclusion: the per unit price decreases once the high-willing to pay buyers are making their purchase and exit the market. ► The total revenue (and since costs are zero this is also the profit) is: TR = P1∙Q1 + P2∙Q2 = = 250∙ ∙50 = 72,500 ► No surprise that the airline is doing far better than the case of uniform pricing (total revenue of 62,500) 500 total capacity residual capacity buys MR1 residual capacity 250 250 (D) buys 200 (F) (E) MR2 (C) 250 300 50 250 units sold first period units sold second period  2016 Kellogg School of Management lecture 8 page | 18

20 microeconomics myopic pricing - model retail industry lecture 8
dynamic pricing (I) the analytics of constrained optimal decisions retail industry myopic pricing - model ► How would you formulate the problem of finding the optimal solution for the myopic pricing case? ► “Ingredients”: demand period 1: P1 = 500 – Q for 0  Q1  300 period 2: P2 = (500 – Q1) – Q for 0  Q2  300 – Q1 objective maximize per-period profit period 1: 1 = P1Q1 = (500 – Q1)Q1 period 2: 2 = P2Q2 = (500 – Q1 – Q2)Q2 ► From an algebraic perspective, the solution is fairly straightforward: period 1: (first derivative = 0) 500 – 2Q1 = 0 gives Q1 = 250 (less than 300, ok solution) period 2: (first derivative = 0) (500 – Q1) – 2Q2 = 0 implies Q2 = 125 (constrained to 50) ► From a modelling perspective the analyst is considering now a “two-shot” market, i.e. charging different prices in the two periods; however, the current formulation maximizes the “per-period” profit not the sum (overall) profit.  2016 Kellogg School of Management lecture 8 page | 19

21 microeconomics strategic pricing - model retail industry lecture 8
dynamic pricing (I) the analytics of constrained optimal decisions retail industry strategic pricing - model ► Two-period market ► Let’s analyze the pricing strategy. The choice of prices in the two steps: - the price is chosen first for period 1 such that it maximizes the profit in period 1 - the remaining units (residual capacity/inventory) is then available for period 2 ► Clearly this is an improvement over the uniform pricing but can the airline do better? How can the retailer improve its pricing strategy, i.e. to get an even higher profit? ► Notice that the retailer chooses the quantity in period 1 without factoring in the decision in period 2, i.e. this is a period-by-period maximization: myopic optimization. ► The profit obtained in period 2 clearly depends on the decision taken in period 1 – this has to be taken into account when the retailer sets the price and quantity in period 1… ► This is again an issue addressed through strategic optimization, or backward induction …  2016 Kellogg School of Management lecture 8 page | 20

22 microeconomics strategic pricing - model retail industry lecture 8
dynamic pricing (I) the analytics of constrained optimal decisions retail industry strategic pricing - model ► The myopic pricing does improve upon the uniform pricing as at least it charges different prices in the two periods to take advantage of the higher willingness to pay of buyers in the second period. The big short-coming is though that the profit maximization is performed “per-period” not looking at the sum of the profit over the two periods. ► This is the next step taken here: maximize the sum of the profit over the two –period. ► How would you formulate the problem of finding the optimal solution for the strategic pricing case? ► “Ingredients”: demand period 1: P1 = 500 – Q for 0  Q1  300 period 2: P2 = 500 – Q1 – Q for 0  Q2  300 – Q1 objective maximize overall profit  = P1Q1 + P2Q2 = (500 – Q1)Q1 + (500 – Q1 – Q2)Q2 ► First notice that there is really no period market before period 1 market is closed (we need Q1 sold in period 1 to figure the demand in period 2). The fact that the choice of Q1 affects the demand function of period 2 means that when we calculate the marginal revenue relative to period 1, i.e. increase Q1 by one unit, we have to take into account how this extra unit affects the revenue in period 2. ► A (small) change in Q1 will bring a change in total revenue, i.e. marginal revenue MR1 equal to MR1 = [500 – 2Q1] + [–Q2] = 500 – 2Q1 – Q2 ► A (small) change in Q2 will bring a change in total revenue, i.e. marginal revenue MR2 equal to MR2 = 500 – Q1 – 2Q2 period 1 period 2  2016 Kellogg School of Management lecture 8 page | 21

23 microeconomics strategic pricing - model retail industry lecture 8
dynamic pricing (I) the analytics of constrained optimal decisions retail industry strategic pricing - model ► With the two marginal revenues available, MR1 giving the change in total revenue when an extra unit is added to Q1 and MR2 giving the change in total revenue when an extra unit is added to Q2, at the optimum MR1 = MR2 that is 500 – 2Q1 – Q2 = 500 – Q1 – 2Q2 with solution Q1 = Q2 ► The second condition is that Q1 + Q2 = 300 ► The optimal allocation is thus Q1 = Q2 = 150 ► The prices are period 1: P1 = 500 – Q1 = 350 period 2: P2 = 500 – Q1 – Q2 = 200  2016 Kellogg School of Management lecture 8 page | 22

24 microeconomics strategic pricing retail industry lecture 8
dynamic pricing (I) the analytics of constrained optimal decisions retail industry strategic pricing first period market second period market ► Two-period market ► If the effect of period 1’s decision on period 2’s outcome is taken into account the solution is different: Q1 = 150 and P1 = 350 Q2 = 150 and P2 = 200 ► The total revenue (and since costs are zero this is also the profit) is: TR = P1∙Q1 + P2∙Q2 = 82,500 ► This is the highest profit that the retailer can obtain! ► The dotted line in the diagram on the left represents the marginal revenue when Q1 changes without taking into account the effect of this change on period 1. 500 buys total capacity residual capacity 350 (H) 350 buys residual capacity Q2 = 150 200 (J) MR1 MR2 (G) 50 50 (I) 150 175 250 300 150 175 units sold first period units sold second period  2016 Kellogg School of Management lecture 8 page | 23

25 microeconomics dynamic pricing – key points retail industry lecture 8
dynamic pricing (I) the analytics of constrained optimal decisions retail industry dynamic pricing – key points ONE PERIOD MODEL TWO PERIOD MODEL UNIFORM PRICING MYOPIC PRICING STRATEGIC PRICING  one demand function  maximize one period profit  one price for all buyers  two demand functions  maximize per-period profits  per-period price discrimination  two demand functions  maximize sum of periods profits  per-period price discrimination single period market first period second period first period second period 350 250 250 200 200 250 250 50 150 150 single period first period second period first period second period ► The shaded areas represent the profit made by the airline (one-market on the far left and two-market case for the two diagrams on the right)  2016 Kellogg School of Management lecture 8 page | 24


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