1. Desirability of religion and the non-cognitive function of misbeliefs
Konrad Talmont-Kaminski Marie Curie-Sklodowska U., Poland

2. Background Philosopher of science
Investigating superstitious, magical and religious beliefs and practices
As cognitive, evolved phenomena
Their relation to science and human rationality
PhD from Monash Uni, Australia
Teaching in Lublin, Poland
Fellowship at the Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research

3. Background Two developments make my approach possible
The cognitive turn
1960’s onwards
Positing mental mechanisms to explain behaviour
Applied to religious & superstitious practices
Evolutionary explanations of human behaviour
1970’s onwards
Ultimate vs. proximate explanations
Behaviours as adaptive, byproducts, etc.
Cultural as well as genetic evolution

4. Background Cognitive Science of Religion Pascal Boyer, Justin Barrett
Religion as byproduct
Evolutionary psychology
Massive modularity
Dual-process accounts of reasoning
Other approaches exist
Approach pursued by me
Religion as a cultural adaptation that exapts/recruits existing cognitive byproducts
Dual inheritance theory
Bounded rationality theory

5. Plan How can misbeliefs be adaptive?
In what ways can misbeliefs be protected?
What makes certain misbeliefs plausible?
Why are some misbeliefs potentially desirable?
What effect does investigating misbeliefs have?

6. Adaptive misbeliefs Misbeliefs can motivate adaptive behaviour
Fear of Fri 13th leads to avoiding train crash
Coincidental
Only significant if systematic
Possible systematic examples
Magical contagion
Religion

7. Adaptive misbeliefs Magical Contagion (Paul Rozin)
Cardigan example (Bruce Hood)
Fear of ‘catching’ evil
Invisible vehicles of contagion passed by contact
Very useful given bacteria & viruses
False explanation, partly true (overgeneralised) correlation
Role of explanation?
Ideas of magical contagion motivate behaviour
Ideas of magical contagion post hoc explanation of behaviour
Studied extensively by Paul Rozin
Misbelief explained as byproduct of cognitive heuristic

8. Adaptive misbeliefs McKay and Dennett, BBS 32.6 (2009)
The “boy who cried wolf” problem
Misbelief in the face of counterevidence
Misbelief unstable due to counterevidence
Can not be systematically adaptive
Disproved misbeliefs
Rejected
Reinterpreted
Contagion example
Belief that you can catch evil not adaptive
But, belief in contagion in general is

9. Protecting misbeliefs
Misbeliefs can be protected against counterevidence
Talmont-Kaminski, BBS 32.6 & Teorema 28.3 (2009)
Protected misbeliefs stable
Can still motivate behaviour
Three ways to protect misbeliefs
Content
Social context
Methodological context

10. Protecting misbeliefs
Content of stable misbeliefs
Avoid content in direct conflict with experience
Claim epistemic impediments
Invisibility – ghosts, Christian god
Shyness – faeries
Distant locale – dragons, Olympic gods
Shape-shifting – Olympic gods
Vagueness – New Age beliefs
Semi-propositional content (Sperber)
Holy Trinity
Apparent problem
Belief in the face of the lack of evidence

11. Protecting misbeliefs
Social context of misbeliefs
Make investigation of misbeliefs socially unacceptable
The sacred – religious and magical beliefs
Religious relics
Respecting religious beliefs above other beliefs
Disparage curiosity
Oppose rational criticism
Problem
Stultifies progress

12. Protecting misbeliefs
Methodological context of misbeliefs
Related to social context
Limit development of science
Scientific theories
Scientific methods/equipment
Scientific attitudes
Problem
Limited access to science
Not such an issue traditionally

13. Plausible misbeliefs Why believe without evidence?
Not really a problem
Only problem with perfectly rational beings
Boundedly rational beings will have systematic biases
Why believe without evidence the things we do?
Primarily: Due to the particularities of human cognitive system
Due to the particular heuristics humans use
Secondarily: Due to function of the beliefs

14. Plausible misbeliefs By-products of cognitive heuristics
Type I errors (Skinner)
Error Management Theory (Haselton)
Smoke alarm principle
Magical contagion (Rozin)
Contagion heuristic
Cognitive science of religion
Minimally counterintuitive concepts (Boyer)
Hyperactive agency detection device (Guthrie)
Enormous scope for further empirical research

15. Desirability of misbeliefs
What, if anything, is the function of misbeliefs?
Not to accurately represent the world
Protecting against disconfirmation ensures truth of a belief is coincidental
Allows noncognitive functions to determine popularity of belief
Function must depend upon the behaviour motivated by the belief

16. Desirability of misbeliefs
Several possibilities
Adaptive for individuals
Costly-signalling (Sosis)
Adaptive for groups
Prosocial behaviour (D. S. Wilson)
Adaptive for beliefs
Memetic virus (Dawkins, Blackmore)
Not directly functional
Simply a byproduct (Boyer)

17. Desirability of misbeliefs
Which thesis about function is correct?
Need to investigate religion to find out
Answer may be complex
Superstitions – byproducts
Religions – prosocial exaptations (ancestral traits?)
Is religion is something desirable for us?
Universally assumed by religious individuals
Dennett’s “Belief in belief”
Not necessarily even if an individual-level adaptation
Dennett’s question: Who thinks that their goal in life is to have as many kids as possible?
Issue is somewhat more complex, of course

18. Still, Dennett has a point

19. Investigating misbeliefs
Even if religious is desirable
There is a problem
Investigation of religion
Requires scientific attitude
Maintaining positive effects of religious claims
Requires maintaining belief in those claims
Which requires protecting those beliefs
Investigation of religion undermines its function
Even if that function happens to be individually desirable
But to determine if religion is desirable we must investigate it

20. Thank you
Konrad Talmont-Kaminski lublin.academia.edu/ KonradTalmontKaminski
McKay & Dennett, Evolution of Misbelief, BBS 32.6 (2009)
Talmont-Kaminski, Effective untestability and bounded rationality help in seeing religion as adaptive misbelief, BBS 32.6 (2009)
Talmont-Kaminski, Fixation of superstitious beliefs, Teorema (2009)