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Complementary Policies

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1 Complementary Policies
for Climate Change: Basis, Design, Strategy January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD 1

2 Complementary Policies
Seeking a Price Response in Failed Markets Making the Case for Complementary Policies Considering a Federal Climate Action Plan Annex: Smart Grid (EISA Title XIII) 2

3 U.S. Approach: Cap-and-Trade
Declining Cap Covered Entities

4 Polluters Compete for Scarce Permits

5 Carbon Price Established by Market Activity
So, is it more profitable to: buy a permit, OR reduce my own emissions? Profit opportunities are a main driver for innovation and investment, and the climate challenge needs both.

6 Carbon Price Established by Market Activity
$40 Would anyone accept $40 for your permit?

7 Carbon Costs Passed to Consumers
$40 $40 $40 $40 $40 35¢ per gallon 2.5 ¢ per kWh 0.6 ¢ per therm People Respond…?

8 Achieving Reduction Targets
To stabilize global warming, most uses of coal, oil, and gas will have to move to a different game: the clean energy economy. 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 6000 7000 $100 $80 $60 $40 $20 $120 $150 $250 $200 $150 $100 $50 $300 $350 $?? What price trajectory would be sufficient to drive people away from fossil fuels? Modeling results are highly uncertain Annual U.S. Emissions (MtCO2) Carbon Price ($/MtCO2) 2000 2100 2050 8

9 Moving to Clean Energy 2030 2020 2010 2050 2040 $100 $50 $200 $30 $150
Players seek better options as costs rise. Cap-and-trade lets players choose at what price they leave the game – and how they want to make that change. Rail Transport Hybrid vehicle Nuclear power $100 Solar power Wind power $50 Green buildings $200 $30 $150 $20

10 Achieving Reduction Targets
2050 Who will be the last greenhouse gas polluters left in the game? Unlike the familiar game of Musical Chairs, the last players still vying for pollution permits are not exactly winners… 10

11 Achieving Reduction Targets
2050 The last ones remaining in the game are those who: can afford to pay the most, or have the least flexibility to change games. The underlying assumption is that the most valuable uses of fossil fuels must be the ones for which people are willing to pay the most. To stabilize global warming, most uses of coal, oil, and gas will have to move to a different game: the clean energy economy. 11

12

13 Market Conditions Perfect Competition Many small buyers and sellers
Perfect freedom of entry and exit from the industry. Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes. Perfect knowledge Low transaction costs No externalities arising from production and/or consumption which lie outside the market SELLERS BUYERS

14 Market Conditions Perfect Competition Many small buyers and sellers
Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes. Perfect freedom of entry and exit from the industry. Perfect knowledge Low transaction costs No externalities arising from production and/or consumption which lie outside the market

15 Market Conditions Perfect Competition Many small buyers and sellers
Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes. Perfect freedom of entry and exit from the industry. Perfect knowledge Low transaction costs No externalities arising from production and/or consumption which lie outside the market

16 Market Conditions Perfect Competition Many small buyers and sellers
Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes. Perfect freedom of entry and exit from the industry. Perfect knowledge Low transaction costs No externalities arising from production and/or consumption which lie outside the market $3.99 $3.99 $3.20

17 Market Conditions Perfect Competition Many small buyers and sellers
Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes. Perfect freedom of entry and exit from the industry. Perfect knowledge Low transaction costs No externalities arising from production and/or consumption which lie outside the market $3.99 $3.99 $3.20

18 Market Conditions Perfect Competition Many small buyers and sellers
Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes. Perfect freedom of entry and exit from the industry. Perfect knowledge Low transaction costs No externalities arising from production and/or consumption which lie outside the market $3.99 $3.99 $3.20

19 Market Conditions Energy Sector Few sellers, many buyers
Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes. Perfect freedom of entry and exit from the industry. Perfect knowledge Low transaction costs No externalities arising from production and/or consumption which lie outside the market $3.99 $3.99 $3.20

20 Market Conditions Energy Sector Few sellers, many buyers
Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes. High capital requirements and regulatory barriers to entry Perfect knowledge Low transaction costs No externalities arising from production and/or consumption which lie outside the market $3.99 $3.99 $3.20

21 Market Conditions Energy Sector Few sellers, many buyers
Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes. High capital requirements and regulatory barriers to entry Lack of transparency Low transaction costs No externalities arising from production and/or consumption which lie outside the market $/Btu? $??

22 Market Conditions Energy Sector Few sellers, many buyers
Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes. High capital requirements and regulatory barriers to entry Lack of transparency Persistent transaction costs No externalities arising from production and/or consumption which lie outside the market $?? $/Btu?

23 Market Conditions Energy Sector Few sellers, many buyers
Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes. High capital requirements and regulatory barriers to entry Lack of transparency Persistent transaction costs Many, Very Large Externalities – climate change is just one… $?? $/Btu?

24 Complementary Policies
Seeking a Price Response in Failed Markets Making the Case for Complementary Policies Considering a Federal Climate Action Plan Annex: Smart Grid (EISA Title XIII) 24

25 #1 Complementary Policies Reduce the Cost of Price-Based Policies
Messages: This is a summary of our conclusions; the curve represents a simplified view of all the abatement opportunities identified in the 6 sectors and 6 geographies at a cost lower or equal to 40 EUR/ton The opportunities are reported in increasing cost order BAU emissions 2030 could be reduced by 27 Gton (46% compared to BAU) if all measures below 40 EUR/ton are captured Almost a quarter of these measures, 7 Gton) are at negative or zero cost The opportunities are highly fragmented cross regions and sectors

26 #1 Complementary Policies Reduce the Cost of Price-Based Policies
($/tonCO2) Abatement costs <$50/ton 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 -10 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 -20 Potential Gigatons/year IN 2030 -30 -40 -50 -60 -70 Messages: This is a summary of our conclusions; the curve represents a simplified view of all the abatement opportunities identified in the 6 sectors and 6 geographies at a cost lower or equal to 40 EUR/ton The opportunities are reported in increasing cost order BAU emissions 2030 could be reduced by 27 Gton (46% compared to BAU) if all measures below 40 EUR/ton are captured Almost a quarter of these measures, 7 Gton) are at negative or zero cost The opportunities are highly fragmented cross regions and sectors -80 -90 -100 -110 -120 -230 Mid-range case, McKinsey 2007

27 #1 Complementary Policies Reduce the Cost of Price-Based Policies
($/tonCO2) Abatement costs <$50/ton 100 90 A price on carbon will not address all the non-price barriers to reducing GHGs – or the price insensitive reasons people consume fossil fuels. 80 70 Residential electronics Residential buildings - Lighting Fuel economy packages – Cars Cellulosic biofuels Industry – Combined heat and power Conservation tillage Fuel economy packages – Light trucks Coal mining – Methane mgmt Industrial process improve-ments Commercial buildings – New shell improvements 60 50 40 30 20 10 -10 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 -20 Potential Gigatons/year IN 2030 -30 -40 -50 -60 -70 Messages: This is a summary of our conclusions; the curve represents a simplified view of all the abatement opportunities identified in the 6 sectors and 6 geographies at a cost lower or equal to 40 EUR/ton The opportunities are reported in increasing cost order BAU emissions 2030 could be reduced by 27 Gton (46% compared to BAU) if all measures below 40 EUR/ton are captured Almost a quarter of these measures, 7 Gton) are at negative or zero cost The opportunities are highly fragmented cross regions and sectors -80 -90 Commercial electronics -100 -110 -120 -230 Mid-range case, McKinsey 2007

28 #1 Complementary Policies Reduce the Cost of Price-Based Policies
($/tonCO2) Abatement costs <$50/ton 100 Natural gas and petroleum systems mgmt Afforestation of pastureland Reforestation Winter cover crops New coal power plants with CCS for EOR Biomass power – Cofiring Industry – CCS new builds on carbon-intensive processes Shift dispatch of existing plants from coal to natural gas Car hybridi-zation 90 80 70 Commercial electronics Residential electronics Residential buildings - Lighting Fuel economy packages – Cars Cellulosic biofuels Industry – Combined heat and power Conservation tillage Fuel economy packages – Light trucks Coal mining – Methane mgmt Industrial process improve-ments Commercial buildings – New shell improvements 60 50 40 30 20 10 -10 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 -20 Potential Gigatons/year IN 2030 -30 -40 -50 -60 -70 Messages: This is a summary of our conclusions; the curve represents a simplified view of all the abatement opportunities identified in the 6 sectors and 6 geographies at a cost lower or equal to 40 EUR/ton The opportunities are reported in increasing cost order BAU emissions 2030 could be reduced by 27 Gton (46% compared to BAU) if all measures below 40 EUR/ton are captured Almost a quarter of these measures, 7 Gton) are at negative or zero cost The opportunities are highly fragmented cross regions and sectors -80 -90 -100 -110 -120 -230 Mid-range case, McKinsey 2007

29 #1 Complementary Policies Reduce the Cost of Price-Based Policies
($/tonCO2) Abatement costs <$50/ton Reduction Target: 1 GtCO2e 100 Natural gas and petroleum systems mgmt Afforestation of pastureland Reforestation Winter cover crops New coal power plants with CCS for EOR Biomass power – Cofiring Industry – CCS new builds on carbon-intensive processes Shift dispatch of existing plants from coal to natural gas Car hybridi-zation 90 80 70 60 $40 / tonCO2 50 40 30 20 10 -10 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 -20 Potential Gigatons/year IN 2030 -30 -40 -50 -60 -70 Messages: This is a summary of our conclusions; the curve represents a simplified view of all the abatement opportunities identified in the 6 sectors and 6 geographies at a cost lower or equal to 40 EUR/ton The opportunities are reported in increasing cost order BAU emissions 2030 could be reduced by 27 Gton (46% compared to BAU) if all measures below 40 EUR/ton are captured Almost a quarter of these measures, 7 Gton) are at negative or zero cost The opportunities are highly fragmented cross regions and sectors -80 -90 -100 -110 -120 -230 Mid-range case, McKinsey 2007

30 #1 Complementary Policies Reduce the Cost of Price-Based Policies
($/tonCO2) Abatement costs <$50/ton Reduction Target: 1 GtCO2e 100 New coal power plants with CCS for EOR Shift dispatch of existing plants from coal to natural gas New coal power plants with CCS for EOR Shift dispatch of existing plants from coal to natural gas 90 80 70 60 $40 / tonCO2 50 40 $10 Billion 30 20 10 Residential buildings -Lighting Fuel economy packages – Cars packages – Light trucks -10 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 -20 Potential Gigatons/year IN 2030 -30 -40 -50 -60 -70 Messages: This is a summary of our conclusions; the curve represents a simplified view of all the abatement opportunities identified in the 6 sectors and 6 geographies at a cost lower or equal to 40 EUR/ton The opportunities are reported in increasing cost order BAU emissions 2030 could be reduced by 27 Gton (46% compared to BAU) if all measures below 40 EUR/ton are captured Almost a quarter of these measures, 7 Gton) are at negative or zero cost The opportunities are highly fragmented cross regions and sectors -80 -90 -100 -110 -120 -230 Mid-range case, McKinsey 2007

31 #2 People May Reject a Carbon Price Signal Before They Reject Fossil Fuels
COST ($/tonCO2) Abatement costs <$50/ton 100 New coal power plants with CCS for EOR 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 Residential buildings -Lighting Fuel economy packages – Cars packages – Light trucks -10 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 -20 Potential Gigatons/year IN 2030 -30 -40 -50 -60 -70 Messages: This is a summary of our conclusions; the curve represents a simplified view of all the abatement opportunities identified in the 6 sectors and 6 geographies at a cost lower or equal to 40 EUR/ton The opportunities are reported in increasing cost order BAU emissions 2030 could be reduced by 27 Gton (46% compared to BAU) if all measures below 40 EUR/ton are captured Almost a quarter of these measures, 7 Gton) are at negative or zero cost The opportunities are highly fragmented cross regions and sectors -80 -90 -100 Shift dispatch of existing plants from coal to natural gas -110 -120 -230 Mid-range case, McKinsey 2007

32 #2 People May Reject a Carbon Price Signal Before They Reject Fossil Fuels
32

33 #2 People May Reject a Carbon Price Signal Before They Reject Fossil Fuels
Carbon Price: $0/tCO2 $20/tCO2 Nuclear Coal Power Natural Gas Sets Price Sets Price Market Price Market Price Profit Profit Profit Profit Profit Dispatch Price per MWh Profit Dispatch Price per MWh 33

34 #2 People May Reject a Carbon Price Signal Before They Reject Fossil Fuels
Carbon Price: $0/tCO2 $20/tCO2 Nuclear Coal Power Natural Gas Sets Price Sets Price Market Price Market Price Profit Profit Profit Profit Profit Dispatch Price per MWh Profit Dispatch Price per MWh 34

35 #2 People May Reject a Carbon Price Signal Before They Reject Fossil Fuels
Gasoline Consumption Price of Gasoline ~$150/tCO2

36 World Resources Institute; 2003 data
#3 Stabilization Requires Reducing Emissions Outside a Managed Cap of Measurable Sources CAP OFFSETS World Resources Institute; 2003 data

37 Complementary Policies
Seeking a Price Response in Failed Markets Making the Case for Complementary Policies Considering a Federal Climate Action Plan Annex: Smart Grid (EISA Annex XIII) 38

38 Market Conditions Perfect Competition Energy Sector
Many small buyers and sellers Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes. Perfect freedom of entry and exit from the industry. Perfect knowledge Low transaction costs No externalities arising from production and/or consumption which lie outside the market Few sellers, many buyers Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes. High capital requirements and regulatory barriers to entry Lack of transparency Persistent transaction costs Many, Very Large Externalities – climate change is just one…

39 Complementary Policies
Market Conditions Energy Sector Few sellers, many buyers Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes. High capital requirements and regulatory barriers to entry Lack of transparency Persistent transaction costs Many, Very Large Externalities – climate change is just one… Complementary Policies Price-Based Policies

40 Market Conditions Energy Sector Price-Based Policies
Few sellers, many buyers Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes. High capital requirements and regulatory barriers to entry Lack of transparency Persistent transaction costs Many, Very Large Externalities – climate change is just one… Curing market failures Coping with market failures Covering emissions by sector Price-Based Policies

41 Designing Complementary Policies
An “economy-wide” cap-and-trade policy does not distinguish between sectors End-Use CAP U.S. GHG Emissions U.S. Sources OFFSETS INSIDE U.S. World Resources Institute; 2003 data

42 Designing Complementary Policies
End-Use Transportation Distance Mode Fuel Source Fuel Economy U.S. GHG Emissions U.S. Sources World Resources Institute; 2003 data

43 California’s Strategy to Reduce Emissions to 1990 by 2020 = 174 MMTCO2E below baseline = 10% below Vehicle GHG Standards

44 California’s Strategy to Reduce Emissions to 1990 by 2020 = 174 MMTCO2E below baseline = 10% below Low Carbon Fuel Standard Vehicle GHG Standards

45 California’s Strategy to Reduce Emissions to 1990 by 2020 = 174 MMTCO2E below baseline = 10% below Low Carbon Fuel Standard Transportation & Other Vehicle Measures Vehicle GHG Standards

46 Designing Complementary Policies
End-Use Transportation Electric Power Sector U.S. GHG Emissions U.S. Sources World Resources Institute; 2003 data

47 California’s Strategy to Reduce Emissions to 1990 by 2020 = 174 MMTCO2E below baseline = 10% below Low Carbon Fuel Standard Transportation & Other Vehicle Measures Vehicle GHG Standards Efficiency Standards & Incentive Programs

48 California’s Strategy to Reduce Emissions to 1990 by 2020 = 174 MMTCO2E below baseline = 10% below Low Carbon Fuel Standard Transportation & Other Vehicle Measures Vehicle GHG Standards Efficiency Standards & Incentive Programs Renewable Portfolio Standard: 33% by 2020

49 California’s Strategy to Reduce Emissions to 1990 by 2020 = 174 MMTCO2E below baseline = 10% below Low Carbon Fuel Standard Transportation & Other Vehicle Measures Vehicle GHG Standards Efficiency Standards & Incentive Programs Renewable Portfolio Standard: 33% by 2020 Million Solar Roofs

50 Designing Complementary Policies
End-Use U.S. GHG Emissions U.S. Sources Industrial Gases World Resources Institute; 2003 data

51 California’s Strategy to Reduce Emissions to 1990 by 2020 = 174 MMTCO2E below baseline = 10% below u Low Carbon Fuel Standard Transportation & Other Vehicle Measures Vehicle GHG Standards Efficiency Standards & Incentive Programs Renewable Portfolio Standard: 33% by 2020 Million Solar Roofs F-Gases & Refrigerants

52 California’s Strategy to Reduce Emissions to 1990 by 2020 = 174 MMTCO2E below baseline = 10% below u Low Carbon Fuel Standard Transportation & Other Vehicle Measures Vehicle GHG Standards Efficiency Standards & Incentive Programs Renewable Portfolio Standard: 33% by 2020 Million Solar Roofs Sustainable Forests F-Gases & Refrigerants

53 California’s Strategy to Reduce Emissions to 1990 by 2020 = 174 MMTCO2E below baseline = 10% below u Low Carbon Fuel Standard Transportation & Other Vehicle Measures Vehicle GHG Standards Efficiency Standards & Incentive Programs Renewable Portfolio Standard: 33% by 2020 Other Million Solar Roofs Sustainable Forests F-Gases & Refrigerants

54 California’s Strategy to Reduce Emissions to 1990 by 2020 = 174 MMTCO2E below baseline = 10% below u Low Carbon Fuel Standard Transportation & Other Vehicle Measures Vehicle GHG Standards Efficiency Standards & Incentive Programs Renewable Portfolio Standard: 33% by 2020 Cap-And-Trade Market Response Million Solar Roofs Sustainable Forests F-Gases & Refrigerants

55 Designing Complementary Policies
End-Use U.S. GHG Emissions U.S. Sources CAP OFFSETS INSIDE U.S. World Resources Institute; 2003 data

56 Energy Intensive Industries
Most of the Industrial GHG Emissions Covered by a Cap-and-Trade Policy are in 5 Sub-Sectors Energy Intensive Industries Capped

57 Most of the Industrial GHG Emissions Covered by a Cap-and-Trade Policy are in 5 Sub-Sectors
ISO 50001: Int’l Energy Management Std. Capped

58 Complementary Policies for EE & RE
National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency recommendations Renewable Portfolio Standard; Renewable Fuel Standard Generation performance standards; Low Carbon Fuel Standard Requiring efficiency to be an alternative in power plant EIS studies Remove barriers to grid access (“Free the Grid” report) Green power purchases and marketing Combined heat and power (CHP) standards, incentives, and/or barrier removal Public Benefits Charge – and all that it could fund

59 Policy Horizon On the Books: EPAct 2005 EISA 2007
Existing executive authorities across all departments Looking ahead: New Energy for America SAFETEA-LU (Transportation Reauthorization) Cap-and-Trade legislation Mass vs. EPA regulations

60 Complementary Policies
Seeking a Price Response in Failed Markets Making the Case for Complementary Policies Considering a Federal Climate Action Plan Annex: Smart Grid (EISA Title XIII) 61

61 Supplemental questions on Smart Grid
What does Smart Grid do? What characterizes a Smart Grid? What does Smart Grid deliver? … as specified in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007

62 What does a Smart Grid do? (EISA Title XIII)
Dynamic optimization of grid operations and resources, with full cyber-security. Development and incorporation of demand response, demand-side resources, and energy-efficiency resources. Provision to consumers of timely information and control options.

63 What characterizes a Smart Grid? (EISA TitleXIII)
Increased use of digital information and controls technology to improve reliability, security, and efficiency of the electric grid. Deployment and integration of distributed generation (e.g. renewable resources) Deployment and integration of advanced electricity storage and peak-shaving technologies, including plug-in electric and hybrid electric vehicles, and thermal- storage air conditioning. Deployment of `smart' technologies (real-time, automated, interactive technologies that optimize the physical operation of appliances and consumer devices) for metering, communications concerning grid operations and status, and distribution automation. Integration of `smart' appliances and consumer devices. Development of standards for communication and interoperability of appliances and equipment connected to the grid, including grid infrastructure. Identification and lowering of unreasonable or unnecessary barriers to adoption of smart grid technologies, practices, and services.

64 What does a Smart Grid deliver? (EISA Title XIII)
The ability to measure or monitor electricity use as a function of time of day, power quality characteristics such as voltage level, current, cycles per second, or source or type of generation and to store, synthesize or report that information by digital means. The ability to sense and localize disruptions or changes in power flows on the grid and communicate such information instantaneously and automatically for purposes of enabling automatic protective responses to sustain reliability and security of grid operations. The ability to detect, prevent, communicate with regard to, respond to, or recover from system security threats, including cyber-security threats and terrorism, using digital information, media, and devices. The ability of any appliance or machine to respond to such signals, measurements, or communications automatically or in a manner programmed by its owner or operator without independent human intervention. The ability to use digital information to operate functionalities on the electric utility grid that were previously electro-mechanical or manual. The ability to use digital controls to manage and modify electricity demand, enable congestion management, assist in voltage control, provide operating reserves, and provide frequency regulation.

65 Complementary Policies
for Climate Change: Basis, Design, Strategy January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD 66


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