1. Plato on Change

5. Gorgias
(c )

6. Gorgias
(c )
Protagoras
(c )

8. Socrates (469/ BCE)

14. Plato ( BCE)

20. “Becoming” is by us incorrectly called being, but is really becoming, for nothing ever is, but all things are becoming. Summon all philosophers-Protagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and the rest of them, one after another, and with the exception of Parmenides they will agree with you in this. Plato, Theaetetus

21. The Divided Line Higher Forms (the Good, the Beautiful, etc.)
Ontological
Epistemic
Higher Forms (the Good, the Beautiful, etc.)
Lower Forms (shapes, numbers, etc.)
Physical Objects (plants, tables, etc.)
Images (paintings, pictures, etc.)
Understanding (philosophy)
Reason (mathematics)
Perception (science)
Imagination (art)
Being
Knowledge
Becoming
Opinion

22. The Divided Line Higher Forms (the Good, the Beautiful, etc.)
Ontological
Epistemic
Higher Forms (the Good, the Beautiful, etc.)
Lower Forms (shapes, numbers, etc.)
Physical Objects (plants, tables, etc.)
Images (paintings, pictures, etc.)
Understanding (philosophy)
Reason (mathematics)
Perception (science)
Imagination (art)
Being
Knowledge
Becoming
Opinion

23. The Divided Line Higher Forms (the Good, the Beautiful, etc.)
Ontological
Epistemic
Higher Forms (the Good, the Beautiful, etc.)
Lower Forms (shapes, numbers, etc.)
Physical Objects (plants, tables, etc.)
Images (paintings, pictures, etc.)
Understanding (philosophy)
Reason (mathematics)
Perception (science)
Imagination (art)
Being
Knowledge
Becoming
Opinion

24. Do we say that there is such a thing as the Just itself, or not
Do we say that there is such a thing as the Just itself, or not? We do say so, by Zeus. And the Beautiful, and the Good? Of course. And have you ever seen any of these things with your eyes? In no way, he said. Or have you ever grasped them with any of your bodily senses?... [Or do you instead do so] by using pure thought alone?

25. Well then, consider what then follows if you also accept my hypothesis
Well then, consider what then follows if you also accept my hypothesis. For it seems to me that if anything else is beautiful besides Beauty itself, it is beautiful on account of nothing else than because it partakes of Beauty Itself. And I speak in the same way about everything else. Plato, Phaedo

26. Platonic Forms are:
ungenerated,
indestructible,
unchanging,
indivisible,
imperceptible,
immaterial, and
ultimately real.

27. The Divided Line Higher Forms (the Good, the Beautiful, etc.)
Ontological
Epistemic
Higher Forms (the Good, the Beautiful, etc.)
Lower Forms (shapes, numbers, etc.)
Physical Objects (plants, tables, etc.)
Images (paintings, pictures, etc.)
Understanding (philosophy)
Reason (mathematics)
Perception (science)
Imagination (art)
Being
Knowledge
Becoming
Opinion

28. The Divided Line Higher Forms (the Good, the Beautiful, etc.)
Ontological
Epistemic
Higher Forms (the Good, the Beautiful, etc.)
Lower Forms (shapes, numbers, etc.)
Physical Objects (plants, tables, etc.)
Images (paintings, pictures, etc.)
Understanding (philosophy)
Reason (mathematics)
Perception (science)
Imagination (art)
Being
Knowledge
Becoming
Opinion

29. The Divided Line Higher Forms (the Good, the Beautiful, etc.)
Ontological
Epistemic
Higher Forms (the Good, the Beautiful, etc.)
Lower Forms (shapes, numbers, etc.)
Physical Objects (plants, tables, etc.)
Images (paintings, pictures, etc.)
Understanding (philosophy)
Reason (mathematics)
Perception (science)
Imagination (art)
Being
Knowledge
Becoming
Opinion

30. The Divided Line Higher Forms (the Good, the Beautiful, etc.)
Ontological
Epistemic
Higher Forms (the Good, the Beautiful, etc.)
Lower Forms (shapes, numbers, etc.)
Physical Objects (plants, tables, etc.)
Images (paintings, pictures, etc.)
Understanding (philosophy)
Reason (mathematics)
Perception (science)
Imagination (art)
Being
Knowledge
Becoming
Opinion

32. The Divided Line Higher Forms (the Good, the Beautiful, etc.)
Ontological
Epistemic
Higher Forms (the Good, the Beautiful, etc.)
Lower Forms (shapes, numbers, etc.)
Physical Objects (plants, tables, etc.)
Images (paintings, pictures, etc.)
Understanding (philosophy)
Reason (mathematics)
Perception (science)
Imagination (art)
Being
Knowledge
Becoming
Opinion

33. The Divided Line Higher Forms (the Good, the Beautiful, etc.)
Ontological
Epistemic
Higher Forms (the Good, the Beautiful, etc.)
Lower Forms (shapes, numbers, etc.)
Physical Objects (plants, tables, etc.)
Images (paintings, pictures, etc.)
Understanding (philosophy)
Reason (mathematics)
Perception (science)
Imagination (art)
Being
Knowledge
Becoming
Opinion

34. The Divided Line Higher Forms (the Good, the Beautiful, etc.)
Ontological
Epistemic
Higher Forms (the Good, the Beautiful, etc.)
Lower Forms (shapes, numbers, etc.)
Physical Objects (plants, tables, etc.)
Images (paintings, pictures, etc.)
Understanding (philosophy)
Reason (mathematics)
Perception (science)
Imagination (art)
Being
Knowledge
Becoming
Opinion

35. The Divided Line Higher Forms (the Good, the Beautiful, etc.)
Ontological
Epistemic
Higher Forms (the Good, the Beautiful, etc.)
Lower Forms (shapes, numbers, etc.)
Physical Objects (plants, tables, etc.)
Images (paintings, pictures, etc.)
Understanding (philosophy)
Reason (mathematics)
Perception (science)
Imagination (art)
Being
Knowledge
Becoming
Opinion

36. The Divided Line Higher Forms (the Good, the Beautiful, etc.)
Ontological
Epistemic
Higher Forms (the Good, the Beautiful, etc.)
Lower Forms (shapes, numbers, etc.)
Physical Objects (plants, tables, etc.)
Images (paintings, pictures, etc.)
Understanding (philosophy)
Reason (mathematics)
Perception (science)
Imagination (art)
Being
Knowledge
Becoming
Opinion

37. The Divided Line Higher Forms (the Good, the Beautiful, etc.)
Ontological
Epistemic
Higher Forms (the Good, the Beautiful, etc.)
Lower Forms (shapes, numbers, etc.)
Physical Objects (plants, tables, etc.)
Images (paintings, pictures, etc.)
Understanding (philosophy)
Reason (mathematics)
Perception (science)
Imagination (art)
Being
Knowledge
Becoming
Opinion

39. One excellent proof, said Cebes, is afforded by questions
One excellent proof, said Cebes, is afforded by questions. If you put a question to a person in a right way, he will give a true answer of himself; but how could he do this unless there were knowledge and right reason already in him? Plato, Phaedo

40. Do you realize what a debater’s argument you are bringing up, that a man cannot search either for what he knows or for what he does not know? He cannot search for what he knows—since he knows it, there is no need to search—nor for what he does not know, for he does not know what to look for. Plato, Meno

41. The Paradox of Inquiry
For any question, you either already know the answer or you don’t.
If you know already the answer, then inquiry is unnecessary.
If you don’t, then inquiry is impossible.
All inquiry is either unnecessary or impossible.