1. Comparative political economics
Lecture 2
Paolo Graziano

2. The Westminster model of democracy
Majority principle
British parliamentary and governmental institutions
Need for alternation that prevents ‘elective dictatorship’
Prerequisite: homogeneous societies
UK, Canada…
… Australia, New Zealand …
… Barbados.

3. The case of UK I
concentration of executive power in one- party and bare-majority cabinets (large minority is excluded from power) – exception with minority cabinets in the ’70s
cabinet dominance vis-à-vis Parliament (but possible – although rare - vote of no confidence)
two-party system: Conservative and Labour party (but recently increase of the Liberal Democrats)
majoritarian (single-member districts and ‘first past the post’) and disproportional (votes vs. seats) electoral system.
interest group pluralism

4. The case of the UK II unitary and centralized government
concentration of legislative power in asymmetrical bicameral legislature: House of the Commons and House of the Lords
flexible (“unwritten”) Constitution
absence of judicial review: Parliament is the sovereign authority (except for EU control…)
central bank controlled by the executive (1997: power to set interest rates)

5. The consensus model of democracy
more usable for ‘plural’ societies
it contributes to conflict reduction…
…guaranteeing strong minorities…
…limiting the power of majorities.
Switzerland, Belgium …
… and the European Union.

6. The cases of Switzerland/Belgium I
executive power-sharing in broad coalition cabinets
executive-legislative balance of power (possible government instability)
multiparty system (religious, socioeconomic and linguistic cleavages)
proportional representation
interest group corporatism (agreements reached among few strong political and social actors)

7. The cases of Switzerland/Belgium II
federal and decentralized government
strong bicameralism (with the partial exception of Belgium)
constitutional rigidity: need of ‘supermajorities’ in order to change
judicial review (but not in Switzerland)
central bank independence

8. A supranational case of CD: the EU I
executive power-sharing in broad coalition cabinets
executive-legislative balance of power
multiparty system
proportional representation
interest group corporatism

9. A supranational case of CD: the EU II
federal and decentralized government
strong bicameralism
constitutional rigidity
judicial review
central bank independence