1. Department of Energy Office of Waste Management Status Update
Douglas Tonkay
Director, Office of Disposal Operations
Low Level Waste Forum, Inc. Spring 2015 Meeting
Alexandria, Virginia
April 2015

2. Presentation Topics
Path forward for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) and transuranic wastes across the DOE Complex
Update on low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and mixed LLW (MLLW) waste disposal at DOE facilities
Manifest Information Management System (MIMS) status
Fire:
Occurred shortly after 11 a.m. on Feb. 5.
86 people in the mine, all exited safely; 6 personnel were transported to the Carlsbad Medical Center for smoke inhalation were released the same day. 7 were treated on-site.
WIPP’s Emergency Operations Center was activated.
An underground vehicle used to transport salt was on fire in the underground.
All operations at the repository ceased at that time.
Radiological Incident:
Shortly before midnight on Feb. 14 a continuous air monitor detected a radiological release in the underground.
HEPA filters on-site immediately engaged, thereby minimized releases to the environment.
Monitors on site detected slightly elevated levels of airborne radioactive concentrations, which is consistent with the type of radiation TRU waste has when being placed in the repository.
After recognizing that it wasn’t a radon event, additional precautions were taken to shelter workers.
Concentrations were then and remain today well below a level of public or environmental hazard.
Samples from around the site have been taken and results are confirming these findings.
22 workers on site Feb. 14 and Feb. 15 were exposed to extremely low levels of americium and plutonium these employees are unlikely to experience any health effects as a result .

3. EXCAVATE BUILD & TREAT TRANSPORT PACKAGE DEMOLISH SAFEGUARD
EM Cleanup Program: Remediates the Environmental Legacy of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex
EM is an operational federal program, performing a wide variety of tasks to clean up the environmental legacy of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex:
PACKAGE
BUILD &
TREAT
EXCAVATE
TRANSPORT
DEMOLISH
SAFEGUARD

4. EM Has Made Significant Progress Cleaning Up the Environmental Legacy of the Cold War
EM Historical Cleanup Sites (107)
Sites Remaining Today (16)
K-25 Pre-Cleanup
K-25 Post-Cleanup

5. Recap of the Incidents at WIPP
February 5, 2014 Truck Fire:
All operations at the repository ceased following salt haul truck fire in the WIPP underground.
An investigation team was deployed to determine the cause of the fire.
February 14, 2014 Radiological Incident:
A continuous air monitor detected airborne radiation in the underground.
WIPP’s ventilation system automatically switched to high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration mode when airborne radiation was detected
Underground and the WIPP mine remains in filtration mode at this time.
Extensive sampling and monitoring conducted by DOE, New Mexico, and Carlsbad Environmental Monitoring Research Center Monitoring.
EPA and the NMED also performed sampling.
Efforts by the DOE and Nuclear Waste Partnership are ensuring workers are fully protected during recovery and restart.
Fire:
Occurred shortly after 11 a.m. on Feb. 5.
86 people in the mine, all exited safely; 6 personnel were transported to the Carlsbad Medical Center for smoke inhalation were released the same day. 7 were treated on-site.
WIPP’s Emergency Operations Center was activated.
An underground vehicle used to transport salt was on fire in the underground.
All operations at the repository ceased at that time.
Radiological Incident:
Shortly before midnight on Feb. 14 a continuous air monitor detected a radiological release in the underground.
HEPA filters on-site immediately engaged, thereby minimized releases to the environment.
Monitors on site detected slightly elevated levels of airborne radioactive concentrations, which is consistent with the type of radiation TRU waste has when being placed in the repository.
After recognizing that it wasn’t a radon event, additional precautions were taken to shelter workers.
Concentrations were then and remain today well below a level of public or environmental hazard.
Samples from around the site have been taken and results are confirming these findings.
22 workers on site Feb. 14 and Feb. 15 were exposed to extremely low levels of americium and plutonium these employees are unlikely to experience any health effects as a result .

6. Incidents at WIPP February 14, 2014 Radiological Release
February 5, 2014 Underground Fire
February 14, 2014 Radiological Release
The Department appointed an Accident Investigation Board, which conducted and completed an investigation of the underground fire.
The Accident Investigation Board identified the root cause of the February 5 fire to be the failure of the DOE, WIPP’s management and operating (M&O) contractor, Nuclear Waste Partnership, and the previous M&O contractor to adequately recognize and mitigate the underground fire hazard.
After the radiological event, DOE appointed a second Accident Investigation Board (AIB) to determine the cause of the radiological release and to develop recommendations for corrective actions. This second AIB is using a two-phased approach. The first phase focused on the response to the radioactive material release, including related exposure to aboveground workers and the response actions. The Phase 1 report cited deficiencies in the response to the event and in the areas of nuclear safety, maintenance, radiological protection and controls, emergency management, safety culture and oversight.
We are finalizing corrective action plans for both the underground fire and Phase 1 of the radiological release. The key elements of the corrective action plans are also outlined in this Recovery Plan, and implementation of the corrective actions are well underway.
The second phase of the investigation is ongoing and focuses on the cause of the radiological release. The AIB will provide its findings when the investigation is complete, currently expected by the end of calendar year 2014.
The Department also established a Technical Assessment Team (TAT) to perform a comprehensive technical review of the mechanisms and chemical reactions that may have occurred underground and contributed to the release of radioactivity. TAT Report issued March 26, 2015.
The TAT is conducting sampling, analyses, and assessments to determine the causal mechanisms and chemical reactions that may have resulted in the release of radioactive material.
To date the investigations suggest that the radiological release originated from a TRU waste drum that did not meet the WIPP waste acceptance criteria. This drum was processed at LANL and was known to contain nitrate salts, low pH and organic material, which may be contributing factors to the release.
Accident Investigation Board (AIB) Report issued March 13, 2014
AIB Report, Phase I issued April 24, 2014
AIB Report, Phase II issued April 16, 2015

7. Recap of Incidents: Layout of the Underground
The diagram shows where the two incidents occurred.

8. Key Recovery Steps toward Resumption of Operations
Nuclear Safety Document Revisions
Safety Management Program Revitalization
Underground Restoration
Re-Establish Degraded Equipment
Fire Protection
Maintenance and Ground Control
Radiological Roll-back
Soot cleaning of electrical panels
Expedite mine stability
Initial Panel 6, Panel 7, Room 7 Closure
Interim Ventilation
Supplemental Ventilation Modifications
This is a list of major activities required for restart. There is more detail on subsequent slides. A few points:
Nuclear Safety Documentation and Safety Management Programs (SMP) revisions
Safety is paramount to the overall strategy. The Accident Investigation Board reports identified a number of weaknesses with the WIPP safety programs (nuclear safety, maintenance, radiological protection and controls, emergency management, safety culture and oversight). It is imperative that safety documentation be revised, upgraded to required standards, and implemented prior to recommencing waste emplacement operations, in order to ensure the safety of the public, the workers, and the environment. Evaluation of Safety of the Situation documents used to evaluate and perform recovery activities, until a revised Documented Safety Analysis is completed.
Recovery of the Underground
Routine entries into the underground are ongoing for the purpose of:
Conducting geotechnical inspections for structural integrity of the mine and identify areas where ground control is needed in order for access to be safe
Conducting radiological surveys and sampling to characterize contamination levels and re-post areas of the mine where Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) is not necessary
Cleaning and soot removal for electrical components and equipment
Again, re-establishing safety systems and cleaning or replacing safety equipment including fire protection and emergency equipment
Mine Stability and Ground Control—the mine went 9 months without mine stability work (bolting). More on that in subsequent slides
NMED Orders on Panel Closure—WIPP has an order from the New Mexico Environmental Department to perform expedited panel closures for panel 6 and panel 7 room 7--more on subsequent slides
Ventilation – additions necessary to run in filtration mode
Adequate ventilation is required for life sustainability, removal of dust during mining, and to provide fresh air, and remove exhaust fumes during diesel engine operations.
As previously mentioned, since the radiological event, it has been necessary to operate the existing underground ventilation system in filtration mode. The current ventilation system is inadequate to support operations of both “clean” and contaminated underground areas.
The ventilation levels must be increased to support the recovery of WIPP and resume waste emplacement and, eventually, full disposal operations and concurrent mining operations. Ventilation through High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filtration serves as the first line of defense in the event of an incident in the underground and was one of the key reasons the environmental release that occurred in February was so low.

9. Room 7 Panel 7 Project REACH--Completed
Videos were completed on January 28; Accident Investigation Board confirmed no additional videos required.
REACH project is complete.
Photographic and video examination found no anomalies or other breached drum.
Accident Investigation Board released the Phase II report on April 16, 2015.
The photo shows a view through room 7, panel 7 indicating the destruction of bags that held 1-2 tons of MgO during the incident. MgO bags are placed in 3 rows on top waste stacks.
MgO provides an engineered barrier that decreases the solubilities of the actinide (An) elements in TRU waste in any brine present in the postclosure repository.
15 metallic elements with atomic numbers from 89 to 103, actinium, Thorium, Protac­tinium, Uranium, Neptu­nium, Plutonium, Ameri­cium, Curium, Berkel­ium, Califor­nium, Einstei­nium, Fer­mium, Mende­levium, Nobel­ium, lawrencium.
MgO consumes all of the carbon dioxide (CO2) that would be produced should microbial activity consume all of the cellulosic, plastic, and rubber materials in the TRU waste, waste containers, and waste-emplacement materials
Waste in the WIPP underground facility is stacked in six columns, with each column consisting of up to three layers of TRU waste containers.
In the schematic, orange supersacks are those which are no longer there and their contents were spread throughout the room.
The red waste containers are those containing the “MIN02” waste stream. You can see the suspect drum in the center several stacks in row 16, under the orange sack.

10. AIB Phase II Direct and Root Causes
The AIB determined the accident was preventable.
Direct Cause: Exothermic reaction of incompatible materials in a LANL waste drum.
Local Root Cause: Failure of LANS to understand and effectively implement the LANL Hazardous Waste Facility Permit and Carlsbad Field Office directed controls.  
Systemic Root Cause:  Los Alamos Field Office and National Transuranic Program failure to ensure that LANL had adequately developed and implemented repackaging and treatment procedures.
The AIB’s findings identify shortcomings within both contractor and federal processes at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, WIPP, EM, and the National Nuclear Security Administration.

11. AIB Report Forensics Summary
Fire/Heat Analysis Team - Results
February 2015
AIB Report Forensics Summary
Event initiated at R16:C4 – Drum 68660
Ruled out initiation in R15:C5
Ruled out other start locations
Greatest damage at areas with most exposed combustibles
Demonstrated importance of ember transfer propagation
Radiological and chemical analyses were similar to the TAT results

12. Radiological Rollback
The colors:
Gray = filled waste disposal rooms
Orange = controlled area--clean
Green = Radiological Buffer Area (radiation boundary) – clean
Red = high contamination area
Dark Blue = restricted area--high contamination (contaminated air exhaust from panel). Established in safety documentation (Evaluation of Safety of the Situation documents—ESS)
Light blue = contamination area

13. Contamination Mitigation
WIPP has procured new equipment to mitigate contamination
Spray cart
Applies a water mist to stabilize and encapsulate the radioactive particles into the salt
HEPA vacuum system
Used to capture loose contamination that has not been encapsulated into the salt

14. Ventilation
Increasing ventilation (airflow) is a principal requirement for safe underground operations, as it supports worker safety, mining and waste emplacement.
Current Status
Ventilation in Filtration Mode
60,000 cubic feet per minute (cfm) of filtered air
Note: WIPP’s standard (unfiltered) operational airflow is 425,000 cfm
WIPP Permit requires annual average 260,000 cfm through underground
Minimum of 35,000 cfm of air through the active rooms when waste disposal is taking place
Recovery Actions-- Ventilation will be increased in three phases.
Phase I – HEPA skid and fan unit (114,000 cfm).
Phase II – Reconfiguring airlock and bulkheads and additional fans (180,000 cfm). ECD
Phase III (not needed for initial limited
operations) – Design and construct new
permanent ventilation system (420,000 cfm).
Increasing ventilation capacity is a principal requirement for safe underground operations. Additional ventilation is necessary because the facility is now operating in filtration mode (under HEPA filtration) at all times (60,000 CFM which greatly limits activities underground). Ventilation will be increased in phases.
Phase 1--Interim ventilation (June timeframe): This ongoing first phase is the installation of two skid-mounted fans, which will allow increased activities requiring diesel engines, such as roof bolting, and will provide redundancy with the current high-efficiency particulate air filter system operations. Procurement is on-going.
Phase 2—Supplemental Ventilation (August timeframe): Additional fans will be added and ducting, bulkheads reconfigured. This reconfiguration allows for increased activities that create fumes and dust, including very limited mining and initial waste operations.
Phase 3—Permanent Ventilation System (several years out): Required prior to resuming full operations. Critical Decision (CD)-0, Mission Need, approved Oct 22, Cost ~$77-$309M. This last phase will restore WIPP to its pre-incident airflow capacity for mining and waste operations.
Periodic filter replacements are expected and included in the Recovery effort.
The WIPP ventilation system has two filter units
Each unit has 84 filters comprised of four layers
The first stage of filters (moderate filters) are being replaced due to a buildup of salt dust.
Recent radiological surveys show significantly less contamination (10X less) on the filters than during previous filter replacements in June 2014.

15. Panel Closure Plans Completed: On-going: Upcoming:
Installation of two portable 10 horsepower fans in the entrance access area for air movement
Bolting at the entrance side of Panel 6
Installation of a bulkhead at the entrance side of Panel 6 (brattice cloth, chain-link and 10ft of salt already installed)
On-going:
Bolting activities continue into the exhaust side of Panel 6
Upcoming:
Panel 7, Room 7 to follow Panel 6
Panel 6
Air Intake entrance
Panel 6 Air Exhaust
bolting
continues
Isolating the suspect waste stream (MIN-02) is a priority for DOE.
368 containers in Panel 6
55 containers in Panel 7, Room 7
WIPP has an order from the New Mexico Environmental Department to perform expedited panel closures for panel 6 and panel 7 room 7.
The WIPP closure plan was approved and we are working the planning and pre-requisites to complete the work (e.g., contaminated bolting, establishment of bulkheads, movement of salt).
The approved plan calls for the use of chain link, brattice cloth, run of mine salt against the waste face and a steel bulkhead for closure.
A significant amount of contaminated bolting is required to access Panel 6. Original observations last fall were approximately 380 bolts. Observations last week indicated more than 600 bolts need to be replaced. This additional work has extended the closure date into April.

16. Accident Investigation Reports/Corrective Actions
DOE HQ Corrective Action Plan (CAP) in response to Accident Investigation Board (AIB) Report on the fire was issued August 27, 2014.
Approval of the DOE HQ CAP in response to AIB Report on the Radiological Release, Phase 1 Report issued March 11, 2015.
CBFO CAP on Fire/Phase 1 approved February 6, 2015.
The Management and Operations contractor CAP on Fire/Phase 1 approved on February 12, 2015.
Radiological Release, Phase 2 AIB Report corrective actions under development.
Background—INTERNAL ONLY:
The Board identified the direct cause of this accident to be an exothermic reaction of incompatible materials in LANL waste drum that led to thermal runaway, which resulted in over-pressurization of the drum, breach of the drum, and release of a portion of the drum’s contents (combustible gases, waste, and wheat-based absorbent) into the WIPP underground. This is consistent with the event cause described in the Technical Assessment Team report.
Root causes can be local (specific to the one accident), and/or systemic (common to a broad class of similar accidents). For this accident, the Board identified both local and systemic root causes.
The Board identified the local root cause of the radioactive material release in the WIPP underground to be the failure of Los Alamos National Security, LLC (LANS) to understand and effectively implement the LANL Hazardous Waste Facility Permit and Carlsbad Field Office-directed controls. Specifically, LANL’s use of organic, wheat-based absorbent instead of the directed inorganic absorbent such as kitty litter/zeolite clay absorbent in the glovebox operations procedure for nitrate salts resulted in the generation, shipment, and emplacement of a noncompliant, ignitable waste form.
The Board identified the systemic root cause as failure by the Los Alamos Field Office and National Transuranic Program/Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) to ensure that LANL had adequately developed and implemented repackaging and treatment procedures that incorporated suitable hazard controls and included a rigorous review and approval process. Los Alamos Field Office and CBFO did not ensure the adequate flow down of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and other upper tier requirements, including the WIPP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit, Attachment C, Waste Analysis Plan, WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria, and the LANL Hazardous Waste Facility Permit requirements into operating procedures at LANL.

17. TRU Waste Generator Impacts
Prioritization of Shipments:
It is premature at this stage of the recovery to predict and allocate the rate of TRU waste shipments to WIPP.
Initial focus will be on emplacement of wastes generated during recovery activities and emplacement of wastes currently stored in the WIPP surface facilities (these wastes were received but not emplaced prior to the events). 
The timing for resumption of shipments from offsite currently is uncertain and will be based on a variety of factors.  
In determining the rate of shipments among sites, DOE will consider numerous technical and programmatic factors
WIPP transportation and waste acceptance capabilities
Generator site compliance commitments
Storage capacities
Other site specific technical or safety issues
Background—INTERNAL ONLY:
Paramount sensitivity -- communications must remain internal to DOE until a communications strategy is developed to address generator site compliance issues and potential factors for prioritization among sites.
We recognize pessimistic assumptions are not supportive of compliance commitments, especially at Idaho, but outyear TRU planning assumptions must be consistent, tie to current WIPP PMB and budgets; and identify impacts so we can identify strategies to mitigate them.
For FY 2017 budget planning, sites may be requested to identify resources needed to mitigate impacts, e.g., time and cost of rebuilding transportation fleet; evaluate options for storage away from generator sites.
In FY 2017, TRU waste sites will be planning for a more pessimistic case, e.g., substantial WIPP disposal after FY 2017/FY 2018. 
The Mission Unit (EM-30) and CBFO will continue to work closely with the waste generator sites to ensure current understanding of status and future outlook.
 By this summer, the Mission Unit and CBFO hope to have additional information to update and inform detailed near-term and five-year planning horizon for TRU waste disposal at WIPP. Considerations include:
Progress toward goal for resumption of operations with outstanding risks/uncertainties (receipt of permits; documented safety analysis/safety envelope; completion of readiness reviews; contractor performance)
Availability of transportation carriers are limited; cost and schedule for obtaining capabilities when needed.
The WIPP performance measurement baseline (PMB) assumes waist hoist repair/outage in FY 2017/FY 2018 timeframe.
Alternatives for TRU waste storage.

18. Recovery Costs
WIPP recovery costs for resumption of operations were estimated in the WIPP Recovery plan to be approximately $242 million
Major cost drivers include: facility program and safety documentation enhancements and revisions, mine habitability and operations, facility upgrades, waste emplacement operations, operational readiness assessments, and program management support. 
Currently two capital asset project line items are anticipated:
A new permanent ventilation system and supporting exhaust shaft, with an estimated combined cost range of $ million.
The capital projects are still in the early planning process.  They are being planned and implemented in accordance with DOE’s project management order, which requires deliberative planning and decisions. 
The design, procurement and construction activities associated with these projects will span multiple years. 
Costs are based on the planning to date and may change as new information is received or requirements change
Detailed baseline numbers are below—for context only, not to be provided.
Recovery Plan collapses FY16-FY18
Recovery Plan uses Line Item ranges, as we’re at CD-0.
FY 2014=$23M, FY2015=$127M, FY2016=$87M $237M (98% of recovery Plan)
Operations costs below from October 27, 2014 Performance Measurement Baseline
Capital Asset Project costs below from September 25, 2014 Performance Measurement Baseline

19. Summary
WIPP Recovery Plan – released September 30, that puts safety first
WIPP is making progress on recovery
Approval of PMB – January 2015
Project REACH complete
Safety documentation upgrades
Extensive underground radiological rollback
Mine stability--contaminated and uncontaminated bolting
Panel 6 and Panel 7, Room 7 closure preparations
Interim, Supplemental, Permanent Ventilation
WIPP continues to communicate often and transparently throughout this process with -
Frequent briefings for regulators and stakeholder groups
Regular town hall meetings
WIPP updates
Takeaways:
Implement the WIPP Recovery Plan
WIPP will reopen with the highest levels of safety
Implementing broad corrective actions
Establish performance baseline—that process is complete (they’ve been working to interim since Fall 2014)
Use of existing personnel
Maintain communications with stakeholders – forums such as this.
[Sequence of future shipments will be determined as recovery progresses and consider compliance, risk and other factors]

20. Complex-wide LLW/MLLW Disposal Rates by Disposal Location
This bar chart shows some interesting forecasted trends for FY13-16.
It’s important to note, though, that this forecast predates the WIPP incident and the impact of the WIPP suspension on the DOE generator sites. Some sites may be revising strategies such that greater focus will be on MLLW disposition. Other sites may need to reduce waste generating projects.
The reduction in onsite disposal from FY14 to FY15 reflects the completion of the K-25 demolition at ETTP in FY14, where much volume went to onsite cell.
Commercial disposal forecast decreases 68% from FY15 and 16 largely due to SPRU disposal completion. A likely shift may also occur should Portsmouth open an on-site disposal cell.
NNSS disposal increases 67% between FY13-15 as a result of Portsmouth X326 converter disposal as well as LANL and ORO waste disposition. However, a 55% decrease is anticipated between FY15 and 16. NNSS disposal overall is predicted to decrease 25% between FY13 and the FY16 forecast.
On-site disposal decreases (82% decrease) between FY14 and 15 due to the completions at Oak Ridge (K-25) and Richland (completion of River
Corridor work).
TBD wastes forecasted for FY16 are anticipated waste disposal from Portsmouth and Paducah.
18.38

21. Summary of DOE LLW and MLLW Disposal Options
DOE utilizes both Federal and commercial disposal facilities; under DOE policy commercial facilities may be utilized if disposition is cost effect, compliant, and in the best interest of the government
Site-generated LLW and MLLW continues to be disposed at Hanford and Nevada Nuclear Security Site (NNSS); Savannah River Site continues to dispose of LLW; and some limited LLW disposal continues by NNSA at Los Alamos
DOE has operating CERCLA disposal facilities for LLW and MLLW from site cleanup at Hanford, Idaho Site, and the Oak Ridge Reservation; potential future new facilities are being evaluated at Portsmouth GDP and Paducah GDP sites
NNSS accepts DOE LLW/MLLW for disposal from other DOE sites without disposal options on site; currently there are 26 approved generators to NNSS, from 18 geographic sites
Hanford currently does not accept DOE LLW/MLLW from other DOE sites
DOE has indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity national treatment and disposal contractors with commercial vendors open to all DOE sites and contractors
Waste disposed at the WCS Federal Waste Facility falls under an MOU with the State of Texas and contract provisions with WCS; DOE will accept title to the FWF disposal cell upon closure at no cost to the government

22. Current Disposal Issues & Topics
Ability to systematically plan and implement disposal plans for legacy nuclear materials
Continually to assure availability of receiver sites
Potential changes to transuranic waste processing and certification requirements
Decreased volumes and market impacts
Considerations in selection of offsite disposal
Evaluation and planning for new on-site cells
Pending regulatory changes affecting commercial facilities
Monitoring NRC's progress regarding the potential licensing of WCS as an eventual GTCC disposal facility.

23. Other Waste Management Updates
Implementing efforts to strengthen DOE’s oversight of DOE disposal facilities and its waste management programs.
DOE Order update remains in DOE/Headquarters internal review
Finalizing GTCC EIS is anticipated to be published in calendar year 2015
Continue to seek opportunities to optimize waste generation, treatment, transportation and disposal
Working with EFCOG Waste Management Working Group on efforts to integrate waste disposition efforts (such as LLW and TRU Corporate Boards)
Continuing collaboration with stakeholders and industry is key to continued success

24. Manifest Information Management System
DOE maintains the Manifest Information Management System (MIMS) under a requirement of the LLWPAA
The system has been updated to meet current DOE IT platform requirements and is hosted at:
The website has new flexible reporting features for generator and isotope data
Jamie Joyce has responsible for data administration
Currently, the system has records from operating disposal sites at Barnwell, EnergySolutions Utah, and Richland (and closed Beatty site)
The software was modified to add Waste Control Specialists (WCS) data; we have an offline version and are working to validate data with WCS