1. 'Bio-chem, arms control and the frontiers of science and technology’
David J. Galbreath
Professor of International Security
University of Bath
'Bio-chem, arms control and the frontiers of science and technology’

2. Scientific context
“We are facing a time of rapid advances in science and technology. New chemical compounds and production methods are constantly being researched and discovered, affording the global community many benefits but also bringing with them certain risks…” Director General’s Opening statement, 16th Conference of the States Parties 29th November 2011
“The Conventions objective…will only be successfully achieved and maintained if advances in science and technology are effectively monitored and evaluated….” Report of the advisory panel on future priorities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 25th July 2011.

3. Outline Context Problem Conceptual approach Preliminary results
Our team and outputs

4. Scientific Context Bio-chemistry as a conjoined science
Bio-research as a citizen science
Bio-engineering as a growing science
Bio-risk as increasing factor

5. Political content
Chemical Weapons Convention (1992) and the OPCW (1997)
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (1975) and the problem with compliance
National governments and national resilience
Publics and hazard
Weaponisation and proliferation

6. Biochemical threat spectrum chart adapted from: Pearson, G
Biochemical threat spectrum chart adapted from: Pearson, G. (2002) Relevant Scientific And Technological Developments For The First CWC Review Conference, University of Bradford.

7. Our research problem Science and Technology innovation is fast
National political solutions are slower
International political solutions are slower still
Key question: How to develop systems of governance that allow for bio-chemical security for all?

8. Bio-Chem 2030: Questions
What is the relationship between science and technology (S&T) advances and how we think about security and control?
How are security governance mechanisms able to shift with the demands of S&T advances?

9. Bio-Chem 2030: Questions
What is the relationship between arms control, education and resilience?
How do power, interests and knowledge impact on the international communities ability to be good managers of bio-chem insecurities?

10. Research Goals
How to manage arms control beyond and beneath the state,
Understand how power, interests and knowledge together produce models of institutional governance,
How advances and controversies around bio-chem, synthetic biology and dual use inform models of institutional governance.

11. Our crossroads International regimes Governance Power politics
Converging interests
Shared norms and knowledge
Governance
Multilateral
Regulatory
Policy networks

12. Arms Control approach Why arms control?
Traditional model of arms control
Reactionary
Backwards facing
Deterrence
Compliance
Limitations in the arms control approach?

13. Education approach Why the Education approach?
The traditional education approach
Mutual
Status quo orientated
Non-binding
Low-cost
Problems with the Education approach?

14. Anticipatory approach
A new form of anticipatory governance
Forward facing
Multi-level
Multi-directional
Wider stake-holder pool

15. Project Design (Stream 1)
Bio-Chemistry Regime(s)
S&T
Governance
Knowledge Generation

16. Bio chem regime, probs and solutions
Science and Technology innovation is fast
National political solutions are slower
International political solutions are slower still
Key question: How to develop systems of governance that allow for bio-chemical security for all?

17. Project Design (Stream 2)
Local level Assessment and Networking
Feasibility Study

18. Examples
The convergence of chemistry and biology – new risks, new opportunities for international cooperation [Ralf Trapp]
Chemical Incapacitants , S&T and the CWC [Michael Crowley]
An assessment of the emergence of the hacker/DIYbio community in Synthetic Biology and its implications for S&T threat perceptions and responses [Catherine Jefferson]
Analysis of different perceptions of synthetic biology, its security implications and potential for international cooperation [Brett Edwards]
Analysis of different perceptions of nanotechnology/targeted drug delivery, its security implications and potential for international cooperation [Kathryn Nixdorf]

19. Thank you Prof David Galbreath (PI) Brett Edwards (RO)
@EuroSecProf
Brett Edwards (RO)
@bwiedwards
@BioChemSec2030