1. Kant recap Kant’s 1st point Kant’s 3rd point
God does not have to necessarily exist, if he is God: reject both God and his necessary existence.
Kant’s 3rd point
To say a thing exists, is just to say you posit the thing with all its properties. There is no extra “is”
To have a concept of something, is to conceptually presuppose the existence of a subject. (existence is prior to any predicating you might do)
Otherwise paradox – if you say something lacks the property of existence – this is paradoxical, since how can something that doesn’t exist, be said to lack anything?
Kant 2nd point (like Hume)
A cocker spaniel  an existing cocker spaniel
- to predicate the property of “existing” is redundant: it doesn’t change, or add to, my concept.
All good
GOD
All powerful
exists
"A hundred real thalers do not contain the least coin more than a hundred possible thalers…” (CPR)
“not the least bit gets added to the thing when I posit in addition that the thing exists..or what would exist would not be equivalent to my concept” (CPR)

2. Russell and Frege “exists” as a second order description, not a predicate of a subject.
“Dinosaurs do not exist”
Which is a better paraphrase:
Dinosaurs do not have the property of existence OR
2. There is no such thing as dinosaurs
2 because:
- If you say they do not have the property of existence, you are supposing there is something, which lacks this property.
- So you are saying something that doesn’t exist, exists – in order to have the property of non-existence.

3. Problems with Names “Mr Corish is a Headmaster”
- Mr Corish denotes/ stands for something in the world (this person) and we predicate “headmaster” of this subject.
Subject-predicate sentence.
“Leprechauns are little green men”
- leprechauns denotes/ stands for something and we predicate “little green man” of it
- PROBLEM…: no such thing as a leprechaun exists in the world that we can point to. So is this sentence True ? False? Meaningless?

4. The Problem of Empty Terms
The Problem of Negative Existentials
“Leprechauns are little green men”
- if leprechauns don’t exist, then what is this sentence about? How can we refer to them, and predicate properties of them?
Leprechauns are “empty terms”: they do not denote any object. So the sentence is meaningless. But it does seem to mean something to us...so how does it work?
Since empty terms are meaningful, then names don’t work by denoting or picking anything out in the world. So how do they work?
“Dragons do not exist”
This seems true.
But if it is true, then it can’t be about dragons, since there are no dragons.
If dragons denote something, then they must exist in some way. So sentence is FALSE.
If dragons do not denote something, then the statement isn’t about anything and is MEANINGLESS.
Should we think of concepts like dragons as existing in some way? But then all sorts of imaginary things would “exist”. Or is this sentence meaningless?

5. The present King of France is bald.
How would you analyse this statement?
What problems do you find with it?

6. These problems can apply to the Ontological Argument:
Clearly, the problem lies with the idea of names, as picking out something.
Names can’t be “denoting” entities in the world.
Russell has a solution…
These problems can apply to the Ontological Argument:
“God is TTWNGCBT” – like “leprechauns are green” – what does “God” pick out in the world? If nothing, then how can it be true ? Is it meaningless?
“God does not exist” – Anselm/ Descartes say this is impossible (the concept of God includes his necessary existence). But is this the same as saying “Dragons do not exist” is impossible, as you must assume the dragon’s existence in some form, in order to predicate non-existence of it? Or is it meaningless?

7. Bertrand Russell
Whenever you “name” something, you are not really picking out an entity in the real world, you are only giving a description. Russell calls giving something as description, as giving it an “intention”.
“Socrates” becomes a property [of socratising]
“Foxes exist” becomes “There is a property [of being fox]“
There is an thing X such that this thing has the property of X
X exists = there is a thing, such that this thing [has the property of being X]
(and NOT – x has the property of existence. This way of putting it suggests that x is a subject with a predicate of existence. It makes existence sound like a real predicate, and gives the impression of the subject as existing in order to predicate something of it)
Russell’s solution does not require you to identify some entity – no individual is designated (which we then wrongly say exists)

8. How does this solve our initial problems with names as denoting?
EMPTY TERMS:
“Leprechauns are little green men” = Russell translates this into a description (an intention) - “There is a thing X such that this thing has the property of [being a little green man]” This is clearly false. So now we can say this statement is false, not meaningless. No such property is instantiated in the world. It has no extension in the world.
NEGATIVE EXISTENTIALS:
“Dragons do not exist” = the descriptive property of dragon is not instantiated – we don’t have to suppose dragons exist, in order to assert their non-existence. The property is simply not instantiated in any individual. The property does not have extension.
ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT: “God exists” or “God does not exist” is not a meaningless statement, or impossible. It is potentially true or false. It depends on whether the property of [being God] or [being TTWNGCBT] is actually instantiated in the world.
It is a matter of fact about the world (synthetic) and for experience to confirm (a posteriori). Russell was an empiricist – everything eventually has to be traced back to experience.

9. Explain Russell’s Objections to the O.A.