1. PRINCIPLES OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
The Principles of peacekeeping are based on the information contained in the UN Capstone Doctrine on peacekeeping. They are also based on the experiences of several former United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO) personnel and mission members. The roots of these ideas are clearly expressed in the “Agenda for Peace Part II” and the Brahimi Report. These documents are similar and have captured the lessons over the last 15 years, which are the foundation for conducting successful peacekeeping operations.
The Objective of this module is to help a peacekeeper understand:
a) the guiding principles of peacekeeping
b) the core UN business in post conflict areas.

2. TRAINING OBJECTIVES
Review core UN business concerned with peacekeeping
Review some key articles of the UN Charter that impact principles
Discuss principles and guidelines for UN peacekeeping operations and understand their application
The aim of the presentation is to present the most updated guidelines and principles of current UN peacekeeping operations.
By the end of the presentation, the participant should be familiar with the history of UN peacekeeping, and be able to describe the current principles and success factors of UN missions.

3. TRAINING OBJECTIVES
Review core UN business concerned with peacekeeping
Review some key articles of the UN Charter that impact principles
Discuss principles and guidelines for UN peacekeeping operations and understand their application
The aim of the presentation is to present the most updated guidelines and principles of current UN peacekeeping operations.
By the end of the presentation, the participant should be familiar with the history of UN peacekeeping, and be able to describe the current principles and success factors of UN missions.

4. CORE BUSINESS OF UN PKO
Create a secure and stable environment, while strengthening the State’s ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights.
Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation, and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance.
Provide a framework for ensuring that all UN and other international actors pursue their activities at the country level in a coherent and coordinated manner.
The slide shows the core UN areas of interest when deployed in a post armed conflict area. An implied core business is the protection of civilians. It is the expectation of the local population and the international community.
It also shows the complexities of UN intervention and need for integrated missions. The next slide uses a graphic to demonstrate this more clearly.

5. WHAT ARE THE “CRITERIA” FOR SUCCESSFUL DEPLOYMENT?
Conducive environment for deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation
Clear, achievable mandate, with resources to match
A peace to keep
Full backing of the Security Council and positive regional engagement
UN Capstone Doctrine:
A Peace to Keep: A UN peacekeeping operation can only succeed if the parties on the ground are genuinely committed to resolving the conflict through a political process. A UN peacekeeping operation deployed in the absence of such a commitment, runs the risk of becoming paralysed or, worse still, being drawn into the conflict.
Positive Regional Engagement: Many of the crises facing the Security Council are regional in character. Rarely can the problems in one state be treated in isolation from its neighbours. The attitude of neighbouring states can be as important a factor in determining the viability of a peace process as the commitment of the local parties, some of whom may even be acting as proxies for neighbouring states.
The Full Backing of a United Security Council: While the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation only requires nine votes from the Security Council’s 15 members, anything other than unanimous Security Council backing can be a serious handicap. Divisions within the Security Council are likely to send mixed messages to the parties, and may undermine the legitimacy and authority of the mission, in the eyes of the main parties and the population, as a whole.
A Clear and Achievable Mandate, with Resources to Match: When the Security Council decides to deploy a UN peacekeeping operation, the Secretariat must help to ensure that the mandate is clear and achievable. Since the credibility of a UN peacekeeping operation is dependent on its ability to carry out its mandated tasks, it is important to ensure that the mandate reflects the level of resources that contributing countries are able and willing to provide. If the situation on the ground requires the deployment of capabilities that a UN peacekeeping operation is unlikely to have, the Security Council should be encouraged to consider alternative options.

6. THE UN CHARTER Peace Peacekeeping enforcement Chapter VI Article 36/
Chapter VII
Article 42
at tactical level
Consent
Peace
enforcement
No consent
required
Chapter VIII
Regional Orgs
No use of terms
“peacekeeping” or
“peace enforcement”
Any discussion of peacekeeping must start with an examination of the UN Charter. This document establishes a framework for nations to deal with threats to international peace and security. As a treaty, the Charter has the force of International Law, and the principle Organs of the UN are granted authorities by the Member States to perform the tasks outlined in the charter. In peacekeeping, Chapter 5 assigns the Security Council responsibility for the maintenance of International Peace and Security.
In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security, with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources — the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating plans, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 are the primary tools in the charter, which the Security Council uses to manage International Peace and Security. Article 36 in Chapter VI is the primary basis for Traditional peacekeeping. In Chapter VII, Article 42 is the primary basis for the Use of Force by Peacekeepers in missions. Chapter VIII allows Regional Organizations or groups of nations to conduct these types of operations under the authority of the Security Council.

7. TRADITIONAL MISSIONS Peaceful settlement of disputes
Security Council provides assistance at request of parties
Chapter VI Peacekeeping Operations
Assists in consolidating peace and building confidence
Forces are lightly armed for self-defence
Chapter VI provides for the settlement of disputes by a variety of peaceful measures (Article 33). Article 33 of the UN Charter states:
“The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, meditation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.”
Ideally, peacekeeping should be conducted as a Chapter VI pacific activity. Yet, under certain circumstances, providing a peacekeeping mission with a Chapter VII mandate can help to demonstrate political resolve, or can authorise the force to use all necessary means to protect itself and carry out the mandate in very difficult environments. But, it is well to keep in mind that in general, the peacekeeping force is a lightly armed one, and in the long term, giving it unrealistic objectives can undermine its credibility and eventually destroy the mission.
UN CAPSTONE DOCTRINE

8. MULTIDIMENSIONAL MISSIONS
Conflict is on-going, or high-risk conflict may start again
Parties not in agreement
Presence of militias, criminal gangs and other spoilers, who may actively seek to undermine the peace process or pose a threat to the civilian population
May be risky internal situation – violence/human rights abuses/banditry/weapons
Self-defence may be insufficient to protect deployed forces; more robust measures may be required
Legal basis to protect deployed forces is needed (Status of Forces Agreement [SOFA] cannot be agreed)
Usually under Chapter 7
United Nations peacekeeping operations have traditionally been associated with Chapter VI of the Charter. However, the Security Council need not refer to a specific Chapter of the Charter when passing a resolution authorising the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation and has never invoked Chapter VI. In recent years, the Security Council has adopted the practice of invoking Chapter VII of the Charter when authorising the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping operations into volatile post-conflict settings, where the State is unable to maintain security and public order. The Security Council’s invocation of Chapter VII in these situations, in addition to denoting the legal basis for its action, can also be seen as a statement of firm political resolve, and a means of reminding the parties to a conflict and the wider United Nations membership of their obligation to give effect to Security Council decisions.
Consent from the parties to the conflict is not necessary for Chapter 7. This means that the conflict may still be ongoing, or that it may restart. Also, in an intrastate conflict, even if one party agrees to the peacekeeping deployment, there may be other groups that are not included in the peace process, that will require the PKO force to be prepared to use force to compel compliance to the resolution. Per the CAPSTONE Doctrine, Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. The principle of non-use of force except in self-defence dates back to the first deployment of armed United Nations peacekeepers in The notion of self-defence has subsequently come to include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent the peacekeeping operation from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council.23 United Nations peacekeeping operations are not an enforcement tool. However, it is widely understood that they may use force at the tactical level, with the authorisation of the Security Council, if acting in self-defence and defence of the mandate.
In many instances, third-country forces may be involved (e.g., conflicts in Africa). Given all these challenges and diverse threats in an uncertain environment, forces require more than self-defence in order to enforce the mandate.
UN CAPSTONE DOCTRINE

9. CHAPTER VII
Does not tell you to use force actively and is not a combat operation
Provides full range of powers, up to and including enforcement powers (sanctions to use armed force)
Robust peacekeeping should not be confused with peace enforcement (envisioned under Chapter VII). There are important differences between the two:
Robust peacekeeping involves use of force at the tactical level, with the consent of the host authorities and/or the main parties to the conflict
Peace enforcement may involve the use of force at the strategic level, which is normally prohibited under Article 2 (4) of the Charter unless authorised by the Security Council
Chapter VII authorises whatever actions “…as may be necessary to restore or maintain international peace and security” (Article 42). Historically, the UN has not had the capacity to conduct large-scale peace enforcement missions, such as the Korean War or the Gulf War. Such operations have been delegated to Coalitions of the Willing.
While Chapter 7 allows force to be used, it does not actively instruct that force is to be used. One should always remember that the aim of a Chapter 7 enforcement is ultimately to “promote” consent, in order to move into a Chapter 6 operation. The less force that is used to achieve this, the easier would be the follow-on mission.
Therefore, force should be used as the last resort, and Chapter 7 provides options from the strategic to tactical levels, and from the use of sanctions to the use of force on the ground. These tools can be used in a complementary manner, with the overall aim of compelling compliance and promoting consent.
In the UN context, Peacekeeping is about the minimal use of force. It’s not that force must not be used, but how to accomplish the most with minimising force. Chapter 7 allows for a more robust force in environments that need it.
The CAPSTONE Doctrine states that “robust” peacekeeping and peace enforcement may appear blurred at times and may appear similar on the ground, there are important differences between the two. While robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the consent of the host authorities and/or the main parties to the conflict, peace enforcement may involve the use of force at the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for Member States under Article 2 (4) of the Charter unless authorised by the Security Council.

10. “CHAPTER VIII” MISSIONS
Regions can deal with peace and security matters
Issue appropriate mandate for regional action
Actions consistent with UN purposes/principles
Every effort to achieve pacific settlement before referral to Security Council
Regional action encouraged by Security Council
Regional action does not preclude Security Council action
The Coalition of the Willing is an alliance of member states authorised under Chapter VIII of the Charter. By stating that “the Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilise such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority,” Article 53 of Chapter VIII authorises agencies to deal with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, provided that their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the UN.

11. PRINCIPLES OF UN PEACEKEEPING
Consent
Impartiality
Non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate
According to the Capstone Doctrine adopted by the UN, consent, impartiality and nonuse of force are traditional principles of UN peacekeeping. These principles will be examined in the following slides.

12. CONSENT
UN PKO is deployed to support the will of the parties — a peace to keep through a political process
Needs strong cultural awareness to sustain and build, plus analysis capability to monitor
Consent is dynamic and operates at different levels
Where opposition exists, the military component must be resourced and equipped to deal robustly
The principle of consent is historically rooted in peacekeeping since There must be a peace to keep, and the parties to the conflict should all agree on deployment of a peacekeeping force. Such consent must be maintained through professional behaviour by the peacekeepers and impartial implementation of the mandate.
Consent is a dynamic factor, and can be fractured or weakened. Locally/tactically, consent may be lost if rebel groups split up or withdraw from the processes.
Spoilers are, unfortunately, a trait of today’s operational environments and must be dealt with firmly — and, if needed, robustly, with the use of force.

13. IMPARTIALITY Mandate must be applied even-handedly.
Does not mean inactivity; Violations of the peace must not be ignored under guise of impartiality
The UN will use armed force if elements are working against mandate.
Last resort
But impartial action must be accompanied by:
Transparency
Communication strategies
Impartiality should not be confused with neutrality. The peacekeeping mission should be treating all parties equally. If one gets out-of-line, does not follow the appropriate procedures, goes against the mandate or breaks the peace — then peacekeepers should respond based on the mandate and the rules of engagement.
While the peacekeeping troops must act impartially — any action needs to be accompanied by good communication and understanding of the mission’s goals and objectives, by both the belligerent factions and the population.

14. NON-USE OF FORCE, EXCEPT IN SELF-DEFENCE AND DEFENCE OF THE MANDATE
The UN will use force to protect itself, its mandate and the people embraced by it.
“All necessary means”
Use of force
Should be calibrated in a precise, proportional and appropriate manner to achieve the desired effect
Governed by rules of engagement (ROE) and international humanitarian law (law of armed conflict)
A key factor is the appropriate use of force, where the main idea is that the minimal amount of force should be used to resolve the situation. The Rules of Engagement and the Geneva Conventions will determine the appropriate application of force.

15. OTHER SUCCESS FACTORS Legitimacy Credibility
Local and national ownership
There are many other key factors that are necessary for the successful completion of the mission. Some of the most important ones are legitimacy, credibility, and local and national ownership.
We will look at each of these in the next slides.

16. LEGITIMACY
At strategic level - based on a united Security Council Resolution (SCR)
At mission level - seen to be fair and decent
Loss of legitimacy leads to erosion of consent
The first among these is legitimacy. Legitimacy must be achieved at all levels within and external to the mission.
If the belligerents, local population and the international community do not believe in the legitimacy of the mission, then it has a greatly reduced chance of success. All of the actors must believe in the legal and logical justification of the mission.

17. CREDIBILITY
Peacekeeping operations will be tested for weakness, when missions are at their weakest.
Demands:
A firm and professional posture based on a deliverable mandate,
Resources to match
Solid mission plan
Once lost, hard to recover
The more credible the presence, the less likely is the need to use force.
Credibility also is a challenge for the UN. The goals and objectives of the mission must be achievable. If no one believes that the tasks can be achieved, then the support of the local population and others will be hard to solicit.
In a robust mission, the peacekeeping forces will be tested by the belligerents. Proper application of the rules of engagement, use of force, good attitude and good conduct by the peacekeepers — will aid in building credibility. Once credibility and trust are lost by the mission, they are very difficult to recover.

18. NATIONAL & LOCAL OWNERSHIP
Application will vary according to availability of local, credible, sustainable and legitimate capacity.
Peacekeeping and peacebuilding programmes and activities must be geared toward building local capacity based on genuine and credible partnerships.
Peacekeepers should avoid displacing local capacity and keep their footprint as light as possible.
If all the work of the mission is seen to be just imposing the will of the international community, and not of supporting the will of the local population, then the mission will never be able to leave. Long-term sustainability relies upon the capability and capacity of the locals.
Capacity building, even though it is a long-term issue, is something that needs to be addressed in the early stages of the mission. The time taken to build capacity of local leaders and institutions, is worth the benefits received over the long term by the mission and the people.
Local ownership is also the keystone to the good transitions between a peacekeeping mission and a peacebuilding one. Without local capacity, peace will not be sustainable.

19. UN Contemporary Peacekeeping Operations (The Complexity)
HOST NATION
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS
LOCAL GOVTS
MILITARY
FORMATIONS
UNITS
POPULATION
OHCHR
GENEVA
UNHQ
NEW YORK
UNHCR
UN LSD
UN DPA
UN DPKO
REBEL FACTION(S)
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
REGIONAL LEADERSHIP
LEADERHIP
MILITARY
FORMATIONS
UNITS
POPULATION
SRSG
Force Commander
Police Comissioner
Chief Administrative Officer
Human Rights
Division
Humanitarian Affairs Coordination
Information
Office of the SRSG:
Political Affairs
Legal Affairs
Special Assistant
Electoral
Deputy SRSG
INTERNATIONAL
AND LOCAL MEDIA
COUNTRY DIRECTOR
OHCHR
PROMOTION GROUP
PROTECTION GROUP
TECHNICAL SUPPORT GROUP
LIAISON GROUP
INDIGENOUS TRAINING
PARTNER TRAINING
IN-HOUSE
TRAINING
STATION
SECTOR NORTH
SECTOR SOUTH
SECTOR EAST
SECTOR WEST
LEGAL
FORENSIC
INVESTI-GATIONS
ANALYSIS
SRSG LIAISON
FORCE COMD LIAISON
CIVPOL COM LIAISON
LIAISON POOL
ADMIN SERVICES GP
PERSONAL/ ADVISORY STAFF MP
CIMIC
UN CIVPOL CONTINGENT
SECTOR
NORTH
SOUTH
EAST
WEST
STATION
POLICE TRAINING UNIT
Chief of Administrative Services
Chief of Integrated Supt Services
Engineering/ Facilities Management
Assets Management
Transport
Comms and ADP
Personnel
Finance
Procurement
General Admin Services
UN OCHA
UNICEF
UNHCR
WFP
UNDP
FAO
WHO
Hostile Elements 19

20. REFERENCES
UN Charter
“Capstone Doctrine” (United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines)
Core Pre-deployment Training Materials

21. QUESTIONS