1. Warfighting Functions: Indirect Fires

2. Fire Support Principles
Plan early and continuously
Exploit all available target acquisition and reconnaissance
Consider airspace coordination
Use lowest echelon capable of furnishing effective support
Avoid unnecessary duplication of effort
Use the most effective means to accomplish the mission
Provide rapid and effective coordination
Provide for flexibility of employment
The principles of fire support are the framework for a thought process that ensures the most effective use of fire support assets. These principles apply at all levels of command, regardless of the specific fire support assets available:
Plan early and continuously.
Exploit all available reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) assets.
Consider airspace management and the use of all fire support (lethal and nonlethal) means.
Use the lowest level of command capable of furnishing effective support.

3. Systems Warfare
The use of three phases are essential to the integration and successful employment of AD at the strategic and operational level.
Phase III is most important for this lesson because it is where the tactical AD mission takes place.
Employ a fire support concept centered on a phased cycle that consists of the following:
Find critical component of the enemy’s combat system and determining its location with RISTA assets.
Engage the key system with precision fire or other indirect fire means.
Exploit and recover assets in order to support other ongoing operations.
The three phases are defined by where the enemy aircraft are and what they are doing:
Phase I: Actions against enemy aircraft and control systems on the ground before they are employed. This phase is conducted using primarily strategic- and operational-level assets of the Army and the Air Force.
Phase II: Actions against enemy aircraft while in flight but before they enter the airspace over threat ground maneuver forces. Again, this mission is performed primarily at the strategic and operational levels.
Phase III: Actions against enemy aircraft that have penetrated into the airspace over threat ground maneuver forces. Thus, the “target area” consists of the area where enemy aircraft have penetrated over the threat disruption, battle, and support zones. OSC-level tactical fighters and the short- to medium-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), antiaircraft (AA) guns, and other weapons of the ground maneuver units execute this phase. It is in this phase that ground-based tactical air defense plays its primary role.
Comms
Fuel
Parts
In flight
Over forces
Parking/Departure
Ammo
People

4. Many of these systems can be either towed or self-propelled
Indirect Fire Systems
Mortars. All OPFOR infantry, motorized infantry, and mechanized infantry battalions contain constituent 120-mm mortars. Smaller mortars are also available. Guerrilla and other organizations may have them as well.
Cannon systems. Cannon artillery includes field guns, howitzers, and hybrid systems.
Multiple rocket launchers. The OPFOR categorizes MRLs as medium-caliber (100- up to 220-mm) and as large-caliber (220-mm and larger).
Surface-to-surface missiles. SSMs include tactical- through strategic-level ballistic missiles and land-attack cruise missiles using warheads ranging from conventional to nuclear.
M1943 Mortar
M mm Gun
Smerch 9K58 MRL
Target damage is the effect of fires on a given military target. It results in total, partial, or temporary loss of the target's combat effectiveness. The OPFOR categories of target damage are annihilation, demolition, neutralization, and harassment. Of these categories, the first three fall under the general term destruction.
Annihilation fires render targets completely combat-ineffective and incapable of reconstruction or token resistance. For a point target such as an antitank guided missile launcher, the OPFOR must expend enough munitions to ensure a 70 to 90 percent probability of kill. For area targets such as platoon strongpoints or nuclear artillery assets, the OPFOR must fire enough rounds to destroy from 50 to 60 percent of the targets within the group. These fires result in the group ceasing to exist as a viable fighting force.
The OPFOR uses the term demolition in reference to the destruction of buildings and engineer works (such as bridges, fortifications, or roads). Demolition requires enough munitions to make such material objects unfit for further use.
Fire for neutralization inflicts enough losses on a target to (1) Cause it to temporarily lose its combat effectiveness, or (2) Restrict or prohibit its maneuver, or (3) Disrupt its command and control (C2) capability. To achieve neutralization, the OPFOR must deliver enough munitions to destroy 30 percent of a group of unobserved targets. The expectation is that the target is severely damaged but could again become capable of coordinated resistance after the fire is lifted. The term neutralization applies only in an artillery context.
The OPFOR uses a limited number of fire support systems and munitions within a prescribed time to deliver harassment fires. The goal of these fires is to put psychological pressure on enemy personnel in locations such as defensive positions, command posts (CPs), and logistics installations. Successful harassment fire inhibits maneuver, lowers morale, interrupts rest, and weakens enemy combat readiness.
9P113 TEL SSM
Many of these systems can be either towed or self-propelled

5. Indirect Fire Support in a DTG IFC
The threat ground force structure includes air defense units. These units are equipped with a variety of systems having the firepower, mobility, and range to fully support fast-moving tank and mechanized forces in dynamic offensive operations.
The IFC is a combination of a standing C2 structure and a task organization of constituent and dedicated fire support units.
The DIV/DTG commander specifies the organization of forces for combat and the tasks for indirect fire support assets.
DTG Indirect Fire missions
Exploit carefully integrated ground and air fire support actions.
Reduce time from target acquisition to engagement.
Mass their effects without concentrating formations.
Ensure the optimal fire support asset(s) are assigned any given mission.
Ensure adherence to the commander’s priorities.
Integrate the effects of fires.
Divisions:
Divisions can be assigned to create task-organized division tactical groups (DTGs). When this occurs, consideration must be given to allocating additional air defense assets to ensure protection of the augmented force. In some situations, the DTG may be allocated assets normally associated with operational-level organizations.
Divisional and Separate Brigades:
Like the division, maneuver brigades may be task-organized as brigade tactical groups (BTGs) and may require additional air defense assets to protect newly allocated units.
Separate brigades may contain a more robust air defense battalion.
However, separate brigades typically contain a more robust capability than divisional brigades, even without augmentation. Thus, air defense augmentation of a separate brigade (task-organized as a BTG) may be the equivalent of an air defense brigade.
Battalions:
The platoon leader of the MANPADS platoon (or the senior air defender) also coordinates with the appropriate staff member, or FAC if present, to deconflict any possible fratricide issues.
Companies:
Most threat tactical vehicles are equipped at least with a 7.62-mm general-purpose machinegun that can engage enemy aircraft in addition to ground targets. All threat units receive training in the employment of massed small arms weapons fire to engage low-flying enemy aircraft. This technique is routinely practiced by troop units and is usually employed under the supervision of the company commander when he has been notified that an enemy aircraft is approaching. For additional information, see All-Arms Air Defense below.

6. Indirect Fires in the Force Structure
The threat ground force structure includes air defense units. These units are equipped with a variety of systems having the firepower, mobility, and range to fully support fast-moving tank and mechanized forces in dynamic offensive operations.
Divisional Artillery Brigade
18x 122-mm MRL, 9A51/PRIMA
54x 152-mm SP Howitzer, 2S19
Separate Brigades
6x mm MRL, 9A51/PRIMA
18x 152-mm SP Howitzer or
2S19/155-mm SP How or
G6/ 155-mm Towed G5
Divisions:
Divisions can be assigned to create task-organized division tactical groups (DTGs). When this occurs, consideration must be given to allocating additional air defense assets to ensure protection of the augmented force. In some situations, the DTG may be allocated assets normally associated with operational-level organizations.
Divisional and Separate Brigades:
Like the division, maneuver brigades may be task-organized as brigade tactical groups (BTGs) and may require additional air defense assets to protect newly allocated units.
Separate brigades may contain a more robust air defense battalion.
However, separate brigades typically contain a more robust capability than divisional brigades, even without augmentation. Thus, air defense augmentation of a separate brigade (task-organized as a BTG) may be the equivalent of an air defense brigade.
Battalions:
The platoon leader of the MANPADS platoon (or the senior air defender) also coordinates with the appropriate staff member, or FAC if present, to deconflict any possible fratricide issues.
Companies:
Most threat tactical vehicles are equipped at least with a 7.62-mm general-purpose machinegun that can engage enemy aircraft in addition to ground targets. All threat units receive training in the employment of massed small arms weapons fire to engage low-flying enemy aircraft. This technique is routinely practiced by troop units and is usually employed under the supervision of the company commander when he has been notified that an enemy aircraft is approaching. For additional information, see All-Arms Air Defense below.
2S19
9A51/PRIMA

7. Methods of Fire Plan Detect Deliver Assess
Fire Support to a Strike - Coordinated with assault
Reconnaissance Fire - Dislodge, force exposure
Close Support Fire - Based on proximity, requirement
Interdiction Fire - Prevent movement of forces/support
Counterfire/Counterbattery-Destroy/neutralize enemy weapons
PLAN. The plan phase provides the focus and priorities for the reconnaissance collection management and fire planning process. It employs an estimate of enemy intent, capabilities, and vulnerabilities in conjunction with an understanding of the OPFOR mission and concept of battle. A determination is made during the plan phase of what HPTs to look for, when and where they are likely to appear on the battlefield, who (reconnaissance or target acquisition assets) can locate them, and how the targets should be attacked.
DETECT. During the detect phase the reconnaissance plan is executed. As specified targets are located, the appropriate COP or delivery system is notified to initiate the attack of the target.
DELIVER. Timely, accurate delivery is the culmination of synchronization of fire support. The delivery is rapidly executed by having designated attack systems respond to the maneuver commander’s guidance when the HPTs are observed.
ASSESS. Following the attack of the target, the RISTA assets are cued to determine if the target has been defeated in accordance with the established target damage criteria. If it is determined that the target damage criteria are not achieved, delivery assets re-en
Fire support (including Indirect Fire Support) to a strike involves the employment of a wide variety of ammunition types (such as standard, course corrected, advanced, and precision) to destroy an enemy formation after typically setting the conditions for its destruction through reconnaissance fire.
Reconnaissance fire is the integration of RISTA, fire control, and weapon systems into a closed-loop, automated fire support system that detects, identifies, and destroys critical targets in minutes. Reconnaissance fire enables the OPFOR to deliver rotary-wing air, SSM, cruise missile, and artillery fires (including precision munitions) on enemy targets within a very short time after acquisition.
Close support fire is fire used to support maneuver forces and attack targets of immediate concern to units such as battalions, brigades, and BTGs.
Interdiction fire is fire designed to attack targets in depth (such as logistics sites or assembly areas) and to prevent enemy follow-on or reserve forces from reinforcing or influencing a battle or situation.
Counterfire is fire designed to destroy the enemy fire support infrastructure throughout the battlefield. The fire support infrastructure includes mortars, cannon, rockets, missiles, fire support C2 and RISTA, and logistics assets.
Counterbattery fire is fire that accomplishes the annihilation or neutralization of enemy artillery batteries.
Final protective fire is an immediately available preplanned barrier of indirect and direct fire designed to prevent an advancing enemy from penetrating a defensive position.
gage the target until the desired target damage has been achieved.
Plan
Detect
Deliver
Assess
“do this…”

8. Target Damage Criteria
Annihilation: Targets are “completely combat-ineffective and incapable of reconstruction or token resistance.”
Demolition: Destruction of buildings and engineer works (such as bridges, fortifications, or roads). Demolition requires enough munitions to make such material objects unfit for further use.
Neutralization: Inflicts enough losses on a target to
Cause it to temporarily lose its combat effectiveness,
Restrict or prohibit its maneuver,
Disrupt its command and control (C2) capability.
Harassment: Inhibits maneuver, lowers morale, interrupts rest, weakens enemy combat readiness
Target damage is the effect of fires on a given military target. It results in total, partial, or temporary loss of the target's combat effectiveness. The OPFOR categories of target damage are annihilation, demolition, neutralization, and harassment. Of these categories, the first three fall under the general term destruction.
Annihilation fires render targets completely combat-ineffective and incapable of reconstruction or token resistance. For a point target such as an antitank guided missile launcher, the OPFOR must expend enough munitions to ensure a 70 to 90 percent probability of kill. For area targets such as platoon strongpoints or nuclear artillery assets, the OPFOR must fire enough rounds to destroy from 50 to 60 percent of the targets within the group. These fires result in the group ceasing to exist as a viable fighting force.
The OPFOR uses the term demolition in reference to the destruction of buildings and engineer works (such as bridges, fortifications, or roads). Demolition requires enough munitions to make such material objects unfit for further use.
Fire for neutralization inflicts enough losses on a target to (1) Cause it to temporarily lose its combat effectiveness, or (2) Restrict or prohibit its maneuver, or (3) Disrupt its command and control (C2) capability. To achieve neutralization, the OPFOR must deliver enough munitions to destroy 30 percent of a group of unobserved targets. The expectation is that the target is severely damaged but could again become capable of coordinated resistance after the fire is lifted. The term neutralization applies only in an artillery context.
The OPFOR uses a limited number of fire support systems and munitions within a prescribed time to deliver harassment fires. The goal of these fires is to put psychological pressure on enemy personnel in locations such as defensive positions, command posts (CPs), and logistics installations. Successful harassment fire inhibits maneuver, lowers morale, interrupts rest, and weakens enemy combat readiness.
“In order to…”

9. Deployment Techniques
These techniques provide flexibility to conduct multiple fire missions simultaneously, since the battery can organize into more than one distinct firing unit.
Fire from Dispersed Locations
Fire and Decoy
Shoot and Move
Fire from Fixed Location
Purported Russian Artillery formations in Ukraine
Split battery is a tactic designed to increase the survivability of OPFOR artillery against enemy counterfire and counterbattery fire. Positioning the firing platoons 200 to 500 m apart can move at least one platoon from the beaten zone of a conventional fire strike.
Dispersed platoon is another tactic designed to increase the survivability of OPFOR indirect fire support weapons against enemy counterfire and counterbattery fire. The tactic also facilitates the employment of single firing systems or pairs in multiple small areas that would not accommodate larger groups of firing systems.
The OPFOR employs fire-and-decoy techniques to increase survivability as well as to deceive the enemy of the actual firing unit location. The techniques include roving gun, roving units, deception battery, and false battery.
The deception battery is a technique where the OPFOR creates an additional battery in an attempt to deceive the enemy of the actual battalion location. This technique is also referred to as the “fourth battery” technique.
The false battery is a technique that involves the use of active and decoy weapon firing positions to give the appearance of a battery firing position. Depending on conditions such as the terrain, enemy situation, and mission, the battery commander may employ up to two indirect fire support weapons in each platoon position with the camouflaged decoys or derelict equipment in the primary firing position to create the impression of use.
Shoot and move is a technique that involves the rapid displacement of a firing unit from a firing position immediately after completion of a fire mission.
The fire-from-fixed-locations technique is generally employed where there is limited movement in areas such as mountains, jungles, or urban areas.

10. Types of Firing Position Areas
Primary
Alternate
Temporary
Deception 1 1 1
Battalion
Primary
Firing Position Area
Battalion Alternate
Firing Position Area 3 2 2 2 3 2
Temporary Firing Position
The primary firing position area is designated for carrying out the primary fire missions in all types of battle.
The alternate firing position area is usually designated in a defensive situation for battalion or battery maneuver and to carry out fire missions during an intentional or forced abandonment of the primary firing position area.
The temporary firing position area can be designated for carrying out individual fire missions. A temporary firing position can allow a battery to accomplish special, short-term, or emergency missions. It could be forward of the battle zone, for support of maneuver units defending in the disruption zone or for firing on distant targets.
A battery (or battalion) may prepare deception firing positions and COP sites on its own or as part of the senior commander’s deception plan. Their purpose is to mislead the enemy as to the actual deployment of artillery units.
Battalion Temporary Firing Position Area
Battalion Alternate
Firing Position Area

11. Exploiting Vulnerabilities
Avoid its enemy’s strengths and exploits his vulnerabilities.
Outmaneuver, overwhelm, and outpace the enemy.
Deny the enemy any sanctuary, locally and in depth.
Use all fire support means to attack the most vulnerable parts of the enemy’s combat systems.
This includes infrastructure and even civilian targets!
Synchronize and focus RISTA and fire to destroy key enemy formations or systems
Can shift the balance of combat power and undermine enemy morale and resolve.

12. Offensive Fire Support
Suppress enemy troop activity and weapon systems
Deny the enemy information about friendly forces
Prevent the enemy form restoring fire support, C2, and RISTA systems
Deny the enemy the ability to use reserve forces
Create favorable conditions for a strike
Fire support considerations for the offense apply to all types of offensive action. The OPFOR plans and executes fires to support the attack and complete the destruction of the enemy. The use of selected lines or zones controls the shifting of fires, displacement of fire support units, and changes in command and support relationships between fire support units and maneuver units. Fires are planned to
·  Suppress enemy troop activity and weapon systems.
·  Deny the enemy information about friendly forces.
· Prevent the enemy from restoring fire support, C2, and RISTA systems neutralized during previous fire support missions.
· Deny the enemy the ability to use reserve forces to conduct a counterattack.
· If necessary, create favorable conditions for the conduct of a strike.
·   Support the exploitation force.

13. Defensive Fire Support
Key is the application of fire support as early as possible throughout the AOR in support of the defensive battle plan.
Deny the enemy information about friendly forces
Develop the situation early
Maximize the effect of obstacles
Create favorable conditions for a strike or counterattack
Fire support considerations for the defense apply to all types of defensive action. Key is the application of fire support as early as possible throughout the AOR in support of the defensive battle plan. Emphasis is placed on RISTA assets locating enemy formations and attack positions, with the goal of determining the direction and composition of the enemy main attack. Carefully analyzing the terrain over which the enemy will advance and canalizing his movement into kill zones can create conditions for fires in the defense. Fires are planned to
Deny the enemy information about friendly forces.
Develop the situation early by forcing the enemy to deploy early and thus reveal the location of his main effort.
Maximize the effect of obstacles as combat multipliers.
Create favorable conditions for the conduct of a strike and counterattacks.
Close-support fire is directed against advancing enemy maneuver units. Close support firencludes fires within defensive positions that are initiated after the enemy has successfully penetrated friendly defensive positions.
Final protective fire is planned along the most likely avenue of approach into the defensive position.
Carefully analyzing the terrain over which the enemy will advance and canalizing his movement into kill zones can create conditions for fires in the defense.

14. Artillery Munitions Sensor-fused Frag-HE, HEAT Smoke, Illumination
Course Corrected
THSM
Frag-HE, HEAT
Smoke, Illumination
ICM and DPICM,
Mines, Flechette
RF jammer
TV and UAV
Other PGMs
Sensor-fuzed munitions (SFMs) – SFMs are munitions in which the functions of target detection, acquisition, recognition, classification, and identification are performed without human intervention. They are designed for shoot-to-kill operation, normally from a top-attack position.
  SFMs can be delivered from weapons as small as 120-mm mortars up to 300-mm rockets. Most use millimeter wave and infrared to help in target recognition. Once delivered to and dispensed over the target area, an onboard sensor begins to search for targets. Generally, they are like a coffee can hanging from a parachute. It looks at the dirt right underneath it and the sensor, fixed to the body of the munitions, begins to scan the area. It recognizes the target based on algorithms (signal intensity and signal duration for infrared objects/MMW active/MMW passive vs average ground clutter). It is important to note that SFMs do not have onboard autopilot nor flight control devices to steer itself to the target. However, SFMs can be packaged inside of a course corrected carrier (projectile, rocket, or missile) that is steered over the target area prior to dispensing of the SFMs. Upon detection, the SFM immediately fuzes a lethal mechanism, usually an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) or a short fat slug, and directs it at the target. Since SFMs do not require on-board guidance to impact, they are simpler in design and lower in cost than terminally-guided munitions.
Terminally homing munitions (THMs) – THMs are munitions in which the functions of target detection, acquisition, recognition, classification, identification, and tracking are performed without human intervention. THMs are hit-to-kill subsystems; that is they employ onboard autopilot and flight control devices to steer to the target. An onboard warhead, usually a shaped-charge, is detonated upon impact.
Terminally-homing submunitions (THSMs) are packed inside of a carrier vehicle (rocket or missile) and dispensed for flyout into the target area. Thus a “many on many” munition to target effect is achieved. A cannon or a mortar fires terminally-homing projectiles (THPs) (Terminally-homing mortar projectiles -THMP) into the target area. THPs achieve a “one on one” munition to target effect. THPs must be sufficiently robust to survive high launch accelerations. The Swedish 120-mm Strix mortar projectile is an example of a currently produced and fielded THMP. THMs are for the most part still in the developmental stage.
They are the ‘Cadillac” design of artillery delivered high precision munitions and are much more expensive than other types of munitions. However, we should see relatively widespread use by 2010.

15. Russian Artillery (Ukraine Conflict)
Here are the facts:
Russia continues to accumulate significant amounts of equipment at a deployment site in southwest Russia. This equipment includes tanks of a type no longer used by the Russian military, as well as armored vehicles, multiple rocket launchers, artillery, and air defense systems. Russia has roughly doubled the number of tanks, armored vehicles, and rocket launchers at this site. More advanced air defense systems have also arrived at this site.
We are confident Moscow is mobilizing additional tanks that are no longer in the active Russian military inventory from a depot to send to this same deployment site.
We are concerned much of this equipment will be transferred to separatists, as we are confident Russia has already delivered tanks and multiple rocket launchers to them from this site.
Available information indicates Moscow has recently transferred some Soviet-era tanks and artillery to the separatists and that over the weekend several military vehicles crossed the border.
Social media videos of separatist military convoys suggest Russia in the past week alone has probably supplied the militants with at least two-dozen additional armored vehicles and artillery pieces and about as many military trucks.
Publicly available videos posted on July 14 of a Luhansk convoy on the road to Donetsk revealed at least five T-64 tanks, four BMP-2 armored personnel carriers (APC), BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, three towed antitank guns, two ZU 23-2 antiaircraft guns, and probably a 2B16 mortar.
A video of Krasnodon, near the Izvaryne border crossing, on 11 July showed two BTR armored personnel carriers, two antitank guns, and various trucks on a road heading in a westerly direction towards Donetsk.
A video filmed in Donetsk on 11 July showed a convoy of three BMD-2 APCs, two BMPs, one 2S9 self-propelled gun, and a BTR-60 APC.
In addition, after recapturing several Ukrainian cities last weekend, Ukrainian officials discovered caches of weapons that they assert came from Russia, including MANPADS, mines, grenades, MREs, vehicles, and a pontoon bridge.
Ukrainian forces have discovered large amounts of other Russian-provided military equipment, including accompanying documentation verifying the Russian origin of said equipment, in the areas they have liberated from the separatists.
Photographs of destroyed or disabled separatist equipment in eastern Ukraine have corroborated that some of this equipment is coming from Russia.
Recruiting efforts for separatist fighters are expanding inside Russia and separatists are looking for volunteers with experience operating heavy weapons such as tanks and air defenses. Russia has allowed officials from the “Donetsk Peoples’ Republic” to establish a recruiting office in Moscow.
Ukrainian pilot Nadiya Savchenko, who has long had a distinguished career in the Ukrainian military, was taken by separatists in mid-June. She is now being held in a prison in Voronezh, Russia. According to the Ukrainian government, she was transferred to Russia by separatists.
Separately Russia continues to redeploy new forces extremely close to the Ukrainian border. We have information that a significant number of additional military units are also in the process of deploying to the border.
Ukraine’s Good-Faith Efforts: In a bid to unify the country, President Poroshenko outlined a comprehensive peace plan on June 7. President Poroshenko’s plan offers amnesty to separatists who lay down their arms voluntarily, and who are not guilty of capital crimes; commits to providing a safe corridor for Russian fighters to return to Russia; establishes a job creation program for the affected areas; includes an offer of broad decentralization and dialogue with eastern regions, including the promise of early local elections; and grants increased local control over language, holidays, and customs. President Poroshenko also has reached out to the residents of eastern Ukraine and is pursuing constitutional reform which will give local regions more authority to choose their regional leaders and protect locally-spoken languages.
President Poroshenko implemented a unilateral seven-day (later extended to ten days) unilateral ceasefire on June 20. He also proposed meeting with leaders from eastern Ukraine - including separatists - despite their stated unwillingness to abide by the cease-fire or to negotiate.
Yet Russia and its proxies in Donetsk and Luhansk did not act on this opportunity for peace. Hours after the ceasefire began, Russia-backed separatists wounded nine Ukrainian service members. During the course of the ten-day ceasefire, Russia-backed separatists attacked Ukrainian security forces over 100 times, killing 28 service members. The separatists continue to hold more than 150 hostages, mostly civilians, including teachers and journalists. Separatists have refused all offers by the Ukrainian government to meet.
This timeline of events leading to, during, and after the unilateral Ukraine ceasefire illustrates how the good-faith efforts of the Ukraine government and European leaders to broker a ceasefire with Russia and the separatists it backs have been rejected. Russia and the separatists they are supporting continued to destabilize Ukraine throughout the ceasefire, and continue to destabilize Ukraine today.
May 25: Petro Poroshenko, who had campaigned on a platform stressing reconciliation with the east and Russia, is elected by an absolute majority of voters in Ukraine.
June 8-17: President Poroshenko hosts five rounds of contact group talks, facilitated by the OSCE envoy, in the lead-up to his announcement of a ceasefire.
June 12: Poroshenko initiates a call to President Putin to open communication.
June 14: EU-brokered gas talks end with a final EU brokered proposal: Ukraine accepts the proposal, but Russia rejected it.
June 20: Poroshenko implements a seven-day unilateral ceasefire. Hours later, nine Ukrainian service members are wounded by pro-Russian separatists, foreshadowing separatists’ 100 plus violent actions over the next 10 days.
June 19: Poroshenko meets with eastern Ukrainian leaders, including separatists, in Kyiv.
June 23: The contact group meets in Donetsk.
June 25: NATO Secretary General Rasmussen notes that there are “no signs” of Russia respecting its international commitments with regard to Ukraine.
June 27: Ukraine provides constitutional reform provisions to the Venice Commission for review. This reform would allow for the direct election of governors and for local authorities to confer special status on minority languages within their regions.
June 27: Poroshenko extends the unilateral ceasefire another 72 hours to allow another chance for OSCE contact group negotiations to show progress.
June 28: Ukraine shoots down two Russian UAVs violating Ukraine’s airspace in the Luhansk region.
June 30: Due to the separatists’ refusal to abandon violence in favor of negotiation, President Poroshenko allows the cease-fire to expire.
July 3: President Poroshenko in a telephone conversation with U.S. Vice President Biden reaffirms that he is ready to begin political negotiations to resolve the situation in Donetsk and Luhansk regions without any additional conditions.
July 8: President Petro Poroshenko visits the former rebel stronghold of Slovyansk to meet with local residents after government forces recapture it from pro-Russian separatists.
July 9: Ukraine restores electricity and train service to Slovyansk, and Ukrainian security forces distribute food, drinking water, and humanitarian aid to the population.
July 11: The Ukrainian government establishes an inter-agency task force in Slovyansk that is conducting damage, security, and humanitarian needs assessments.
July 11: The Ukrainian government reports that it delivered over 60 tons of humanitarian aid supplies in Donetsk Oblast over the preceding 24 hours, bringing the five-day total to 158 tons. President Poroshenko announces that Ukrainian security forces had successfully cleared nearly 100 mines and roadside bombs from liberated territory.
As General Philip Breedlove, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, stated on July 1: “The cease fire in Ukraine was not ended because of accusations; it was ended because Russian-backed separatists responded with violence while President Poroshenko tried to open a window for peace. Russia’s commitment to peace will be judged by its actions, not its words.” As the United States and our European allies have repeatedly stated, we call on the Russian government to halt its material support for the separatists, to use its influence with the separatists to push them to lay down their arms and abide by a ceasefire and to release all hostages. Only then can the process of bringing peace to Ukraine truly begin.
Image 1 shows Russian military units moving in a convoy formation with self-propelled artillery in the area of Krasnodon, Ukraine, well inside territory controlled by Russian separatists. The image was captured on 21 August There is confidence the equipment is Russian, since Ukrainian units have not yet penetrated this far into separatist controlled territory
Image 2 shows Russian self-propelled artillery units set up in firing positions near Krasnodon, Ukraine. They are supported by logistical vehicles which are likely carrying extra ammunition and supplies. This configuration is exactly how trained military professionals would arrange their assets on the ground, indicating that these are not unskilled amateurs, but Russian soldiers. Russian artillery systems like these have recently shelled Ukrainian positions outside the city of Luhansk in conjunction with a separatist counteroffensive to attempt to break the Ukrainian siege of the city.
Image 1 shows Russian military units moving in a convoy formation with self-propelled artillery in the area of Krasnodon, Ukraine.
Russian self-propelled firing positions supported by logistical vehicles. Configuration is how trained military professionals would arrange formations. Similar artillery systems like have recently shelled Ukrainian positions outside the city of Luhansk in conjunction with a separatist counteroffensive.

16. Irregular Indirect Fire

17. Questions?