ITU-T activities in the field of telecommunications security

ITU-T activities in the field of telecommunications security
Sami Trabulsi ITU/TSB

Introduction ICT security is high in the agenda of many national, regional or international organizations Computing and networking are an important part of daily life Increase in widely reported security incidents Need for effective security measures to protect computer and telecom systems of governments, industry, commerce, critical infrastructure and consumers

Security services/dimensions
Security services or dimensions X.800 X.805 Access control provides protection against unauthorized use of resources accessible protects against unauthorized use of network resources. Ensures that only authorized personnel or devices are allowed access to network elements, stored information, information flows, services and applications Authentication provides for the authentication of a communicating peer entity and the source of data serves to confirm the identities of communicating entities. Ensures validity of the claimed identities of the entities participating in communication (person, device, service or application) and provides assurance that an entity is not attempting a masquerade or unauthorized replay of a previous communication Non-repudiation with proof of origin or with proof of delivery provides means for preventing an individual or entity from denying having performed a particular action related to data by making available proof of various network-related actions (such as proof of obligation, intent, or commitment; proof of data origin, proof of ownership, proof of resource use). It ensures the availability of evidence that can be presented to a third party and used to prove that some kind of event or action has taken place Data confidentiality provides for the protection of data from unauthorized disclosure protects data from unauthorized disclosure. Ensures that the data content cannot be understood by unauthorized entities. Encryption, access control lists, and file permissions are methods often used to provide data confidentiality

Security services/dimensions
Communication security ensures that information flows only between the authorized end points (the information is not diverted or intercepted as it flows between these end points) Data integrity counters active threats (detects any modification, insertion, deletion or replay of any data) ensures the correctness or accuracy of data. The data is protected against unauthorized modification, deletion, creation, and replication and provides an indication of these unauthorized activities Availability ensures that there is no denial of authorized access to network elements, stored information, information flows, services and applications due to events impacting the network. Disaster recovery solutions are included in this category Privacy provides for the protection of information that might be derived from the observation of network activities. Examples of this information include websites that a user has visited, a user's geographic location, and the IP addresses and DNS names of devices in a service provider network

Background Carnegie Mellon Uni. CERT CC Symantec Corp.
A key concern for ICT security relates to systems vulnerabilities Statistics on computer-security vulnerabilities Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1Q,2005 Vulnerabilities 1,090 2,437 4,129 3,784 3,780 1,220 Vulnerabilities reported 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 171 345 311 262 417 Total vulnerabilities reported (1995-1Q,2005): 17,946 Carnegie Mellon Uni. CERT CC Symantec Corp. This computer-security company cataloges 11,000 vulnerabilities in 20,000 technologies, affecting 2,000 vendors in the last decade

Background An increasing number of countries now have data protection legislation requiring compliance with demonstrated data protection standards Some SDOs have security in their work programme as a continuous item (e.g., ITU, ISO, IETF) Or, other SDOs may be established to respond to a specific issue (e.g., e-business: OASIS SPAM: MAAWG)

High Level Security Drivers
ITU Plenipotentiary Conference (PP-02) Intensify efforts on security World Telecommunications Standardization Assembly (WTSA-04) Security robustness of protocols Countering spam World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS-05) Cyber security

ITU Plenipotentiary Conference 2002 Resolution PLEN/2 - Strengthening the role of ITU in information and communication network security resolves to review ITU's current activities in information and communication network security; to intensify work within existing ITU study groups in order to: a) reach a common understanding on the importance of information and communication network security by studying standards on technologies, products and services with a view to developing recommendations, as appropriate; b) seek ways to enhance exchange of technical information in the field of information and communication network security, and promote cooperation among appropriate entities; c) report on the result of these studies annually to the ITU Council.

ITU-T World Telecommunications Standardization Assembly (WTSA)
Resolution 50, Cyberscecurity - Evaluate existing and evolving new Recommendations with respect to their robustness of design and potential for exploitation by malicious parties - Raise awareness of the need to defend against the threat of cyber attack Resolution 51, Combating spam - Report on international initiatives for countering spam - Member States to take steps within their national legal frameworks to ensure measures are taken to combat spam Resolution 52, Countering spam by technical means - Study Groups, in cooperation with other relevant groups, to develop as a matter of urgency technical Recommendations on countering spam

ITU-T Study Groups ITU-T work is divided up between Study Groups (SGs). SG 2: Operational aspects of service provision, networks and performance SG 4: Telecommunication management SG 5: Protection against electromagnetic environment effects SG 6 Outside Plant and related indoor installations SG 9 Integrated broadband cable networks and television and sound transmission SG 11 Signaling requirements and protocols SG 12 Performance and quality of service SG 13 Next Generation Networks SG 15: Optical and other transport networks SG 16: Multimedia services, systems and terminals SG 17: Security, languages and telecommunication software SG 19: Mobile Telecommunications Networks SG17 is the Lead Study Group on security.

Overview of ITU-T Security Standardization Collaboration is key factor

Study Group 17: Security, languages and telecommunication software
SG 17 is the Lead Study Group on telecommunication security - It is responsible for coordination of security across all Study Groups. Subdivided into three Working Parties (WPs) WP1 - Open systems technologies; WP2 - Telecommunications security; WP3 - Languages and telecommunications software Most (but not all) security Questions are in WP2 Summaries of all draft Recommendations under development in SG 17 are available on the SG 17 web page at

Current SG 17 security-related Questions
Working Party 1: 1/17 End-to-end Multicast Communications with QoS Managing Facility 2/17 Directory services, Directory systems, and public- key/attribute certificates 3/17 Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) 16/17 International Domain Names (IDN) Working Party 2: 4/17 Communications Systems Security Project 5/17 Security Architecture and Framework 6/17 Cyber Security 7/17 Security Management 8/17 Telebiometrics 9/17 Secure Communication services 17/17 Countering spam by technical means Note: a short description of the work of each of these Questions is contained under the ITU-T SG17 section of the Security Roadmap (see later slide).

WP 2/17 Security Questions (2005-2008)
Telecom Systems Users Q8/17 Telebiometrics *Multimodal Model Fwk *System Mechanism *Protection Procedure *X.1081 Telecom Systems Q5/17 Q7/17 Secure Communication Services *Mobile Secure Communications *Home Network Security *Security Web Services *X.1121, X.1122 Security Management *ISM Guideline for Telecom *Incident Management *Risk Assessment Methodology *etc… *X.1051 Security Architecture & Framework *Architecture, Model, Concepts, Frameworks, *etc… *X.800 series *X.805 Q9/17 Cyber Security *Overview of Cyber-security *Vulnerability Information Sharing * Incident Handling Operations Q6/17 New Countering SPAM *Technical anti-spam measures Q17/17 New Q4/17 New Communications System Security *Vision, Coordination, Roadmap, Compendia…

ITU-T SG 17 Question 4 Communications Systems Security Project
Security Workshop ICT Security Roadmap Focus Group on Security Baseline For Network Operators

New Horizons for Security Standardization Workshop
Workshop held in Geneva 3-4 October 2005 Hosted by ITU-T SG17 as part of security coordination responsibility ISO/IEC JTC1 played an important role in planning the program and in providing speakers/panelists. Speakers, panelists, chairs from: ITU-T ISO/IEC IETF Consortia – OASIS, 3GPP Regional SDOs – ATIS, ETSI, RAIS

Workshop Objectives Provide an overview of key international security standardization activities; Seek to find out from stakeholders (e.g., network operators, system developers, manufacturers and end-users) their primary security concerns and issues (including possible issues of adoption or implementation of standards); Try to determine which issues are amenable to a standards-based solution and how the SDOs can most effectively play a role in helping address these issues; Identify which SDOs are already working on these issues or are best equipped to do so; and Consider how SDOs can collaborate to improve the timeliness and effectiveness of security standards and avoid duplication of effort.

Workshop Results Excellent discussions, feedback and suggestions
Documented in detail in the Workshop report Results are reported under following topics: What are the crucial problems in ICT security standardization? Meta issues and need for a global framework; Standards Requirements and Priorities; Liaison and information sharing; User issues; Technology and threat issues; Focus for future standardization work; Process issues; Follow-on issues The report is available on-line at:

ICT Security Standards Roadmap (an SG 17 work-in-progress)
Publicly available under Special Projects and Issues at: Part 1 contains information about organizations working on ICT security standards Part 2 is database of existing security standards Part 3 will be a list of standards in development Part 4 will identify future needs and proposed new standards

Roadmap access Part 2 includes ITU-T, ISO/IEC JTC1 and IETF standards. It will be expanded to include other standards (e.g. regional and consortia specifications). It will also be converted to a Database format to allow searching and to allow organizations to manage their own data We invite you to use the Roadmap, provide feedback and help us develop it to meet your needs

Other Q.4/17 projects Security in Telecommunications and Information Technology – an overview of existing ITU-T Recommendations for secure telecommunications (Security Manual, v3) Security compendium: catalogue of approved ITU-T Recommendations related to telecommunication security extract of ITU-T approved security definitions listing of ITU-T security related Questions We are in the process of establishing a Security Experts Network (SEN) to maintain on-going dialogue on key issues of security standardization.

Focus Group: Security Baseline for Network Operators
Established October 2005 by SG 17 Objectives: Define a security baseline against which network operators can assess their network and information security posture in terms of what security standards are available, which of these standards should be used to meet particular requirements, when they should be used, and how they should be applied Describe a network operator’s readiness and ability to collaborate with other entities (operators, users and law enforcement authorities) to counteract information security threats Provide meaningful criteria that can be used by network operators against which other network operators can be assessed, if required. Next Step Survey network operators by means of a questionnaire 2 meetings in preparation for 2006

ITU-T SG 17 Question 5 Security Architecture and Framework
Brief description of Q.5 Milestones Draft Recommendations under development

Brief description of Q.5/17
Motivation The telecommunications and information technology industries are seeking cost-effective comprehensive security solutions that could be applied to various types of networks, services and applications. To achieve such solutions in multi-vendor environment, network security should be designed around the standard security architectures and standard security technologies. Major tasks Development of a comprehensive set of Recommendations for providing standard security solutions for telecommunications in collaboration with other Standards Development Organizations and ITU-T Study Groups. Maintenance and enhancements of Recommendations in the X.800 series: X.800, X.802, X.803, X.805, X.810, X.811, X.812, X.813, X.814, X.815, X.816, X.830, X.831, X.832, X.833, X.834, X.835, X.841, X.842 and X.843

Q.5/17 Milestones ITU-T Recommendation X.805, Security Architecture for Systems Providing End-to-end Communications, was published in 2003. ISO Standard , Network security architecture, was developed in collaboration between ITU-T Q.5/17 and ISO/IEC JTC 1 SC 27 WG 1. The Standard is technically aligned with X.805. It was published in 2006.

ITU-T Recommendation X.805
X.805 defines a network security architecture for providing end-to-end network security. The architecture can be applied to various kinds of networks where the end-to-end security is a concern and independently of the network’s underlying technology.

ITU-T X.805 Approach X.805

ITU-T X.805 X.805 Provides A Holistic Approach:
Comprehensive, End-to-End Network View of Security Applies to Any Network Technology Wireless, Wireline, Optical Networks Voice, Data, Video, Converged Networks Applies to Any Scope of Network Function Service Provider Networks Enterprise Networks Government Networks Management/Operations, Administrative Networks Data Center Networks Can Map to Existing Standards Completes the Missing Piece of the Security Puzzle of what to do next X.805

E.409: Incident organization and security incident handling
analyze, structure and suggest a method for establishing an incident management organization within a telecommunications organization, where the flow and structure of incident handling is dealt with. flow and structure of incident handling helps in classifying a problem as: event incident security incident crisis incident flow handling also covers the critical first decisions to be made

Pyramid of events in E.409 Are considered as Information and Communications Networks (ICN) Security Incident any real or suspected adverse event in relation to the security of ICN. This includes: intrusion into ICN computer systems via the network; occurrence of computer viruses; probes for vulnerabilities via the network into a range of computer systems; PABX call leak-through; and any other undesired events arising from unauthorized internal or external actions, including denial of service attacks, disasters and other emergency situations, etc.

E.409 suggested reactions telecommunication organizations should create computer security incident response teams (CSIRT), as the first step, declare their use of taxonomy in order to avoid misunderstandings. Collaboration is much easier when using the same "language". organizations should use the term Incident and ICN Security Incident (any undesired, unauthorized event: computer intrusion denial of service attack virus attack), define their own subdivisions with regard to severity, depending on motivation, experience and available knowledgeable resources. When an effective virus fighting team has been created, viruses may not be considered as ICN security incidents but rather as incidents

Q.5/17 Draft Recommendations 1/2
Applications and further development of major concepts of ITU-T Recommendation X.805 X.805+, Division of the security features between the network and the users. This Recommendation specifies division of security features between the networks and users. It provides guidance on applying concepts of the X.805 architecture to securing service provider’s, application provider’s networks and the end user’s equipment. X.805nsa, Network security certification based on ITU-T Recommendation X.805. This Recommendation describes the methodology, processes and controls required for network security certification based on ITU-T Recommendation X.805, Security Architecture for Systems Providing End-to-End Communications.

Standardization in support of Authentication Security Dimension (defined in X.805) X.pak, Password-authenticated Key Exchange Protocol (PAK). This Recommendation specifies a password-based protocol for authentication and key exchange, which ensures mutual authentication of both parties in the act of establishing a symmetric cryptographic key via Diffie-Hellman exchange. X.ngn-akm, Framework for authentication and key management for link layer security of NGN. This Recommendation establishes a framework for authentication and key management for securing the link layer of NGN. It also provides guidance on selection of the EAP methods for NGN. Standardization of network security policies X.spn, Framework for creation, storage, distribution, and enforcement of security policies for networks. This Recommendation establishes security policies that are to drive security controls of a system or service. It also specifies a framework for creation, storage, distribution, and enforcement of policies for network security that can be applied to various environmental conditions and network devices.

ITU-T SG 17 Question 6 Cyber Security
Definition Motivation Objectives Scope Current area of focus Draft Recommendations under development

Cybersecurity working definition (SG17 – SG2 liaison)
As a working definition within the ITU-T, Cybersecurity means the collection of tools, policies, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies that may be used to protect organization and user’s assets on the cyber environment. Organization and user’s assets include connected computing devices, computing users, applications/services, Telecommunications systems, multimedia communication, and the totality of transmitted and/or stored information in the cyber environment. It encompasses the attainment and maintenance of the security properties of the organization and user’s assets against relevant security risks in the cyber environment. The security properties include one or more of the following: Availability Integrity, which may include authenticity and non-repudiation Confidentiality

Q.6/17 Motivation Network connectivity and ubiquitous access is central to today’s IT systems Wide spread access and loose coupling of interconnected IT systems is a primary source of widespread vulnerability Threats such as: denial of service, theft of financial and personal data, network failures and disruption of voice and data telecommunications are on the rise Network protocols in use today were developed in an environment of trust. Most new investments and development is dedicated to building new functionality and not on securing that functionality An understanding of cybersecurity is needed in order to build a foundation of knowledge that can aid in securing the networks of tomorrow

Q.6/17 Objectives Perform actions in accordance with Lead Study Group (LSG) responsibility with the focus on cybersecurity Work with Q.1 of SG 2 on a definition of Cybersecurity Identify and develop standards required for addressing the challenges in cybersecurity, within the scope of Q.6/17 Provide assistance to other ITU-T Study Groups in applying relevant cybersecurity Recommendations for specific security solutions. Review project-oriented security solutions for consistency. Maintain and update existing Recommendations within the scope of Q.6/17. Coordinate security activities with other ITU-T SGs, ISO/IEC JTC 1 eg. SC6, SC27 and SC37), and consortia as appropriate. Provide awareness on new security technologies related to cybersecurity

Q. 6/17 Scope Definition of Cybersecurity
Security of Telecommunications Network Infrastructure Security Knowledge and Awareness of Telecom Personnel and Users Security Requirements for Design of New Communications Protocol and Systems Communications relating to Cybersecurity Security Processes – Life-cycle Processes relating to Incident and Vulnerability Security of Identity in Telecommunication Network Legal/Policy Considerations

Q.6/17 Current area of focus
Work with SG 2 on the definition and requirements of cybersecurity. Collaborate with Q5,7,9,17/17 and SG 2 in order to achieve better understanding of various aspects of network security. Collaborate with IETF, OASIS, ISO/IEC JTC1, W3C, APEC-TEL and other standardization bodies on cybersecurity. Work on framework for secure network operations to address how telecommunications network providers secure their infrastructure and maintain secure operations. Work on Recommendation for standardization of vulnerability data definition. Study new cybersecurity issues – How should ISPs deal with botnets, evaluating the output of appropriate bodies when available. Call for contributions for the outstanding questions identified in the revised scope.

Overview of Cybersecurity (X.cso) This Recommendation provides a definition for Cybersecurity. The Recommendation provides a taxonomy of security threats from an operator point of view. Cybersecurity vulnerabilities and threats are presented and discussed at various network layers. Various Cybersecurity technologies that are available to remedy the threats include: Routers, Firewalls, Antivirus protection, Intrusion detection systems, Intrusion protection systems, Secure computing, Audit and Monitoring. Network protection principles such as defence in depth, access and identity management with application to Cybersecurity are discussed. Risk Management strategies and techniques are discussed including the value of training and education in protecting the network. A discussion of Cybersecurity Standards, Cybersecurity implementation issues and certification are presented. A vendor-neutral framework for automatic checking of the presence of vulnerabilities information update (X.vds) This Recommendation provides a framework of automatic notification on vulnerability information. The key point of the framework is that it is a vendor-neutral framework. Once users register their software, updates on the vulnerabilities and patches of the registered software will automatically be made available to the users. Upon notification, users can then apply

Guidelines for Internet Service Providers and End-users for Addressing the Risk of Spyware and Deceptive Software (X.sds) This Recommendation provides guidelines for Internet Service Providers (ISP) and end-users for addressing the risks of spyware and deceptive software. The Recommendation promotes best practices around principles of clear notices, and users’ consents and controls for ISP web hosting services. The Recommendation also promotes best practices to end-users on the Internet to secure their computing devices and information against the risks of spyware and deceptive software Guidelines on Cybersecurity Vulnerability Life-cycle Management(X.cvlm) The Recommendation provides a framework for the provision of monitoring, discovering, responding and post-analysis of vulnerabilities. Service providers can use this Recommendation to complement their existing Information Security Management System process in the aspect of regular vulnerability assessment, vulnerability management, incident handling and incident management.

ITU-T SG 17 Question 7 Security Management
Tasks Recommendations planned Revised X.1051 Approach for revised X.1051

Q.7/17 Tasks Information Security Management Guidelines for telecommunications (Existing X.1051, Information security management system – Requirements for telecommunications (ISMS-T) ) ・Maintain and revise Recommendation X.1051, “Information Security Management Guidelines for telecommunications based on ISO/IEC27002”. ・Jointly develop a guideline of information security management with ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27. Risk Management Methodology ・Study and develop a methodology of risk management for telecommunications in line with Recommendation X ・Produce and consent a new ITU-T Recommendation for risk management methodology. Incident Management ・Study and develop a handling and response procedure on security incidents for the telecommunications in line with Recommendation X ・Produce and consent a new ITU-T Recommendation for incident management methodology and procedures.

Recommendations planned in Q.7/17 (Security Management)
X.1050: To be proposed X.1051: In revision process Information Security Management Guidelines for Telecommunications based on ISO/IEC 27002 X.1052: To be proposed X.1053: To be proposed (Implementation Guide for Telecoms) X.1054: To be proposed (Measurements and metrics for Telecommunications) X.1055 :In the first stage of development Risk Management Guidelines for Telecommunications X.1056: In the first stage of development Security Incident Management Guidelines for Telecommunications X.1057: To be proposed (Identity Management for Telecoms)

Information security management guidelines for Telecommunications (Revised X.1051)
Information Assets for Telecom Revised X.1051 Security policy Organising information security Asset management Human resources security Physical & environmental security Communications & operations management Access control Information systems acquisition, development and maintenance Information security incident management Business continuity management Compliance

Q.7/17 Approach to develop revised ITU-T Rec. X.1051
CONTROL Implementation requirements for Telecom ISMS Process Existing X.1051 CONTROL Implementation guidance Other information ISO/IEC (2005) CONTROL Implementation guidance for Telecom Other information Revised X.1051

ITU-T SG 17 Question 8 Telebiometrics
Objectives Study areas on Biometric Processes X.1081 and draft Recommendations under development

Q.8/17 Objectives 1）To define telebiometric multimodal model framework
2）To specify biometric authentication mechanism in open network 3）To provide protection procedures and countermeasures for telebiometric systems

Q.8/17 Study areas on Biometric Processes
Sensors X.1081 X. p hysiol Safety conformity tsm: Telebiometrics System Mechanism tpp: Protection Procedure s Matching Application Yes/No Score NW Extraction NW:Network Decision Acquisition ( Captur ing) Storage X.tai: Telebiometrics Authentication Infrastructure X.bip: BioAPI Interworking Protocol

Q.8/17 Recommendations 1/4 X.1081 – The telebiometric multimodal model framework – A framework for the specification of security and safety aspects of telebiometrics This Recommendation defines a telebiometric multimodal model that can be used as a framework for identifying and specifying aspects of telebiometrics, and for classifying biometric technologies used for identification (security aspects). X.physiol – Telebiometrics related to human physiology This Recommendation gives names and symbols for quantities and units concerned with emissions from the human body that can be detected by a sensor, and with effects on the human body produced by the telebiometric devices in his environments.

Q.8/17 Recommendations 2/4 X.tsm-1 – General biometric authentication protocol and profile on telecommunication system This Recommendation defines communication mechanism and protocols of biometric authentication for unspecified end‑users and service providers on open network. X.tsm-2 – Profile of telecomunication device for Telebiometrics System Mechanism (TSM) This Recommendation defines the requirements, security profiles of client terminals for biometric authentication over the open network.

Q.8/17 Recommendations 3/4 X.tai – Telebiometrics authentication infrastructure This Recommendation specifies a framework to implement biometric identity authentication with certificate issuance, management, usage and revocation. X.bip – BioAPI interworking protocol This Recommendation is common text of ITU-T and ISO/IEC JTC1 SC37. It specifies the syntax, semantics, and encodings of a set of messages ("BIP messages") that enable BioAPI-conforming application in telebiometric systems.

Q.8/17 Recommendations 4/4 X.tpp-1 – A guideline of technical and managerial countermeasures for biometric data security This Recommendation defines weakness and threats in operating telebiometric systems and proposes a general guideline of security countermeasures from both technical and managerial perspectives. X.tpp-2 – A guideline for secure and efficient transmission of multi-modal biometric data This Recommendation defines threat characteristics of multi-modal biometric system, and provides cryptographic methods and network protocols for transmission of multi-modal biometric data.

ITU-T SG 17 Question 9 Secure Communication Services
Focus Position of each topic Mobile security Home network security Web services security Secure applications services

Q.9/17 Focus Develop a set of standards of secure application services, including Mobile security Under study Home network security Under study Web Services security Under study Secure application services Under study Privacy protection for RFID and multimedia content and digital Identity management To be studied Security Authentication - to know who is accessing your data Privacy - to protect your data from intrusion Encryption - to secure the data from misuse or abuse Biometrics - 'what you are‘ replace ‘what you know' - items, such as PIN numbers augment 'what you have‘ - forms of identification, such as cards X.509 Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks X.842 Guidelines for the use and management of Trusted Third Party services X.843 Specification of TTP services to support the application of digital signatures Recommendation X.509 Information technology - The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks This Recommendation defines a framework for public-key certificates and attribute certificates. These frameworks may be used to profile application to Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Privilege Management Infrastructures (PMI). Also, this Recommendation defines a framework for the provision of authentication services by Directory to its users. It describes two level of authentication: simple authentication, using a password as a verification of clamed identity; and strong authentication, involving credentials formed using cryptographic techniques. Approved Information technology – Security techniques – Guidelines for the use and management of Trusted Third Party services This Recommendation provides guidance for the use and management of Trusted Third Party (TTP) services, a clear definition of the basic duties and services provided, their description and their purpose, and the roles and liabilities of TTPs and entities using their services. This Recommendation identifies different major categories of TTP services including time stamping, non-repudiation, key management, certificate management, and electronic notary public. Q13/7 Information technology – Security techniques – Specification of TTP services to support the application of digital signatures This Recommendation defines the services required to support the application of digital signatures for non repudiation of creation of a document. Since this implies integrity of the document and authenticity of the creator, the services described can also be combined to implement integrity and authenticity services.

Secure application services
Position of each topic Web Services security Application Server Home Network Mobile Terminal Mobile Network Open Network Home network security Mobile security Secure application services

Q.9/17 - Mobile Security X.1121, Framework of security technologies for mobile end-to-end data communications – Approved 2004 X.1122, Guideline for implementing secure mobile systems based on PKI – Approved 2004 X.msec-3, General security value added service (policy) for mobile data communication Develops general security service as value added service for secure mobile end-to-end data communication. X.msec-4, Authentication architecture in mobile end-to-end data communication Constructs generic authentication architecture for mobile data communication between mobile users and application servers. X.crs, Correlative reacting system in mobile network Develops the generic architecture of a correlative reactive system to protect the mobile terminal against virus, worms, trojan-horses or other network attacks to both the mobile network and its mobile users.

Q.9/17 - Home network security
X.homesec-1, Framework for security technologies for home network Framework of security technologies for home network Define security threats and security requirements, security functions, security function requirements for each entity in the network, and possible implementation layer X.homesec-2, Certificate profile for the device in the home network Device certificate profile for the home network Develops framework of home network device certificate. X.homesec-3, User authentication mechanisms for home network service User authentication mechanisms for home network service. Provides the user authentication mechanism in the home network, which enables various authentication means such as password, certificate, biometrics and so on.

Q.9/17 - Web Services security
X.websec-1, Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) Security assertion markup language Adoption of OASIS SAML v2.0 into ITU-T Recommendation X Consented April 2006 Define XML-based framework for exchanging security information. The security information expressed in the form of assertions about subjects, where a subject is an entity (either human or computer) that has an identity in some security domain. X.websec-2, eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) eXtensible Access Control Markup Language Adoption of OASIS XACML v2.0 into ITU-T Recommendation X Consented April 2006 Provides an XML vocabulary for expressing access control policies and the syntax of the language and the rules for evaluating policies. X.websec-3, Security architecture for message security in mobile Web Services Develops a guideline on message security architecture and service scenarios for securing messages for mobile Web Services.

Q.9/17 - Secure applications services
X.sap-1, Guideline on strong password authentication protocols Guideline on secure password-based authentication protocol with key exchange. Define a set of requirements for password-based protocol with key exchange and a selection guideline by setting up criteria that can be used in choosing an optimum authentication protocol for each application. X.sap-2, Secure communication using TTP service Secure end-to-end data communication techniques using TTP services Specifies secure end-to-end data communication techniques using TTP services that are services defined in X.842 or other services. X.p2p-1, Anonymous authentication architecture in community communication Requirements of security for peer-to-peer and peer-to-multi peer communications Investigates threat analysis for P2P and P2MP communication services and describes security requirements for secure P2P and P2MP communication services. X.p2p-2, Security architecture and protocols for peer to peer network Security architecture and protocols for peer to peer network Describes the security techniques and protocols in the P2P environment.

ITU-T SG 17 Question 17 Countering spam by technical means
Objectives Set of Recommendations

Q.17/17 Objectives The aim of this Question is to develop a set of Recommendations on countering spam by technical means for ITU-T, taking into account the need for collaboration with ITU-T other Study Groups and cooperation with other SDOs. The Question focuses particularly on technical requirement, frameworks and new technologies for countering spam. Guidelines on countering spam by technical means are also studied.

Spam definition SG2 TD 3 Rev.3 (PLEN/2)
The ITU’s WSIS Thematic Meeting on Countering Spam, held 7-9 July 2004 in Geneva ( looked at the issue of defining spam. As reported in the Chairman’s Conclusions of that meeting, the description of what the term is commonly used for is as follows: 12. Although there is no universally agreed definition of spam, the term is commonly used to describe unsolicited electronic bulk communications over or mobile messaging (SMS, MMS), usually with the objective of marketing commercial products or services. While this description covers most kinds of spam, a recent and growing phenomenon is the use of spam to support fraudulent and criminal activities—including attempts to capture financial information (e.g. account numbers and passwords) by masquerading messages as originating from trusted companies (“brand-spoofing” or “phishing”) – and as a vehicle to spread viruses and worms. On mobile networks, a particular problem is the sending of bulk unsolicited text messages with the aim of generating traffic to premium-rate numbers.

Spam definition (2) SG2 TD 3 Rev.3 (PLEN/2)
The OECD Task Force on Spam also addressed the question of defining spam in its Anti-Spam Toolkit launched publicly in April 2006, where the Task Force noted that: SPAM can be considered as the slang term for the reception of unsolicited messages, usually of commercial nature, and sent to multiple destinations. Anyone can send SPAM, it is easy to do and costs very little, and can be done through a variety of media, from to fax and mobile phones. However, there is no commonly held definition of the term. Although broadly referring to the same phenomena, different countries define spam in a manner that is most relevant to their local environment. […] The simplest view of spam is that it is any received message that is unwanted by the recipient. In terms of developing a policy response to spam, or anti-spam legislation, this definition is too broad and simplistic. […] Definitions will generally be the accretion of additional technical, economic, social and practical aspects of spam.

Spam definition (3) SG2 TD 3 Rev.3 (PLEN/2)
A definition was also elaborated for the tripartite Memorandum of Understanding on spam enforcement signed in July 2004 by the relevant regulatory authorities of Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom. For the purposes of this Memorandum, […] “Spam Violations” means conduct prohibited by a country’s Commercial Laws that is substantially similar to conduct prohibited by the Commercial Laws of the other countries, including, but not necessarily limited to: 1. sending commercial containing deceptive content; 2. sending commercial without providing the recipient with a means, such as a valid address or an Internet based mechanism, to request that such communications cease; 3. sending commercial that contains misleading information about the message initiator, or fails to disclose the sender’s address; or 4. sending commercial , when the recipient has specifically requested the sender not to do so.

Q.17/17 Set of Recommendations
Guideline on countering spam (X.gcs) Draft Framework Recommendations: IP multimedia application area (TBD) Technical framework for countering spam (X.fcs) Draft Overview of countering spam for IP multimedia application (X.ocsip) Draft Technology Recommendations: Technical means for countering spam (X.tcs) TBD Other SDOs Requirement on countering spam (X.csreq) Draft Technical means for countering IP multimedia spam (X.tcs)TBD

Q.17/17 Brief Summaries of draft Recommendations under development 1/2
X.csreq, Requirement on countering spam This Recommendation provides the general characteristics of spam, elicits generic objectives and provides an overview of the technical requirements on countering spam. In addition, this Recommendation provides checklist to evaluate the solution on countering spam. X.fcs, Technical framework for countering spam This Recommendation specifies the technical framework for network structure for the countering spam. Functions inside the framework are defined. It also includes the commonsensible characteristics of spam, the universal rules of judgement and the common methods of countering spam.

Q.17/17 Brief Summaries of draft Recommendations under development 2/2
X.gcs, Guideline on countering spam (X.gcs) This Recommendation specifies technical issues on countering spam. It provides the current technical solutions and related activities from various SDOs and relevant organizations on countering Spam. It will be used as a basis for further development of technical Recommendations on countering spam. X.ocsip, Overview of countering spam for IP multimedia application This Recommendation specifies basic concepts, characteristics, and effects of Spam in IP multimedia applications such as IP Telephony, video on demand, IP TV, instant messaging, multimedia conference, etc. It will provide basis and guideline for developing further technical solutions on countering Spam.

Security Work in other ITU-T Study Groups
SG 4 – Security of Management plane SG 9 – IPCablecom SG 13 – NGN security SG 16 – Multimedia security SG 19 – Security in IMT-2000

SG 4: Security of the management plane (M.3016 series)
Approved last year, the M.3016 series is viewed as a key aspect of NGN Management; it is included in the NGN Management Roadmap issued by the NGNMFG In M.3060 on the Principles of NGN Management The M.3016 series consists of 5 parts: M : Overview M : Requirements M : Services M : Mechanisms M : Profile proforma The role of M is unique in that it provides a template for other SDOs and forums to indicate for their membership what parts of M.3016 are mandatory or optional

SG 9: IPCablecom Evolution
Enhance cable’s existing IP service environment to accelerate the convergence of voice, video, data, and mobility Define an application agnostic architecture that allows cable operators to rapidly innovate new services Provide a suite of Recommendations that define the elements and interfaces needed to facilitate multi-vendor interoperability Incorporate leading communications technologies from the IETF and 3GPP IMS

SG 9: IPCablecom Evolution
OSS evolves to support new clients and services Operational Support Systems Provisioning, Management, Security, Accounting Applications Voice, Video, IM Presence, Wireless IPCablecom Network Signaling Framework, Subscriber Data Policy Control NAT Traversal New capabilities added to support additional clients and services IPCablecom expands to support other services PSTN CMS Gateway Operational Support Systems Provisioning, Management, Security, Accounting Telephony was the first service Managed IP Network CMTS DOCSIS®

SG 9: Targeted Applications
Enhanced Cable Voice and Video IP Telephony Support for new media and client types (e.g., video telephony, soft clients) Call treatment based on presence, device capability, identity Maintain support for cable telephony features enabled by current IPCablecom Recommendations Fixed-mobile Convergence over Cable Support for dual mode cellular/WiFi handsets over DOCSIS Call handover between IPCablecom VoIP networks and cellular networks Integrated features and call control between cellular and VoIP platforms Cable Cross-Platform Features Cross platform notification, messaging (e.g., Caller-ID on TV) Third-party call control features, such as ‘Click to dial’

SG 9: Design Approach Incorporate new IP communication technologies
Focus on the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and supporting protocols Leverage the 3GPP IMS as a service delivery platform Develop a modular and extensible architecture that allows new services to be added without impacting the core IPCablecom infrastructure Ensure backward compatibility with existing IPCablecom Recommendations Support a wide variety of client devices

SG 9: IPCablecom Security Requirements Under Consideration
Support a range of authentication schemes UICCs (similar to SIM card) Digital Certificates (existing IPCablecom EMTAs) SIP digest (software clients) Support a range of secure signaling options IPsec TLS Disabled Support secure configuration before registration Support TLS for intra-domain security Minimize changes to IMS Reuse existing standards

SG 9: DOCSIS base line privacy +
The primary goals of DOCSIS BPI+ are to provide privacy of customer traffic, integrity of software downloads, and prevent theft of service. DOCSIS BPI+ provides a number of tools to support these goals: Traffic encryption for privacy/confidentiality. Secure Software Download to assure a valid CM image. Configuration file authentication to help secure the provisioning process. Focus is on the link layer between the CMTS and CM. Security outside the DOCSIS network is provided by applications and other networks.

SG 9: DOCSIS BPI+ Security Algorithms
A Cable Modem Terminations System (CMTS) authenticates cable modems (CM) using X.509 certificates and RSA public key cryptography. Subscriber Traffic encryption 3DES used for key exchange DES used for traffic encryption. AES being considered for future DOCSIS versions. SW download image validation is performed using X.509 certificates and digital signatures using RSA public key cryptography. Message integrity checks (MIC) with keyed MD5 hash used for CM configuration file security. This information must be identified for each feature. There can be multiple slides for each feature. Please do not if possible combine multiple features into one slide.

SG 13: NGN Security Outline
Why NGN security? The ITU-T work on NGN Security Relationship to other SDOs Output of the NGN Focus Group Recent developments—starting the SG 13 Security work Top NGN security issues that need resolution Security is among the key differentiators of the NGN. It is also among its biggest challenges!.. All SG 13 Recommendations have a security section

SG 13: Why Security? (Threat examples)
Subscriber’s perspective Eavesdropping, theft of PIN codes Tele-spam Identity theft Infection by viruses, worms, and spyware Loss of privacy (call patterns, location, etc.) Flooding attacks on the end point Provider’s perspective Theft of service Denial of service Disclosure of network topology Non-audited configuration changes Additional related risks to the PSTN… In NGN, known IP security vulnerabilities can make PSTN vulnerable, too!

SG 13: The ITU-T work on NGN Security
SG 13: Lead Study Group on the NGN standardization. (Question 15/13 is responsible for X.805-based NGN security) SG 17: Lead Study Group on Telecommunication Security—the fundamental X.800 series, PKI, etc. SG 4: Lead Study Group on Telecommunication Management—Management Plane security SG 11: Lead Study Group on signaling and protocols—security of the Control and Signaling planes SG 16: Lead Study Group on multimedia terminals, systems and applications—Multimedia security FGNGN has concluded; its work has moved to SG 13

ITU-T SG 13, 17, 4, 11, 16 … SG 13 is the Lead Study Group for NGN
Collaboration of ITU-T with other SDOs and fora on NGN security Recommendations ISO/IEC JTC1 SC 27, … ATIS ITU-T SG 13, 17, 4, 11, 16 … IETF 3GPP 3GPP2 Fora (such as OASIS) ETSI TISPAN TIA SG 13 is the Lead Study Group for NGN SG 17 is the Lead Study Group for Security

SG 13: Question 15 NGN security
Question 15 (NGN security) of SG 13 – ITU-T lead study group for NGN and satellite matters - will continue standards work started by FGNGN WG 5. Q.15/13 major tasks are: Lead the NGN-specific security project-level issues within SG 13 and with other Study Groups. Recognizing SG 17’s overall role as the Lead Study Group for Telecommunication Security, advise and assist SG 17 on NGN security coordination issues. Apply the X.805 Security architecture for systems providing end-to-end communication within the context of an NGN environment Ensure that the developed NGN architecture is consistent with accepted security principles Ensure that AAA principles are integrated as required throughout the NGN

Security requirements for the Service Stratum
SG 13: FGNGN output: Security Requirements for NGN Release 1 (highlights) Security requirements for the Transport Stratum NGN customer network domain Customer network to IP-Connectivity Access Network (IP-CAN) interface Core network functions NGN customer network to NGN customer network interface Security requirements for the Service Stratum IMS securty Transport domain to NGN core network interface Open service platforms and applications security VoIP Emergency Telecommunication Services and Telecommunications for Disaster Relief

SG 13: FGNGN output: Guidelines for NGN Security Release 1 (highlights)
General General principles and guidelines for building secure Next Generation Networks Detailed examination of IMS access security and NAT and firewall traversal NGN Security Models Security Associations model for NGN Security of the NGN subsystems IP-Connectivity Access Network IMS Network domain and IMS-to-non-IMS network security IMS access Framework for open platform for services and applications in NGN Emergency Telecommunications Service (ETS) and Telecommunications for Disaster Relief (TDR) Security Overview of the existing standard solutions related to NAT and firewall traversal

SG 13: Focus of the current work of Question 15, NGN security
Security Requirements for NGN Release 1 Authentication requirements for NGN Release 1 AAA Service for Network Access to NGN Guidelines for NGN Security Release 1 Security considerations for Pseudowire (PWE) technology At the heart of securing network protocols, the biggest challenge is authentication.

SG 13: Major issues for NGN security standardization
Key distribution (for end-users and network elements) and Public Key Infrastructure “Network privacy”—topology hiding and NAT/Firewall traversal for real-time applications Convergence with IT security Management of security functions (e.g., policy) Guidelines on the implementation of the IETF protocols (e.g., IPsec options) Security for supporting access: DSL, WLAN, and cable access scenarios Guidelines for handling 3GPP vs. 3GPP2 differences in IMS Security Both—network assets and network traffic—must be protected. Proper management procedures will help prevent attacks from within.

SG 13: NGN Architecture

SG 16: Multimedia security in Next Generation Networks
ITU-T SG 16 MM-security activities – Overview (Q.25 and Q.5) Status and results within SG16. Ongoing and future activities within SG16.

Question 25/16 “Multimedia Security in Next-Generation Networks” (NGN-MM-SEC)
Study Group 16 concentrates on Multimedia systems. Q.25/16 focuses on the application-security issues of MM applications in next generation networks Standardizes Multimedia Security So far Q.25 has been standardizing MM-security for the “1st generation MM/pre-NGN?-systems”: H.323/H.248-based systems.

Evolution of H.235 Core Security Framework Engineering 1st Deployment Consolidation Improvement and Additions H.235V3 + Annex I H.235V3 Amd1 + Annex H H.235V3 Amd1 H.235 Annex G H.235V2 Annex D Annex E approved Security Profiles Annex D Annex E started Annex F H.530 consent H.235V1 approved Initial Draft H.323V2 H.323V4 H.323V5 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 => 2005

H.235 v4 subseries Recommendations
Major restructuring of H.235v3 Amd1 and annexes in stand-alone subseries Recommendations H.235.x subseries specify scenario-specific MM-security procedures as H.235-profiles for H.323 Some new parts added Some enhancements and extensions Incorporated corrections Approved in Sept. 2005

H.323 Security Recommendations (1)
H “Security framework for H-series (H.323 and other H.245-based) multimedia systems” Overview of H.235.x subseries and common procedures with baseline text H "Baseline Security Profile” Authentication & integrity for H signaling using shared secrets H "Signature Security Profile” Authentication & integrity for H signaling using X.509 digital certificates and signatures

H "Hybrid Security Profile" Authentication & integrity for H signaling using an optimized combination of X.509 digital certificates, signatures and shared secret key management; specification of an optional proxy-based security processor H "Direct and Selective Routed Call Security" Key management procedures in corporate and in interdomain environments to obtain key material for securing H call signaling in GK direct-routed/selective routed scenarios enhanced extended

H "Framework for secure authentication in RAS using weak shared secrets" Secured password (using EKE/SPEKE approach) in combination with Diffie-Hellman key agreement for stronger authentication during H signaling H "Voice encryption profile with native H.235/H.245 key management" Key management and encryption mechanisms for RTP enhanced modified

H "Usage of the MIKEY Key Management Protocol for the Secure Real Time Transport Protocol (SRTP) within H.235" Usage of the MIKEY key management for SRTP H "Key Exchange for SRTP using secure Signalling Channels" SRTP keying parameter transport over secured signaling channels (IPsec, TLS, CMS) H "Security Gateway Support for H.323" Discovery of H.323 Security Gateways (SG = H.323 NAT/FW ALG) and key management for H signaling

Other SG16 MM-SEC Results
H (2003) “H Directory Services Architecture for H.235” An LDAP schema to represent H.235 elements (PWs, certificates, ID information) H.530 (Revision 2003) “Symmetric security procedures for H.323 mobility in H.510” Authentication, access control and key management in mobile H.323-based corporate networks

Q.5/16 (H.300 NAT/FW traversal) Results (1)
H “Traversal of H.323 signalling across FWs and NATs” H.323 protocol enhancements and new client/server proxies to allow H.323 signalling protocols traverse NATs & FWs; H.323 endpoints can remain unchanged H “NAT & FW traversal procedures for RTP in H.323 systems” uses multiplexed RTP media mode and symmetric RTP in conjunction with H as a short-term solution

More Q.5/16 Results (2) Technical Paper “Requirements for Network Address Translator and Firewall Traversal of H.323 Multimedia Systems” Documentation of scenarios and requirements for NAT & FW traversal in H.323 Technical Paper “Firewall and NAT traversal Problems in H.323 Systems” An analysis of scenarios and various problems encountered by H.323 around NAT & FW traversal

New Q.25/16 items under current study (1)
Draft H.460.spn “Security protocol negotiation” Goal: Negotiate security protocols (IPsec or TLS) for H.323 signaling) (Draft) H.FSIC “Federated Architecture for Secure Internet Conferencing” Goal: Define a generic protocol independent security profile for globally scalable security conferencing using trust federations.

Study Anti-DDoS (Denial-of-Service) countermeasures for (H.323-based) NAT/FW proxy and MM applications Security for MM-QoS (H.mmqos.security) MM security aspects of Vision H.325 “Next-generation Multimedia Terminals and Systems” Goal: MM-security for H.325, MM security for Audiovisual on Demand services, Multimedia Conferencing, Distant learning,...

Study Multimedia-Security aspects of Digital Rights Management (MM-DRM) What does MM-DRM mean? Understand DRM security needs for MM content of MM applications (e.g. IPTV,…) Contributions are solicited. Which other groups are active/interested in this area?

Ongoing Q.5/16 work items Draft H.proxy
Goal: Specify signaling & media client/server proxies connected with a (UDP) tunneling protocol for H.323 NAT & FW traversal

SG 16: Summary Multimedia systems and applications as being studied by SG16 face important security challenges: MM-security and NAT/FW traversal Q.25/16 and Q.5/16 are addressing these issues and have provided various Recommendations The work continues in the scope of NGN-Multimedia Security.

ITU-T SG 19 Work on Security

Security Work in SG 19 (1/3) Q.1/19 Service and network capability requirements and network architecture PDNR Q.FNAB “Functional Network Architecture for Systems Beyond IMT-2000” has included security requirements from the beginning, building on existing material in related domains Q.2/19 Mobility management Security is included as a fundamental component of the analysis mobility management mechanisms in Q-series Supplement 47 “Technical Report on NNI Mobility Management Requirements” Currently progressing, on the same basis and jointly with Q.6/13: Rec.MMR Mobility Management Requirements (Stage 1) Rec.MMF Mobility Management Framework (Stage 2) Rec.LMF Location Mobility Management Framework (Stage 2) Rec.HMF Handover Management Framework (Stage 2)

Security Work in SG 19 (2/3) Q.3/19 Identification of existing and evolving IMT-2000 systems Q.1741 and Q.1742 series of Recommendations include security as a key aspect of its referencing Recommendations for IMT-2000 (3G) Family Members identified in its Q.1741.x (3GPP) and Q.1742.x (3GPP2) series Recommendations, including: an evaluation of perceived threats a list of security requirements to address the threats security objectives and principles a defined security architecture (i.e., security features and mechanisms) cryptographic algorithm requirements lawful interception requirements lawful interception architecture and functions Additional information in backup charts

Q.4/19 Preparation of a handbook on IMT-2000
Security in SG 19 Work (3/3) Q.4/19 Preparation of a handbook on IMT-2000 Next edition of “Handbook of evolving IMT-2000 Systems (Core Network Aspects)” in progress includes a new chapter “Safety and security issues for IMT-2000” Q.5/19 Convergence of evolving IMT-2000 networks with evolving fixed networks Includes security consideration for such areas as user identification and authentication, including IMS security (see Q.3/19)

Conclusions Security is everybody's business
Collaboration with other SDOs is necessary Security needs to be designed in upfront Security must be an ongoing effort Systematically addressing vulnerabilities (intrinsic properties of networks/systems) is key so that protection can be provided independent of what the threats (which are constantly changing and may be unknown) may be – X.805 is helpful here

Some useful web resources
ITU-T Home page Study Group Recommendations ITU-T Lighthouse ITU-T Workshops Security Roadmap

Thank You !

ITU-T activities in the field of telecommunications security

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