1. Lt Gen “JT” Thompson Commander, AFLCMC
AFLCMC Hot Topics
Lt Gen “JT” Thompson
Commander, AFLCMC
Thanks for the opportunity to speak at this marvelous symposium
(Next chart)
Providing the Warfighter’s Edge…

2. Overview AFLCMC mission Product Support (PS) & hot topics
Where We’re Headed
Aircraft Structural Integrity Program (ASIP)
Teaming/Relying on each other
Cyber resiliency of weapon systems

3. AF Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC) Overview
Hill AFB UT
Peterson AFB CO
Tinker AFB OK
JB San Antonio TX
Gunter Annex AL
Eglin AFB FL
Robins AFB GA
WPAFB OH
Hanscom AFB MA
9 major operating locations
Responsible for 2 AF bases
Hanscom AFB, MA
Wright-Patt AFB, OH
Supports over 2,800 programs
Represents 4% of the Air Force’s workforce delivering 100% of its non-space warfighting capabilities
$200B active budget would lead AFLCMC to be #4 on Fortune 500 list!
AFLCMC
Here’s where we reside…26,000 acquisition professionals at 9 major locations
We are about 4% of the AF end-strength and we deliver 100% of the non-space, non-ICBM/Nuclear Weapon warfighting capabilities
We like to think we’re a pretty good return on investment
Anvil speaking points were NOT noted in last years LOA speaker notes
Over 26,000 personnel providing “cradle-to-grave” Acquisition and Product Support for aircraft, engines, munitions, electronics and cyber systems

4. Here is the AFLCMC Enterprise
Agile Combat Support
Acquire and provide Automatic Test Systems, Simulators, Support Equipment & Vehicles, & Human Systems
Tunner Cargo
MRAP
EW Targeting Pod
ACES II
Loading System
Armament
Acquire and provide all non-nuclear munitions
JASSM
QF-16
JDAM
JPF
AIM-9X
SDB-II
Battle
Management
Acquire and provide AF DCGS, AOC, AWACS, JSTARS, & 3DELRR
E-3
DCGS
AOC
E-8
Business & Enterprise Systems
Acquire and provide business IT systems AF-wide
AFEMS
AFSN
DEAMS
ILS-S
IMDS
C3I & Networks
Acquire and provide C3I infrastructure, CCE & JIE
Fighters
& Bombers
Acquire and provide fighter & bomber fleets to the warfighter
A-10
F-15
F-16
F-22
B-1
B-2
BACN
Crypto Systems
C3MS
BITI
ISR/SOF
Acquire and provide ISR capabilities; U-2, Strike Systems, HC/MC-130, TENCAP, RPAs, Battlefield Airmen, NTNF, & Rotary Wing Sensors
MQ-1
MQ-9
U-2
RC-135
Mobility
Acquire and provide more than 25 key capabilities; airborne mobility platforms, executive airlift, USAFA aircraft
C-130J
C-5
C-17
T-38
Tanker
Acquire and provide capabilities for the KC-46, KC-135, & the KC-10
KC-46
KC-10
KC-135
Air Force Security Assistance and Cooperation
Acquire and provide Foreign Military Sales Programs
Iraqi C-208
Iraqi C-130
UAE F-16
RSAF F-15
Propulsion
Acquire and provide leading-edge propulsion systems
T106-PW-100
F135
T56
F100
F119
AETP
Here is the AFLCMC Enterprise
If you’re deployed, from the time you get up until the time you go to sleep, you are utilizing equipment and systems that AFLCMC has developed and fielded.

5. Product Support – What is it?
Wikipedia defines PS as…
“Product support is a service provided by many retailers of various products that provides the end- user with a resource for information regarding the product, and help if the product should malfunction.”
U.S. Law: (10 U.S.C. § 2337)
“The package of support functions required to field and maintain the readiness and operational capability of major weapon systems, subsystems, and components, including all functions related to weapon system readiness”
So what is Product Support…well if you were to type ‘Product Support’ into Google, Wikipedia would come up at the top of the page with this definition. Now everyone knows that Wikipedia is known for being a solid source, but in this case it does emphasize good points, it’s a ‘service’ provided to the ‘end-user’…is a ‘resource of information…should a product malfunction’
Now if you ask Title 10 of the U.S.C or look it up in the DAG, you would find an even more formal answer…but not all that different once you break it down.
But how I define PS is simply … how do we keep a weapon system operationally viable throughout it’s life.
JT’s take on PS… “It’s how we keep a weapon system operationally viable throughout its life”

6. Product Support Hot Topics
F-15E canopy sill longeron crack
A crack of sufficient size to cause catastrophic failure when the aircraft is flown at its design limit load was discovered
The CSL should have been capable of 5900 Equivalent Flight Hours (EFH) of service; however, only 700 EFH had elapsed
ACC issued a stand-down until the 32 other F-15E aircraft that may be vulnerable have been identified
-- Will generalize in talk
1) F-15 CSL Crack: A crack of sufficient size to cause catastrophic failure when the aircraft is flown at its design limit load was discovered, resulting in ACC issuing a stand-down of aircraft.
[This topic ties to Slide 10 – ASIP]
2) JSTARS Depot:
Some depots are 100% Contractor-led and operated (with DCMA oversight)
Over the past 4 years, Contractor-led depots have had 123 mishaps with damages in excess of $33M
Vast majority of damagees are paid for by AF
Trend Items in Contractor Depot Mishaps: a) Not following established procedures or technical orders, b) Poor Quality Assurance, and c) Poor Floor Supervision.
[This topic ties to Slide 12 – AFLCMC/AFSC Teaming with Depots and aiding Industry]
E-8C JSTARS depot
Inspections of 4 aircraft recently returned from the depot identified 12 Safety of Flight Concerns
AFLCMC assembled an IRT to investigate and address the quality issues coming out of depot
AFLCMC has concerns about trend of mishaps at contractor depot operations

7. Product Support Hot Topics
Support Equipment (SE)
Common SE vs Peculiar SE
SE is not tracked and fleet health is under reported -- faces obsolescence
AFSC and AFLCMC dual reporting chains
AOC upgrade slips 2 years
Some program challenges include underestimation of system complexity, legacy 3rd party mission application integration challenges, and evolving cyber security requirements
Government has been working with contractor to ensure the system is delivered with all the needed capabilities
Support Equipment:
The many years, SPOs would regularly procure new SE in lieu of seeking a common solution, which over decades results in several variation of equipment (flight line air conditioners, AGE carts, Mx Stands) that all basically do the same thing.
Historically, AF SE has not been adequately tracked by any traditional systems (like A/C and other weapon systems); which makes it difficult to modernize and answer questions about the health of the SE fleet.
With the creation of AFLCMC and AFSC, teammates that once belonged to the same reporting chain, now work for different bosses (AFLCMC Engineers/PMs by myself; and many of the IM’s by Gen Levy).
[This topic ties to Slide 12 – AFLCMC/AFSC Teaming]
AOC Upgrade Slip: This problem is just one example that’s happening DoD-wide on many modernization programs. Here we’re trying to upgrade the system that the warfighters use to communicate and wage war, while we’re still trying to figure out what we need to be doing as an enterprise in the cybersecurity environment to protect those same warfighters.
[This topic ties to Slide – Cyber Slides]

8. Product Support Hot Topics
Future of the A-10?
How does AFLCMC organize, train, & equip for uncertainty
Should the enterprise spend resources for short-term fixes or invest in longer-term solutions
A-10: [build chart] Here we have the A-10 continuing saga of the AF is phasing out the A-10, no wait, Congress is keeping it… bottom line is how do we as an enterprise organize, train, and equip for a system with an uncertain future?
C-130J: Speak generally about LM owning the data and the AF’s challenge with making decision and remaining responsible to the warfighter
[This topic ties to Slide 13 & 14 – OTB and Data Rights]
C-130J current issues
Government program execution is being impacted due to data proprietary markings
Data owner determines when, what, how, and to whom data will be released
Challenge of data rights claims needs more focus from the Government

9. Where We’re Headed… Aircraft Structural Integrity Program
Teaming/Relying on each other
Cyber resiliency of weapon systems
So now that I’ve given you the doom and gloom, let talk about some of the things we’re trying to do to fix some of these problems:
[next slide]

10. Aircraft Structural Integrity Program
ASIP goal to prevent aircraft losses due to structural failure
No aircraft losses due to structural failure since 2007
Over 15 million flight hours
ASIP aided in service life extensions for A-10, B-1, B-52, C-5, C-130, F-15, F-16, KC-135, & T-38
ASIP uses a proactive approach of quantitative risk analysis to establish MX requirements that keep aircraft safe and don’t overwhelm MX personnel
[This topic ties to Slide 6 – F-15 CSL Crack]
So we talked earlier about the F-15 CSL Crack. We used this as a recent example, but the point to that example is that we need to continue to improve and move the needle in terms of system safety. Don’t get me wrong, we as a service have come a long way. In 1952, the AF lost 789 aircraft/and 1,214 Airman, compared to 2 aircraft and 10 Airman in 2014 (unfortunately that is still 10 Airman too many).
So what role does AFLCMC play in reducing mishaps? It’s by working to develop engineering solutions. Because while improved pilot
training and maintenance do affect mishap rates, major reductions in mishaps rates occur when the Air Force engineers solutions to mishap causes, and engineers hazards out of weapon systems. When you look historically at some of the major reductions in aircraft losses since the 50’s, you see things like:
the ASIP program in 1965
Fault Detection Systems in the 1970s
Ground Proximity Warning Systems in the 80s
Traffic Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS) in the 90s,
Recently (2013) Auto Ground Collision Avoidance System (Auto GCAS), which has already been credited in saving two lives.
My point is that we need to continue to invest in and focus on programs such as ASIP in order to drive to excellence in all we do.

11. Teaming/Relying on Each Other
Life Cycle Management
Organic Sustainment
Warfighter Expectations:
Fight Tonight, Ready Tomorrow
Deliver cost-effective readiness as we drive to Art of the Possible
[This topic ties to Slide 6 & 7 – JSTARS Depot & Support Equipment Dual Reporting Chains]
Bottom Line: AFLCMC and AFSC must work together in two key areas:
First is to team to ensure high quality of aircraft depot work
From requirements documentation/workload planning through work package execution and delivery of aircraft back to the unit
If Aircraft Inspection Deficiency Report rate exceeds standard, team initiates 8-step process to identify root causes of workmanship defects and implement countermeasures (e.g., B-52)
Second is to collaborate to meet supply challenges
AFSC’s MICAP analysis of Air Force- and DLA-managed items reveals current/future drivers negatively impacting not mission capable (for supply), or NMCS, rates
-- Reports include constraint/mitigation/get well date information which enable AFLCMC & MAJCOMs team members to actively manage the fleet
- In AFLCMC organizations, most programs utilize an IPT style of management which allows teams to overcome the challenges of the dual reporting chains. Other tools which aid in overcoming the dual reporting chains include the Product Support Steering Board (PSSB), which provides an executive level stakeholder forum chaired by AFLCMC/CC and AFSC/CC to review enterprise life cycle product support and sustainment related activities.
Some examples of this successful teaming includes:
KC-46A: LCMC and AFSC team are working together with Boeing to stand-up organic sustainment of KC-46A aircraft PDM, commodities, software, and supply support assuring FAA commercial type certification. Additionally, AFSC is actively engaged with the required MILCON projects.
AFSOC C-130 Acceleration: AFSOC asked WR-ALC to accelerate all C-130 through PDM in FY16. Acceleration drives challenges in supportability. Depot maintenance, supply chain, and SPO partners are working together to pull delivery dates to the left to meet production/customer requirements.
KC-135 Block 45 MOD: LCMC and AFSC are addressing aging issues on KC-135 Block 45 modification on the KC-135 to make needed cockpit upgrades. Mods are scheduled over the period FY14-FY22.
KC-135 Block 45
Mod Aircraft
KC-46 Acquisition and Organic
Management
AFSOC C-130 PDM Acceleration
F-35A IOC Depot Mods

12. AF Cyber Boundary Framework
Weapons Systems
Infrastructure
Networks
FAC-A/ISR
C2ISR
DCGS
NIPR
Link 16
UHF
Mission Planning
SIPR
SIPR
NIPR
AOC
Traditionally, cyber resiliency focused on Networks/IT systems
Interconnectedness of our systems requires us to focus more attention on infrastructure and weapon systems
MDL
SIPR
OFP Loader
JTAC
Cyber investments need to be made in weapon systems & infrastructure

13. Cyber Resiliency of Weapon Systems: What’s Different?
Why are weapon’s systems different?
Diverse media
Diverse transmission
Common systems provide services for multiple systems (Simulators, Mission Planning, OFP Loaders, Support Equipment)
Diversity forces us to look beyond the boundaries of individual systems.
Requires us to analyze mission threads to determine risks/vulnerabilities.
Focus mitigation activity on those vulnerabilities that have the greatest impact to the mission
Attack vectors on a weapon system are numerous and include systems outside the aircraft. For example, mission planning systems and OFP loaders provide an avenue for cyber attacks

14. Cyber Campaign Plan (CCP) Weapon System Cyber Resiliency
LOA 7: Provide Cyber Intel Support
LOA 1: Perform Cyber Mission Thread Analysis
Engineering-based threat analysis underpins cyber-resilient designs
LOA 6: Assess & Protect Fielded Fleet
LOA 2: “Bake-In” Cyber Resiliency
Cyber Weapon System Incident Response Team
LOA 5: Develop Common Security Environment
LOA 3: Recruit, Hire & Train Cyber Workforce
Cyber Acquisition Expert Cell
LOA 4: Improve Weapon System Agility & Adaptability

15. AFLCMC…Providing the Warfighter’s Edge!
Questions?
AFLCMC
Why are weapon’s systems different?
Diverse media
Diverse transmission
Common systems provide services for multiple systems (Simulators, Mission Planning, OFP Loaders, Support Equipment)
Diversity forces us to look beyond the boundaries of individual systems.
Requires us to analyze mission threads to determine risks/vulnerabilities.
Focus mitigation activity on those vulnerabilities that have the greatest impact to the mission
Attack vectors on a weapon system are numerous and include systems outside the aircraft. For example, mission planning systems and OFP loaders provide an avenue for cyber attacks
AFLCMC…Providing the Warfighter’s Edge!