1. Ying-yi Hong 康萤仪 Business School The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Applying Experimental Social Psychology to Understand Bribe-Giving in Chinese Context
Ying-yi Hong
康萤仪
Business School
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Talk presented at Tsinghua University, Oct 25, 2016: Beijing

2. Bribery is costly for individual, society, and nation
It can lead to injustice and severe sufferings
I started this research topic about five years ago when I started my thousand talent appointment with Beijing Normal University. This is a topic that affects people’s life a lot. It is one of the biggest problems that impedes on the development of the society and nation.

3. Charney Research – (Jan, 2015): A survey of 2293 top executives working in all regions and economic sectors of China
35% of companies in China pay bribes or give gifts in order to operate.
The problem is more widespread among Hong Kong and foreign-based companies than it is among their domestic mainland counterparts.
Companies report the leading reason corrupt payments are offered as “competitive pressure.”
From a geographic standpoint, corrupt payments are most common in the regions where wealth and power are concentrated. E.g., Beijing, 43% percent of companies report the need to bribe or give gifts.
Charney Research (a consultancy firm based in New York) – White paper (Jan, 2015): Among the white paper’s key findings (of China market intelligence poll of 2293 C-suite executives working in all the country’s regions and economic sectors)

4. Many business persons describe bribe-giving as “an unspoken rule.”
Yet, few business persons would openly admitted the behaviors.
It is very challenging to study.
It is a very challenging topic to study as well…. Many of the students and colleagues are interested in this topic as well, and over the years many of the colleagues and their own students have published papers that are very interesting…. Today I will focus on three papers that I worked on the topic…. First, I want to acknowledge my collaborators, many young talents… generous funding from BNU….

5. collaborators
Liu Zhi Liu Xiaoxiao Chen Yongyuan Lan Tian
Funding

6. Bribery perception Bribery Game Bribery Norms
(Liu, Liu, Hong, et al., OBHDP, conditional acceptance)
Bribery Game
(Chen, Liu, Lan, & Hong, Journal of Social Experimental Psychology, under review)
Bribery Norms
(Lan & Hong, In Preparation)
Bribery perception – cross-cultural study
Bribery Game – we used behavioral game method
Bribery Norms – combine normology research and behavioral game

7. (Liu, Liu, Hong, et al., OBHDP, conditional acceptance)
Bribery perception
(Liu, Liu, Hong, et al., OBHDP, conditional acceptance)

8. 2012 Corruption Perception Index
(reported by transparency international)
Mainland
China
Bribery is harmful to national welfare and social justice (Olken & Pande, 2011; Dufwenbergy & Spagnolo, 2012), yet it is a serious problem plaguing many countries (see Transparency International, Riaño & Hodess, 2008).

9. (reported by transparency international)
2011 Bribery Payers Index
(reported by transparency international)

10. Corruption Perception Index (2010)
Hofstede’s Ind-col Score (2001)
What factors would contribute to people’s bribery? So far, much of the research in psychology has focused on collectivism mainly.
Collectivism
Individualism

11. Culture as an Explanation of Bribery Individualism-collectivism
Country Level Analysis
Davis and Ruhe (2003) found a positive correlation between the Hofstefe’s Collectivism score and the Corruption Perception Index (2000, Transparency International) across 42 countries.
Triandis and colleagues (2001) found among 8 cultures (Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Greece, USA, Australia, Germany, and the Netherland), individuals from collectivist cultures were more likely to lie and bribe in negotiation than were individuals from individualist cultures.
Footnote 4: “A Chinese woman who heard an oral presentation of this study argued that she did not think that the scenario involved deception, ‘because it was in the negotiator’s role to get the contract, and getting the contract benefits the company, not the individual’….”
At the cultural level
Footnote 4: “A Chinese woman who heard an oral presentation of this study argued that she did not think that the scenario involved deception, ‘because it was in the negotiator’s role to get the contract, and getting the contract benefits the company, not the individual’….”

12. Culture as an Explanation of Bribery Individualism-collectivism
Why?
collectivistic values motivate people to protect the interests of their ingroup members to the extreme of committing ethically questionable behaviors.
interdependence (vs. independence) with others alleviates the feelings of being individually responsible for the bribe giving behaviors, and increases intention to give bribe (Mazar & Aggawal, 2011)
At the cultural level
Footnote 4: “A Chinese woman who heard an oral presentation of this study argued that she did not think that the scenario involved deception, ‘because it was in the negotiator’s role to get the contract, and getting the contract benefits the company, not the individual’….”
Individual protects the interest of ingroup  self-sacrifice
Individual protected by the ingroup  group agency rather than individual agency

13. American Psychologist (2000)
Against conceiving culture as general, static values.

14. What is Dynamic Constructivist Model?
People acquire lay theories about the world from their culture. These theories are tools that people use to interpret and understand specific domains of their world.
We contend that cultural influences reflect how individuals respond actively to social institutions, especially based on their shared lay theories of agency.
References:
Hong, Y., Morris, M. W., Chiu, C., & Benet-Martinez, V. (2000). Multicultural minds: A dynamic constructivist approach to culture and cognition. American Psychologist, 55,
Hong, Y., & Chiu, C. (2001). Toward a paradigm shift: From cross-cultural differences in social cognition to social-cognitive mediation of cultural differences. Social Cognition, 19,
In sum, neuroimaging methods allow researchers to ask new questions, such as how and when cultural experiences modulate neural activity (the modulation question) and how and when they determine which brain regions are recruited during a specific task (the constitutional question). Importantly, “even though the same brain region might be recruited by different cultural groups during the same cognitive task, two cultures might have different meanings for the concepts involved in a task” (Hans & Northoff, 2008, p.652). To discern whether the cultural groups indeed infer different meanings for the concepts, we will need to rely on theory. This assertion attests to the intimate, reciprocal relationship between theory and method.

15. Chinese culture Western culture Agency
Social organizations have more agency in bringing about important outcomes than individuals.
Individuals have autonomy and free will; social organizations are formed to meet the needs of individuals.
Bribery behaviors
Organizations should be blamed for bribery more than individuals.
Individuals should be blamed for bribery more than organizations.
Attributions (why did the organization vs. individual bribe?)
More internal attribution to organizational bribery than individual bribery
More internal attribution to individual bribery than organizational bribery
Cost and Benefit
More costs for organizational bribery
More costs for individual bribery

16. Organizational Bribery
Individual Bribery
Organizational Bribery
1. In order to get more attention and opportunities in school for their children, a parent gives gifts or money to the children’s teacher.
10. In order to beat out other companies in a bidding war, a company gives gifts or money to the person in charge of the bidding.
2. In order to get better care and treatment, the family member of a patient gives gifts or money to the doctor in charge.
11. In order to get a loan, a company gives gifts or money to the bank official in charge of loan approval.
3. In order to get a promotion, a government officer gives gifts or money to his chief officer.
12. In order to pass an inspection, a company gives all kinds of favors to the inspectors in charge of quality control.
4. In order to get a favorable judgment or to prevent a judgment in favor of the other party, a person gives gifts or money to the judge.
13. In order to maintain good relationships with certain government departments, a university president admits children of officials from these departments, even though the children do not meet the admission criteria.
5. In a city mayoral election, a candidate gives all kinds of special favors to the voters in order to get more votes.
14. In order to get a license or pass an inspection, a company gives all kinds of favors to relevant government officials.
6. In order to avoid a heavy penalty or reduce the fine, a person who breaks a traffic law gives money or other favors to the police officer.
15. In order to sell more products, a pharmaceutical company gives kickbacks to hospital administrators and physicians.
7. In order to get a visa more smoothly or more quickly, an applicant gives money or other favors to the officer in charge.
16. In order to successfully obtain research funding, a university administrator gives all kinds of favors to the members of a grant review committee.
8. In order to impress at an interview for graduate school admission, a student applicant gives gifts or money to the interview committee members.
17. In order to positively exaggerate or fabricate its image, a company gives all kinds of favors to news media personnel.
9. In order to get a good job, a university graduate gives money or gifts to the personnel in charge of the organization (company or government department) to which he is applying.
18. In order to open a new market in a country, an international company gives all kinds of favors to the local government officials.

17. Study 1 Methods College students participants: China: N=144, US: N=89.
Prison guards in China: N=97
Bribery perception:
9 individual + 9 organizational situations questionnaire point Likert scale (α>0.8)
“Do you think people should do this?”
“Do you think this behavior is moral?”
“Do you think this behavior qualifies as bribery?”
A composite score is calculated by averaging these three items; the higher the score, the more tolerant.

18. Study 1 Results: Composite Score
6=Absolutely should/moral/not bribery * *
Create a new slide with composite (the higher the score, the more tolerant)  the point loud and clear is that for both groups, organizational bribery were not tolerated. However, individual bribery is relatively more tolerated in China than in US
1=Absolutely should not/not moral/bribery
Individual bribery
Organizational bribery
* p<.05

19. Study 2 Replicate study 1 finding
Investigate the underlying reasoning process of bribery judgment
Rule out the alternative explanation that the two types of bribery situations are differentially common in China and the US.
Culture
Bribery Reasoning
Bribery Perception
Rational calculation: Cost vs. benefit
Attribution: internal vs. external
Integrity inferences of the agents
Individual vs. organizational bribery

20. Study 2 Method
Participants: College students participants: CN: N=80, US: N=80.
Measurement: Bribery perceptions 3 individual (e.g., teacher) + 3 organizational (e.g., sell medicine) situations questionnaire, 6-point Likert scale (α > 0.8)
“Do you think people should do this?”
“Do you think this behavior is moral?”
“Do you think this behavior qualifies as bribery?”
Means of Composite Score of Bribery Judgment
Put the composite graph but show it later.

21. Alternative Explanation
Perceived Commonness of Bribery Situations
Extremely
common
There are cross-cultural main effect on the perceived prevalence. However, since our findings focus on the within cultural comparison between individual vs. organizational bribery, even organizational bribery was perceived more prevalent in both countries, and in US, both bribery were perceived as less common than in China, we still find the pattern.
Not at all
common

22. Study 2 Method Example: Cost vs. Benefit
In order to sell more products, a pharmaceutical company gives various favors to hospital administrators and physicians.
Example:
Cost vs. Benefit
Cost: 3 items (a= )
This company will be prosecuted.
This behavior will be reported.
This company will not get any benefits despite this behavior.
Benefit: 3 items (a= )
This company will be more competitive than other companies.
This company will be given special treatment or attention.
This company will be given more opportunities to succeed.

23. Study 2 Results – Bribery Reasoning
Rational calculation: Cost vs. Benefit
6=highly likely
In general, all subjects except for HK participants estimate higher benefit than cost of bribery behaviors.
2. (look at benefit) Secondly, all subjects estimate higher benefit of organizational bribery than individual bribery.
3. CN estimate organization bribery induce more cost than individuals by conducting bribery.
In contrast, US estimate individual bribery will incur more cost than organizations.
1=highly unlikely
>

24. Study 2 Method Example: Attribution
In order to sell more products, a pharmaceutical company gives various favors to hospital administrators and physicians.
Attribution
Internal: 5 items (a= )
e.g., This is to fulfill the company’s aspiration.
e.g., This is to achieve success or prevent failure.
External (5 items) (a= )
e.g., This is a social norm.
e.g., Other companies are doing this. So this company has to do this too.

25. Study 2 Results – Bribery Reasoning
Attribution: External vs. Internal
6=highly likely
CN make similar levels of internal and external attribution, whereas HK and US make more internal attribution than external of individual and organizational bribery.
We replicate the previous research results on cultural differences in attribution. External: CN>HK>US, for internal: US>HK>CN
Secondly, subjects in three areas make more external attribution for organizational bribery.
Next, CN make more internal attribution for organizational bribery as well, however, US make more internal attribution for individual bribery.
1=highly unlikely
>

26. Study 2 Method Integrity inferences of the bribery giving agents:
Example:
In order to sell more products, a pharmaceutical company gives various favors to hospital administrators and physicians.
Integrity inferences of the bribery giving agents:
“If a company has such a behavior, how do you feel about the management of the company? ”
Honest, Trustworthy, Righteous, Sincere (a= ).

27. Study 2 Results – Bribery Reasoning
Honest? Trustworthy?
Integrity
6=Very appropriate
1=Very inappropriate

28. Study 2 Partial Multiple-Mediator Model
Integrity
Sobel Test: z =4.68, p < .05.
Control for gender and perceived prevalence

29. Only perceptions Not bribery behavior! Bribery Game
(Chen, Liu, Lan, & Hong, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, under review)

30. Collectivist social ecology
Social ties
In fact, a collectivist culture is often also associated with the practice of relying on the helps of ingroup members (or 熟人) to achieve their goals. Ingroup members have obligations to help each other – particularism. For instance, Guanxi (Connections) in Chinese societies and Wasta (Going in between) in Arab nations both indicate connections or processes in which someone could mobilize personal relations to achieve goals (Smith, Huang, Harb, & Torres, 2012). This creates a collectivist social ecology.
Guanxi (Chinese societies)
Blat (in Russia)
Wasta (in Arab Nations)
( Smith, Huang, Harb, & Torres, 2012, Chen, Chen, & Xin, 2004; Cunningham, & Sarayrah, 1993; Ledenva, 1998 )

31. Research Context Mainland China Typical collectivistic Culture
High Prevalence of bribery, indicated by Bribe Payer Index
Increasing residential mobility (mobile population is up to 20% of whole population)
Could be removed……
Mainland China

32. How would individuals respond to a collectivist social ecology?
Intuitively, people who are deeply embedded in a social network (e.g., those who have stayed in the same community for a long time), should follow the norms of guanxi practices more than those who move around a lot.
However, contrary to this intuition, we argue that people with high residential mobility should be more likely than people with low residential mobility to bribe. Why?

33. Residential Mobility and Social network
Residential mobility refers to the frequency with which individuals change residence from one city or town to another (Oishi, 2010) .
Mobility mindset and individual differences on residential mobility have very similar effects on many aspects of psychological
outcome (Oishi, Miao, Koo, Kisling, & Ratliff,
2012; Lun, Oishi, & Tenny, 2011; Oishi et al.,
2007)

34. Residential Mobility and Social network
People with higher residential mobility are less likely to get social support from immediate social network.
(Oishi, Krochik, Roth, & Sherman, 2012; Lun, Roth, Oishi, & Kesebir., 2012; Oishi, & Kesebir., 2012; Oishi, Miao, Koo, Kisling, & Ratliff, 2012; Lun, Oishi, & Tenny, 2011; Oishi et al., 2007).

35. High residential mobility individual
Bribe giving
Low residential mobility individual
Within such cultural background, bribe giving is enabled to complement for absence of such social ties
Bribe giving

36. and Instrumental concern
Mediating Process
Residential mobility
economic construal
and Instrumental concern
Intention of Bribe Giving
Increasing mobility fosters impersonal exchange (Park, 1957; Simmel, 1903).
Thus, high mobility people are more likely to construe bribery as a business/economic exchange than low mobility people.
The boundary condition is that when bribery cannot achieve their goals, high mobility will not show an effect.

37. Overview
Pilot study: personal history of residential moves -- Intention of bribe giving
Experiment 1 & 2: priming mobility mindset → economic construal on bribery → Intention of bribe giving
Experiment 3 : behavioral game (manipulate mobility and utility) → expected instrumental return → amount of bribe paid in a behavior game

38. Pilot Study
Participants: online participants (53.6% male , aged = ± 5.05) recruited from So-jump, which is similar to Mturk.
IV : residential moves since primary school
DV: bribe giving intention on four scenarios (a=0.77)
Covariate: individualism-collectivism scale (Singelis).

39. To what extent would you approve of this behavior?
1) In order to get more attention and opportunities in school for their children, a parent gives gifts or money to the children’s teacher.
2) In order to get better care and treatment, the family member of a patient gives gifts or money to the doctor in charge.
3) In order to get a visa more smoothly or more quickly, an applicant gives money or other favors to the officer in charge.
4) In order to get a good job, a university graduate gives money or gifts to the personnel in charge of the organization (company or government department) to which he is applying.
To what extent would you approve of this behavior?
How likely would you also do this if you were in this person’s position?
From 1 = not at all to 10 = definitely

40. Intention of bribe giving
The average of moving was 1.21 (SD = 1.19), ranging from 0 to 5. The distribution of actual residential mobility was positively skewed (skewness = 0.83, kurtosis = 0.22).
Variable M SD
2. Age
29.17
5.05
3. Education
3.92
.63
4. SES
3.49
.72
5. Collectivism (1-7)
5.54
.54
6. Residential Mobility
1.21
1.19
7. Intention of Bribe Giving
4.88
1.85
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
Intention of bribe giving: 10-point (M=4.88, SD=1.85);
Collectivism: 7-point (M=5.54, SD=0.54);
Residential Mobility (M=1.21, SD=1.19)

41. Experiment 1
Participants: online participants (87 males, 147 females , aged = ± 4.51) recruited from So-jump.
IV : priming high vs low residential mobility mindset
DV: intention of bribe giving
Mediator: economic construal

42. Priming of Residential mobility
(adapted from Oishi, Miao, Koo, Kisling, &Ratliff , 2011)
High Mobility
Low Mobility
Imagine that you were offered a job that you had always wanted. The job also involves moving to a different location every other year in the past 5 years.
Imagine that you were offered a job that you had always wanted. The job also involves living in the same area for the past 5 years.
Imagine that you were offered a job that you had always wanted. However, the job kept you moving to a different location every other year in the past five years, right before you moved to the place you live currently
“What will it be like to live in a different place every other year [stay in the same city for the last five years]?”, “What are the positive and negative outcomes about it?”, “How do you think it will affect your relationships with other people?”.

43. Bribery Scenario
(adopted from Mazar& Aggarwal, 2011)
“Imagine that you are working as a sales agent over the summer for a company that does a lot of business internationally. Part of your work involves communicating with international buyers and trying to win sales orders for your firm. You earn part of your remuneration as salary, and part through commission for sales orders won for the firm. The commission is 0.1% of sales.
Now imagine that you have been in communication with a potential buyer based in Latin America. The buyer really likes your company’s products. Your prices are fairly competitive and you are quite optimistic that you will win the order. The order itself is of large value (i.e. $5,000,000), and will be the largest one that you would have successfully handled.

44. You are quite happy with the way negotiations have been going
You are quite happy with the way negotiations have been going. There are two other firms competing for the same order. You are fairly confident of your firm’s quality in comparison to the two competing firms but know that you will not be able to compete on price.
Yesterday you heard back from the potential buyer. He still hasn’t made up his mind. You think he might be willing to give your company the order if you offered to give him some money for making it happen. The amount of money your were thinking of was significantly less than the money that your company would make if they got this order. In fact, it was 1/5th of the commission that you would personally earn from this deal alone (i.e. $1,000 of your commission of $5,000).
You want to get back to him by tomorrow and therefore need to make a final decision. What do you decide to do?”

45. DV: “To what extent will you offer a unofficial payment to the potential client?” (1=not at all, to 7=definitely)
Mediator: Economic Construal: “Under such situation, to what extent do you perceive offering unofficial payment to the potential client as an economic behavior?” (1=not at all, to 7=definitely)
Covariates: Individualism-Collectivism; Motivation to Win (“How much would you want to win the contact?” 1-7 point)
“To what extent will you offer a unofficial payment to the potential client?” (1 = not at all to 7 = definitely). To assess the mediator, we measured participants’ economic construal by “Under such situation, to what extent do you perceive ‘offering unofficial payment to the potential client’ as an economic behavior?”  (1 = not at all to 7 = definitely)”. Finally we also measured participants’ motivation to win the contract as a control variable by “How much would you want to win the contract?” (1 = not at all to 7 = very much). We also measured participants’ collectivism using Singelis’ scale (α=0.88) and demographic variables as in the pilot study.

46. Bribe-giving Intention
Results of Experiment 1
b= .29**
b = .22***
b = .21**
(b’ = .14, ns.)
Economic construal
Mobility
Bribe-giving Intention
Variable M SD
1. Gender ―
2. Age
30.40
4.51
3. Education
3.92
0.48
4. SES
2.47
0.59
5. Collectivism
5.46
0.68
6. Motivation to win
6.63
0.70
7. Mobility Mindset Manipulation
8. Economic Construal
4.82
1.59
9. Intention of Bribe Giving
5.16
1.42
Collectivism and Motivation to win were controlled as covarites.
Sobel’s Z =2.22, p=.03
Intention of bribe giving: (M=5.16, SD=1.42); Collectivism: (M=5.46, SD=0.68);
Economic construal: (M=4.82, SD=1.59); Motivation to win (M=6.63, SD=0.70)
All scales were 7-point.

47. Experiment 2 Participants: 187 online participants
IV : priming high vs low residential mobility mindset (10 years instead of 5 years)
DV: intention of bribe giving
Mediator: instrumental concern for self-interest:
(a) “I care about my commission very much,”
(b) “In the decision of giving the unofficial payment or not, my primary concern is my self-interest,” and
(c) “Under such circumstances, I prioritize my self-interest over the interest of the company,”
(1 = not at all, 8 = definitely) (α = .79)
Covariates: Individualism-Collectivism; Motivation to Win (“How much would you want to win the contact?” 1-7 point)

48. Results of Experiment 2 Concern for self-interest
b= .24**
b = .24***
b = .18*
(b’ = .14, ns.)
Concern for self-interest
Mobility
Bribe-giving Intention
Variable M SD
1. Gender ―
2. Age
30.40
4.51
3. Education
3.92
0.48
4. SES
2.47
0.59
5. Collectivism
5.46
0.68
6. Motivation to win
6.63
0.70
7. Mobility Mindset Manipulation
8. Economic Construal
4.82
1.59
9. Intention of Bribe Giving
5.16
1.42
Collectivism and Motivation to win were controlled as covarites.

49. Experiment 3
Participants: Chinese undergraduate students (49.8% male , aged = ± 2.11) in Beijing.
IVs: Mobility X Utility design
DV: amount of bribe
Mediator: instrumental concern

50. Behavioral Game on Bribery
(Gneezy, et al., 2013)
Two-round Creativity contest between two workers
A referee judges who wins the contest in each round
Worker can send money to the referee during the contest

51. Bribery Game Warm up session (three same gender persons).
Participants were told that they will play a game in a group of three (same gender) persons. One of the players will be randomly assigned as a referee while the other two players as workers.
At the beginning of the game, the referee was endowed with 10RMB and each player with 20RMB.
In each round, the two workers generated answers on a creativity task (in independent experiment room). They have 6 minutes to finish the task in each round. They were told the referee would selected a winner after evaluating the workers’ answers. The winner would receive a bonus of 20RMB.
Each worker submitted his/her answer in an envelope and could send up to 10RMB to the referee in the envelope confidentially.
Participants will be informed about the results at the end of two rounds and they will be paid accordingly to the outcomes of the evaluations.

52. Creativity Task
Instructions: We use analogy everyday in our conversation or writing. An analogy is formed when two things from different domains resemble each other in certain ways. Here is one analogy about friendship:
FRIENDSHIP is like a STONE.
Possible relationship: Friendship is something that cannot be broken easily.  Just like a stone, it is strong and is hard to break.
Please think of two analogies for TIME, and describe some connections between time and what time is compared to in the space provided.

53. High Mobility vs Low Mobility
commonality
All the Ps have never meet each other before the game.
Have a 7-mins warm-up session with other members
Groupings in the first round are the same as warm-up session.
All Ps were told that they have been randomly assigned into the role of a worker. They need to generate creative answers and compete with the other worker.
differences
Ps were told that they will stay in the same group in the 2nd round of the game.
Ps were told that they will play with different people in the 2nd round of the game.

54. Manipulation of Utility of Bribery
(Gneezy et al., 2013)
Low Mobility
High Utility
Low Utility VS
Referee will keep the money offered by both workers
Referee will keep the money offered by the winner only

55. Manipulation check on Utility
Utility Belief: (α=.68); 7-point scale
“To what extent do you think the quality of the answers would affect the judgment of the referee?” (reverse item)
“To what extent do you think the amount of money each worker sent would affect the judgment of the referee?
Between the quality of the answers and the amount of money each worker sent, which factor would affect the referee’s judgment more?” (reverse item)
Participants in high utility condition has stronger utility belief (M =3.92, SD= 1.11 ) than their counterpart in low utility condition (M = 3.56, SD= 0.81), t = 2.90, p<.05.

56. Measures of Mediator
Instrumental Concern (expected instrumental return): (α=.75); from 1 (not at all) to 7 (definitely)
To what extent do you trust that sending money to the referee would increase your chance of winning?
If you have sent more money to the referee than your competitor, to what extent do you expect that the referee would evaluate your answers more favorably?
If your competitor have sent more money to the referee than you, to what extent do you expect that the referee would evaluate your competitor’s answers more favorably?

57. Predicted Mediated Moderation
Expected Instrumental
concern
Mobility
Amount of Bribe Paid
High Utility
Expected Instrumental
concern
Mobility
Amount of Bribe Paid
Low Utility

58. Mean bribe amount (in RMB)

59. Mean expected instrumental return

60. Bootstrapping results for mediated moderation -- 1

61. Bootstrapping results for mediated moderation -- 2

62. Summary
Pilot study: personal history of residential moves -- Intention of bribe giving (correlational)
Experiment 1 & 2: priming mobility mindset → economic construal on bribery → Intention of bribe giving (casual effect, mediation process)
Experiment 3 : behavioral game (manipulate mobility and utility) → expected instrumental return → amount of bribe paid in a behavior game
(casual effect, mediation process, boundary condition)
These effects go beyond collectivism!

63. Theoretical Implications
Culture creates a social ecology within which individuals optimize their adaptation –
people with high versus low mobility would construe the situations differently (or in reality the situations may indeed be different), which in turn would give rise to different behavioral tendency.
These effects go beyond individuals’ endorsement of individualism-collectivism values.

64. Bribery Norms (Lan & Hong, In Preparation)
Can bribe-giving be a norm?
Bribery Norms
(Lan & Hong, In Preparation)

65. Motivation behind Bribe-giving
Personal benefit
Norm conforming
Economic optimizing: maximize bribe utility
Social acceptance: fit in
Decrease uncertainty
Besides moral violence, Note: Basic logic: bribe would increase the possibility to win.
giving bribe has 2 major motivation:
Win and get personal benefit in economic
Conform to the norm for fit in or decrease uncertainty about environment
Note: Basic logic: bribe would increase the possibility to win.

66. Differential Predictions
Others give large bribe
Economic optimizing
Norm conforming
Low utility of bribe: give less bribe
High utility of bribe: give more bribe
Follow others: give more bribe
Follow others: give less bribe
Others give small bribe
Based on these motives, the behavior would be different when you see the descriptive norms of bribery
Others give large bribe Economic optimizing motive value utility of money on bribe. They would reduce risk by give less money. But give more bribe when others give small bribe because bribe money has high utility in such situation.
However, norm conforming make participants followed the descriptive norm.

67. Social acceptance Decrease uncertainty
Norm conforming
Social acceptance
Decrease uncertainty
Public condition: driven by norm conforming
Private condition: driven by economic optimizing, not to conform
Conform to norms both in public and private condition
There are also 2 reasons of conforming:
1 is for social acceptance, other is for decrease uncertainty
Social acceptance make people want to fit in, so they would conform to the norm in public condition. They would not conform to the norm in private.
Who want to decrease uncertainty treat descriptive norm as anchor. They would conform to norm in both private and public conditions.

68. Behavioral games Gneezy（2013） Players wining rewards in competition
Referee decide the winner
Player allow to bribe the referee

69. Participants
133 participants were recruited through internet of Beijing Normal University. They are undergraduates in Beijing (not including psychology major students). 53 % were female. Mean of age = 19.1.
We conduct 133 participant in Beijing. 70 female participants.

70. Design Creative competition
Each group contains 4 participants (same gender)
1 participant will be randomly assigned to be “referee”(confederate)
3 participants will be players. In fact, All of them were assign to be “Player C”.
We recruite them on the name of “creative competition”
4 participants showed up to the lab together
Experimenter told them 1 of those would be randomly be assigned to be referee, and 3 others would be randomly be player. The referee was our confederate.

71. Complete task in Separated rooms
Mission card: player C
Tokens: capital 100 per round × 5
Envelope: creative task
Time limit: 3 minutes for each round
Play 5 rounds
After mission explanation, participants entered into seperated rooms, like the right picture, on the desk,there are mission card saying “you are player C”, capital tokens for 5rounds and envelope with creative task inside. Each round has 3 minutes. There were 5 rounds in total.

72. Rules Reward: Winner received 150 tokens, losers received 0 token.
Players: choose to submit part of capital to the referee (0-90/round) in the envelope with task
Referee: take the tokens submitted from the winner; return tokens from losers.
The Experimenter enter the room and collect the envelope after each round.
The rule is each round winner get 150 tokens as reward.
Players can choose to submit some tokens to the referee into the envelope.
Referee can only took tokens from winners, others tokens has to be returned to account

73. Incentivized Game 20 tokens ＝ 1 RMB
Income ＝ Capital (100 × 5 ) + Reward (150 × wining times) – Bribe (tokens submitted in winning rounds)
Their final payment would be decided by the account, 20 tokens equals 1 yuan.

74. Manipulation (Norm level)
Players were asked to fill the forms of submission when experimenter collected the envelope.
Norm level: High = 85 tokens; L = 15 tokens
HIGH
Player A
Player B
Player C
Round 1 80 90
LOW
Player A
Player B
Player C
Round 1 10 20
We manipulate the norm in 2 by 2 condition by experimenter collect envelope and ask the participants to fill out the for of submission.
We first manipulate norm level
In high norm level, player A and B gives 85 tokens on average.
In low level, player A and B gives 15 tokens.

75. Manipulation (Norm context)
Private: cannot be seen by others
Public: can be seen by others
We also manipulate norm context
Private condition, form changes every round, player C always the last one to fill in
Public condition using one form, player C can be “seen” by others.

76. Hypothesis
Follow the logic above, we want to use a behavioral game to test the hypothesis that can dissolve the motivation behind bribe giving. Especially in culture where the bribe is series.
Controlled difficulty, confidence, winning motive, belief in bribe will win, economic construal, moral construal, personal trait, social value orientation, etc.

77. Main effect of Norm level
F = 8.13, p = .01
Participants conform to the bribe level of others from second round onward, indicating conforming to norms
Norm level has sgnificant main effect. Participants began to confrom to norm from 2 round

78. Main effect of Norm context
F = 6.02, p = .02
More bribes in private context than in public context, suggesting that public exposure inhibits bribe-giving.
Participants also bribe higher in private context than public context

79. No significant interaction effect of Norm Level × Norm Context
F =.02, p = .88, ns
Norm level and Norm context have additive effects on bribe-giving.
No significant interaction between norm level and norm context. Norm context giving information anchor, not vary across two norm levels.
High-bribe-private condition motivates bribery the most, whereas low-bribe-public condition motivates bribery the least.

80. Main effect of Gender F = 8.65, p = .00 Male participants
bribe more than female participants
Male participants give more bribe than females

81. Interaction effect of Norm Level × Gender
F = 4.04, p = .05
Females bribe significantly less in the low-bribe condition, whereas Males bribe at a high level regardless of the norm level, suggesting that they want to win in the low-bribe condition.
In high norm level, both female and male participants showed higher norm conforming(give high bribe)
Low norm level, only female conform to norm. male participants bribes more also express higher desire for wining and more willing to treat it as economic construal.

82. Interaction effect of Norm Context × Gender
F = 6.06, p = .02
Males bribe more in the private condition than in the public condition. Females bribe less regardless of private or public context.
Female participant give less bribe no matter norm context is Public or private. But male participants show pretty high bribe in private condition.

83. Summary
Conforming to social norms is a strong motivational drive underlying bribe-giving.
Male participants gave more bribe, even when the norm level is low, suggesting some personal economic optimizing motivation. Also, they bribed more when the context was private than public, suggesting social acceptance seeking.
Female participants used others’ bribe levels as anchors in both public and private contexts, suggesting that they were uncertain.

84. Theoretical Contribution
Multiple accounts to explain individuals’ bribe giving.
Moral faulty (Graaf, 2007)
Cultural values like collectivism  Liu, Liu, Hong et al.
Economic man hypothesis  Chen, Liu, Lan, & Hong
Cultural norms  Lan & Hong

85. Managerial Implications
Companies in Mainland China need to manage their guanxi networks, which is crucial for their success.
-- having a special task force: the “night shifts”;
-- hiring employees who have extensive guanxi networks;
-- However, companies can be the change agents of culture in the society!

86. China Data Group (CDG) is a leading business processes outsourcing company based in Beijing, China. Roc Yang, Chairman of CDG had to confront a dilemma when he discovered that one of his senior managers gave a gift to a potential client in an effort to win a large business deal. Although this practice was pervasive in the China business context characterized by heavy reliance on personal relationships or guanxi, it went against the founding principles of CDG - professionalism and service quality. Yang had to decide where to draw the line between adherence to principles of professionalism and local norms in a country caught in the midst of rapid economic transformation.
CDG: Managing in China's Economic Transformation Roy Y. J. Chua, Shaohui Chen, Lisa B. Kwan Oct 19, 2010 ( PDF-ENG)
As the mainland companies try to move up the value-chain, they have to go global and have global standards.

87. Your comments will be very much appreciated!!!
Please visit my webpage:

88. Extra slides

89. Examples of Answers on Creativity Task
Examples of least creative answers: 
(1)时间如同流水，它和时间的联系是：时间匆匆流逝，像流水一样，不紧不慢，不以人的意志魏转移；
(2) 时间如同流向大海的河流，它和时间的刘希是，时间总是一去不复返，正如汇入大海的河流，逝者如斯。
Examples of most  creative answers:
(1)公交站牌上的广告一样; 它和时间的关系是：时间是凭一己之力无法改变的事物，正如公交站牌上的 等相关广告，无论上面的电影是好还是烂，上面的明星是美还是丑，它总是不定期的更换，无法预料，无法改变，无法期待，作为一个路人只能默默地走好自己的路。
(2) 坠入无尽的悬崖： 它和时间的关系是：时间对每个人而言都是一样，它的终点即人的死亡，自由落体的物体都需要遵从物理定律，穷人不会比富翁拥有更多的时间，富翁也不会比穷人有更小的重力加速度。

90. Results of Creativity Task
No Significant differences among the creativity scores in four conditions.
Under High utility + Mobile condition, bribe paid in the first round is positively correlated with creativity score. No significant correlations were found in the other three conditions.

91. How about Hong Kong people?
Priming culture can help us establish the causal role of culture.
Strong social relevance – Many Hong Kong people need to work in both Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese contexts.
Studying Hong Kong people can shed light on globalization process.

92. Cultural Frame Switching -- After extensive exposure to multiple cultures, individuals can acquire multiple lay theory systems, and can dynamically switch between the “cultural frames.”

93. Chinese-American Bicultural Individuals
The Basic Premises of the Dynamic Constructivist Approach
People possess theories about the world. These theories are tools that people use to interpret and understand specific domains of their world. Bicultural individuals, e.g., Chinese Americans, may have acquired both the American and Chinese cultural knowledge systems.

94. Cultural priming
Chinese

95. Cultural priming
American

96. Evidence
Cognition: External versus internal attributions (Hong, Chiu, & Kung, 1997, Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000; Hong et al., 2001, 2003)
Behavior: Cooperation versus competition in Prisoner’s dilemma game (Wong & Hong, Psych. Science, 2005)
Affect: Relational versus Ego-centric emotional projection (No, Hong, et al., JPSP, 2008)
References
Hong, Y., Benet-Martinez, V., Chiu, C., & Morris, M. W., (2003). Boundaries of cultural influence: Construct activation as a mechanism
for cultural differences in social perception. Journal of Cross-cultural Psychology, 34,
Hong, Y. , Chiu, C., & Kung, M. (1997). Bringing culture out in front: Effects of cultural meaning system activation on social cognition. In K. Leung, U. Kim, S. Yamaguchi, & Y. Kashima (Eds.), Progress in Asian social psychology, Vol.1. (pp ) Singapore: Wiley.
Hong, Y., Morris, M. W., Chiu, C., & Benet-Martinez, V. (2000). Multicultural minds: A dynamic constructivist approach to culture and cognition. American Psychologist, 55,
Wong, R. Y-M., & Hong, Y. (2005). Dynamic Influences of Culture on Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Psychological Science, 16,

97. Chinese Cultural
Primes
Neutral Primes
American Cultural

98. Moderator of cultural frame switching
Bicultural identity integration (Veronica Benet-Martinez, Michael Morris, Chi-ying Cheng)
“I don’t feel trapped between the Chinese and American cultures,”
“I feel part of a combined culture (I feel a product of the Chinese and Western culture).”
Identification as a “Hong Konger”, which is a distinctive identity that implies a combination of Western and Chinese culture (cf. Brewer, 1999).
(1 = “Strongly disagree”, 7 = “Strongly agree”).

99. Predictions
Hong Kong participants in the neutral priming condition will show similar intolerance toward individual and organizational bribery.
Hong Kong participants with high bicultural identity integration would switch between cultural frames and show the same cross-cultural differences as in Studies 1 and 2.
Hong Kong participants with low bicultural identity integration would show contrastive switching.

100. Neutral priming

101. High bicultural identity integration

102. Low bicultural identity integration

103. Result Summary
Culture influences the shared beliefs of agency and affects how people perceive different types of bribery: Chinese participants tolerate individual (vs. organization) bribery more than Americans do, seemingly driven by their perception of lower cost, external attribution, and less moral blame toward individual bribery.

104. Implications Different blind spots in curbing bribery:
In America: Focusing on blaming the bad apples in the financial scandals, and less focus on the problems with the organizations and system (e.g., legal regulations).
In China: Focusing on curbing the large-scale organizational bribery, and less focus on resolving everyday bribery of common people. Individuals try to exert personal control over an inefficient social systems. There is a grey area of renqing and bribery.