1. CREATING JOBS BY INCREASING WAGES ?
Econospheres, Brussels
November 2015

2. RECALLING THE BACKGROUND
THE EURO AREA’S EXPERIMENT WITH INTERNAL DEVALUATION
« IF WE CAN’T DEVALUE THE CURRENCY ANYMORE, WE HAVE TO DEVALUE WAGES »

3. THE ROLE OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE
BASICALLY A TRANSFER OF NATIONAL COMPETENCE ON WAGES (AND LABOUR MARKET POLICY) TO THE EUROPEAN LEVEL
ITS AIM IS TO ALLOW THE EUROPEAN LEVEL TO IMPOSE REFORMS ON MEMBER STATES THAT WOULD OTHERWISE BE VERY DIFFICULT….
…. BUT REFORMS THAT ARE NECESSARY TO SAVE THE SINGLE CURRENCY:
WAGES THAT ARE FLEXIBLE DOWNWARDS
MANY DIFFERENT WAYS
Troika bail outs
Commission issuing each year country specific recommendations
Macro conditionalities in European structural funds
Since 2011, a new policy process (« Excessive Macro Imbalances’) giving the Commission the possibility to intervene in national economic policy making (including wages)

4. THEIR LATEST INVENTION: NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS BOARDS
Commission wants European Council to agree to a Council Recommendation that requests all euro area member states to set up a National Competitiveness Board
(Non euro members can join this if they want)
Independent experts, not to be influenced by ‘stakeholders’ (social partners should be consulted as a relevant stakeholder)

5. WHAT EXACTLY WILL THESE COMPETITIVENESS BOARDS BE DOING?
Monitor competitiveness developments relative to global competitors. This includes wage dynamics (short term).
Inform the wage setting process by providing relevant information.
Monitor policies and formulate policy advise in the field of competitiveness.
Provide advice on the implementation of the Country Specific Recommendations

6. THE COMMISSION’S PROPOSAL
There is language on taking national wage formation systems into account and not affecting the right to negotiate collectively and to take collective action (but this is only written in the recitals)
However, ‘mission creep’ is already in the pipeline:
Boards need to be statutory: Points to a legalistic approach to wage competitivenesstional law.
Future progress report to see ”whether the adoption of binding provisions appears necessary” is already being announced (after 6 months)
Accompanying Commission Communication: “if necessary in stage 2 (…) common principles by means of a binding instrument will be presented”. Stage 2 = Mid 2017

7. THE COMMISSION’S PROPOSAL
Basically, stage is being set for a general (euro area wide) trespassing into the domain of wage bargaining…
… and this under the banner of ‘competitiveness’
Inspired by the Belgian law  on competitiveness and wages 
Experience of Belgian trade unions:
Works systematically to the advantage of employers,
Allows government to intervene in wages, even when this goes against collective agreements already concluded
Organizes the ‘race to the bottom’: The lower wage dynamics in Germany/France, the more the legal wage margins in Belgium get compressed

8. THE ETUC RESOLUTION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OCTOBER 2015
Basic position:
The ETUC rejects these National Competitiveness Boards.
« We do not accept any institution (or the basis of such institution) that interfere with the autonomy of the social partners »

9. COMPETITIVE WAGE DUMPING: DOES IT MAKE ANY SENSE ?
NOT ALL OF US CAN BECOME MORE COMPETITIVE AGAINST THE REST OF US
IF ALL OR A SERIES OF EURO AREA COUNTRIES SQUEEZE WAGES, NO ONE IMPROVES ITS COMPETITIVE POSITION….
…. BUT IF ALL OF US SQUEEZE WAGES WE UNDERMINE OUR OWN DOMESTIC DEMAND DYNAMICS…
….AS WELL AS EACH OTHERS’ EXPORT MARKETS

10. RECENT IMF STUDY SEEMS TO CONFIRM THIS
IMF STAFF DISCUSSION NOTE: WAGE MODERATION IN CRISIS 15/22
SIMULATES SCENARIO WHEREBY 5 CRISIS COUNTRIES (GREECE,ITALY,SPAIN,IRELAND,PORTUGAL) JOINTLY PUSH NOMINAL WAGES DOWN BY 2% OVER TWO YEARS
IMF ALSO ASSUMES NOMINAL INTEREST RATES ARE ALREADY AT THE ZERO BOUND, SO ECB CAN NOT CUT INTEREST RATES AS IT IS DIFFICULT TO HAVE INTEREST RATES BELOW ZERO

11. THE RESULTS FOR THE ENTIRE EURO AREA

12. ANOTHER SIMULATION: ALL, NOT JUST FIVE COUNTRIES, SQUEEZE WAGES BY 2%

13. THE MECHANISM BEHIND
2% WAGE MODERATION IN ALL EURO AREA COUNTRIES (HENCE NO CHANGES IN INTRA EURO AREA COMPETITIVE POSITIONS)
PULLS INFLATION DOWN BY 2%
NOMINAL INTEREST RATES ARE STUCK AT THE ZERO LEVEL
SO REAL INTEREST RATES INCREASE
AND STIFLE CONSUMPTION AND INVESTMENT EXPENDITURE
END RESULT : WAGE MODERATION KILLS JOBS

14. THE INVERSE MECHANISM
WHAT IF ALL EURO AREA MEMBER STATES RAISE WAGES BY 2% ?
NO ONE LOSES COMPETITIVENESS TO ANOTHER EURO AREA COUNTRY
INFLATION GOES UP AND GOES BACK FROM ZERO NOW TO 2%
WHICH IS WHAT THE ECB LIKES TO SEE AS IT DEFINES A PRICE STABIITY TARGET OF 2%
SO THERE IS NO REASON FOR THE ECB TO RAISE INTEREST RATES
HIGHER INFLATION WITH NOMINAL INTEREST RATES STAYING PUT IMPLY LOWER REAL INTEREST RATES
CONSUMPTION AND INVESTMENT TAKE OFF: WE HAVE A RECOVERY!

15. PICTURE YOURSELF THIS GRAPH INVERTED

16. OTHER RESEARCH CONFIRMS THIS
OZLEM ONARAM/THOMAS OBST: WAGE LED GROWTH IN EU 15 MEMBER STATES – FEPS 2015 PAPER
STARTS FROM OBSERVATION THAT WAGE SHARES HAVE BEEN FALLING ALL OVER EUROPE
SIMULATES WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF WAGE SHARES ARE SIMULTANEOUSLY INCREASED BACK TO THEIR PEAK LEVELS IN THE EU 15

17. A SIMULTANEOUS WAGE LED RECOVERY FOR EU 15

18. MECHANISM BEHIND THESE RESULTS
TENDENCY TO CONSUME OUT OF WAGE INCOME IS HIGHER THAN TENDENCY OF CAPITAL OWNERS TO CONSUME OUT OF PROFITS
REDISTRIBUTION FROM PROFITS TO WAGES BOOSTS CONSUMPTION DEMAND
IMPROVED DEMAND PERSPECTIVES IMPLY HIGHER INVESTMENT , EVEN IF PROFIT SHARE IS LOWER
ON TOP OF THAT: INCREASE IN DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION IN ONE MEMBER STATE PROVIDES EXPORT MARKET FOR OTHERS AND VICE VERSA: INVESTMENT EVERYWHERE GETS AN EXTRA UPWARD PUSH

19. CONCLUSION
OUR DEMAND FOR AN INCREASE IN PAY FOR ALL WORKERS ACROSS EUROPE MAKES MUCH SENSE IN THIS CONTEXT OF LOW INFLATION
PROBLEM HOWEVER: HOW TO CONVINCE POLICY MAKERS ?