1. Authoritarian Developmentalism (AD) in East Asia
Prof. Mark R. Thompson
MAMAS, AIS, CityU
AIS5024: The State and Economy in East Asia, Lecture 4

2. Authoritarian developmentalism (AD) as…
Economic strategy
EOI-based industrial policy
Aims upgrading/‘deepening’ (‘ships and planes’)
Authoritarian political regime
Founded/headed by leader (Park, LKY, Deng, etc)
Dependent business, co-opted middle class
Represses labour (also students)
Ideology
Developmentalism justifies authoritarian rule
If successful delays demo, but may fail

3. DS vs. AD Agree it involves certain economic strategy
EOI, labour repressive, etc.
DS as a state form
Stresses institutional aspects
Technical process of running an (efficient) state
AD as a political regime
Focus on actual authoritarian powerholders
And their ideology of powerholding

4. A more or less Moore-ian approach
Barrington Moore, Jr. (1966)
Different paths to the modern world
Democratic and authoritarian
Class coalitions crucial
Business dependent on developmentalist state
“labour repressive” regimes
The stronger developmentalism, the later democratization will occur (if at all)

5. A “reactionary coalition”
Coalition of civilian/civilianized powerholders,
Technocrats for bureaucratic-rationality
Close business associates (“cronies”)
lead industrialization and reduce transaction costs
Religious leaders provide traditionalist legitimacy
With labor demobilized and business dependent
who is there to oppose developmentalism?
Have to “wait” for the rise of middle class
But can also be co-opted by state

6. AD II: Changing power relations
Initially involves despotic power
Power over society
But strives for infrastructural power
power through society (Michael Mann)
by sustained economic growth
and political control with limited coercion

7. Comparison Despotic Power Power OVER civil society
Strong in historic regimes
One-way Street
Distributive
Infrastructural Power
Power THROUGH society (via infrastructure)
Strong in modern regimes
Two-way Street
Collective

8. AD III: Phases Phase 1: Economic Diversification
Basic exports/low wages
Despotic power/repression
Paternalist ideology (‘father knows best’)
Phase 2: ‘Deepening’, move to high tech
Increasing infrastructural power
Meritocracy (‘some are smarter than others’)
Phase 3: ‘Widening’, service industry, rise middle class
Little open repression, co-optation key
Culturalist defence of authoritarianism

9. Developmentalist “flying geese”*
Malaysia
(1969 emergency,
Mahathir’s PMship)
Thailand
( Sarit
military regime,
military rule )
China
(1979 Deng’s reforms)
South Korea
(1961, Park
regime)
Hong Kong
(British colony until 1997)
Japan
(mid-19th
Meiji restoration)
"Market-Leninism"
Southeast Asian
“tiger cubs”
Four “tigers”
Vietnam
(1986
“doi moi” reforms)
Taiwan
(1949,
KMT regime)
Singapore
(1961,
Lee-led
PAP regime)
Indonesia
( , Suharto regime)
Philippines
(1972, Marcos declares
martial law)

11. Other commonalities among ADs
Flying Geese
With Japan at lead as successfully authoritarian developmentalism
Its former colonies want to be ADs too
Singapore now “model” for China’s AD regime today
Cold War context
U.S. support and markets key
Unites leadership against common threat
Common ideology and economic strategy
Postpone democracy in name of development
“Governed market”, EOI, labor repression, etc.

12. Japan (Meiji, Militarist and Postwar)
First non-Western country to industrialize
German developmentalism chosen as model
Colonies industrialized
Sets stage for S. Korea and Taiwan
Japanese militarism
Obscures ongoing influence Japanese model
Postwar democracy
But labour repressed
MITI planning

13. South Korea I One of world’s poorest after Korean war US aid drying up
Unstable authoritarian civilian rule (Rhee)
And democratic interlude
Park Chung-hee’s coup (1961)
Former Japanese officer/model
Nationalist Cold warrior, hates N Korea
Determined to make S Korea strong by being rich

14. South Korea II AD Period dictatorship, then pseudo-democracy
Strong repression labor, opposition coerced
Paternalist ideology
Diversification quickly yields deepening
State-led capitalism
Chaebols led by coopted ‘enemy’ industrialists
Hard criteria limits cronyism
First ‘new giant’ Asian economy after Japan

15. Taiwan’s developmentalism
KMT loses civil war
Chiang Kai-shek flees to Taiwan
Establish ‘enclave’ regime
But claim to rule all of China!
Saved by US from mainland conquest
To build strength, turn to growth
Cronyism in state sector
But dynamism in SMEs

16. Singapore Ultimate AD PAP highly cohesive and efficient
Led by Lee Kuan Yew (LKY)
and ‘familyLEE’ (PM Lee Hsieng Loong)
Cronyism without (obvious) corruption
State as entrepreneur
Use foreign investment/capital
State-led upgrading
Local entrepreneurs long disadvantaged

17. Hong Kong Neither DS nor AD Authoritarian British colony
with not highly interventionist colonial state
No state-led strategy
“Lame efforts” at upgrading/”deepening”
Inertia as still rely on low cost labour until uncompetitive
Relocation to Mainland as market decision
China vetoes political democratization
But liberal civil liberties tradition (still) largely in place

18. Thailand Sarit’s military dictatorship 1957-1963
Classically AD: Strong role for technocrats
‘Despotic paternalism’
Thanom Praphat successors cronyist
Student uprising 1973 (demo overthrown 1976)
‘Premocracy’
Less despotic AD, after rapid growth partial deepening
‘Oscillation’ since 1988
Asian crisis and then slow growth
Periodic military coups
Particularly after rise pro-poor populism

19. Indonesia Sukarno’s nationalist, isolationism
Ends in economic crisis and political massacre
Suharto seizes power 1965 (‘New Order’)
AD established
Despotism gradually ‘infrastructuralized’
After oil boom, increasing turn to EOI in 1980s
Three decades growth stopped cold 1997
Asian crisis hits crony-plagued Indon hard
Reformasi protests call for gd gov and demo

20. Philippines Long democratic tradition
But political infighting, insurgency, corruption
Excuse for Marcos’s 1972 martial law
‘New Society’
Strong role for technocrats, econ planning
EOI with electronics leading way
Growing problems
Falling commodity prices, economic crisis
Cronyism as Marcos loses legitimacy

21. Malaysia Idiosyncratic case of quasi-developmentalism
Racially “plural” society
NEP affirmative action for Malays
But ethnic Chinese and Tamils feel discriminated
But AD dictatorship?
DS-style strategic planning in 1970s and 1980s
Mahathir’s authoritarian leadership
EOI, labor repression, and crony industries
Problems with “deepening”
Pressures for democratization with growing focuse on corruption

22. China Dwarfs all previous AD regimes
Post-totalitarian reforms after Mao’s death
‘Market’ not ‘Marxist’-Leninist
Successful diversification (world’s factory)
Authoritarian control
Labor repression
Now attempting to deepen
Was also attempt to move from coercion to more subtle control
Until Ji’s renewed repression

23. Vietnam Doi moi reforms in mid-1980s Similar trajectory to China
Post-totalitarian reforms after crisis
But China model
And reforms less deep (was less totalitarian)
Rapid transition to EOI-led growth
Spontaneous land reform and ag. Export
EOI, forex, diversification, rapid growth
Unclear if can ‘deepen”

24. Idiosyncrasies I
Despite key similarities in AD regimes, also many differences
Japan
Some developmentalism persists under demo
South Korea
Repressive, highly militarized dictatorship
Heavy industrial concentration (chaebols)
Taiwan
“Contested state” and “émigré regime”
SMEs dominant; dual economy

25. Idiosyncrasies II Malaysia Multi-ethnic
Affirmation action alongside developmentalism
Singapore
Small
Run like a family business
China
Large
Experiments, bottom-up pressures

26. Idiosyncracies III ‘Market-Leninism’ Least expected case of AD
But former state socialist regimes states well suited
Used to strategic planning
Just shift economic strategic
Already dictatorial
Just shift to “softer” post-totalitarianism

27. Failed developmentalism
All have authoritarian leadership
Thailand (Sarit), Indonesia (Suharto), Phils (Marcos)
All have growth ideology
But was nationalism weaker?
EOI and successful diversification
But failed deepening
Cronies over technocrats,
loss business support and traditionalists revolt

28. Developmentalist involution
Early growth sustained by agricultural and primary industrial exports
Failure of industrial “deepening”
Indonesian planes versus Korean ships
Friends, not “foes” as cronies
Lack of performance criteria
Rising debt to compensate for growing inefficiency increases vulnerability to crisis

29. Cronies versus technocrats
Marcos and particularly Suharto regime once seen as “strong”
Guided by technocrats
Later denounced as “cronyist”
Cronyism less cause than consequence of weakening regimes
Close state-business ties not unusual
Economic crisis leads state-linked businesses to turn on technocrats

30. Development crises Growth: economic downturn
cronies scramble to save conglomerates
technocrats sidelined
Competition: electoral manipulation
popular mobilization
military politicization
Legitimation: “crony capitalism”/“KKN”
by business or students
backed by traditionalists

31. People powers Similarities Thailand 1976/1992 Philippines 1986
Indonesia 1998
Opposition groups
Student role often key (‘vanguard in a vacuum’)
Traditionalist religious groups disillusioned
Popular mobilization against hardline regime
Overthrown or forced to compromise

32. Successful deepening, but failed widening
South Korea beginning in the mid-1980s
Similar timing in Taiwan
Is Malaysia close to democratizing in upcoming elections?

33. Developmentalist evolution
Business “enemies” lead industrialization
South Korean chaebols
native Taiwanese entrepreneurs
ethnic Chinese in Malaysia
Performance-linked “deepening”
South Korean developmentalism survives
Park’s assassination and economic crisis
Unlike Suharto,
Mahathir able to cope with Asian financial crisis

34. Post-development crises I
Inequality: not sharing growth
Despite growth, technocrats on defensive
Labour unrest in South Korea
Ethnic Taiwanese resentments
Ethnic distributional conflicts in Malaysia

35. Post-developmental crises II
Participation: electoral challenges
Tangwai launches opposition party
Minjung activists back oppositionists
Opposition gains in 2008 Malaysian elections
Identity: decolonizing lifeworlds
Social justice and constitutional issues politicize professionals
Reject culturalist authoritarian identities

36. Developmentalist crises
Timing/ Crisis sphere
Early
Late
(not yet)
Economic
Failure to deepen turns cronies against technocrats
Evolution through deepening but
inequality puts technocrats on defensive
Devolution of growth benefits eases distributional conflict
Political
Electoral/constitut-ional manipulation spurs mobilization and politicization
Participation gap prompts electoral challenge
Stability of illiberal electoralism
Ideological
Personalism leads business/students and traditionalists to demand “good governance”
Social injustice/
constitutional issues politicizes professionals who reject culturalism
Materialism and culturalist collectivism

37. Three developmentalist paths
(Non-developmentalist, despotic power)
Stalinism in North Korea
Repressive military rule in Burma ( )
1. Economic and political failure
Diversification but not deepening
Demobilization but not disaggregation
Thailand 1973/1988/1991
Philippines 1986
Indonesia 1998
Myanmar

38. Three developmentalist paths (cont.)
2. Economic success, political failure
‘Deepening’ but not ‘widening’
Disaggregation but not cooptation
South Korea and Taiwan mid-1980s
Malaysia after 2008 election?
3. Authoritarian modernism
Requires ‘widening’ and cooptation
Singapore since mid-1980s
China attempting to emulate this (tho challenged by “widening” )
Vietnam much less certain (probs with “deepening”
and “widening”)

39. And the winner is… Singapore
Paternalist diversification
After Malayan Union breakup
Meritocratic deepening
By end of 1970s
Culturalist widening
Middle class and “Asian values”
Powerless opposition (until recently)
repression, collaboration, co-optation

40. China: Having your cake and eating it too?
Worries about CPP
Growing corruption
Anti-corruption driven and increased repression as anti-dote
Singapore counterexample
PAP’s unfettered power
But still good governance
Power monopoly and governance compatible
If ruling party ‘morally good’
But ‘mis-modeling’ Singapore (Thompson/Ortmann)

41. AD’s relevance “Success” of developmentalism slows demo
Demobilization of labour and others in civil society
“Pragmatic acceptance” through rapid growth
“Failure” of developmentalism speeds demo
Too much cronyism makes regime unpopular
Failed “deepening” contributes to economic crisis
Successful developmentalist dicts “late”
Have to “wait” for middle class to democratize
And nationalist opposition to emerge

42. Non-AD regimes Maoist China (1949-1976) ‘Great leap’ backwards
Totalitarian rule and economic disaster
‘Kimist’ North Korea (1949-present)
Only still-existing totalitarian state
Survives despite economic implosion
Burma ( )
Highly authoritarian military rule
But lacks EOI or strong technocracy

43. Next week Country case studies presentations begin
Must APPLY 1 of 3 theories - DS, MS or AD - to a country study
Do NOT use unnecessary background/historical info
Week 4 ‘Classic’ E. Asin cases (Japan, SK Taiwan) Feb. 7
Week 5 The Unusual Cases of Singapore and HK Feb. 14
Week 6 ‘Failed’ SEA Cases (Philippines, Indonesia) Feb. 21
Week 7 ‘Mixed’ SEA Cases (Malaysia, Thailand) Feb. 28
Week 8 ‘Market-Leninism’ (China and Vietnam) March 7
Week 9 Non-developmental states March 14
(Myanmar, North Korea, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos)