1. The EU Member States and Relations with Eastern Europe Dr. Nathaniel Copsey European Research Institute, University of Birmingham/JMWEN Presentation to SIDA, Kyiv, 17 November 2008

2. Plan EU Member States’ preferences on for EU relations with the eastern neighbours: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Georgia Why are Member State preferences important? What factors determine these preferences? Country studies: Poland, Germany, France, Czech Republic and UK Who decides? Conclusions: what kind of relationship with Eastern Europe?

3. EU Member States’ Preferences for Relations with the Eastern Neighbours Relations with the former USSR were not a political priority within EU during the 1990s – took a firmly second place to EMU, then enlargement Rose steadily up the political agenda as EU accession drew nearer - Wider Europe Communication 2003 - two different interpretations Institutions are important – but it is the EU Member States that set the overall Union agenda If you want we understand where the Union is going, we have to look at what the Member States want Although, of course, not all MS will have preferences

4. What Factors Determine Preferences? Clearly, much of what determines preferences is rational, technocratic and rooted in a cost-benefit analysis of the national interest Trade dependency, net recipient/net contributor to budget, energy policy,JHA issues, security etc. Elements of ‘grand strategy’, geopolitics, Turkey question etc. Preferences with the eastern neighbours clearly contain a strong element of this, but are also linked to much softer factors, like ‘identity’ or certain readings of history (especially in new Member States) More room for persuasive argument What kind of Europe?

5. MS Preferences: Poland Very high on Polish agenda for the EU: Poles will push as a priority for their team presidency with Denmark and Cyprus First and foremost to have sovereign independent, democratic, stable and prosperous neighbours to the East Not to be the eastern border of the Union in perpetuity Democratization of Belarus European integration of Ukraine and Georgia leading to eventual full membership This field of relations with the east enjoys a very high level of political consensus

6. MS Preferences: Poland What about Russia? Poland’s relationship with Russia is not easy Security concerns about Russia persist at the elite and popular level: ‘yesterday tanks; today gas’ mentality Ideal would be to have a good working relationship with Russia Certain amount of variety or nuance in positions between political parties, governments and presidents

7. What Factors Determine Polish Preferences? Counter-intuitively, Polish preferences on external policy towards the east are determined by classical realist interpretation of hard security interests Geopolitics, geostrategic concerns about hard and soft security Giedroyc and Bączkowski History: fear of Russia and sense of responsibility for the territories of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (amongst conservative elites) Far less consideration is given to national interests calculated as a cost–benefit analysis: economic determinants (trade/migration), JHA-related concerns etc.

8. MS Preferences: Germany Tradition of strong interest in the region, which has been steadily increasing No definite stance on possibility of future enlargement Shift away from Russia-first policy in recent years Priorities are concrete: integration into single market, visa facilitation etc.

9. MS Preferences: France ENP should not lead to enlargement Giscard: further enlargement only take when EU-27 (EU-28 with Croatia) have converged socially and economically Shift away from Russia-first policy under Chirac Major shift in attitude towards kind of agreements to be negotiated

10. MS Preferences: Czech Republic Policy priority for the Czech Presidency of the Union in first half of 2009 Impact of Russia–Georgia conflict, memory of 1968 Suspicion of Russia lingers Topolánek’s August 2008 speech on ‘light’ (freedom) and ‘darkness’ (dependence) – link with energy ‘Duty to explain Russia to the EU’ Not opposed to further enlargement

11. MS Preferences: Hungary Relations with the east not a priority of the team presidency in second half of 2011 Hungary sympathetic to the eastern neighbours - also suspicious of Russia, but attitude more nuanced Priority is Western Balkans, but also energy Issue likely to rise up political agenda if Social Democrats lose and Fidesz is elected - but too late to change the Presidency priorities

12. MS Preferences: UK Pro-eastern enlargement, specifically to Ukraine Cool policy towards Russia But the issue is not high on the UK’s European agenda, well behind the budget, British rebate etc. UK not always credible on enlargement

13. What kind of a relationship with Eastern Europe? Who decides? Clearly, all Member States have a say in this Perceptions (and preferences) are shifting, steadily if not dramatically – membership not likely to be on the agenda in near future Germany remains the key player: no progress to be made until institutional reforms are complete in EU

14. Conclusions Despite differences between the MS, there are some areas where there is broad consensus on the kind of relationship the EU should have with its eastern neighbours These provide the basis for some of the proposed elements of the eastern partnership: deepened bi-lateral cooperation, deep FTA, increased sector support, people to people contacts, better monitoring methodology etc. Relations with Russia tend to colour MS perceptions of the kind of relationship the Union wants with Eastern Europe Obvious that new MS are enthusiastic, but lack capacity to be influential (poor administrative and political coordination) Once institutional reform is complete, establishing a truly effective framework for the relationship with the neighbours could become the main Union priority