EPISTEMOLOGY. DIRECT REALISM There is an external world/ objects in the world cause our sense perceptions we learn of the world through our sense.

EPISTEMOLOGY

DIRECT REALISM There is an external world/ objects in the world cause our sense perceptions we learn of the world through our sense Things are as they appear Instinctual belief of most people

DIRECT REALISM It is common sense to say that we perceive physical objects, and these exist independently of our minds. ‘Physical objects’ include tables, books, our own bodies, plants, mountains. Cosmology and the theory of evolution suggest that physical objects, such as stars and planets, existed billions of years before minds existed to experience them. When I leave my study, all the physical objects remain just as they are. According to direct realism, what we perceive through our senses are just these very things, physical objects, together with their various properties. When I perceive my desk, I perceive its size, shape colour, smell and texture. So direct realism claims that what we perceive are mind-independent physical objects and their properties.

CRITICS Illusion – constantly encounter ‘every day’ illusions, if world is at it seems then these illusions must be true since are indistinguishable from other sense perceptions. E.g. stick in the water or phantom limb Perception – the world is often not perceived as imagine to be. For example, that tree is smaller in the distance and the table has patches of light and dark red due to the light. How do we know what to trust? Hallucination – if world is as it appears what do we make of hallucinations/dreams? Are the pink elephants of a drunken person’s visions actually real? Inclined to say no – suggests other factors. Circularity – claiming that we know how the world actually is through the senses requires that we know how the world actually is. Different perceptions – other creatures – or even people – cannot all be perceiving the same world

DISTANCE AND SIZE Does your thumb really look bigger than the moon? Or is it rather that the moon looks further away? The way our visual system works, it is difficult to separate properties from properties of distance. How big something looks, in the usual sense of that phrase, depends on how far away it looks. Something which only takes up a small part of the visual field might actually look huge and very distant. Direct realists say that you directly perceive the physical object, but this doesn’t mean that every aspect of your perceptual experience is determined by the properties of the physical object itself. For example, I this case, there is also the relative property of its distance from you. We experience both the size of the object and its distance. (The experience – distant things taking up less of the visual field – is also determined by facts about light and our visual system. But these facts are themselves part of the experience – we don’t experience them.) So, to explain your thumb and the moon, we don’t need to say that you are immediately perceiving sense-data, which are different from physical objects. You are directly perceiving physical objects, but you are directly perceiving their distance as well as their size. We might object that we do not experience distance. Rather, the object does look small but, because we know about distance and size, we judge it to be large and far away. When we don’t know how large something is, we can sometimes wrongly judge it to be small and close, rather than large and distant, or vice-versa. This shows that we don’t experience distance directly, and there is a distinction between how big it seems and how big it is. To account for this we need sense-data.

THE ARGUMENT FROM PERCEPTUAL VARIATION What we perceive may not be the same as what is ‘out there’. Russell uses the example of looking at a shiny brown desk – we say it is brown, but it doesn’t actually look an even colour all over: depending how the light falls, some parts are lighter than others, and some are even white from the shininess. So Russell objects – saying the table is brown means no more than it looks brown ‘to a normal spectator from an ordinary point of view under usual conditions of light’ – BUT why think this colour is more real, more of a property of the table, than any of the other colours you experience? What colour any part of the desk looks to you depends on where you stand – if you and someone else look at the table together, you will see different patterns of colour. Suppose a shiny spot on the table looks light brown to you but white to the other person. The table can’t be both brown and white in the same spot at one time.

RUSSELL Russell then runs the same argument – appealing to variations in our perceptual experience – for the properties of texture and shape. The table might be smooth to touch but at a microscopic level, there are all kinds of bumps and dips – so should we say that when we touch the table, the smoothness we feel is a property of the table And the shape that something appears to have, like its colour, varies with the angle from which you view it. A rectangular table, from every angle except 90 degrees, does not look perfectly rectangular. These examples draw our attention to a distinction between appearance and reality. Obviously, much of the time, we talk as though things are just as they seem. But, clearly, we also distinguish between appearance and reality – and Russell remarks that having any skill as a painter requires that one does.

A PROBLEM FOR A DIRECT REALIST All this perceptual variation causes a real problem for the direct realist. The direct realist says I perceive physical objects and their properties, in this case the desk, ‘directly’, as they are. The immediate object of perception is the physical object itself.

OUTLINE 1.There are variations in perception. 2.Our perception varies without corresponding changes in the physical object we perceive. (For example, the desk remains rectangular, even as the way it looks to me changes as I look at it from different angles). 3.Therefore, the properties physical objects have, and the properties they appear to have, are not identical. 4.Therefore, what we are immediately aware of in perception is not exactly the same as what exists independently of our minds. 5.Therefore, we do not perceive physical objects directly.

SENSE DATA - RUSSELL Russell calls the colour and shape of the desk as I see it now sense data. When I look at the desk, I have a (visual) sensation – I am immediately aware of something. The ‘content’ of my sensation – what I am immediately aware of – is sense data. We can also think of sense-data as appearances (how things appear to us to be). Sense data are distinct from the table. The table exists independently of my perception of it, while sense data is defined as what it is I perceive – so they depend on my perception. If I close my eyes, the colour and shape of the table as seen by me, cease to exist. The colour and shape of the table as seen by me varies from where I look at it, while we don’t want to say that the table itself varies in this way. We can summarise the argument so far by saying that perceptual variation shows that what we directly perceive are not physical objects, but sense data.

OBJECTIONS There is no good reason to say that one of the colours we experience the table as having is more real than the others. As he notes, what we mean by the colour of an object is the colour that it appears to have when seen by normal observers under normal conditions. That we don’t always see this colour – that our perception of its colour varies – doesn’t show that direct realism is false: we can still say that we see the table, and its colour, under normal conditions. We all do see it as some shade of brown (shading to white), rather than some of us seeing it as brown, others as red, others as blue. In seeing its colour (as some variant of brown), we see the desk and its properties. With shape we have an even better reason to privilege the claim that the desk is rectangular rather than obtuse – we can use its shape to perform various actions, like getting it through a narrow doorway, which will only succeed if it is rectangular and not obtuse.

WHAT IT IS TO SEE THE DESK AND ITS PROPERTIES. In perception, we can be aware of a range of properties, some of which the objects has independent of our minds, and some of which it has in relation to being perceived. For instance, a rectangular desk has the property of ‘looking obtuse’. The property of ‘looking obtuse’ is a relational property, in this case a property the desk has in relation to being seen. (Another relational property is ‘being to the north of’ – the desk has this property in relation to me when it is to the north of me.) ‘Looking obtuse’ is a property the desk has, claims direct realism, not the property of sense-datum. And we can even explain why the desk has the property of looking obtuse (to us) in terms of its being rectangular plus facts about light and vision.

CONCLUSION Direct realism claims that what we perceive are physical objects (not sense data), but it doesn’t have to claim that all their properties, as we perceive them are mind independent. This response challenges premise (4) and (5)

THE ARGUMENT FROM ILLUSION If you half-submerge a straight stick in a glass of water, it looks crooked; but it isn’t. We see a crooked stick but the stick isn’t crooked. However, just from what you experience, you can’t tell whether you are seeing an illusion or not. Someone who doesn’t know about the crooked stick illusion thinks they are seeing a crooked stick. It looks just like a crooked stick in water. Illusions can be ‘subjectively indistinguishable’ from veridical perception.

OUTLINE 1.We perceive something having some property, F (e.g. a stick that is crooked). 2.When we perceive something having some property F, then there is something that has this property. 3.In an illusion, the physical object does not have the property F (the stick is not crooked). 4.Therefore, what has the property F is something mental, a sense-datum. 5.Therefore, in illusions, we see sense data, and not physical objects, immediately. 6.Illusions can’t be ‘subjectively indistinguishable’ from veridical perception. 7.Therefore, we see the same thing, namely sense-data, in both illusions and veridical perception. 8.Therefore, in all cases, we see sense-data, and not physical objects, immediately. 9.Therefore, direct realism is false.

OBJECTION When the stick in water looks crooked, there is nothing that is crooked; (2) is wrong. Instead, we should say the stick has the property of looking crooked when half-submerged in water. There is a difference between the property ‘being straight’ and the property ‘looking straight’. The two properties can come apart, and something can look crooked when it is straight. So sometimes we perceive the ‘looks’ properties of physical objects. We experience the properties they have that don’t relate to how they are perceived. In both cases, we directly perceive physical objects and their properties.

THE ARGUMENT FROM HALLUCINATION We can experience hallucinations – not just visual ones, but auditory and olfactory hallucinations as well. 1.In a hallucination, we perceive something having the property F. 2.When we perceive something having some property F, then there is something that has this property. 3.We don’t perceive a physical object at all (unlike the case of illusion). 4.Therefore, what we perceive must be mental – sense data. 5.Hallucinations can be experiences that are ‘subjectively indistinguishable’ from veridical perceptions. 6.Therefore, we see the same thing, namely sense-data, in both hallucinations and veridical perception. 7.Therefore, in all cases, we see sense data, and not physical object, immediately. 8.Therefore, direct realism is false.

THE DISJUNCTIVE THEORY OF PERCEPTION Direct realism’s reply to the argument from illusion won’t work here. We can’t say that what is seen is how some physical objects look, because no physical object is seen at all! There is a different way of challenging premise (2). According to the disjunctive theory of perception, if something looks a certain way, then one of two quite different things is going on. Either I directly perceive a mind independent physical object that is F or as in the case of hallucination, it appears to me just as if there is something that is F, but there is nothing that is F. (An either/or claim is called a disjunction). Hallucinations and veridical perception are two completely different kinds of mental state, because in hallucination, the person isn’t connected up to the world. They can seem exactly the same, but that doesn’t prove that they are the same. We can use this to challenge (6). The fact that hallucinations are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perception tells us nothing significant about what perception is. In hallucination, we don’t perceive anything, we imagine it. To imagine something is not to perceive something mental, such as sense-data, but not to perceive anything at all. So the argument from hallucination doesn’t show that in veridical perception, we perceive sense-data instead of physical objects.

THE TIME LAG ARGUMENT As Russell notes in the problems of Philosophy Ch 3, it takes time for light waves, or sound waves, or smells, to gets from physical objects to out sense organs. For example, it takes 8 minutes for light from the sun to reach the earth. If you look at the sun (not a good idea!), you are actually seeing it as it was 8 minutes ago. If it blew up, you would see it normally for 8 minutes after it had blown up – it wouldn’t even exist anymore, and you’d still see it! Therefore, we could argue, you aren’t seeing it directly.

OBJECTION But this doesn’t show what you perceive is actually a sense-datum of the sun. The ‘image’ you see is physical, carried in light waves. The light waves exist during those 8 minutes. So if you see the sun indirectly, then it is because you see light waves directly. But then what we perceive immediately is not the sun, but the light from the sun. We can generalise: what we perceive immediately is not the sun, but the light from the sun. We can generalise: what we perceive is the physical medium by which we detect physical objects (light waves, sound waves, chemicals for sound and taste). So, we don’t perceive (ordinary) physical objects directly. Direct realism cab reply that this is a confusion between how we perceive and what we perceive. Compare these two questions: 1. ‘Can you see the lake?’ and ‘Can you see the light reflecting off the lake?’ 2. ‘Can you see the paper?’ and ‘Can you see the light reflecting from the paper?’ In (1) we can turn out attention from the lake to the light reflecting off it. So we can talk, literally, about seeing the light. But in (2) there is not difference in what one is supposed to see. To ‘see’ the light that the paper reflects is just to see the paper. In fact, you cannot see the light itself – only the paper. SO direct realism can argue, except in special conditions, we don’t perceive light waved directly and physical objects indirectly. Light waves are part of the story of how we see physical objects. The time lag means we see the physical object as it was a moment before, not as it is now. This means that we see into the past. We always experience the world as it was a moment ago, or in astronomy, when we look at distant stars and galaxies, we look into distant past.

DIRECT REALISM AND COMMON SENSE If you were to describe what you see normally, you would usually do so by referring to physical objects: ‘ I see a desk, covered with pens and paper, and a plant.’ If you perceive the world via sense-data, the immediate ‘content’ of what you perceive is mental. So try to describe your experience in terms of sense-data, without referring to any physical objects. You could talk about ‘coloured patches’ standing in spatial relations to each other. BUT this would be very awkward and it is virtually impossible for any normal scene. What shape is that coloured patch on the left? – well, ‘plant-shaped’, BUT plant refers to a physical object. So our way of describing sense-data is dependent on concepts of physical objects. We can’t give an account of what we experience without referring to physical objects, even if we try. What this shows is that our perceptual experience presents what perceive as mind-independent objects. That doesn’t prove that we perceive mind-independent objects, but it does make such a claim highly intuitive. Only direct realism holds onto this basic inution. It is very counter-intuitive to think, then, that what we perceive are sense-data. Ant theory that claims w perceive sense-data has to say that perception is not what it seems to be. It has to say that it seems that we perceive mind-independent objects, but we don’t. We need very strong reasons to accept that perception is misleading in this way.

STRENGTHS AND COUNTERS Strawson counter on illusion/ sense data – variation in the way perception = part of naïve realism because ‘what we think depends on context’. Might say ‘it looks like x’ but say ‘I see x’ on closer inspection. If sense-data theory true, should always say ‘It looks like x’ as can never be sure actually is it. McSomething counter on hallucination – might not see any hallucinogenic difference subjectively, but very much difference from external (objective/our) perspective. Therefore, hallucinations are distinguishable from perceptions. Criticism of the illusion objection - in the case of seeing a stick bent in water, we are literally seeing the world as it is, because science tells us that this is how light behaves in water. Ironically, if the stick appeared straight, then we would not be seeing the world as it really is. ME on instinct – this is our instinctual belief. This implies it is reliable, simple and PRACTICAL so why reject it when it works? When we have illusions cannot be perceiving directly Must perceive something else - a mental object. Not possible to tell the difference between illusions and reality follows that on all occasions we are not directly perceiving physical objects. Rather we are perceiving mental objects (often known as sense-data)

REPRESENTATIVE REALISM There is an external world/ objects in the world cause our sense perceptions There is an external world/ objects in the world cause our sense perceptions We learn of the world through our sense perceptions constructed from sense data (which the objects cause). We learn of the world through our sense perceptions constructed from sense data (which the objects cause). These sense perceptions are mediated in some way. These sense perceptions are mediated in some way. Often coupled with ‘primary’ - e.g. size - and ‘secondary’ - e.g. taste - qualities to counter variability of qualities. Often coupled with ‘primary’ - e.g. size - and ‘secondary’ - e.g. taste - qualities to counter variability of qualities.

INTRO TO REPRESENTATIVE REALISM A little reflection suggests that what we perceive isn’t quite the same as what it ‘out there’. For example, if you put your thumb up against the moon, it looks like your thumb id larger than the moon, but it isn’t. If you move away from the table, you don’t think the table itself gets smaller, even though it looks smaller. Or if you look at a red rose in sodium street lights, it looks grey, but the rose itself hasn’t changed. If you half submerge a straight stick in water and look at it from the side it looks bent; but it isn’t. So what we perceive in all these cases isn’t the world as it is; but we are still perceiving the world – the moon, the rose, the stick - in some way. Representative realists say that we perceive these objects ‘indirectly’; what we perceive ‘directly’ is a ‘representation’, a mental image, that exists in our minds but which represents the physical object. The physical object is perceived ‘via’ this representation. The representation is an ‘appearance’; philosophers have called it a ‘sense-datum’. Arguments in favour of representative realism can begin as objections to direct realism. Representative realists argue that they have a good explanation of our three examples above. There is a distinction between how the world is and how we perceive the world to be, but it still makes sense to say we perceive the world. We perceive it indirectly. What we perceive ‘directly’ is a representation of the world, a sense-datum.

SENSE-DATA AND PHYSICAL OBJECTS Sense data are mental things – they exist as part of the mind. Physical objects by contrast, exist physically. Characteristics of sense data: 1.Sense-data are private. No one else can experience your sense data. They are the particular sense data they are, by definition, as part of your consciousness. By contrast, physical objects are ‘public’. One and the same table can be experienced by different people. 2.Sense-data only exist while they are being experienced. An experience must be experienced by someone to exist at all. A physical object, such as a table, can exist when one experiences it. 3.Sense-data are exactly as they seem. As we said above, they are appearances. There is no further reality to an appearance than how it appears. (otherwise you would have to ask whether you perceived the appearance as it appears or as it really is!). Physical objects can appear differently from how they really are (e.g. stick). They have a reality that is not defined by appearance.

RESEMBLANCE AND REPRESENTATION We could argue that we know what the world is like and that it exists because sense-data resembles the world in primary qualities but not secondary. Both Hume and Berkeley disagree. Berkeley pointed out that Locke was wrong to say that the appearance resembles the object in its primary qualities, but not in its secondary. For example, circles do not look circular when viewed from an angle, they look oval. So the lack of resemblance applies to both primary and secondary qualities. There is no more constancy in one than the other. Second, Berkeley argued, you can’t say that two things resemble ach other unless you can compare them. But you can never compare the physical object to the sense data since you only ever perceive sense data immediately. We can’t say that physical objects have any of the qualities we perceive, including size and shape, because the only basis for doing so is our experience of the sense-data. We don’t know that physical objects have size and shape unless we know our sense-data resemble them; but we don’t know whether our sense-data resembles them unless we can say they have size and shape.

REPLY To reply to these objections, representative realists dropped the idea of ‘resemblance’ in favour of ‘representation’. They emphasise the other part of Locke’s theory, that sense data are caused by physical objects; and this causation is very detailed and systematic. Yes, if you turn a penny, it looks circular, then increasingly oval, then flat (from the side). But all of these sense-data represent the penny because they are very systematically related to it. We can explain representation in terms of this complex causation. What remains central to representative realism is that we perceive the world via sense data.

WHAT CAUSES EXPERIENCE Hume argues, how can we even know that physical objects exist, and cause our sense-data? From the sense-data themselves, how can we tell what, if anything, causes them? We can’t; all that perceptual experience is the sense data, not any connection between sense-data and physical objects. Since we only ever experience sense-data ‘immediately’, if there were no physical objects, how would we know? It wouldn’t seem any different if our sensations were caused by a computer; or were not caused at all, but just ‘happened’. In order to know that physical objects cause our sense data, we first have to know that physical objects exist. But the only access we have to physical objects is through our sense-data. So, in fact, we cannot know that a world of physical objects exists independently of our sense data. At best, then, saying that physical objects exist is a hypothesis, a theory to explain our sense-data.

PHYSICAL OBJECTS Many representative realists claim that secondary qualities are subjective, and only primary qualities are real. But Berkeley argued that we cannot form a conception of a physical object that has primary properties alone. For example, we can’t conceive of something as merely having size and shape, it must have colour as well (try imagining a shape of no colour). However, Locke agrees that we can’t conceive of something as merely having size and shape. But rather than colour, Locke argues the other property we need is solidity, which is a primary quality. We can have a coherent conception of something as simply extended and solid without having any further secondary qualities. Colour is not necessary – just ask any blind person. HUME – while everyone accepts that secondary qualities do not properly belong to physical objects, but are ‘in the mind’, we have no reason to suppose that the same is not true of primary qualities. These are equally derived from our senses, and all that we are given in experience is the sense data themselves. Perhaps nothing in the object resembles squareness, just as nothing resembles redness. Perhaps our experiences of both are caused by something quite different. Going just on sense-data, how could we know? As Berkeley argued, you can’t know that two things resemble each other unless you can compare them, and we can’t compare sense-data and physical objects.

REPLIES Representative realists respond to both these objections, that we can’t know what physical objects are like or whether they exist, by saying they misunderstand sense-data. The objections wrongly assume sense-data ‘come between’ us and the world. In fact, we perceive the world via sense-data, which are the ‘medium’ by which we perceive the world. Compare: we describe the world using words. But words don’t get in the way of describing the world. We couldn’t describe the world without them! Sense-data don’t get in the way of perceiving the world. They are how we perceive the world. They don’t block our access to the world, they mediate it. The world is still what we perceive; and so it is not a hypothesis. Sense-data differing from the physical objects they represent e.g. the stick in water, do not come between us and the world. This is all explicable in terms of physical objects, and their effects on us, and only in these terms. In other words, in order to properly explain illusions, secondary qualities, perceptual variation, and all the rest, we need both sense data and physical objects.

SENSE DATA ARE IMPOSSIBLE Locke seems to claim that sense-data have the very properties that the objects they represent do. So a sense datum of a yellow square is itself square and yellow. The object in itself is square, so the sense-datum and the object resemble each other; but the object in itself isn’t yellow, so the sense-datum doesn’t resemble it. But how can sense data be literally square or yellow. A sense-datum isn’t in space, it doesn’t take up space, so how can it be square. And how can something mental actually be yellow. Ideas and experiences can’t really be coloured. As mental things, sense-data can’t resemble what the physical objects represent at all. If the rose looks grey, it said, there must be something that is grey. But the objection claims how can anything mental actually be grey? Certainly, something is represented as looking grey. But that ‘something’ that is represented as grey is the rose itself. Representative realists point out the difficulty with this objection. If the rose isn’t grey and there is no sense-datum which is grey, how is it possible that I see (rose-shaped) patch of grey? Surely it is true that if I see grey, then something must be grey. If it isn’t the rose, then it must be something mental. There is a second objections that sense-data just don’t make sense. Sense data are said to be exactly how they seem; they are appearances. So it seems that my sense-data can’t have properties that I am not aware of. But imagine looking at a scattered pile of matches on the table, I don’t know how many. How many matches are there in my sense-datum? Is it the same number as on the table. But then why don’t I know how many matches there are if my sense-data are exactly as they appear. Alternatively, since I don’t know how many matches there are, we could say that there are an ‘indeterminate’ number of matches in my sense-datum. But how can we say there are a number of matches in my sense-datum, but that that number is not 52, or 54 or 49; it is an ‘indeterminate number’? There is no such number as an ‘indeterminate number’!

CRITICISMS Real world – like direct realism, assumes the world exists Veil of Perception – we are each behind a ‘veil’ – we receive sense data but can never know what is beyond it. Does the world really exist? Uknowableness – the theory makes the real world unknowable – can only ever know about how the world appears to us. Berkley on inseparability – sensation/ sense data distinction may be intellectually possible but not practically. For example, surely shape is just the boundary of colour? Causality/ representation – how can we be sure of this? In order to know that A cause/ represents B we must be able to experience both independently

STRENGTHS AND COUNTERS Account for illusions – if the world is only a representation then it is understandable that we should sometimes interpret this wrong Supported by modern science – many modern scientific theories seem to agree with this – i.e. those about light. Against veil of perception (Descartes style?) Have no control over our sense perceptions Without sense organs, do not perceive Senses agree with each other Russel against veil/ idealism – to suggest the world exists is the simpler/ instinctual reaction (although nothing logically forces us to hold one view or the other) Me – see direct realism above

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES

THE DISTINCTION Size, shape, motion; and properties depend upon particular ways of perceiving objects. Colour, by definition, is something that is experienced in vision. The work that scientists such as Newton, Descartes and Galileo did on light laid the foundations for our modern theory of colour as wavelengths of the electromagnetic field we experience as light. Science therefore, was beginning to develop an explanation for colour. And likewise, it has developed theories of sound, smell, taste and other secondary qualities. But these theories - that colour is frequency of electromagnetic radiation, that smell and taste are chemical compounds – suggest the world as we experience it through our senses and the world as science describes it are quite different. We experience all the wonderful properties of the senses.; the world ‘as it is in itself’, as described by science, is ‘particles in motion’ and empty space.

LOCKE For Locke, primary qualities are those properties of an object that are not related by definition to perceivers. The primary qualities are sixe, shape, motion, number, and solidity. We might say that the object has these properties ‘in and of itself’. Primary qualities, Locke says, are ‘inseparable’ from a physical object, whatever changes it goes through e.g. physical objects always have some shape and size. These properties don’t depend, either conceptually or for their existence, on whether and how the object is perceived. By contrast, secondary qualities are related to perceivers by definition. Colour, by definition is something that is experienced in vision. SO it is a property that an object can have only in relation to its being seen by someone. The other secondary qualities are temperature, smell, taste, and sound. Secondary qualities aren’t possessed by all physical objects, e.g. plain glass doesn’t have a colour or a smell. And they aren’t even possessed by the same physical object at different times, e.g. glass is made from sand, and sand does have colour. SO sand loses its colour completely when its made into glass.

ARE SECONDARY QUALITIES ‘SUBJECTIVE’? Do secondary properties exist ‘in the object’ or ‘in the mind’ of the perceiver? Hume thought that modern science and philosophy had shown that secondary qualities exist only in the mind. Objects aren’t coloured; instead, we could say, their parts have certain properties of size and motion and so on, causing them to emit or reflect wavelengths of light (which is a type of vibration, not itself a colour). It is not until we turn to human experience – something mental – that we need the concept of colour, that we come across ‘colour experience’. In his discussion of primary and secondary qualities, Locke claims that the ‘ideas’ (the sense impressions) of primary qualities – our sense-data of shape, size, motion and so on – ‘resemble’ the primary qualities that the object we are perceiving has. However, the sense impressions of secondary qualities – our sense-data of colour, smell and so on – don’t resemble the object at all. The experience of seeing red, for example, just isn’t like detecting a vibration – yet it is. Does this show that secondary qualities exist in the mind? Locke’s ‘official’ theory is that secondary qualities are properties of the object that are related to its being perceived by us. Secondary qualities are nothing in the objects themselves but powers to produce various sensations in us.

Here Locke identifies the secondary quality with the power of the object. He goes on to argue that this power should be understood in terms of primary properties of the object’s ‘most minute parts’, or as we would now put it, in terms of its atomic and molecular structure. As we suggested, secondary qualities can be causally explained in terms of primary properties. We can use this definition to resist Hume’s view that colours only exist in experience. The argument confuses the relation between secondary qualities and experience: secondary qualities are powers in the physical object to produce certain experiences in us. To be brown is to look brown to normal perceivers under normal conditions. So secondary qualities are no less real, no less part of the external world, than primary qualities; it is just that they are a different type of property, one defined in terms of how we perceive the world. We could reply that physical objects aren’t ‘really’ coloured or don’t ‘really’ have a smell, because physical objects are made of molecules without colour or smell. But this misinterprets what it means to say that something is coloured or smells. To say that the table is brown is not to say that it must be composed of microscopic particles which are also brown. It is to say that the table looks brown to normal observers under normal conditions. The sub-atomic particles that make up a table don’t have to be brown for the table to be brown! Take another example: solidity. Science tells us that solid objects are, in fact, mostly empty space; the distances between atoms are huge compared to the size of the subatomic particles themselves. Does this mean that a table, because it is mostly empty space, is not solid? Of course not; atoms forming this rigid pattern, even with a great deal of empty space, comprise a solid. This is what the word ‘solid’ means.

PERCEPTUAL VARIATION But some philosophers, following an argument in Plato’s Theaetetus, have argued that there is another contrast we can draw between primary and secondary qualities, which supports the view that secondary qualities exist in the mind. Plato argues that ‘heat’ isn’t a real property of an object, since what is hot to one person is not. By contrast, we might think that ‘being two feet long’ is a property of an object, since this doesn’t vary from one person to another. Locke also gives this argument, undermining his own ‘official’ theory. Likewise, some philosophers, including Bishop Berkeley in his Principles of Knowledge, claim that secondary qualities vary from person to person. For example, the sea may look blue to me and green to you; an apple might taste sweet to me and sour to you. But the sea can’t be both blue and green; an apple can’t be both sweet and sour. So we shouldn’t say that secondary qualities are properties of the object. What shade of colour is it – how you see it or how I see it?? Secondary qualities, they conclude, only exist in the mind of the perceiver, whereas primary qualities exist independently of the perceiver. Primary qualities are objective, but secondary qualities are subjective. It must be, then, that we don’t perceive the object directly, that some of the properties we perceive are actually properties of the sensations that occur in each of our minds. We could insist that whether the sea is blue or green depends on whether it looks blue or green to normal perceivers under normal conditions. But in this example, it is hard, perhaps impossible, to say who and what conditions will count as ‘normal’. And in the case of the apple, taste in general seems to differ from one person to another. Direct realists could say that the taste is still a power in the object to create experiences, but that this power creates different experiences in each of us. So the apple is sweet-to-me and sour-to-you; the apple really is both of these – so we both perceive the apple when we taste it, not sense-data.

IDEALISM There is no external world All that exists is minds and their ideas To be is to be perceived (see phenomenalism) All properties of object are sense perception dependent (as all sense data = secondary and therefore dependent on object). An object is the sum of its properties Therefore, all objects are sense dependent Objects are a stable (coherent/ orderly) collection of perceptions which are created when we perceive them Anti-realist

INTRODUCTION The doctrine of idealism holds that "whatever can be known to exist, must be in some sense mental." The character of this doctrine opposes our common sense view that ordinary, physical objects like the table or the sun are made up of something very different from what we call "mind" or our "thoughts." We think of the external world as independent and holding physical things made of matter. Compared with the common sense view, idealism is plainly harder to believe. In the last chapter, Russell claimed that the way in which physical objects exist differs radically from our notion of sense-data; although, they do share a correspondence. Neither this relation nor common sense justified the possibility of a direct way of knowing the real nature of the outside world. The rejection of idealism on the basis that it runs counter to common sense thus seems premature.

WEAKNESSES AND CRITICISM’S Berkley’s error – cannot conceive of non-conceived tree ≠ cannot conceive of tree existing without conception Simplicity/ instinct –external object is simpler than to suppose that a new perception (object) pops into existence when perceiving. Veil of perception – just pushes back further. What are the sense perceptions? Where do they come from? Why are they coherent? Scepticism – forces solipsism on us. Have no reason to suppose anything exists except our mind Hallucinations – what is to suppose that these are not ‘real’?

BERKELEY Berkeley couched his philosophy in the edifice of a theory of knowledge. He argued that the objects of sensation, our sense-data, must depend on us in the sense that if we stopped hearing or tasting or seeing or perceiving, then the sense-data could not continue to exist. It must exist, in some part, in a mind. Russell allows that Berkeley's reasoning thus far is "valid." However, further extrapolations are less valid. Berkeley continued that the only things of which our perceptions could make us sure of their existence were sense-data. Since sense-data existed in the mind, then all things that could be known existed in a mind. Reality was a product of some mind, and any "thing" not in some other mind does not exist.

Berkeley called the pieces of sense-data, or things that could be immediately known, "ideas." Memories and things imagined could also be immediately known by virtue of the way the mind works and were also called ideas. Something like a tree exists, according to Berkeley, because someone perceives it. What is real about a tree exists in its perception, an idea from which the famous philosophic idiom: esse is percipi derives; the tree's being is in its being perceived. But what if no human perceives the tree? Berkeley admitted belief in an external world independent of humans. His philosophy held that the world and everything in it was an idea in the mind of God. What we call a real thing is the continuing "physical" object or permanent idea in God's mind. Our minds participate in God's perceptions, and thus different people's differing perceptions of the same object are variable but similar because each is of a piece with the same thing. Nothing could possibly exist or be known except these "ideas."

RUSELL’S RESPONSE Russell responds to Berkeley's idealism with a discussion of the word "idea." Russell claims that Berkeley generates a use of the word that makes it easier to believe the arguments advanced for idealism. Since we think of ideas as mental things anyway, when we are told that a tree is an idea, an easy application of the word "idea" places the tree in our minds. Russell suggests that the notion of something being "in the mind" is hard to understand. We speak of bearing some concept or some person "in mind," meaning that the thought of it or him is in our mind, not the thing itself. And thus, "when Berkeley says that the tree must be in our minds if we can know it, all that he really has a right to say is that a thought of the tree must be in our minds." Russell says that Berkeley's meaning is in gross confusion. He attempts to unravel the sense in which Berkeley engages sense-data and the physical world. Berkeley treated the notion of sense-data as something subjective, depending on us for its existence. He made this observation, then sought to prove that anything that "can be immediately known" is in the mind and only in the mind. Russell points out that the observation about the dependence of sense-data does not lead to the proof Berkeley seeks. What he would need to prove is "that by being known, things are shown to be mental."

RUSSELL ON IDEAS Russell continues to consider the nature of ideas, in order to analyze the grounds of Berkeley's argument. Berkeley refers to two different things using the same word, "idea." One is the thing of which we become aware, like the color of Russell's table, and the other is the actual act of apprehension. While the latter act seems obviously mental, the former "thing" does not seem so at all. Berkeley, Russell argues, produces the effect of natural agreement between these two senses of "idea." We agree that the apprehending takes place in the mind, and by this we soon arrive at an understanding in the other sense, that things that we apprehend are ideas and are also in the mind. Russell calls this sleight of reasoning an "unconscious equivocation." We find ourselves at the end believing that what we can apprehend has been in our minds, the "ultimate fallacy" of Berkeley's argument. Russell has made a distinction between act and object, using the sense of "idea." He returns to it because he claims that our entire system of acquiring knowledge is involved with it. Learning and becoming acquainted with something involves a relation between a mind and something, anything, other than that mind. If, with Berkeley, we agree that things that can be known exist in the mind alone, then we instantly limit man's capacity to gain knowledge. To say that what we know is "in the mind" as if we mean "before the mind" is to speak a tautology. Yet, this leads to the contradictory conclusion that what may be before the mind may not be in the mind as it may not be mental. The nature of knowledge itself refutes Berkeley's argument. Russell dismisses Berkeley's argument for idealism.

IDEALISM – ARE PHYSICAL OBJECTS COLLECTIONS OF IDEAS? All forms of idealism claim that reality is, in some important sense, dependent on minds. Berkeley claims that the ordinary objects of perception – tables, chairs, trees and so on – are dependent on our minds. THEY MUST BE PERCEIVED IN ORDER TO EXIST. The only things that exist then, are minds (that perceive) and what minds perceive. Therefore nothing exists that is independent of the mind. So idealism claims that what we think of as physical objects are bundles of ideas that we have come to associate with each other because they ‘are observed to accompany each other’. In his objections to representative realism, Berkeley argued that primary qualities don’t resemble objects any more than secondary qualities do. They can be just as subjective – for example, the apparent shape of something changes at different angles. So you and I could be looking at a penny, and you see something circular and I see something oval. This suggest that what we perceive are sense data and of course sense data cannot exist without being perceived.

PROPERTIES Berkeley argues we always perceive the qualities of physical objects, and, as a result, we can’t even make sense of what a physical object independent of its qualities is. Since its qualities are all mind-dependent, there is nothing left of a physical object to be mind-independent.

THE LINKING PROBLEM As well as not making sense, realism also leads to scepticism. Idealism solves the problem of scepticism because there is no need to ‘link’ the ideas we perceive to something else (physical objects). Ideas don’t represent physical objects, they are physical objects. The possibility of a world quite different from what we experience just doesn’t arise. In experiencing ideas, we are experiencing the world.

EMPIRICISM Berkeley also argues that idealism is more consistent than realism with a commitment to empiricism. The hypothesis that there is a physical world, quite independent of our experience o fit, is not something we can verify through experience. We have no experience of substance, only of primary and secondary qualities. Worse still, the hypothesis of a physical ‘substance’ is not one that is even suggested by experience. If we pay close attention to experience, we are led to the claim that all there is (all we can say there is) is what we can experience, and what we experience are ideas.

IS REALISM A SIMPLER ALTERNATIVE TO IDEALISM? Without physical objects what explains why we perceive what we do? There are three options: ideas, my mind and another mind. But ideas themselves don’t cause anything, they are completely passive says Berkeley. Second, perception is quite different to imagining, we are more passive – the sensations just occur to us, and we can’t control them. From this difference between (voluntary) imagination and (involuntary) perception, we can rule out my mind. So they must be caused by some other mind. When you think of the complexity and systematicity of our perception, Berkeley argues, that mind must be God. Realism claims to be able to explain perception by appealing to something outside of our minds, physical objects, that cause our experiences. But Berkeley argues that physical objects provide no explanation at all. No one has been able to say how it is that physical objects give rise to ideas (even if we can say now physical objects affect processes in the brain, we still have no explanation of how any of this causes an experiences.) So how our experience comes about remains a mystery. Also, if ordinary objects are really ideas how can I distinguish between my ideas just part of my mind, and real things part of the world beyond my mind? Berkeley replies by again pointing out the distinction between perception and imagination. In fact, Berkeley has three criteria for an idea being part of an object of perception, rather than just my mind. The idea is not voluntary: the idea forms part of the order of nature, the coherent set of ideas that we experience as reality, and the idea is caused by the mind of God.

UNPERCEIVED OBJECTS. If objects are not being perceived then they don’t exist. Berkeley provides two different answers in different books. His first reply is this: what the word ‘exists’ means when applied to an ordinary object of perception is that it is or can be perceived. ‘The table exists’ means the table is being perceived, or would be perceived if in the presence of some mind. Berkeley then adds that what we perceive exists in the mind of God. However, our ideas couldn’t be a aprt of a divine mind which can’t have the sort of sensations we have. Second, ordinary objects change and go out of existence, but God’s mind is said to be unchanging and eternal. But Berkeley may respond that God’s ideas which correspond to ordinary objects are not ones God thinks, but what God wills us to experience ‘things… may properly be said to begin their existence… when God decreed they should become perceptible to intelligent creatures.’

STRENGTHS AND COUNTERS Avoids ‘veil of perception’ – argues that veil makes concept of matter meaningless and therefore disregards it Gives an account of what the world is

SENSE DATA World exists (but not in realist sense) Learn of world through senses (in a Foundationalist way?): objects = families of ACTUAL/ POSSIBLE sense exp./data Physical existence: “permanent possibility of sensation” (see idealism!) sense experience reducible to indubitable sense data (added later – deals with problem of unperceived perceptions) object claim make implicit prediction of possible sense experience + therefore open to empirical error! (Must be verified before can make certain claim – object does/doesn’t exist only after we fulfil conditions of perception. Some take further i.e. always possibility of error due to infinite range of possible sense data)

CRITICISMS Sense data reductions – can object statements be reduced to sense data? Object – sense data would have to be (for some) an infinitely long list – surely impossibility? Space – requires we state where sense data would occur. BUT, space refers only to physical/spatial juxtaposition. I – surely we are objects? How do we reduce ourselves? Sense data certainty/ purity – ‘I see red’ ≠ naming that sensation, but describing. We relate it to all the red OBJECTS we have seen. (use language of involves physical; beyond momentary sense datum). Counter intuitive – Russel/ Occoms razor/ instinct type arguments. Perceptual Ambiguity – may be multiple (or uncertain) hypotheses for the same sense data. How do we determine/ define correctly in phen. terms? E.g. white paper may appear red under red light and red paper may appear red under white light. How do we express this as sense data? Possible Sense data etc. – what is this? Some kind of non-material object? How can there be an unperceived perception? Scepticism – seems to force scepticism; seems to suggest always possible new sense data refutes logical inference Originating – where do the sense data come from? Surely coherence/ order etc. suggests a physical cause? Can we accept that they ‘just are’ in the same way we would a physical world?

STRENGTHS Accounts for illusions etc. (implicit prediction) Accounts for object existence when not being perceived (take that idealism!) Logical (kind of) and Foundationalist

SCEPTICISM – ILLUSION, DREAMING, DECEPTION Illusion – our senses sometimes perceive us, so how do we know that they won’t always do so? Black tower example (Descartes) Dreaming – have had dreams before that were indistinguishable with reality; how do we know we are not doing so now? Deception – it is possible that we are being deceived in our perceptions. How do we know that we are not being? E.g. could be just a brain in a vat/ could be an evil demon which is constantly tricking us. How do we know this is not occurring?

A third good reason for idealism: Substance Properties are held together and united by a substance – matter. It is because objects have matter and substance that they can exist unperceived. But what is substance apart from it’s properties? Once you list all the properties of a table what is left which is the ‘substance’ of the table? Locke saw the point and accepted that substance was unknowable. So a realist view of physical objects remains a mystery. Berkeley’s idealism solves the need for talking about the substance of physical objects: they are nothing more than ideas we perceive, existing together as a bundle. He objected that we didn’t really know what we were talking about, or even if we were talking sense, in talking about substance. He had argued that what we experience when we experience qualities are ideas; and ideas only exist in the mind. What is the shape ‘square’ except what we see or feel? We can only make sense of it as our experience of a square. Locke and other realists can respond that primary qualities are not dependent on being perceived, and in this way, we can make sense of physical objects existing unperceived. To Berkley this makes no sense. Locke argues that the squareness of a physical object resembles what we see. But nothing resembles an idea, says Berkeley, except another idea. What do we mean when we say that the shape ‘resembles’ the shape we see? How can squareness resemble the idea of squareness? The only idea of shape we have is the one we see or feel. So it makes no sense to say that primary qualities – any more than pain or colour – exist in physical objects when they are not being perceived. While realism is tied to saying that substance exists, idealism gets rid of it.

ILLUSIONS What about misperceptions and illusions? Misperceptions are no more voluntary than perceptions, and can be perfectly natural and regular: a stick looks bent half-submerged in water, red looks grey under yellow and so on. Berkeley’s response is that we aren’t misperceiving – the stick is bent when half-submerged. However, this is misleading if we infer that the stick would be bent when pulled out of the water. So we shouldn’t say the stick is bent since this means it would remain so under normal conditions; the intuitive thing to say is that the stick looks bent - and this is correct, it does looks bent.

A FINAL OBJECTION Berkeley’s idealism confuses the use of ideas, at least when it comes to saying whether something s the ‘same’ idea or not. 1.Ideas exist in the mind. 2.So when I perceive the table, the ideas I perceive (which comprise the table) exist in my mind. They are, after all, my perceptions. 3.But that means the table I perceive must exist in my mind. 4.You cannot experience my ideas. SO you cannot see the very same table I see. 5.At best, you will experience a similar table. Perhaps even an exact twin. While you might see something qualitatively identical, you won’t see the numerically identical table.

BERKELEY’S REPLY We see the same table in the sense of ‘exactly resembling’. We might say, likewise, that if you and I both think of ice cream, we have the same idea. But of course, there are two ideas in this case – one that exists in your mind and one exists in my mind. ‘The same idea’ is used ambiguously (with more than one meaning), because we can count ideas by their content (table, ice cream’) or we can count them by whose idea it is (your thought of ice cream, my thought of ice cream). But this reply runs counter to common sense. Surely you and I can look at the same table. Realism of course says we can, the table is a physical object, publicly accessible and independent of either of our minds. Berkeley then has a further two part response. 1.Representative realism faces the same problem – you experience your sense-data of the table, I experience mine, so we don’t experience the same thing. But representative realism can say that we so, viz. we both experience one and the same table via our different sense-data. But then Berkeley says, he can say the same regarding the idea of the table in God’s mind; we both experience the table that is in or cause by God’s mind. 2.However, this causes a further problem: how can the ideas that I perceive when I perceive the table exist both in God’s mind and in mine? They must exist in mine because I am perceiving them. So all we can say is that my ideas resemble God’s. But in fact, we saw the problem that ideas of physical objections don’t exist in God’s mind in anything like the way they exist in mine. The solution was that God wills me to experience the ideas of the table. But then if God wills you to experience them as well, once again, we don’t perceive the very same table (set of ideas), but each perceive the set of ideas God wills us to perceive.

WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? There are different types of knowledge. Acquaintance knowledge – ‘I know Oxford well’ Ability knowledge – ‘I know how to ride a bike’ Propositional knowledge – ‘I know that eagles are birds’

PROPOSITIONAL KNOWLEDGE Proposition: a proposition is a declarative statement or more accurately, what is expressed by a declarative statement, for example, ‘eagles are birds’. Propositions can go after phrases ‘I believe that’ and ‘I know that’. So what is it to know that a proposition is true or false?

THE TRIPARTITE DEFINITION OF KNOWLEDGE The tripartite definition of knowledge claims that knowledge is justified, true, belief. It claims that if you know some proposition ‘p’, then: 1.The proposition p is true; 2.You believe that p; 3.Your belief that p is justified And if you have a justified true belief that p, then you know that p.

NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS The three conditions taken together are intended to be ‘equivalent’ to knowledge. So if someone know some proposition, they should fulfil those three conditions. The conditions are ‘necessary and sufficient’ for their knowledge that p. Necessary and sufficient conditions are related to conditional statements, which take the form ‘if x, then y’. Such statements relate the truth of two propositions, e.g. ‘it is raining’ and ‘I am getting wet’ so ‘if it is raining, then I am getting wet’. The condition asserts that if the first statement (known as the antecedent is true, then the second statement (the consequent) is also true. Suppose the conditional is true: if it is true, then I am getting wet. It follows that if the antecedent is true (it is raining), then the consequent is true (I’m getting wet). It also follows that if the consequent is false (I am not getting wet) then the antecedent is false (it is not raining). You don’t need anything else apart from these three conditions, the three conditions together are sufficient. Also it claims that there is no other analysis of knowledge; so the conditions are necessary.

JUSTIFICATION IS NOT A NECESSARY CONDITION OF KNOWLEDGE True beliefs can be formed or help on irrational grounds. For example, someone on a jury might think that the person on trial is guilty just from the way they dress. Their belief, that the person is guilty, might be true; but how someone dresses isn’t evidence for whether they are a criminal. Or true beliefs can just be lucky. For example, there is a lot of evidence that astrology does not make accurate predictions, and my horoscope has often been wrong. Suppose on one occasion I read my horoscope and believe a prediction although I know there is evidence against thinking it is right. And then this prediction turns out true. Did I know it was right? In both examples, it is counter-intuitive to say that the belief counts as knowledge, because the person has no reason, no evidence, no justification, for their belief. Knowledge, then needs some kind of support, some reason for thinking that the proposition believed is true. This is what is meant by saying that knowledge needs to be justified. We can object that sometimes we use the word ‘know’ just to mean ‘believe truly’, without worrying about justification. If I ask ‘do you know who wrote the meditations?’, I’m only interested in whether you have the true belief that it was Descartes. But we could reply this was just a loose use of the word ‘know’; strictly speaking, unless your belief is justified, it isn’t really knowledge. Alternatively, we could say that true belief can count as knowledge (at least sometimes) in this sense; but there is another, stronger sense of ‘knowledge’, which is what we are interested in here.

TRUTH IS NOT A NECESSARY CONDITION OF KNOWLEDGE. People can believe propositions that aren’t true. So what if many people, perhaps a whole society, share a particular belief and have good reason for doing so? E.g. almost everybody used to believe the earth is flat. It does, after all, look that way. Should we say that people used to know that the earth is flat? Or should we say that they didn’t know it, they only believed it? One of the most important revolutions in scientific thinking was the shift from Newtonian physics to Einstein’s theory of relativity. Now our everyday experience is very accurately described by Newtonian physics (because we are not moving at speeds close to the speed of light). However, strictly speaking, Newtonian physics is false. So do we know the claims of Newtonian physics, which after all, we rely on and use all the time, very successfully? One response is to note that the claims of Newtonian physics are roughly true, or ‘true enough’ in the context of everyday life. So rather than saying we don’t know them, because strictly speaking they are false, we can say that we do know them roughly speaking. (This rules out the opposite claim regarding the flat earth- it is not even roughly true that the Earth is flat, so people only believed, but didn’t know, that it was flat).

DOING AWAY WITH TRUTH – THOMAS KUHN ‘PARAGIDM’ Thomas kunn argues that science repeatedly makes large changes in thought, such as the shift from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics. One way of thinking (a paragidm) is replaced by another. When this happens, Kuhn says we can’t compare the two paradigms (set of concepts) in such a way as to say that one is true and the other is false, because ‘paradigm shifts’ involved changes in the concepts that we use to understand and explain reality. And there is not just one right set of concepts that matches reality. Kuhn argues there is no ‘theory-neutral’ way of describing the world which we can use to compare and judge between two paradigms. 1.How scientist describe what they observe depends on the concepts they use. 2.The main concepts of a paradigm acquire their meaning in relation to the paradigm as a whole. 3.Therefore, a different paradigm even if it uses the same term, interprets the concept differently, because it plays a new and different role. 4.Therefore, different paradigms are talking about different things. 5.There is no neutral way of describing the world. 6.Therefore, we cannot compare different paradigms’ claims to say that one is more ‘correct’ or ‘true’ than another, as they could both be correct in their own terms. If we insist that knowledge involves truth then it will be difficult to talk of scientific knowledge. So we should say that knowledge is justified belief.

OBJECTIONS If we do not assume that scientific theories are getting closer to the truth, we cannot explain the success of science. Technology has advanced considerably – the best explanation for this is that the scientific theories which underpin technology are more accurate than before. Kuhn responds that there is progress, including the solving of problems, but he argues that the idea that we are getting ‘closer to the truth’ makes no sense. Science response to the challenges it faces at any particular time; this does not mean that there is an ‘ultimate goal’ –truth – towards which it is moving. Also there have been no revolutions as Kuhn describes them. Changes in scientific theory involve considerable continuity and overlap e.g. in beliefs about methodology and evidence. If there have been no Kuhnian revolutions, then scientific theories exhibit enough similarity for us to compare them and judge which is better. A third objection accepts that we can’t talk about Truth, how the world ‘really’ is independent of our concepts or experience or way of thinking about it. But we can still argue that within each way of thinking, there are true and false beliefs. And only those beliefs are true, using the concepts available within that paradigm, can count as knowledge. Knowledge is not justified True belief, it is justified true belief.

BELIEF IS NOT A NECESSARY CONDITION OF KNOWLEDGE The weak objection: suppose john is sitting an exam, but he’s very nervous and has no confidence in his answers. Suppose when answering ‘which philosopher wrote the meditations?’ he writes ‘Descartes’. He’s right, and the answer isn’t a lucky guess – he has remembered what he learned. So it is plausible to say that John knows the answer, he knows more than he thinks- he’s just unconfident. But because he’s unconfident, we should say that John doesn’t believe that the answer is Descartes. So he knows the answer without believing it. We can reply that John doesn’t know the answer e.g. because he can’t produce a justification for giving that answer. Or that he does believe it but this belief is unconscious. Knowledge is not a form of belief – Timothy Williamson Williamson argues that knowledge is not a form of belief, but an entirely different mental state. Either you believe something or you know it; but you don’t know something by believing it. Williamson argues that we should understand belief in terms of knowledge. To believe that p is to take p to be true. You can’t believe that elephants are grey while also believing your belief that elephants are grey is false. In other words, to believe that ‘p’ is to treat ‘p’ as if you know that ‘p’. We can only understand what beliefs are if we first understand what knowledge is.

OBJECTION The occasions on which we make mistakes. Suppose I think I know something but it turns out I didn’t. We would usually say that I had, nevertheless, believed it. I believed it, but I thought I know it; this shows that we can mistake belief for knowledge. If knowledge isn’t a kind of belief, this would be puzzling. But Williamson can reply that just because belief and knowledge can be subjectively indistinguishable does not tell us anything significant about what knowledge is.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BELIEF AND KNOWLEDGE If you know ‘p’ then ‘p’ must be true. If you believe ‘p’ is true that doesn’t necessarily make it true. ‘I believe flamingos are grey’ is false but you can still believe it. However, flamingos are pink so you cannot know they are grey. You can’t know something false. People can have true beliefs without having evidence or justification e.g. thinking someone is a criminal because of the way they dress; they might be a criminal but their clothes are no justification for this. Belief can be accidently true. Someone can hold that it is true when they have evidence to suggest it is false. Evidence that astrology does not make accurate prediction –coincidence that a prediction turns out true, but did you know it before hand? Knowledge needs to be justified.

TWO IMPORTANT CONTRASTS Analytic and synthetic This is a contrast between the types of proposition. A proposition is analytic if it is true or false just in virtue of the meanings of the words. Many analytic truths, such as ‘squares have four sides’, are obvious but some are not: ‘in five days’ time it will have been a week since the day which was tomorrow three days ago’. A proposition is synthetic if it is true or false not just in virtue of the meanings of the words, but in virtue of the way the world is, for example, ‘ripe tomatoes are red’. A priori/ A posteriori A priori knowledge is knowledge of propositions that do not require (sense) experience to be known to be true. An example is ‘Bachelors are unmarried’. If you understand what the proposition means then you can see straight away that it must be true. You don’t need to find bachelors and ask them if they’re married or not. Propositions that can only be established through experience are a posteriori, e.g. ‘snow is white’.

LINKING THE CONTRASTS All analytic propositions are known a priori. However, this doesn’t mean all a priori propositions are analytic. Some philosophers argue there can be synthetic a priori knowledge. This disagreement forms the debate between rationalism and empiricism.

RATIONALISM Rationalism claims that we can have synthetic a priori knowledge of how the world is outside the mind. They argue that it is possible for us to know (some) synthetic propositions about the world outside of our own minds. For example, mathematics, morality, or event he physical world. Rationalist argue we have a form of rational ‘intuition’ or ‘insight’ which enables us to grasp certain truth intellectually, or we know certain truth innately, as part of our rational nature or both. They may also argue that some – or even all – of our concepts are innate or come from rational insight.

EMPIRICISM Denies that we can have synthetic a priori knowledge of how the world is outside of the mind. Empiricism says we can quickly understand the sources of knowledge. We gain knowledge through our senses by perceiving how the world is, which is a causal process. This is also how we form our concept – through experience. Once we have acquired concepts, our understanding of them gives us analytic knowledge.

KEY POINTS There are different types of knowledge: acquaintance, ability and propositional knowledge. Theories of knowledge discussed here are about propositional knowledge. Knowledge is not the same as belief. Beliefs can be mistaken, but no one can know what is false. Knowledge is not the same as true belief either. True beliefs may not be justified, but can be believed without evidence. To be knowledge, a belief must be justified. Rationalism claims that we can have synthetic a priori knowledge of how things are outside the mind. Empiricism denies this. It claims that all a priori knowledge is only analytic propositions.

LOCKE ON ‘TABULA RASA’ Locke argues that at birth, prior to any experience, the mind is a ‘tabula rasa’ – latin for blank slate. Thus the mind contains no ideas – no thought or concepts. If you observe new born babies, says locke, you’ll find no reason to disagree. All our ideas then derive from two sources: 1.Sensation – our experience of objects outside of the mind, perceived through the senses. This gives us ideas of ‘sensible qualities’. 2.Reflection – our experience of the ‘internal operations of our minds’, gained through introspection or an awareness of what the mind is doing. This provides the ideas of perception, thinking, willing, and so on. These ideas may well arrive later in childhood.

IMPRESSIONS AND IDEAS The sensation of yellow isn’t the same as the concept yellow. When we see something yellow, this perceptual experience is quite different from the role yellow plays in the though ‘if it is yellow, it is coloured’. Hume develops this idea into clearer terminology. What we are immediately and directly aware of are ‘perceptions’. Perceptions are divided into ‘impressions’ and ‘ideas’, the difference of the two being marked by a different of ‘forcefulness’ and ‘vivacity’, so that impressions relate roughly to ‘feeling’ and ideas to ‘thinking’. Although he doesn’t say so explicitly here, Hume, following Locke, divides impressions into those of ‘sensation’ and those of ‘reflection’. Impressions of sensation derive from our senses, impressions of reflection derive from our experience of our mind, including emotions. Hume argues that ideas are ‘faint copies’ of impressions. So just as there are impressions of sensation and reflection, there are also ideas of sensation and ideas of reflection. What Hume means by idea here we can refer to as a concept. So his theory is about how we acquire concepts.

THE MISSING SHADE OF BLUE Hume notes that there is an excpetion to his principle that all simple ideas are copies of impressions. If you present someone with a spectrum of shades of blue with one shade missing, then using their imagination, they will be able to form an idea of that shade. This idea has not been copied from an impression. Hume dismisses the example as unimportant – but its not. If it is possible that we can form an idea of a shade of blue without deriving it from an impression, is it possible that we could form other ideas without preceding impressions? The question is important because Hume uses the ‘copy principle’ repeatedly in his philosophy.

AMENDING THE COPY PRINCIPLE The first solution weakens the copy principle: any ideas that are not copied from impressions are only meaningful if they could be copied from impressions. In other words, what the idea is an idea of is something we can encounter in experience. The missing shade of blue clearly meets this condition, but perhaps many metaphysical ideas will not. The second solution keeps the copy principle as it is – ideas are copied from impressions – but explains how and why the missing shade of blue is an ‘exception’. The simple impressions of different shades of blue are related to each other, as they can be arranged according to how they resemble each other. From the arrangement, we can form the idea of the missing shade drawing on other similar impressions we already have. This only works when impressions are structured by resemblance like this. If we have no relevantly similar impressions which strongly resemble the missing impressions, we cannot form the missing idea. This is the same reason a blind man cannot form an idea of colour, and so it fits well with Hume’s theory.

SIMPLE AND COMPLEX CONCEPTS Locke argues that the basic building blocks of all thought are simple ideas, or more precisely, in Hume’s terminology, simple impressions – single colours, single shapes, single smells and so on. A simple impression or concept ‘contains nothing but one uniform appearance or conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable into different ideas’. 1.We can unite or combine the impressions of the qualities we perceive into the concept of a single object – we identify one and the same thing, a dog, say, as having a particular colour, shape, smell. So we can think of ‘that thing’, where the concept of that thing is made up of many concept of colour, shape, smell. This is a complex concept. 2.We can also form complex concepts by abstraction, e.g. the concept DOG doesn’t correspond to any one particular dog. When we abstract, we ignore certain features and concentrate on others; so to develop the concept DOG, we ignore the different colours and sizes of dogs and pick out features they have in common, like four legs, tail, bark, hairy. 3.We can put together simple concepts in an original way. While many of us have seen a picture of a unicorn, someone had to invent the conCept without seeing a picture. They did it by putting together concepts of HORSE and HORN and WHITNESS.

OBJECTION Hume and locke argue that in no concept, no matter how abstract or complex, is more than putting together, altering or abstracting from simple concepts. Hume challenges us to find a counterexample. However, is he really giving us a satisfactory analysis of how we derive whatever counterexample we choose from experience. Attempts to analyse philosophical concepts like KNOWLEDGE, TRUTH, and BEAUTY into their simple constituents have all failed to produce agreement. A good explanation for this is that they don’t have this structure and Locke and Hume’s theory of the origin of concepts is wrong.

JOHN LOCKE’S ARGUMENT He begins his argument by attacking the opposite view – that some ideas are not derived from experience, but are ‘innate’. By ‘innate idea’ Locke means a concept or proposition which is part of the mind from birth. For an idea to part of the mind, the mind must know or be conscious of it. From locke’s definition of ‘innate idea’, it follows that everyone knowns all innate ideas from birth. Assuming that our minds are alike in which innate ideas they have, if some truth were part of the mind from birth, every person would know it. But perhaps innate ideas are ones that are known as soon as the person gains the use of reason – which children and idiots do not (yet) have. Locke replies that what is missing (in many cases) isn’t the use of reason, but the ideas.

A DIFFERENT DEFINITION OF ‘INNATE IDEA’ Rather than to say that ‘innate ideas’ are known from birth, nativists maintain that they are ideas the content of which cannot be gained from experience. Rationalists argue that experience triggers our awareness of the concept or truth (some add that it is innately determined).

EXPERIENCE AS A ‘TRIGGER’ In some species of bird, a baby bird only needs to hear a little bit of the bird song of its species befpre being able to sing itself. Peter Carruthers notes that there are many developments in our cognitive capacities that are genetically determined.

EMPIRICISTS ON ACQUIRING CONCEPTS Locke summarises his view of how the mind acquires ideas thus: ‘the senses first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet: And the Mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the memory and names got to them. Afterwards the mind proceeding farther, abstracts them, and by degrees learns the use of general names. In this manner the mind come to be furnish’d with ideas and language, the materials about which to exercise its discursive Faculty’. As we come to remember particular experiences through repetition, we start to be able to label them. Then we abstract from the individual cases to talk about ‘types’ of experience, for example, we move from ‘red’, ‘yellow’, ‘blue’ and so on, to the idea of ‘colour’.

LOCKE’S OBJECTIONS 1.If we observe new born babies we have no reason at all to think they have any concepts beyond, perhaps, ones deriving from their experience in the womb, such as WARMTH and PAIN. Certainly we cant think that such advanced concepts as IDENTITY or IMPOSSIBILITY are concepts babies are familiar with an d conscious of. 2.Locke also says the concept of GOD is not only a concept babies don’t have not all human beings have. Whole societies, historically, have been atheist. The concept of GOD is not innate, but learned by children from their teachers. 3.The only way a concept can be part of the mind without the mind being conscious of it is if it is lodged in memory. To remember something is to have been conscious of it in the past. If you aren’t remembering a concept then it is new to your mind.

LEIBNIZ He accepts Locke’s claim that innate knowledge requires innate concepts. Therefore, if we want to say that ‘it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be’ is innate knowledge, we will have to say that concepts such as IDENTITY and IMPOSSIBILITY are innate. These are essential to all thought. Leibniz notes that to lack the word for God is not to lack the concept of GOD. Some societies have no word for ‘being’ but that doesn’t mean they don’t have thought that use the concept. Leibniz also argues that innate concepts exist as dispositions in the mind – so neither new, in the sense of originating outside the mind, nor remembered. Leibniz gives a number of examples of ideas that he claims are innate. On reflection he comments ‘to reflect is to simply attend what is in us, and something that came within us is not something that came from the senses.’ Thus he says the concepts of BEING, UNITY, SUBSTANCE, DURATION, CHANGE, ACTION, PERCEPTION AND PLEASURE are all innate, because we are ourselves beings, unities, substances, that endure through time, that change, act, perceive and experience pleasure.

PLATO ON UNIVERSALS.

ISSUES Cases of lucky true beliefs show that the justification should be either strengthened, added to or replaced. Gettier-style problems are an example of this. Gettier starts by claiming, uncontroversially, that deductive argument preserves justification. He gives two counterexamples to the tripartite definition.

SMITH AND JOHN Smith and john are applying for the same job. Smith has excellent reason to believe that Jones will get the job e.g. smith has been told this by the employer. Smith also has excellent reason to believe that Jones has ten coins in his pocket e.g. smith has just counted them. Therefore, both of these beliefs are justified. Smith then puts the two beliefs together and deduces that the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket. This belief is justified because it is inferred deductively from justified beliefs. It turns out that Jones doesn’t get the job, Smith does. It also happens that, unknown to him, smith also has ten coins in his pocket. So smiths belief that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket is true. Smith’s belief is both true and justified, but we shouldn’t say that smiths knows the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. Smith inferred his belief from a false belief, namely that jones would get the job. So the reason smith has for his belief is false. What makes his belief true has come apart from what justifies his belief. There is no connection between what justifies his belief and his belief’s being true.

ADD A ‘NO FALSE LEMMAS’ CONDITION (J+T+B+N) Smith doesn’t know that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, we said, because he inferred his belief from a false belief, namely that Jones will get the job. So all we need to do is rule this out in the definition of knowledge by adding an extra condition. You know that p if: 1.P is true 2.You believe that p 3.Your belief that p is justified 4.You did not infer that p from anything false Condition (4) is called the ‘no false lemmas’ condition. A lemma is a claim part way through an argument. Smith concluded that jones will get the job from being told by the employer; and he then used that information to conclude that the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job. So ‘Jones will get the job’ is a lemma.

BARN COUNTY There are Gettier cases in which you don’t make an inference, so condition (4) is satisfied, but you still don’t have knowledge. This is a famous example from Alvin Goldman, ‘Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge’. Henry is driving through the countryside. He doesn’t know it, but in this part of the country – call it ‘Barn county’ – there are lots of fake barns, just barn facades. But they have been built so that they look just like real barns when seen from the road. As he drives along, Henry often thinks ‘there’s a barn’. These beliefs don’t count as knowledge because they are false. But just once, Henry thinks ‘there’s a barn’ when he is looking at the one and only real barn in the area. This belief is true and it is justified – it is formed from normal perception and Henry has no reason to suspect that he is the victim of an elaborate hoax. If our normal perceptual beliefs are justified, then so if Henry’s belief. But it is not knowledge, because – as in the Gettier cases – it is only a matter of luck that Henry’s belief is true in this one instance. Henry hasn’t inferred that there;s a barn from something false. First, forming beliefs from perception isn’t a matter of inference – we simply believe what we see. Second, suppose it were a matter of inference. Suppose Henry thinks ‘It appears to me as though there is a barn. Appearance is a good guide to reality. Therefore, there is a barn’. None of these claims is false, so he has not inferred ‘there is a barn’ from any false lemmas. (If Henry relied on the belief ‘Appearance is a good guide to reality around here’, then this would be a false lemma, but who thinks like this?)

INFALLIBILISM The tripartite definition of knowledge does not tell us what it is for a belief to be justified. Gettier has assumed that Smith’s beliefs – that Jones will get the job and that he has ten coins in his pocket – are justified. Because they are justified, his deduction that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket is justified. Because they are justified, his deduction that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket is justified. But we can challenge Gettier’s assumption. Perhaps Smith’s initial beliefs are not justified or, better, not justified enough to count as knowledge. If so, then his deduction will not be justified enough either. Smith has excellent reasons for both his beliefs about Jones getting his job and having ten coins in his pocket. But infallibilism argues that knowledge is certain. Only certainty can provide the degree of justification needed to turn true belief into knowledge. We can either say that a belief is not justifief if it is not certain or that it is not sufficiently justified to count as knowledge if it is not certain or that it is not sufficiently justified to count as knowledge if it is not certain. The implication that we should draw from Gettier cases is that our beliefs are rarely sufficiently justified to count as knowledge.

DESCARTES To establish his certainty, Descartes seeks to test his beliefs by doubting them. As he tries to call his beliefs into questions, he repeatedly asks how he can know they are true. So he understands knowledge in terms of what is ‘completely certainty and indubitable’. If we can doubt a belief then it is not certain, and so it is not knowledge. Descartes wonders if he can know what exists at all. Of course, his habitual opinions are highly probable, but they are not certain. To remind himself of this, he supposes that he is the victim of a massive deception by an evil demon, telepathically, controlling his experiences and thoughts.

DISCUSSION By ‘indubitable’ Descartes doesn’t mean that he has a feeling of certainty. That could vary from one person to the other, e.g you might feel certain that God exists or that your friends will never betray you. We can all make mistakes and be certain of something when it is not certain. For Descartes, for a belief to be indubitable, it must be infallible in some way. This is where Descartes method of doubt comes in. Using his best most careful judgement, what he judges must be true, it is impossible that he could be making a mistake. 1.No one can know what is false. 2.Therefore, if I know that p, then I can’t be mistaken that p. 3.Therefore, for justification to secure knowledge, justification must guarantee truth. 4.Therefore, if I am justified in believing that p, I can’t possibly be mistaken. 5.Therefore, if it is possible that I am mistaken, then I can’t be justified in believing that p. 6.Therefore, infallibilism is true. Infallibilism defends the tripartite definition of knowledge and rules out Gettier cases, because in these cases I do not have justified, true, belief. However, it is rare that out evidence rules out the possibility of error. Infallibilism entails that we have very little knowledge (even if we still have many beliefs that are very probably true). Descartes brings everything into question. Unless he can build his way back out using only infallible beliefs, then infallibilism leads to scepticism, rather than secure knowledge. It would be better to find a definition of knowledge that allowed us more of it.

REJECTING THE ARGUMENT FOR INFALLIBILISM The argument for infallibilism rests on a logical error. Premise (2), ‘if I know that p, then I can’t be mistaken about p’, has more than one meaning, depending on how one understands ‘can’t’: 2’ It can’t be the case that if I know p, I am mistaken that p. We should agree with this because of (1) ‘No one can know what is false’. 2” If I know that p (I am in a position that) I cant possibly be mistaken that p. This is what infallibilism assumes in moving from (2) through (3) to (4). It is a much stronger claim than (2’) because it says that not only am I not mistaken, but I cant possibly be mistaken that p. Obviously there are many cases of perception or memory in which I could be mistaken that p, but in fact I am not, and my true belief rests on evidence, so there are good reasons why I am not mistaken. The argument for infallibilism slips from (2’) (inferred from (1)) to (2”) (to support (4)). But this is a mistake, confusing one claim for another. (This is called the fallacy of equivocation.) The two claims are distinct, since one is a claim about whether I am mistaken, and the other is a claim about whether I could be mistaken. So the argument fails. To accept infallibilism, we need some other, independent reason to believe (2”).

RELIABILISM Reliabilism claims that you know that p if: 1.P is true; 2.You believe that p; 3.Your belief is cause by a reliable cognitive process. A reliable cognitive process is just one that produces a high percentage of true beliefs. Examples include perception, memory and testimony. True beliefs caused by such processes count as knowledge. (Of course, if these processes cause a false belief – if you misperceive or misremember or someone lies to you – then your belief isn’t knowledge, but that’s because it is false.)

RELIABILISM One advantage of Reliabilism is that it allows young children and animals to have knowledge. It is odd to say, of many animals, that they have reason or evidence for their beliefs – they don’t have that kind of sophisticated psychology. But they get around the world very well indeed, so it is also odd to deny that they have knowledge. Reliabilism explains both points. Justification is irrelevant to knowledge, which children and animals have because their true beliefs are cause by reliable processes. However, simple Reliabilism like this is unsatisfactory e.g Barn county story. Henry’s belief is caused by a very reliable process, namely vision, and it is cause precisely by what makes it true. The problem is that in Barn county, this reliable process has produced a true belief in circumstances in which the belief still seems only accidently true.

One solution is to make Reliabilism more complex. In normal situations, Henry can discriminate between barns and things that aren’t barns just fine, so he knows a barn when he sees one. But in barn county he cant reliably discriminate between real barns and facades. That’s why he doesn’t know that what he sees is a barn when it is. This more sophisticated Reliabilism says that you know that p if: 1.P is true; 2.You believe that p; 3.Your belief that p is caused by a reliable cognitive process; 4.You are able to discriminate between ‘relevant possibilities’ in the actual situation.

RELIABILITY AS TRACKING THE TRUTH We defined a reliable process as one that produces a high percentage of true beliefs. Robert Nozick provides a different definition in terms of ‘tracking the truth’. You know that p if 1.P is true; 2.You believe that p; 3.In the situation you are in, or a similar situation, if p were not true, then you would not believe that p; 4.In the situation you are in, or a similar situation, if p were true, then you would believe that p. (3) tends to be more important for solving the counterexamples. In normal cases, Henry knows that he is looking at a barn, because if it wasn’t a barn he was looking at, he wouldn’t believe that it was. But in Barn county, henry doesn’t know that he is looking at a barn, because he would believe that it was a barn even if it was a façade. So in normal cases, henry knows that there is a barn by sight; but in barn county, he doesn’t. (3) does not imply that you could not be mistaken, no matter what. As stated, it means that in the situation you are in and others that are likely to come up, you are able to tell whether or nor p is true.

DENYING THE PRINCIPLE OF CLOSURE According to Reliabilism, I know I have two hands. It’s true and I can see and feel them. But now consider a rather extreme thought experiment. In Meditation I, Descartes envisages the possibility that he is being telepathically deceived by an evil demon, so that although it seems to him that there is a world of physical objects, including his own body, in fact there is no such world. The modern variant of this is to imagine oneself as a brain vat, being fed perceptual experiences by a supercomputer. According to Reliabilism, do I know that this isn’t true, that im not a brain in a vat? I believe that I am not, but can I tell reliably? The answer must be ‘no’, because if I were a brain in a vat, I would continue to believe that I am not. My experiences, after all, would be exactly as they are now, in the real world. So I don’t know that I am not a brain in a vat. These two results – that I know I have two hands, but I don’t know that I am not a brain in a vat – produce a paradoxical conclusion. Deduction is a reliable cognitive process. If you start with true beliefs (the premises), and validly deduce another belief (the conclusion) then that belief must be true. ‘The principle of closure’ says that if I know the premises, and I validly deduce the conclusion from the premises, then I know the conclusion. So here is a valid deduction: 1.I have two hands. 2.If I have two hands, then I am not a brain in a vat. 3.Therefore, I am not a brain in a vat. Reliabilism claims that I know (1), and of course, I know (2), because it is true by definition. But although I know both premises, and the premises entail the conclusion, Reliabilism says that I do not know the conclusion. But that must mean that deduction does not always produce knowledge! Many philosophers have found this an absurd conclusion that shows that Reliabilism cannot be a correct analysis of what knowledge is.

VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY (V+T+B) Virtue epistemology is a recent development out of Reliabilism. The idea of a ‘virtue’ in this context relates to intellectual virtue. An intellectual virtue can be understood as a particular intellectual skill or ability or trait that contributes to getting to the truth. There are two types of virtue epistemology, each of which emphasises the importance of different kinds of intellectual virtue.

‘RELIABILIST VERSIONS’ ‘reliabilist’ versions of virtue epistemology developed directly out of reliabilism. They focus on the virtues of cognitive faculties, such as acuity of perceptual organs, reliability of memory, and rationality of thought processes. ‘Responsibilist’ versions of virtue epistemology focus on the virtues of intellectual traits, such as caring for the truth, open-mindedness and intellectual courage. Responsibilist virtue epistemologists focus more on the conditions of a virtuous knower than on definitions of knowledge. Reliabilist virtue epistemology claims that you know that p if: 1. p is true; 2. You believe that p; 3. Your true belief is a result of you exercising your intellectual virtues. The fact that you have true belief represents a ‘cognitive achievement’ of your for which you deserve ‘credit’. You have the true belief ‘owing to [your] own abilities, efforts, and actions, rather than owing to dumb luck, or blind chance, or something else.

EPISTEMOLOGY. DIRECT REALISM There is an external world/ objects in the world cause our sense perceptions we learn of the world through our sense.

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EPISTEMOLOGY. DIRECT REALISM There is an external world/ objects in the world cause our sense perceptions we learn of the world through our sense.

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