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Cold War 1945-1991. To what extent was the Cold War inevitable, or could it have been avoided – how could it have been avoided? Even though the Grand.

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Presentation on theme: "Cold War 1945-1991. To what extent was the Cold War inevitable, or could it have been avoided – how could it have been avoided? Even though the Grand."— Presentation transcript:

1 Cold War 1945-1991

2 To what extent was the Cold War inevitable, or could it have been avoided – how could it have been avoided? Even though the Grand Alliance unraveled – in spite of past tensions….could it have been avoided? Answer with your partner

3 Tension / Hostility between USA and Russia/USSR, before 1945 USA criticized authoritarianism of Czarist Russia (Wilson reluctant to fight with Allies so long as Russia was ruled by the Czars…abdicate…Kerensky) USA critical of Communist take over in Oct. / Nov. 1917 (supported Provisional Govt. / Kerensky): Democracy and Capitalism were completely opposite to Communism and Totalitarianism….sends troops Whites against Reds USA upset with Treaty of Brest-Litovsk; USA upset with Comintern (led to Red Scare), with anti-US propaganda from the USSR

4 USSR upset with US for exclusion from Versailles Conference, USA gave support to Whites during the Civil War, and then non- recognition of the new Soviet regime, and negative propaganda Eventually the USA recognized the USSR in 1933, though the relationship did not improve very much USA upset/critical with Purges, persecution of Religion, minorities…Nazi-Soviet Pact, Soviet invasion of Poland, Baltic States and Finland But both became Allies in WW II after 1941: USA extended Lend Lease to the USSR ($11b in aid) Yet some tension – delay in opening a second front in the West, cancelling Lend Lease and loans right after Germany surrendered, Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe and East Germany…an uneasy Grand Alliance

5 When the war ended the past tensions and mistrust re- surfaced, and became much more intense……leading to the Cold War The two remaining Super Powers differed in their ideologies –USA: Democracy, Regulated Capitalism, Christian Values, Religious freedom, Free Education, Civil Rights –USSR: Communism / Totalitarianism, Public Ownership / Command Ec, Atheism, denial of freedom of speech, assembly, controlled Ed, Media, Socialist Realism Added to their differing systems were now their different visions for constructing a post-war Europe / World (sovereignty, self-determination), and about the future of Germany (US wants a unified, democratic, but disarmed Germany)….based on their ideologies

6 Different Ideologies / Visions The US vision was contained in FDR’s Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter agreed with Churchill: his vision resembled Wilson’s vision, contained in his 14 points (later, Truman Doctrine – speech to Congress) Incorporates self-determination, sovereignty, democracy, no spheres of influence…. international co-operation and peace

7 FDR’s Four Freedom’s 1. Freedom of speech and expression 2. Freedom to worship God 3. Freedom from want 4. Freedom from fear

8 The Atlantic Charter 1. No aggrandizement, territorial or other 2. No territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned… 3. Respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live 4. Access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world 5. Improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security 5. Improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security 6. A peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries 7. A peace that enables all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance 8. Abandonment of the use of force… the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security (UN).. disarmament

9 The Soviet Vision Involved: Securing a sphere of domination / a wall of Soviet dominated nations protecting its Western border / a buffer zone (Soviet Block, Iron Curtain) as protection against possible future aggression…to include East Europe and East Germany Spreading Communism / Stalinism, within this sphere Revenge / retribution on Germany (inc. Reparations) and a permanently weakened, divided, disarmed Germany Added to this….a personality conflict; Stalin, Truman

10 Soviet Domination of Eastern Europe

11 FDR and the US was already taking the lead as the war ended in setting up institutions which embodied its vision. 1. The International Monetary Fund - 1944 - to regulate world currency exchange rated - to encourage trade. 2. The World Bank - to aid in the economic growth of war ravaged countries – 1944 3. The United Nations, set up in San Francisco in 1945, with its headquarters in NY

12 The USSR refused to get involved in the first two. The USA, Britain, and the USSR – leaders met at three conferences - display the tension, opposing philosophies, divisions between the two emerging super powers. Readings….Chafetz and Hampton….on the role of ideology Met at Teheran (Iran), Yalta (Russia), and Potsdam (Germany)…..differences began to emerge…

13 In November 1943, FDR and Churchill traveled to Teheran, Iran…first time FDR and Stalin met FDR and Stalin established a cordial relationship. The 3 leaders agreed that an Anglo-American second front would be opened within 6 months in the Western Europe / France Teheran

14 Read more from Judge and Langdon on Teheran Conference

15 The meeting also considered the future of Germany – demilitarization and occupation of Germany - problems in Eastern Europe and the Orient, and the shape of the postwar peace system - but no decisions were made. Too early - war was yet to be won…they stopped discussing these contentious issues Stalin also agreed to enter the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany They all agreed to be part of an international organization after the War "We came here with hope and determination", the three leaders wrote in the Declaration of Teheran, "and we leave here, friends in fact, in spirit, and in purpose."

16 Yalta The Big Three met again at Yalta in Russia, in a former palace of the Czars on the Black Sea, in Feb. 1945. FDR was at this stage beginning to despair, sensing resistance to his internationalist dreams…USSR had occupied and controlled much of Eastern Europe. Stalin, whose armies were now only miles from Berlin and who was well aware of how much the US wanted him to assist in the Pacific, was confident and determined.

17  They agreed about setting up the United Nations, with veto powers held by the 5 permanent members of the Security Council (of eleven) and to meet in San Francisco to discuss these plans / details at greater length  Stalin promised to join the war against Japan "two or three months after Germany surrendered”  In return for this promise, FDR agreed that the USSR should receive part of the island of Sakhalin, the Kurile islands and part of Manchuria.

18 On other issues, however, there was no / little agreement - especially the future of Poland, the Polish border, Eastern Europe, and Germany. the future of Poland was a stumbling block. Stalin had already installed a govt. composed of pro-Communists, to the protests of the Britain and the US Stalin wanted an expanded Polish border, at the expense of Germany: in return FDR / Churchill wanted a new provisional gov. more representative of Democratic parties; they demanded that the pro-Western Polish govt. in exile, in London, be allowed a place in the govt. of Poland, and that democratic elections be held

19 … stalemate…eventually the West accepts an expanded border but unwilling to break with Russia on the eve of Germany’s collapse, accepted Stalin’s vague promises about granting them a place in the govt. (the Polish people would have the opportunity to express their will) and about holding free elections, though he made no firm commitment to a date ….FDR was happy to defer the issue Later it was claimed that Poland was sold out at Yalta, like Czechoslovakia was at Munich (Judge and Langdon pg.28) Judge and Langdon; “Poland was treated shabbily at Yalta (FDR had little interest in Poland), but given the Red Army’s occupation of the country and the political and military concerns of the West, it is difficult to envision a radically different outcome.” pg.28

20 Other parts of Eastern Europe were also disputed. Stalin demanded recognition of Soviet power / Communist Regimes in Romania, Bulgaria, Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. FDR and Churchill protested strongly. Reluctantly they agreed to Soviet influence in eastern Europe for the moment, but insisted that Stalin hold "free and unfettered elections" at an early date, which Stalin vaguely agreed to

21 The future of Germany was heatedly discussed. They all agreed that Germany should not soon again become a major military power, but there were wide differences in their views of how to accomplish that goal. FDR and Churchill wanted a reconstructed and reunited Germany with a prosperous modern economy, but one that would remain under the careful supervision of the Allies. Stalin, in contrast, wanted a permanent dismemberment / divided, and unarmed Germany, which Britain and France firmly rejected.

22 Stalin wanted to impose $20b in reparations on the Germans, of which Russia would receive half. FDR agreed on the $20b figure as a "basis for discussion" but left final settlement to a future reparations commission The agreement they came to on Germany, was, like the Polish and Eastern Europe agreement, vague and unstable The US, Br, Fr, and the USSR, would each control its own "zone of occupation" in Germany - the zones to be determined by the position of troops at the time the war ended.

23 Berlin, though 110 miles inside the Soviet zone, would, because of its importance, be divided into four sectors, one for each nation to occupy At an unspecified date, the nation would be reunited; but no specific agreement was reached on how the reunification would occur. Both sides also agreed to respect the territorial integrity of Iran and to evacuate from Iran as soon as the war was over. FDR and Churchill had little choice but to give in to Stalin for the moment. The Germans had not yet surrendered and with the Pacific war still raging, they had no means of forcing Stalin to back down from his position of strength – he already occupied most Eastern European countries….yet FDR was later accused of appeasement towards the USSR (Judge and Langdon say his decisions were not impaired by his illnesses, as some suggest – p.25-26)

24 FDR and Stalin returned home from Yalta with different interpretations about what had been agreed on. In the weeks following the conference FDR watched with horror as the Soviet Union moved systematically to established repressive pro- Communist governments in more and more Eastern European nations. Stalin made no effort to introduce free elections in any Eastern European country. Still, FDR had faith in his ability to win Stalin's trust of the West. Newly elected to a fourth term, FDR believed he could persuade Stalin that the Soviets had nothing to fear and could relax their iron grip on Eastern Europe – but he died on April 12, 1945.

25 Judge and Langdon “All three leaders were delighted, believing they had made concessions only over unimportant matters and had secured their principal objectives. Churchill had gained acceptance of France as a great power, so that Britain would not stand alone against Soviet ambitions in Europe. Roosevelt had obtained agreement on the voting procedure in the UN Security Council and had received Stalin’s commitment to aid in the defeat of Japan. Stalin, while failing to gain acceptance of his German agenda, had nonetheless defended his position in Poland – at least until the next meeting of the Big Three. Each of them had gotten what they wanted most. Yalta was, at least emotionally, the final celebration of the solidarity of the Grand Alliance. Within a few months, as Hitler’s empire disintegrated, the defeat of their common enemy and their inability to resolve fully the vexing issues of Soviet security and expansion would shatter the alliance and reveal on the horizon the hazy outlines of the Cold War.” pg.29-30

26 History in Dispute Article 6 issues were discussed at Yalta 1. Division of Germany 2. Creation of UN 3. German War Reparations: Stalin demands $20b 4. Declaration of Liberated Europe 5. Soviet entry into war against Japan 6. Fate of Poland

27 Agreements 1. Germany to be divided into 4 Zones 2. Veto power to be given to the Big 5 nations at the UN: USSR to get 3 seats in UN General Assembly 3. In exchange for entering war against Japan, 2-3 months after Germany surrenders, Soviets got Southern Sakhalin Island, concessions in Manchurian ports, joint control of Manchurian railroad, control of Central Kuril Island 4. Eastern Polish borders to be set to the advantage of the Soviets (more West) 5. USSR pledge to hold free elections in Eastern Europe 6 War crimes trials to be held after the war

28 USA / FDR got the best possible deal: Frankel Defends FDR from charge that Yalta was “a colossal blunder”, “a betrayal of the principles of freedom and self- determination” by delivering Eastern and Central Europe to Stalin, that it was “appeasement” Frankel argues that: 1. It was the result of FDR’s and Churchill’s strategic choice to concentrate on winning WWII first and thinking about postwar arrangements later 2. Based on realism and the understanding of what was possible: in countries under Nazi occupation many of the anti-Nazi nationalist-liberation forces were led by communists: these communist leaders quickly established themselves as the de facto rulers of their countries

29 –FDR’s and Churchill’s acceptance of provisional governments’ heavily dominated by local communists was thus not a result of … naïve belief in Stalin’s promises to allow free elections: it was the result of recognizing the reality on the ground  3. FDR’s and Churchill’s acceptance of communist dominated governments in Eastern and Central Europe (Bulgaria, Romania) was the result of a tacit recognition of the Soviet’s demand for a defensive belt and their need to ensure that these countries would be friendly to the USSR: they understood the Soviet’s legitimate security needs

30 4. The realism was based on what FDR perceived as the vital need for Soviet participation in the war against Japan; the Soviets demands for control of the Sakhalin and Kurile islands, joint occupation of the Chinese Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, and lease rights to Port Arthur were considered reasonable Frankel concludes that the Yalta agreement was probably the best compromise they could reach The “myth” of Yalta, that they could have gotten more, is just a “myth”

31 Yalta conceded too much to the Soviets: Perlmutter It was not the best deal to serve the post war interests of the West Poland, Eastern Europe, parts of Far East were sacrificed / surrendered needlessly to the Soviets FDR may have been ill He abandoned Wilsonianism More concessions could have been gotten from the USSR : Lend Lease aid to the USSR should have been tied to limiting their expansion in Eastern Europe

32 Truman Truman did not share FDR's belief in the good intentions / flexibility of the Soviet Union – was less trusting and more suspicious of Stalin (more anti-communist), and had a more aggressive, inflexible, abrasive personality

33 Decided to adopt a get tough approach to the Soviet Union. The lessons of Munich, and the failure of appeasement were clearly in his mind. He believed that Stalin had made what he considered to be solemn agreements with the US at Yalta. The US, therefore, would insist that he honor them. Cancelled Lend Lease to the USSR immediately after German surrender – May 8 th - and refused a Soviet request for a $6b loan

34 He showed his hard line approach when he met with USSR’s Foreign Sec. Molotov on April 23 at the White House and chastised him for the violations of the Yalta accords with regard to free elections in Poland. "I have never been talked to like that in my life", a shocked Molotov reportedly replied. "Carry out your agreements and you won't get talked to like that again", Truman replied.

35 Potsdam Truman met with Attlee (replaced Churchill a few days into the conference) and Stalin at Potsdam near Berlin, in July, 1945. They met in a mood of growing hostility…. Germany had by now surrendered (May 8 th 1945)…they didn’t need each other as much as before…though Japan had not yet surrendered The British and US hoped to use the conference to resolve the question of Germany / end the temporary division – to discuss unification - but Stalin refused to budge… so the 4 way division agreed on at Yalta was rubber stamped to continue for now / indefinitely

36 Stalin pressed for a settlement of the German reparations question – they eventually agreed that each country take reparations from its own zone Stalin got Allied confirmation of the Western Neisse Line as the Polish border (moved West / favorable to the USSR) in return for reparations agreement Stalin also refused to budge from Eastern Europe….refused to commit to definite election plans (so called “Yalta Accords”)…..source of great tension (was the atomic bombing of Japan a way of sending a message to the USSR to evacuate Eastern Europe?) The USSR confirmed its commitment to attack Japan 3 months after the surrender of the Germans (May 8), which would be August 8

37 But Truman was no longer certain the Soviet entry into the Pacific War would be a good thing – would they ever leave if they got a foothold in Japan (would Japan become another Eastern Europe) During the conference he had been informed that the Atomic Bomb was ready and waiting to be used…. There might no longer be any need for USSR help against Japan Truman warned the Japanese delegates that if did not surrender they would face utter destruction….they refused Stalin already knew about the Manhattan Project - was not surprised about the development of the atomic bomb, when Truman told him about it

38 Other business - Nuremburg Tribunal was established Over the next few months, Truman's and Stalin's mistrust of one another grew. Stalin continued to oppress most of Eastern Europe, forcing loyalty to the Soviet Union through phony trials and executions. In the Middle East, Stalin kept his troops in Iran long after the US and Br troops had pulled out as agreed, only finally withdrawing them after the US insisted Truman used Atomic Bomb against Japan….see previous notes….Atomic Diplomacy…Aug. 6 th and 9 th …in between, Aug. 8 th, USSR declared war on Japan…Atomic Diplomacy…… (Readings)

39 Judge and Langdon ….pg. 32-33 Compared with Yalta, the conference at Potsdam “exhibited a troubling face”. The Grand Alliance was clearly falling apart. After all, why should any realistic statesman have expected that the wartime alliance would survive Hitler’s demise? The USSR had not been friends with the US prior to 1941, and the unraveling of the alliance was merely a return to the ante bellum situation…. But…it did not mean that the unrelenting hostility between the Soviets and the West was inevitable or even likely. Focus on events / situations….not on Truman….Realist (unlike Fleming, Theoharris….blame Truman…… Stalin…Thompson/Tucker

40 Atomic Bomb Read handout “Why the US dropped the Bomb” Read Alperovitz………then Barrett and Dowling –Evidence is that the Japanese would have surrendered even if the USSR had not declared war, even if the bombs had not been used, even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated (Walker, Messer) –Japanese could have been persuaded to surrender, were close to surrender…allowing Hirohito to continue would have brought about their surrender…Truman was not opposed to this…but he chose to wait until after the bombing to give them this assurance…the US agreed to this later anyway, after the bomb was used –Soviet declaration of war against Japan would have been enough to force their surrender….just the declaration….not necessarily their presence / assistance… this was the decisive factor, not the bomb, in their surrender……..Truman believed this….but bomb was used two days before….USSR declaration of war was the decisive factor, not the bomb, in their surrender

41 –The real goal was to strengthen the hand of the US against the USSR…give the US a “master card” of diplomacy towards the USSR –Stop USSR getting “in on the kill” …Byrnes, Sec of State…stop them pressing their claims on Manchuria, North East China, currently occupied by Japan….no excuse for them to invade these areas –Einstein: the bomb was used to end the war in the Pacific by any means before Russia’s participation: FDR would not have used the bomb –Stimpson, Sec of War, indicates that he and Byrnes discussed with Truman how the bomb could be a “master-card” in big stakes diplomacy towards Russia….with regard to Manchuria, North China, and Eastern Europe….. how the bomb would put the US in a position to dictate its own terms at the end of the war

42 –Truman delayed Potsdam, waiting for bomb to be tested: tested on July 16, met with Stalin on July 17, received word of successful testing next day, became more confident….according to Churchill, he became more emphatic and decisive…he was a changed man –“a number of historians now agree that the long term diplomatic interest – beyond a specific desire to end the war before the Red Army crossed the Manchurian border – influenced Truman, Stimpson, and Byrnes, consciously or unconsciously, when they chose the bomb over other readily available ways to stop the fighting.” –Experts differ in the precise weight to accord this motive in the thinking of the US leader…some hold that solely military factors were involved, or that the weapon’s use was inevitable because of the technological, bureaucratic, and military momentum built up during the war

43 –Other historians argue that because huge sums were spent developing the new weapon, political leaders found it impossible not to use it –“Still others believe a roughly even mix of political- diplomatic considerations and military concerns were at work, and some writers look to bureaucratic in- fighting to explain the outcome. –But Feis (advisor to gov. and a friend of Stimpson’s) believed that “impressing” the Soviets almost certainly played a role in the decision to use the atomic bomb –Yale professor Gaddis Smith sums up a growing modern view that “the decision to bomb Japan was centrally connected to Truman’s confrontational approach to the Soviet Union.”

44 “in fact some historians now believe that the atomic bomb probably prolonged the war and cost”…Truman delayed until the bomb was ready….Historian Sherwin Contributed to Cold War…Eisenhower observed… “before the atomic bomb was used, I would have said, yes, I was sure we could keep peace with Russia…Now I don’t know…people are frightened and disturbed all over. Europe feels insecure again.” John Foster Dulles said that the tensions that became the Cold War started at this time Read Judge and Langdon, read Barrett and Dowling

45 Barrett and Dowling Summarize the views of one of these historians Share notes with partners Decide on which one you agree with most and why, and why you disagree with the other one and why…..be specific about the arguments you agree with and disagree with from the two

46 Stalin’s Two World’s Speech On Feb 9, 1946, Stalin added to the growing tension (Potsdam, Atomic Bombing) with a speech in which he declared that capitalism was a danger to world peace. Capitalism and communism, he said, would eventually clash…with Communism winning. Because of that danger, he would protect Soviet security by ending trade with the West and developing modern weaponry (atomic) no matter how high the cost, and Communism would be promoted through a new organization, the Cominform Taken in the USA to be a declaration of the Cold War, though probably not intended to be (Judge and L, pg. 56) In the American Supreme Court, Justice Wm Douglas said the speech sounded like "a declaration of WW III".

47 Kennan’s Long Telegram A few weeks later Truman asked a young US diplomat to Moscow, an expert on Soviet history and politics – George Kennan – to analyze Soviet Foreign Policy for him In his 16 page reply, on Feb. 26 th 1946 – The Long Telegram – he said that The Soviet had a deep sense of insecurity and fear of the West They would not accept peaceful co-existence of Capitalism and Communism They believed that conflict with the West was inevitable; they would promote the extension of Communism as much as possible in preparation for the eventual showdown, which they expected to win…….confirmed the views of Stalin’s Two World’s Speech They would not be discouraged by the occasional loss to the West

48 But the Soviet economic and political systems had major weaknesses and would eventually crumble internally, without the need for a war The goal for the US should be to accept Communism where it already existed, but vigorously stop it spreading beyond He urged long term, patient, but firm and vigilant Containment of Communist expansion….no more appeasement by the West

49 Churchill’s Iron Curtain Speech, 1946 A few weeks later, in March 5 th 1946, Winston Churchill supported this view in a famous speech at Westminster College in Fulton Missouri when he warned that "from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent." He warned that the West should join forces against the Soviet threat…to block Soviet advancement "There is nothing the Communists admire so much as strength and nothing for which they have less respect for than military weakness."

50 Churchill and Truman, "Iron Curtain Speech," March 5, 1946 On March 5, 1946, former British prime minister Winston S. Churchill (1874–1965) delivered a speech, which he intended for a worldwide audience, at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri. President Harry S. Truman (right) had encouraged Churchill (seated) to speak on two themes: the need to block Soviet expansion and the need to form the Anglo-American partnership. Always eloquent and provocative, Churchill denounced the Soviets for drawing an "iron curtain" across eastern Europe. This speech became one of the landmark statements of the Cold War.

51 He warned that they were tightening their grip and meant to expand power around the world Churchill's speech gave the world a clear picture of the future: a showdown between the West, led by the USA, vs East, led by the USSR “Except in the British Commonwealth and in the United States where Communism is in its infancy, the Communist parties or fifth columns constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilization…… But what we have to consider here today while time remains, is the permanent prevention of war and the establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries. Our difficulties and dangers will not be removed by closing our eyes to them. They will not be removed by mere waiting to see what happens; nor will they be removed by a policy of appeasement.”

52 The Truman Doctrine / Containment, 1947 Truman had not yet responded to the advice of the Long Telegram or Churchill’s urgings (Feb., and March. 1946)…the war of words But in Feb. 1947, events in Greece and Turkey forced him to make a decision Britain had been supporting these countries economically and militarily, to prevent the emergence of Communism…but was no longer able to do so

53 Both were under threat from Communist advance – the British asked the US to take over (Dean Acheson announced that the British were handing the job of world leadership, with all its burdens and all its glory, over to the US) Truman decided to ask a joint session of Congress to approve of a Bill allocating $400m in military and financial aid for Greece and Turkey In his speech he painted a stark picture of a world where Democracy was challenged by terror and repression

54 The struggles in Greece and Turkey were part of a global struggle between freedom and terror. The US must help "all free people" who were "resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures". …..The fall of one nation would lead to the fall of others, creating a domino like effect He had accepted the challenge of Containment – The Truman Doctrine - there was no going back to isolationism, he added – the US must assist pro-Western forces in any struggle against Communism anywhere in the world

55 Congress approved - as a result of US assistance the governments of Greece and Turkey survived The US would engage in this policy of Containment for the next 45 years…..

56 The Cold War was underway from 1945 / 1946 – it would be a conflict in which the two Super Powers would avoid fighting each other directly but would block each others goals around the world A war which would be fought indirectly by propaganda, spying/ espionage, took sides in civil wars in other countries - proxies (Korea and Vietnam), nuclear arms race, space race, befriending developing nations, gathering allies / satellites / client states – a Chess Match, a battle of nerves, a battle of wits, a poker game The setting up of the UN in June 1945 did not bring any resolution to the tension – it also became an arena where both Super Powers competed and tried to spread its influence over other nations

57 The Ideology Question (same as what caused the Cold War?) 1. Explain Ideological Difference / Different Systems….was it about philosophical differences….Chafetz says yes, though not exclusively US / West; 14 Points, 4 Freedoms, Atlantic Charter, Truman Doctrine Liberal Democracy, Laissez-Faire / Capitalist Economics (regulated), Christian Values Elaborate: US Declaration of Independence, Constitution, Bill of Rights (Democracy, Elected President, Elected Congress, Checks and Balances, Supreme Court, Federal System, Fed/State/Municipal Government, Republic, Civil Rights and Liberties, Religious Freedom, Freedom of speech, press, assembly.. Individual Ownership, Profit Incentive

58 USSR / East; Two Worlds Speech, Stalinism in USSR Totalitarianism, Command Economy /Economics, Suppression of Religion Elaborate: Marxism, Marxist-Leninism, Stalinism, Single Party, Dictatorship, No Elections, No Congress, Suppression of Religion, no freedom of speech/press/assembly; Purges, Secret Police, Nationalization, Collectivization, Forced Industrialization, Horrible living and working conditions, bombarded by propaganda / indoctrination / socialist realism

59 2. Explain how these philosophies influenced the Different Visions (lenses) of how the Post World War II World / Europe / Germany should be shaped, with regard to….. Chafetz (“ideology served as the lens through which both sides viewed the world”) Germany: unified, democratic, self-determination, forgive and forget vs permanently divided / dismembered, weak, heavy reparations, punish East Europe; liberated from Nazism, free to choose their own governments, hopefully democratic vs occupied, controlled as satellites or puppets Communist regimes to create a sphere of influence or buffer zone / defensive wall….extract resources/raw materials International Organizations: join United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund vs not in favor of too much international co- operation / involvement……..did join the UN, but not the other organizations….limited international co-operation

60 3. How these philosophies contributed to the events / issues which helped cause the Cold War…… (realist view…events unfolded…) Unraveling of Grand Alliance Tensions at Yalta, Tensions at Potsdam Tensions over spread of Soviet influence over East Europe and East Germany from 1945-1948 Led to Truman Doctrine / Containment (Stalin’s Speech Feb. 1946)…. Led to Marshall Plan, Berlin Blockade and Airlift, Korean War

61 4. Argue that it wasn’t just about ideology but also Personalities: Stalin (inflexible, intransigent, did he need Cold War to retain control of Soviet Union, deranged personality), Truman (blunt, confrontational, stubborn, would Cold War have started or been different in character if FDR had lived)… Historians Fleming, Theoharris, Tucker, Thompson…… Alperovitz/Atomic Diplomacy Historian…Lenin showed flexibility after Civil War, FDR showed flexibility at Yalta…. 5. Not just about ideology but about geopolitical power politics / strategic interests, both economic and political…self- interest…Hampton, Williams, LeFaber Imperialism, Pride and Prestige, Political and Economic hegemony / influence, control, no matter what the ideology of the competing country, Great Powers had argued, fought before, before emergence of Communist ideology Cold War “ended when the ideological underpinnings of the Soviet Union collapsed.” Historians Williams, Le Faber

62 6. unfolding of events…action, reaction…neither side had a plan, looked too far ahead…events unfolded, snowballed, outside of anyone’s control…Realist Historians…. 7. effects of domestics politics….La Faber…the more a candidate or party showed itself to be “cold warriors” the better for domestic elections….trying to impress / established your credentials

63 What caused Cold War? Ideological differences Different visions USSR (Feis, Kennan, Gaddis) or US (Lippman, Wallace, Fleming, Theoharris, Alperovitz, Williams, La Faber, Gardner, Kolko, ) traditional or revisionist, or both / realist (post-revisionist) Halle, Morgenthau…. Past differences, tensions – before and during WWII Leadership personalities… Domestic issues / events (McCarthyism)…LaFaber Geopolitics…imperialism, pol and ec Cycle of unfolding events…spiraling effect of events/measures….realists…Halle (caused by ideological myths)

64 Readings Did ideology play an important role in the US-Soviet conflict? Glenn Chafetz: Yes, ideology played an important role in the Cold War because the US and the USSR both framed their foreign policies in terms of their ideological perceptions (the lens with which they viewed the world; Kennan believed in importance of ideology to the USSR, US presidents/ USSR framed the struggle in ideological terms, criticized opposing ideologies, Alliances formed along ideological lines – not about national power) not only factor – but difficult to understate its importance Mary Hampton: No, ideology was less important than strategic interests in the cold-war conflict between the US and the USSR (contest of interests – the most compelling factor, USA and USSR had combined against Hitler, shows self interests were more important, stability, defense: national security more important: US supports brutal dictators – ideology?) ideology colored but did not drive

65 Which of these two historians do you agree with most – explain why.

66 Cold War: Truman v Stalin 1. Potsdam 2. Atomic Bombing of Japan 3. Truman Doctrine, Containment: Greece, Turkey 4. Marshall Plan 5. Berlin Blockade / Airlift 6. Civil War in China… Mao’s Communism 7. Korean Civil War

67 Historiography on Origins Orthodox / Traditional – blame Stalin / USSR: Feis, Kennan, Revisionist – blame Truman / USA: Lippman, Fleming, Alperovitz, Williams, LeFaber Post-Revisionist – blame both, but Stalin / USSR is more to blame: Morgenthau, Halle, Gaddis Who was the aggressor? Who was reacting? Inevitability factor now that common enemy was gone? Role of Ideology?

68 The Marshall Plan, 1947 The democracies of Western Europe - especially France, Italy, Germany - suffered from economic chaos because of the war, and democracy was under threat in these countries. The war had been over for 2 years but Europe was still struggling to recover - cities, railroads destroyed, homelessness, poverty widespread - dangerous conditions which fed Communism, Fascism Communist parties were already growing in strength in France and Italy

69 Helping these countries economically was a logical step in the policy of Containment. It was also important for the US economy - American businesses depended on European markets. In June 1947 Sec. of State George Marshall proposed that if these countries came up with comprehensive plans for recovery, then the US would provide them with substantial financial subsistence.

70 To qualify for the aid, nations had to agree to spend a high % of the money buying goods from the US, which would help the US economy. At first many conservatives in Congress were reluctant to commit so much money, but events in eastern Europe soon changed their minds, especially the USSR take over of Czechoslovakia, now giving the Soviets complete domination of Eastern Europe. Congress finally agreed in April 1948 to commit $17 billion over 4 years to 16 co-operating countries.

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72 The Soviet Union, which was invited to participate, refused, criticizing it as a form of American imperialism….it refused to allow Eastern European nations to apply (except Yugoslavia / Tito) Was this a genuine offer / invitation?? USSR set up their own version for Eastern Europe – the Molotov Plan The Marshall Plan was very successful. Injection of US money helped Economic recovery. Over the next 4 yrs, Western European industrial production increased by 64% - and US industry benefitted too. Communist Parties in Western Europe - especially Italy and France - lost ground.

73 Issues: did the Marshall Plan represent Economic Imperialism as Stalin insisted? Was it unnecessarily confrontational? Was the offer of Marshall money to the USSR and Eastern Europe genuine? Truman’s policy of Containment had succeeded so far –Greece and Turkey had been Contained through the commitment of $400m of aid, and US troops –Western Europe had been Contained through the Marshall Plan

74 What were the true motivations behind the Marshall Plan? Historians’ Views Read and take notes on the article by James T. Gay Read either Frankel or Soares Exchange notes with partner Which historian/s do you agree with most / least and why? Mention specific arguments Was the Marshall Plan motivated by Economic, Humanitarian, Political concerns?? How successful was the Plan?

75 National Security Act, 1947 Another development in the Cold War was the reorganization of the US armed forces and the creation of a huge national security apparatus In 1947, Congress passed the National Security Act, creating the Dept. of Defense, located at the Pentagon. The navy, army, air force would each have civilian Chiefs of Staff (Joint Chiefs of Staff) who would be under the control of the Secretary of the Dept. of Defense…. The Goal was to bring military unity.

76 The Act also set up the National Security Council (NSC) to advise the President on security and Foreign Policy matters - included the President, several members of his cabinet The Act also set up the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to coordinate the government's foreign fact gathering; to collect information through spying operations overseas. Some Presidents would use the CIA for more than just fact gathering. Through the CIA, later Presidents would take Covert action in foreign countries without Congressional approval / a declaration of war, or informing the public – would cause great controversy

77 Through the Dept. of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security Council, and CIA, defense decisions were centralized, and the power of the President in overseas actions was expanded In 1948, the Draft was revived through another Selective Services Act, for men aged 19-25…another peace-time draft, necessitated by the Cold War.

78 Berlin Crisis; Blockade and Airlift; 1948-1949 Allies and USSR could not come to an agreement over Germany. The Allies wanted eventual unification, USSR wanted permanent division into 4 zones (big issue at Yalta, Potsdam). The US, Britain, France agreed to unify their three zones, including West Berlin, and set up a free West German state. Their plan was to first bring about Economic unity of the three Western zones The Soviets viewed these plans with growing anger and alarm…a strong West Germany might be a threat in the future

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81 When plans were announced to introduce a common currency for all three zones, the first step towards unification of the West – the USSR was outraged and demanded that this be stopped The Allies reminded Stalin that he had no jurisdiction in West Germany Stalin did not welcome their “defiance” at this time – he was also facing another challenge from inside what he considered his own sphere: the govt. of Yugoslavia, under the leadership of Marshal Tito, who broke openly with the Soviet Union and declared the nation an unaligned Communist state.

82 When the Allies pursued their plan, Stalin began a blockade of West Berlin, shutting off the highways, railroads, canals, from the Western zones in West Germany to West Berlin 2.5m West Berliners became hostage, sealed off from the outside world, without the 4,000 tons of food, fuel, and clothes, supplies they needed every day from West Germany…..Stalin also cut off their electricity daily, for long periods By isolating West Berlin Stalin hoped to force the Allies into giving up their plans for West German unification, or at least to salvage something / save face by forcing them to abandon West Berlin, and so give him a partial moral victory………save face

83 Truman was at first advised that he had two choices –do nothing, concede West Berlin, don’t risk war –or force open the roads, railroads, canals, by which he would risk war… Truman didn’t like either option- he didn’t want to lose West Berlin – Containment – didn’t want to lose even half a city to the Soviets – and was accused at home of being “soft on Communism”…..yet didn’t want to be accused of being the aggressor and risk war But then he was advised by General Clay of a middle course of action… that he should take advantage of an agreement at Yalta that the air corridors from West German to West Berlin would be permanently guaranteed: and it would be impossible for Stalin to block the skies….the supplies could be Airlifted to West Berlin without “running the blockade” – the Allies would not have to become the aggressors; if Soviet planes shot down Allied planes, then the Soviets would be the aggressors

84 Truman welcomed this option: West Berlin itself was not that important strategically but the Blockade / Airlift had huge symbolic significance – it was another test of wills for both sides. US was determined to honor its commitment to Europe; departing would demoralize Western Europeans, making them feel that the US would abandon them at the first sign of trouble – it had a moral obligation to the people of West Berlin – could not consign them to the Soviet bloc. The advantage the US had was that it had the atomic bomb – the Soviets didn’t, making them extremely adverse to pushing matters towards war over a stake such as Berlin. The US could afford to take a hard line position. The Soviets could not stop planes from dropping atomic bombs on Russian cities

85 Truman dispatched 60 B-29 to England, giving the impression that he might use atomic against the USSR……was he bluffing, would Stalin call is bluff by shooting down American planes Berlin was a symbol of the West's resolve to resist Communist expansion, to Contain it. The Airlift to the trapped city delivered everything from milk, potatoes, blankets, coal, clothing, vitamins, from the three West German zones to West Berlin’s two airports.

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87 For 10 months and 18 days – the US (mostly), Br, Fr planes flew through thunderstorms, fog and rain, 24 hours a day, landing on average every 3 mins, and at the peak of the airlift they landed every 45 secs in West Berlin. Altogether 277, 804 flights, delivered 2.3m tons of supplies to the population of 2.5 m people. Two-thirds of this was coal. (23 tons of candy bars / Operation Little Vittles, and oranges were also delivered). 78 airmen (Am, Br, Fr) lost their lives in crashes and accidents. The blockade was a complete disaster for Stalin. World opinion turned against him – holding half a city hostage - and the US emerged as a hero.

88 Berlin Air Lift--German children watching American planes bring food, 1948 in "Operation Vittles" bring food and supplies to their beleaguered city. The airlift kept a city of 2.5 million people alive for nearly a year and made West Berlin a symbol of the West's resolve to contain the spread of Soviet communism.

89 In May 1949, realizing the determination of the US not to give in, and because of the bad world press which he received, Stalin lifted the blockade. Berlin was a symbol of Western resistance to Communism. It was an early and vital victory in the Cold War, gained without a shot being fired. Berlin became a symbol of the United States resolve to stand up to the Soviet threat without being forced into a direct conflict. Another victory for Containment (added to Greece / Turkey, Western Europe) Afterwards, the USA, Br, Fr, formed the Federal Republic of Germany from their zones. In October Stalin countered by declaring the German Democratic Rep of Eastern Ger.

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91 Speculate in your essay…suggest issues – did Truman unnecessarily risk war, should he just have abandoned West Berlin to avoid War…should the US have forced the issue of the Unification of West Germany….was it too premature….would FDR have done so….sensitivity to Stalin’s fear of a unified and strong Germany? Knew how much Stalin feared a unified Germany, even a unified West Germany…couldn’t unification had waited until much later? Dangerous incident….Truman had flown atomic bombs to Britain in case they were needed to defend West Berlin…most dangerous event so far….up to this a war of words, and of money (economic assistance to West or East)….but now the first direct conflict, though no war

92 Judge and Langdon It was risky business for Stalin, but he had run risks throughout his life, and this must have seemed reasonably safe….he had troops on the ground, could have taken W. Berlin any time, and there was nothing the West could have done….he had the “logistical and numerical trump cards”….the West had demobilized, he had not….. The US had the atomic bomb but had made no move to use it against the USSR since its use in 1945……Would they use it to defend Berlin? Why? What targets, how would they deliver it?

93 Shows importance of the German Question to the Cold War…(divide or unify, reparations…)….Judge and Langdon thesis…Germany was the key issue in the Cold War…in start, escalation, prolonging… German questions –Future of Germany a big issue at Yalta…different goals / visions….temporary division –Big issue at Potsdam….division into 4 continued…unsatisfactory –Question of Reparations was an ongoing issue…London Conference in Nov. 1947 deadlocked on the issue…failing to resolve one part of the German question –Berlin Blockade and Airlift…..most confrontational issue of Cold War so far….intensification, prolongations

94 NATO, 1948 The Berlin Blockade convinced the Allies that western Europe needed military as well as economic support to remain free….other than the UN (USSR could veto decisions of UN through veto power of permanent members (5) of the 11 member security council In 1948, Br, Fr, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed a defensive alliance – USA joined in 1949 - making it 12 nations (later 15) – really an anti Soviet military alliance Became known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

95 US was in the UN and now in NATO – unlike after WWI: NATO was the first ever peacetime military alliance for the USA In 1955, the Soviet Union matched NATO with their own Warsaw Pact, a Soviet-Eastern Europe alliance of countries behind the Iron Curtain.

96 Communism in China, 1949 Civil War in China between the KMT / Nationalists who controlled the govt. led by Chiang Kai Shek / Jiang Jieshi, and the CCP / Communists led by Mao…had fought together against the Warlords but now were bitter enemies Suspended Civil War to fight Japanese after 1937 invasion (Communists fought Japanese with greater effort): resumed Civil War after expulsion of Japanese in 1945 US hoped that Chiang Kai Shek would retain control of China - essential to the policy of Containment….hoped he would incorporate Communists in his gov. and end Civil War

97 A strong anti-Communist government in China, the most populous country in the world, would block Soviet expansion and give the US an important trading partner; feared that if Mao won the way would be open for Soviet control of Asia. But the KMT was losing support – its govt. did not fulfill its promises about land distribution after taking power in 1927, and was corrupt and repressive CCP / Mao divided land wherever they were in control, Southeast, then later Northwest…increasing their popularity CCP gained ground, survived the Shanghai Massacre, the 6,000 mile Long March, and now after 1945 began to edge the Civil War, eventually winning in 1949

98 However, the Soviets mistrusted Mao and his brand of communism - to Stalin the Chinese Communists were not real communists, they were "margarine communists". (too pro-Peasant / too-Independent from him: didn’t want to scare West any further…etc) USA encouraged co-operation between the KMT and the CCP, before, during, and after the Civil War Hoped for a combined govt. as a worst case scenario Gave KMT govt. $3.5b to help with war against Japan, and as an incentive to co-operate with CCP and introduce reforms to please peasants after the war – but Chiang Kai Shek never introduced the promised reforms…much of the money was embezzled

99 In 1949 the Communists seized Beijing, and Shanghai, and overthrew the KMT - Chiang fled to the offshore island of Formosa, now Taiwan, and set up the Republic of China Mao set up the Peoples Republic of China, and began to introduce Communism – collective farms, totalitarian political system.. From the US point of view, the world’s most populous nation, a nation of 500m people were lost to Communism…..Containment failed

100 Some blamed Truman, claiming that he and the State Dept. should have given more financial support and military support to stop Mao /Communism. Truman responded by arguing that China was not America’s to lose….and too far away, too big, Communists too popular…impossible for US to Contain…Chiang Kai Shek lost it, not the US The US already had expensive programs to pay for in Europe; a full scale war in China would have been impossible financially and militarily…. Chiang had lost it because he refused to introduce reforms.

101 What was not understood though at this time was that there were different brands of Communism in the USSR and China, that their leaders were suspicious of each other, and that the two would not become allies The fall of China to Communism, though seen as a huge loss to Containment, was not as critical as it might have been if they were in cooperation The relationship between the US and China might have been better…no real attempt made by the US to engage China / Mao – and the Korean War did not help…

102 Historiography…. Did Truman do enough to prevent the Communist take over of China? No – China Lobby (in US, in Congress) – he did not make a great enough effort, did not send enough money and should have sent military help Yes – Truman himself, Acheson – they did as much as possible…Marshall went to negotiate with Chiang….financial aid in return for Reform…$3b…but corruption, embezzlement, no Reform, no attempt to negotiate with Communists

103 Historiography……..Read Chen and Christensen Did Truman / USA do enough to establish friendly relations, to engage Mao, after Mao’s take over…did the US miss out on an opportunity to establish friendly relations with Mao, not really understanding that he and Stalin were not friends? Yes he did: tried to establish friendship with Mao but he rebuffed their efforts….Mao would not entertain any suggestion of such a relationship, because of US support for Taiwan, and he also resented US imperialism…historian Jian Chen…he also points out that in the context of domestic US politics…the Red Scare, accusations that the Democrats were soft on Communism…a good relationship between the US and China was unrealistic No he did not do enough: did not respond to Mao’s overtures, and thus lost a chance to drive an even greater wedge between the USSR and China; could have prevented Korean War, and Chinese invasion of North Korea to assist against South Korea / US / UN…..historian Thomas Christensen

104 Nuclear Arms Race, 1949 USSR explodes its first atomic bomb in 1949, years before the US considered they would be able to do so. US now became preoccupied with nuclear war, and with the prospect that what happened at Hiroshima and Nagasaki could now happen too in any US city. Truman set up the Federal Civil Defense Admin which flooded the country with posters, booklets, with information on how to survive a nuclear war

105 Govt. also decide to build a stockpile of more atomic bombs than the USSR – nuclear arms race, AND to also build a bigger more powerful nuclear bomb than the Soviets had In 1950, scientists began to develop a “super” or hydrogen bomb, which would be much more lethal, than the atomic bomb. In 1952, US scientists tested the first H-bomb in the south Pacific.

106 The Soviets responded, developing their own H bomb by 1953. The Nuclear Arms race was well under way and was important part of the Cold War.

107 NSC - 68 In Jan 1950, the Truman Admin. ordered a high level study of America’s defenses. The outcome of the study was NSC-68: National Security Council Report, NSC-68 According to NSC-68, the Soviet Union should be considered an enemy with a design for world domination. As the leader of the free world, only the US could be expected to lead the fight against Soviet expansion, since other nations could not be relied on to take the initiative in resisting communism.

108 Upon the US lay the responsibility for defending freedom in the world: however, that job would require a huge expansion of American military power, with an annual defense budget four times the previously projected figure of $13b; this would require tax increases Truman supported the proposals but Congress had doubts, until the war in Korea convinced it to comply Acceptance of NSC-68 involved another huge commitment to Containment, a commitment to a comprehensive military buildup, to reversal of the post WW II demobilization and demilitarization

109 Truman and his advisers agreed with the report; however, they worried about persuading Congress and the public to support a huge increase in taxes. "We were sweating over it", said a State Dept aid, "and then, thank God, Korea came along". Taking advantage of the Korean War, Truman won from Congress the go ahead to build up the armed forces to 3.5 million and the defense budget to $50b a year.

110 Korean War (forgotten war) 1950 US and USSR liberated Korea from Japanese occupation in 1945: USSR liberated the North, USA liberated the South; temporary division along the 38 th parallel; agreed to hold national elections within two years to create a single national govt. But Soviets began to infiltrate North, spread Communism, and set up a Communist regime under Kim II-Sung, with its capital at Pyongyang (shades of East Europe / East Germany) Soviets / North refused to co-operate with national elections: US supported a so-called Democratic govt. in South Korea under Syngman Rhee, with its capital in Seoul …but his regime became repressive when faced with internal opposition

111 Korea had become a place of Cold War confrontation The US pulled out its troops and accepted the situation, USSR claimed to also have pulled out its troops….may have done so, but left the North heavily supplied June 1950, North Korea, invaded the South….doesn’t appear as if the USSR was involved, but belief among Historians is that the North would not have invaded the South without Stalin’s approval, even if the USSR wasn’t involved in the invasion (also no evidence that China was involved) UN Security Council, urged on by the USA, passed a resolution condemning the invasion and agreed to send help to the South: would not have passed if Soviets were present – were boycotting UN because it refused to give China’s seat to Mao over Chiang - ironic

112 Truman committed the US to help – MacArthur was sent from Japan with US troops: given joint command of US-UN forces; no declaration of War or none requested by Truman – made decision to send troops without consultation (enhanced the power of the presidency and laid the foundation for future undeclared wars - Vietnam)  Commitment of US by Truman became part of his policy of Containment: stop Communist take over of South Korea, and also protection of nearby Japan from domino effect in that region; felt he had to avoid losing Korea after just being accused of losing China, avoid another part of Asia falling to Communism. After taking Soul, the North Koreans pushed the South and US-UN forces back to the Pusan….North had momentum

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114 MacArthur planned a daring break-out from Pusan, and amphibious landing at Inchon – trapping the North Koreans between Inchon and Pusan, forcing half of their troops to surrender and the other half to flee back over the 38th parallel / border MacArthur – the hero of WWII in the Pacific - was again a war hero MacArthur – the hero of WWII in the Pacific - was again a war hero Truman was satisfied, South Korea had been liberated and contained. The US objective had been achieved.

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116 But MacArthur had other ideas; he advocated an invasion of North Korea and an attempt to Roll it Back from Communism – wanted to transform a defensive / limited war into an offensive war But Truman had reservations, especially after China’s foreign minister, Zhou Enlai, had warned that his country would not stand idly by and “let the Americans come to their border” – meaning the Yalu River, the boundary between North Korea and China Truman didn’t want to risk involving China….maybe causing WWIII

117 MacArthur dismissed the possibility of Chinese involvement – said they were bluffing - Truman, reluctantly agreed to the invasion of the North, to escalate the war / to attempt Roll Back ….maybe concerned with his image domestically…would put an end to charges of him being soft on communism South/US/ UN eventually advanced to Yalu River. Then, on the evening of Nov. 25th, some 300,000 Chinese soldiers poured across the Yalu River into Korea, forcing a retreat. By Christmas, the North Koreans and Chinese had driven the UN and South Korean forces 75 to 100 miles below the 38th parallel. Seoul was lost for the second time on Jan. 4th 1951.

118 Then North was pushed back over the border; back to status quo before war - 38 th Parallel MacArthur called for another invasion into N. Korea, even an invasion of China, with assistance from Chiang Kai Shek, and maybe even the use of nuclear weapons against China Truman rejected these plans – was satisfied with Containment – didn’t want war with China, or risk involving USSR MacArthur went over his head - appealed to Congress, wrote to newspapers and magazines in the US: Truman fired him / relieved him of his command for insubordination; military must be under civilian control

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120 Many Americans were outraged with his firing – hero of WWII in the Pacific: an opinion poll showed that 69% of the public supported him; was invited to speak before Congress and received a parade in NY In June 1951, the Soviets suggested a ceasefire. Truce talks began, and by the following spring the opposing sides had agreed on two points – the location of the cease- fire line and the establishment of a demilitarized zone between the opposing sides. Negotiators spent another year wrangling over the exchange of prisoners of war and the exact border between North and South. Finally, in July 1953, the two sides signed an armistice ending the war. Peace settlement did not come until Eisenhower visited Korea personally - threatened to use atomic weapons against North if they continued stalling

121 Results: Containment of South Korea - Truman was satisfied, felt it was a victory, had contained South Korea: had avoided major war / world war, use of nuclear weapons; but he was under attack again in US for being soft on Communism, as well as firing MacArthur: disillusioned, he decided not to run for re- election…. He became a “casualty” of the Korean War Costs to US; 54,000 American lives, $22 billion in expenditure: Political Costs - Republicans won Presidency and control of Congress: Second Red Scare and the intolerance and repression that came with it

122 Issues? See Historiography Yes, US should have intervened: Matray, Du Quenoy No, the US should not have intervened: Cummings, Bernstein, Showalter

123 Truman and the Cold War Summary PersonalityPotsdam Atomic Bomb….Atomic Diplomacy…containment before Containment….kept USSR out of Japan Containment / Truman Doctrine: Greece and Turkey Marshall Plan.. Containment successful Berlin Airlift… Containment successful China…failure of Containment…nor not? Korea…success for Containment? But No Roll Back Nuclear Arms Race: National Security Act, NSC 68

124 Stalin and Cold War This information needs to be added to the Foreign Policy essay we already did (Peaceful Co-existence, Collective Security with West: Relationship with Germany / Hitler: China) His role in Origins and Escalation –Vision of Post War World – security and defense concerns –Occupation of Eastern Europe and refusal to leave and allow elections –Position / stance at Yalta, Potsdam and afterwards: domination of Eastern Europe and East German….German question –Response to atomic bombing –Two Worlds Speech –Non co-operation with Marshall Plan…….Molotov Plan –Berlin Blockade….backing down……Warsaw Pact –Role in Civil War in China….minimal…….. –Nuclear Arms Race: atomic bomb by 1949, H bomb by 1953…. –Communism in North Korea - Role in Korean War

125 Questions Importance of events in 1945 Ideology Role of Stalin, Truman…leadership, personality and decisions, visions Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences Atomic Bomb Origins of Cold War Containment; Greece, Turkey, Marshall Plan, Berlin, China, Korea German Question


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