1. Fathers, Sons and Grandsons: Generation Changes and Regime Trajectory in Russia Vladimir Gel’man (EUSP / University of Helsinki) St.Antony’s College, Oxford, 7 March 2016

2. Fathers, Sons, and Grandsons... Joint paper with Dmitry Travin (EUSP); Russia – the winding trajectory of political and economic transformations over last 30 years: (1) democratization without major market reforms in 1985-91; (2) market reforms at the expense of democratization in the 1990s; (3) rejection of democratic changes (almost “back in the USSR”) after 2000; The same period was and still marked with generational changes – from “fathers” to “sons” and (almost) to their “grandsons” (and “granddaughters”); What is the impact of generations and generational changes on Russia’s political and economic trajectory?

3. Fathers, Sons, and Grandsons... Generations and generational changes – two different (not mutually exclusive) approaches: functionalist (extended age cohorts – Eisenstadt, 1956); historical (common collective experience, major formidable events as “turning points” – Mannheim, 1929) For contemporary Russia: “sixtiers” (shestidesyatniki) – a generation of kids of WWII, who ascended during the Thaw of 1956-68; “seventiers” (semidesyatniki) – a generation of kids of the “long 1970s”, who ascended during perestroika and especially in the “roaring 1990s”; post-Soviet generation – a generation of kids of “roaring 1990s”

4. Fathers, Sons, and Grandsons... Why trajectories of Russian political and economic changes changed so dramatically over time? Existing explanations: Structural approaches (determinism, “no other way”) – the evidence is not so convincing; Self-interests of political leaders – but they not always benefited much from their own moves; An alternative interpretive approach – common ideas and perceptions of representatives of generations, which changed each other on Russia’s political scene; Focus mostly on elites/sub-elites, rather than on masses

5. Fathers, Sons, and Grandsons... Directions and sequencing of changes was mainly driven by ideational agenda of representatives of two different generations; 1985-91 reforms under Gorbachev – conducted by “sixtiers”, who were greatly influenced by Khrushchev’s “thaw” and its aftermath in 1956-68; 1991-98 reforms under Yeltsin and post-2000 developments under Putin – conducted by “seventiers”, who grew up and became adolescent in the period of “long seventies” of 1968-85; And what about coming post-Soviet generation?

6. Fathers, Sons, and Grandsons... One should consider not only top political leaders, but rather their “teams”, including key policy-makers, advisors, and aides (especially true for post-1991 period); Russia after 1991 – almost complete turnover of “teams” and of generations among elites (decline of “sixtiers” and the rise of “seventiers”); Shift of trajectory of changes in 1991 reflected different ideational agendas of two generations; Recent preservation of further changes in Russia (a trend especially visible after 2012) reflected persistence of “seventiers” in power

7. Fathers, Sons, and Grandsons... “Sixtiers” – the generation of “last true-believers” (Hanson, 1991); Kids of WWII: war perceived as a taboo; Khrushchev’s “thaw” and intellectuals: revival of ideas of “genuine” socialism (“good Lenin vs. bad Stalin”) limited political liberalization, low interest to economic issues, low linkages with the West; Interlude of 1968-85: “the long decline” of “sixitiers” (Zubok, 2009): very limited vertical mobility of elites, “freezing” of previous agenda, “kitchen talks” and Aesopian public language, no hope on chances for reforms, no practical policy ideas

8. Fathers, Sons, and Grandsons... Perestroika – back to the “thaw”? Return to previous discussions, elimination of many previous Soviet-era political barriers (many dreams of “sixtiers” come true?); But! – hostages of “renewal” of Soviet ideology: the lack of positive and feasible agenda of political and economic reforms, misunderstanding of the nature of ethno- territorial/nationalities problems, indecisiveness and half- measures (gradualist policy and inefficient compromises); Opportunities for self-enrichment were poorly used; Finally – failure on all dimensions of reforms of the Soviet system, self-discrediting, and gradual resignation from political arena after 1991

9. Fathers, Sons, and Grandsons... “Seventiers” – pragmatists; kids of Cold War (war was not perceived as a taboo, despite Afghanistan); no illusions about the Soviet system and socialism, ideas subordinated to interests; “Niche” professionals; top interest to economic issues, increasing linkages with the West; Perestroika – opening of career chances; Ambiguity in terms of democratization: freedoms are welcomed but no trust to institutions (separation of power, minority rights) – economic populism perceived as the major threat (Chubais et al., 1990)

10. Fathers, Sons, and Grandsons... Reform agenda of the 1990s: Market reform as a top priority (democracy as a distant goal, if not rejected at all); Flexible approach to policy-making as a set of compromises and maneuvering (yet achieved rather mixed results – Shleifer and Treisman, 2000; Wengle, 2015); Not took upper hand in decision-making (self-limited role of policy- makers, advisors and aides in the 1990s); Opportunities for self-enrichment were effectively utilized (Hoffman, 2002; Gustafson, 2012) Learning effect from experience of “sixtiers” – how one should not conduct major changes;

11. Fathers, Sons, and Grandsons... After 2000 – triumph of “seventiers”: they got what they wanted; Russia is ruled by representatives of this generation, who became aged over time (coming “When-I’m-Sixty- Four” effect); Unfree market economy under “soft” version of authoritarianism; A nostalgic normative ideal of a “good Soviet Union” (a great empire without inherent political and economic problems); No will for further reforms and increasing fears: tendency for a preservation of status-quo regime at any cost;

12. Fathers, Sons, and Grandsons... A coming challenge of “grandsons”? Rising new post-Soviet generation is likely to rebel (2011-2012 protests as a first sign?) What we might expect from the future with an inevitable new round of generational changes? Mass surveys – mixed evidence but an age is not a key determinant of demand for changes, especially for democracy; Interviews, focus groups with 2011-2012 protesters (Volkov, 2012) – “ideas strikes back”, “grandsons” are similar to their “grandfathers”? Interviews, focus groups with upward-career-minded pragmatic loyalists (Mickiewicz, 2014) – grandsons are similar to their “fathers”?

13. Fathers, Sons, and Grandsons... Power transfer: a drive to a quasi-dynastic rule (Kirill Shamalov, sons of Patrushev, Chaika, etc.)? “Приближенным к Кремлю деятелям в качестве идеального развития событий, наверное, видится, что погожим днем какого-нибудь 2036 года новым президентом страны станет тот же Кирилл Шамалов, который сформирует правительство, состоящее из детей и внуков нынешних высших чиновников, ушедших к тому времени на покой, если не в мир иной” (deleted from my op-ed by the editor of rbc.ru, 25 February 2016).

14. Fathers, Sons, and Grandsons... Thanks for your attention! Comments are very welcome (vgelman@eu.spb.ru)vgelman@eu.spb.ru