1. Ukrainian Crises and Russia’s Domestic Agenda Vladimir Gel’man (European University at St.Petersburg / University of Helsinki) Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 11 September 2014

2. Ukrainian crises (Russian annexation of Crimea, military clash in Donbass, and ongoing major confrontation with the West) - a “trigger event” for changing domestic political and economic landscape in Russia; rise of regime’s public support; “tightening the screws” in terms of civil and political rights and liberties; “statist turn” in economic policy and decline of quality of governance; further regime’s personalization and securitization

3. Ukrainian Crises and Russia's Domestic Agenda Russia before 2014: “political hangover” syndrome after 2011-2012 protests – regime’s counter-offense towards the opposition, gradual “tightening of the screws”; numerous instances of undermining status-quo from within - gradual decline of public support; regime’s troubles in mayoral elections (Moscow, Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk); gradual slowdown of economic growth, no way to repeat the miracle of 1999-2008 (but strong expectations and Kremlin’s populist promises)

4. Ukrainian Crises and Russia's Domestic Agenda “Ukrainian scenario” – the major sources of fears in the Kremlin: Orange revolution of 2004 (a rebellion against fraudulent elections) – a trigger event for elimination of electoral competition in Russia and attacks towards media, NGOs, etc. (some trends were observed much earlier); Overthrow of Yanukovich in 2014 (a rebellion against ‘crooks and thieves’) was perceived in the Kremlin as a result of Western conspiracy and as a testing ground for Russia;

5. Ukrainian Crises and Russia's Domestic Agenda Kremlin’s reaction on Ukrainian regime change should be analyzed not only as a matter of foreign affairs but also as a top item in domestic agenda; Political survival of authoritarian regimes and their leaders – the priority No.1 in various settings; Reformatting of ‘winning coalitions’ (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2011) as the major tool of domestic politics; Heterogeneity of the ‘winning coalition’ in Russia before Ukrainian crises; ‘Resigned acceptance’ of the status quo by mass public – a source of potential risks

6. Ukrainian Crises and Russia's Domestic Agenda Short-term effects of annexation of Crimea: The rise of regime’s public support (up to 80+%, according to mass surveys); Campaigns against ‘national-traitors’ as arguments for more anti-democratic laws and practices of their implementing (‘foreign agents’, laws on elections and parties, censorship in the Internet, etc.); Further decline of influence of ‘economic liberals’ in the government, of businessmen beyond the ‘inner circle’ of cronies, etc. Reliance upon military/security apparatus as the major information source (Gaaze, 2014); Personalist instead of collegial decision-making

7. Ukrainian Crises and Russia's Domestic Agenda Side effects of continuity of Ukrainian crises after annexation of Crimea on Russia’s domestic agenda: Involvement of the Russian military (no way to avoid causalities); Self-imposed counter-sanctions (major ban on food import from EU/US/Japan, Norway, de-facto foreign travel ban for military and law enforcement officers, etc.); Economic uncertainty (major capital flight, 0% growth at best for 2014); Increasing risks of inadequate decisions in many policy areas

8. Ukrainian Crises and Russia's Domestic Agenda Whether or not the aggravation of numerous regime’s problems against the background of major conflict with the West will lead to its collapse? Not necessarily, at least, in the short-term perspective; “Bad policy is almost always good politics” (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, 2011); Limited capabilities of organized dissent within the country – both at the level of elites and masses; A relatively large margin of strength for the economy

9. Ukrainian Crises and Russia's Domestic Agenda International sanctions might serve as an efficient tool of containment on international arena, but their domestic effects are limited and far from being immediate (Marinov, 2012); Direct military collision is extremely unpopular on domestic arena but the Kremlin not employed this tool on a fully-fledged manner as of yet; Purges towards elites, reshufflings of government, etc. are possible as an instrument of ‘switching the blame’; Regime could survive if exogenous shocks will be not strong enough

10. Ukrainian Crises and Russia's Domestic Agenda Comments are welcome (gelman@eu.spb.ru)gelman@eu.spb.ru Thanks for your attention!