1. Lebensraum and Operation Barbarossa Mr McDonald

2. What we will learn today: 1.What Lebensraum was. 2.What Operation Barbarossa was. 3.How Barbarossa may have affected the Holocaust. 4.Differing historical views on this event.

3. Lebensraum The debate over the Holocaust can really be examined in an intentionalist view point by a mixture of internal and external politics.

4. Lebensraum Lebensraum can best be examined in an intentionalist mode as a policy as a policy of foreign conquest. Farmer in his book highlights this by pointing out “The attack on the USSR in June 1941 was, in the intentionalists’ view, a deliberate attempt to win lebensraum and eliminate the Jews. Thus they see a straight road to Auschwitz” Pg. 3-5

5. Discussion Point To counter this argument through an structuralist standpoint what would you have to think about regarding Lebensraum? First of all was, Lebensraum a racial policy or economic policy? Certainly Farmer points out in pg. 17 that he believes Hitler’s policy was built through a need for a strong Germany. This is different from the Intentionalists in that it is not based on race (Jews) but on power.

6. Operation Barbarossa Operation Bararossa was the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. The invasion is perhaps the strangest of all the Nazi policies as it enacted the same nightmare situation Germany found itself in during the First World War – a two front war, but the Nazi War machine believed it had a significant advantage – again underestimating the Soviet fighting machine.

7. You can see Kershaw in his book follows a structuralist point of view with his reference to the invasion of Russia. He states on pg.168 that “Hitlerian ideological obsessions had played no major part in the actual framing of the decision to attack the Soviet Union”. He did however state that this war would be a war of extermination – did he mean his war against communism or the Judaism? Certainly that ambiguity faced the Einstazgruppen.

9. Kershaw again highlights his structuralist following by his statement that the “decision to wipe out every Jew within German occupied Europe was still some way off.” This is further stated by the belief that the Nazis has according to Kershaw in moving the Jews – beyond the Urals. So therefore according to Kershaw even when the Nazis invaded Russia it was not the turning point in the Holocaust.

10. The examination of the Einsatzgruppen does lead itself in Kershaw’s view as a key development in the invasion of Russia. The killing process was already irreversible and rapidly developed its own momentum.

11. Is Kershaw stating that the Einsatzgruppen and the killing in Russia a cause in itself? Kershaw states that “Heydrich’s orders had evidently left plenty of room for interpretation to the Einsatzgruppen commanders.” He states at first it was Jewish males and then adults that were targeted but as the German advance slowed down and the numbers of Jews rose so did the definition of who was to be killed. Kershaw states this was probably done by Himmler in August 1941. Kershaw also highlights a link with Goldhagen with his reference to the acts committed by the Wermacht.

12. Kershaw appears to be highlighting that the failure of Operation Barbarossa had a significant impact in the development of the systematic programme to kill Jews in Europe – perhaps due to the inability to move the Jews beyond the Urals. Kershaw highlights the policy drift into the Holocaust by the move from Euthanasia to the concentration camps to deal with the Jewish question. The best evidence for this can be see in page 171:

13. “During the summer of 1941, the inexorable course of events in the Russian campaign, together with the growing practical difficulties of coping with the millions of incarcerated Jews, the keenness of Nazi Gauleiter to rid themselves of remaining Jews on their territory and the organisational ambitions of the SS, combined to produce a mounting pressure from a number of sides to bring about a final solution the the Jewish question…But Hitler remained the key to whatever the comprehensive action was taken”

14. Supple and Operation Barbarossa Supple highlights her intentionalist leaning with her view of the German invasion of the Soviet Union. In particular the work of the Einstazgruppen – see pages 142 – 143. She refers to the prejudice the Germans had towards not just Jews but also Gypsies – thus highlighting the racial war that was being fought as opposed to the structuralist perception of the invasion.

15. Farmer and Operation Barbarossa Farmer in his book straight away illustrates why he can be considered a structuralist historian. He looks at the work of American historian Breitman and his premise that the order for the Holocaust occurred no later than January 1941 during the planning for Operation Barbarossa – see pg. 77.

16. Straight way Farmer highlights a lack of anything but circumstantial evidence and he states “most historians think that the genocide decision came later.” He then refers to the plans for the invasion of Russia and the willingness of the army to understand the brutality which shall be evident and that the SS should be entrusted with the special task. He refers to the way in which the army was happy to let the SS deal with it. Perhaps something Goldhagen with his stories of the police battalion might find difficult to swallow.

17. Farmer then highlights the way in which Barbarossa was not according to him the turning point by referring to the conflicting evidence the Einsatzgruppen leaders had over who to kill. Some testified they had not received an order to kill all Jews until August/September 1941. This would be about the time clarification came from Himmler. So even the Einsatzgruppen’s actions can be seen as escalatory rather than distinct policy – see pg. 78.

18. Farmer continues to point out using Swiss historian Burrin that if the Nazi’s wanted the Jews in Russia dead, 4000 men would not do the job very well. He then highlights the most violence in the beginning was done by local people –see pg. 79. The actions in July by Heydrich towards Jews so polices were hardening – death of all Jews in Russian POW camps and encouraging murders of Jews in service of the Soviet Union.

19. Farmer then highlights the plan mentioned by Kershaw to re-settle the Jews in Siberia. To back up this statement he then illustrates the lack of deaths of Jews (50,000 by August 1941). He is obviously stating the policy of the Holocaust is not yet in effect. Farmer then states it was Hitler’s euphoria over the Soviet campaign in July 1941 that highlights the policy of racial cleansing in Russia with two SS Brigades helping the overburdened Einstazgruppen.

20. Barbarossa and the Holocaust Farmer puts forward a point that is critical to Structuralist understanding. The Einsatzgruppen had been given a new role by July 1941. Once that policy was enacted it is possible Hitler could be seen to give two extermination orders – one for Russian Jews and one or European Jewry dependent upon the pace of the Russian campaign – see pg. 81.

21. Goldhagen’s views Goldhagen refers to the invasion of Russia in the most intentionalist manner by highlighting Hitler’s comments in his speeches and in Mein Kampf: Annihilation of the Jews in Europe. – pg 147. He refers to the fact that Hitler made reference to the prophetic speech of 1939 on January 1941.

22. Goldhagen refers to the ending of other ideas to rid Europe of Jews e.g. evacuation as Hitler moves towards an eliminationist policy headed by Heydrich’s Final Solution Project. Goldhagen in pages 148-149 deals with the perceived ambiguity of the Einsatzgruppen orders by posing the question of whether the men would have been able to deal with the knowledge straight away instead of when they are operational “He and other… officers were leery that their men would not have the stomachs to carry out such gruesome orders.” – pg. 149

23. The policy of killing Jewish male adults is seen by Goldhagen as an acclimatisation to the overall policy – breaking the men in to the situation. By keeping the massacres small in numbers (ish) then the men would not be so overawed by the murders/actions they were carrying out. He also states that the reason killings increase is not because of the structuralist argument but because the Germans believed they were going to win so why rush the job?

24. Homework Read and make notes from the Final Solution Text – see chapters 5, 6 & 7 These are on Operation Barbarossa and the Einsatzgruppen.