1. Week 2 Ancient Greece: the Melian dialogue

2. The “Melian dialogue” was written by Thucydides - who was he? What was this dialogue about? Why begin a course on “old” wars vs. “new” wars by looking at what it says?

3. Thucydides was the greatest of the ancient Greek historians; he lived from 460 BC to 400 BC. he was also an Athenian general. his most famous work was a History of the Peloponnesian War. this described the war, in the 5 th century BC, between Sparta and Athens, and is the first work in history to talk about this subject empirically and impartially, e.g., it does not talk about the gods; it talks only about human behavior

5. .. Thucydides valued what eyewitnesses said, therefore, and wrote about events he had probably taken part in.. he also consulted written documents the way contemporary historians do (though he did not say who or what his sources were).. he did include long speeches despite not knowing how they were actually given (he was interested in telling the “truth” even if this meant being less “scientific”)

6. .. he is usually described as the “father of scientific history”, however, even though it is not possible to describe and explain history the way the natural universe is now described and explained, i.e., history is not a “science” where hypotheses can be tested, publicly and repeatedly, to see if they obtain.. though history is not a “science”, it is possible to get close to the story of the human past.. this story can never be told exactly, but Thucydides showed that it an be told both accurately and vividly

8. One of the most famous passages in the History is called the “Melian dialogue” (the other is called the “funeral oration of Pericles”). these two passages were not only written for their literary effect; they were also deemed “true” in that “speech” gives an accurate - and vivid - account of the events involved. it is not “scientific truth” but truth of this sort is not possible under these circumstances anyway

9. The “Melian dialogue” followed the invasion of the island of Melos (by Athens) in 416 BC. the Athenians demanded that the Melians join the Delian League, that is, become part of the Athenian empire. Thucydides created a “dialogue” to show how the Melians replied to this demand and how the Athenians responded to the Melians, i.e., how those facing war might have spoken about it

10. In the process Thucydides created a long-lasting account of dog-eat-dog, might-makes-right, “I-win-you-lose” world affairs “realism”. Why?.. Because he said the Athenians were pessimistic about human nature and.. the context was not one of states in the contemporary sense but Athens and Melos were state-like, i.e. sovereign members of an anarchic system

12. What was the “Melian dialogue”, then?. the Athenians began by saying since the talks were private they would get straight to the point and ask the Melians to hear them out. in reply the Melians said private negotiations were fine, but the military preparations the Athenians were already making suggested they had come as “judges in … [their] own cause”; this left them (the Melians) with the choice of either resorting to war (if they did not submit) or becoming Athenian slaves (if they did).

14. . the Athenians the asked the Melians to discuss only the “safety of … [their] state”. in response the Melians warned the Athenians they would “turn more ways than one … both in thought and utterance”. the Athenians replied by asking the Melians not to offer false views, adding they would do the same: “[Y]ou know as well as we do”, they said, “that right, as the world goes, is only a question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must (my emphasis)”

16. . how to face this (now famous) assertion?. the Melians said: where is the “rightness” here, i.e., what was fair about the Athenian proposal?. they also said that fairness matters, not least to Athenians, since unfair powers, when they do fail, find the “heaviest vengeance” falling upon them. the Athenians replied by saying they were not afraid to fail; they were simply imperialists who wanted Melos kept “for the good of … both”.

18. . the Melians then said: “[H]ow … could it turn out … [to be] good for us … for you to rule?”. the Athenians replied: “Because you would have the advantage of submitting before suffering the worst, and we would gain by not destroying you” (??). the Melians then asked the Athenians to let them be neutral, that is, “friends instead of enemies, but allies of neither side”

19. “… let them be neutral”

20. . to this the Athenian reply was: no! Melos hostility could not hurt them, they said, but smashing Melos could be very useful as a way to show others how strong Athens was. what is more, having the Melians as friends would only show those who were subjects of Athens that Athens was weak. to this the Melians responded by saying that if Athens saw equality like this, then it put all those who had nothing to do with Athens in the same category as those who were its subjects

21. . to this the Athenians replied that their subjects knew to be independent was to be strong and if Athens left them alone it was only because they were afraid of them. what is more, conquering Melos would extend the Athenian empire and make Athens more secure by showing how a weak island had not been able to oppose the “masters of the sea”

23. . Melos met this argument by saying: “How can you avoid making enemies of all … [who are] neutral[] … [since] one day you might attack them? And … is this … [not] to make greater enemies than you have already, and to force others to become so who would [never] otherwise have … thought of it?”. the Athenians replied by saying that they were not afraid of mainlanders, since they were not likely to act against them …

24. … They were afraid of those islanders who were outside their empire, however, and by subjects who “smarting” under Athens’ “yoke”. to which Melos replied by saying if you “risk so much to retain your empire and your subjects to get rid of it, it were surely great … cowardice in us who are still free not to try everything that can be tried, before submitting …”. (??)

25. “… ‘smarting’ under their ‘yoke’”

26. . the Athenians replied by pointing out that the contest was not equal and it was “self- preservation” that was the issue, not resisting those who were “far stronger”.. at which point Melos changed tack, saying that the “fortunes of war” could provide a different result from the one the difference in the size of military forces might suggest; to submit would thus be to despair, while not to would be to hope

28. . the Athenian reply was to say that hope is a comfort in times of danger, and relevant to those with “abundant resources”, however, “its nature is to be extravagant, and those who go so far as to put their all upon … [it] see it in its true colors only when they are ruined … Let this not be the case with you, who are weak and hang on a single turn of the scale; nor be like the vulgar, who … turn to … prophecies and oracles and other such inventions that delude men …”

29. “… prophecies and oracles”

30. . Melos answered by saying that it was well aware that fighting Athens would be difficult since they were, indeed, not equal; nonetheless.. they hoped the “gods” might favor them; they were just men facing unjust ones; also.. what they lacked in power might be made up for by their alliance with Spartans, who would come to their aid “if only for … shame … [In short, their] confidence... [was] not … utterly irrational”

31. . the Athenians said any talk of the favor of the gods applied to them and to Melos, also. “of men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature (my emphasis) they rule wherever they can (likewise) … [I]t is not as if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon it … [W]e found it existing before us, and shall leave it to exist for ever after us; all we do is make use of it, knowing that you, and everybody else, having the same power, would do the same …”.

33. . they also said that, as to allies, Melos was foolish; they knew these allies - people who only pursued their own interests; who considered just only what was convenient: “Such a way of thinking” they said “does not promise much” for the safety which Melos sought. “But it is for this very reason” Melos replied, “that we now trust [them] not to … [betray us thus] losing the confidence of their friends … and helping their enemies …”

34. . so, said the Athenians, you do not see what Sparta considers convenient as being relevant? You do not see all this talk of justice and honor as putting the people of Melos in danger?. to this the Melians replied that their allies would help them since Melos was near Sparta; this would make it easier for them to act; their common blood would also make sure they did

35. . the Athenians then said: “Yes, but what an intending ally [relies on] … is not the goodwill of those who ask his aid, but... [clearly superior] power … and the … [Spartans will] look to this even more than others … [I]t is only with numerous allies that they [are likely to] attack a neighbor; … [Moreover, i]s it likely that while we are masters of the sea they will cross over to an island?”

37. . Melos responded by saying that the Spartans could send others. the sea was also wide which made it harder for those commanding it to intercept such allies (and easier for those who wanted to avoid Athens to do so). moreover, a Spartan force might attack Athens instead and rather than fighting in Melos, Athens would then have to fight for Athens

38. . The Athenians agreed that something of this sort could happen one day, but if it did, Melos would learn, “as others have done”, that the Athenians “never once yet [have] withdr[awn] from a siege for fear of [what Melos described] … [We are also] struck by the fact that, after saying you would consult for the safety of your country, in all this discussion you have mentioned nothing which men might trust in and think to be saved by. [Indeed y]our strongest arguments …

39. … depend on hope and the future, and your actual resources are too scanty, as compared with those arrayed against you, for you to … [win]. You will therefore show great blindness of judgment, unless … you … find some counsel more prudent than this. You will surely not be caught by the idea of disgrace, which … proves so fatal to mankind … lead[ing] them on to a point at which they become so enslaved by a phrase as … to fall … into … disaster …

40. “… the idea of disgrace”

41. … [In short, y]ou will not think it dishonorable to submit to the greatest city in … [ancient Greece], when it makes you the moderate offer of becoming its tributary ally, without ceasing to enjoy the country that belongs to you; nor when you have the choice … between war and security, will you be so blinded as to choose [war] … [I]t is certain that those who do not yield to their equals, who keep terms with their superiors, and are moderate towards their inferiors, on the whole succeed best (my emphasis)” …

42. … And do not forget, they said, “it is for your country that you are consulting, that you have not more than one, and … upon these deliberations depend your prosperity or ruin”.. the Athenians then withdrew. Melos then decided it would not “in a moment” give up the freedom of an island-city inhabited “… [for] seven hundred years”; they chose instead to put their trust in good fortune, in their closest ally, and in self help

44. In sum: the Athenians said surrender and become tributaries or be destroyed. they concluded by saying it was not shameful to surrender to a stronger enemy In sum: Melos made a number of arguments, i.e, 1. they were neutral and not an enemy (Athens said this would make them look weak, or at least not strong enough to win) 2. invading Melos would alarm other Greek states who would become hostile to Athens …

45. … (Athens said Greek states on the on the main- land would not act this way though island and its subjects might) 3. it would be shameful and cowardly to give in without a fight (Athens said the issue was not honor but self-preservation) 4. despite Athens’ strength, Melos could still win (Athens said Melos was too weak to have such hopes) 5. that the gods were on their side (Athens said the gods were like men and favored strength)

46. 6. their Spartan kin would come and help them (Athens said Sparta had nothing to gain by doing so, and much to lose; they also said that mere kinship would not, under these circumstances, be enough to motivate Sparta) For a good summary of these points, see: www.youtube.com/watch?v=PNzHQqjMHwY

47. What was the short-term result?. Melos lost. there were a number of battles and some internal treachery, but the power of Athens prevailed. all the adult men were then killed. the women and children were sold as slaves, and. Athens sent five hundred colonists to settle on Melos in their place

49. What was the long-term result?. Athens lost. after Melos was destroyed, Athens started to decline (Thucydides says). Athens was correct in predicting that Sparta would not stop Athens from destroying Melos. Melos was also correct, however, in trusting their Spartan kin to help them …

50. … e.g., after the fall of Melos the Spartans re-settled the surviving Melians on the mainland. not long after this the Peloponnesian War began again. these Melian exiles helped raised funds to support Sparta fight Athens. the Athenian empire was destroyed and a Spartan general - Lysander - retook Melos; the Melians were given their homeland back

52. The third question given at the beginning was about “old” war versus “new” war:. is Thucydides an example of an analyst of the “old” war or “new” war sort (to use Kaldor’s terms)?.. does he, that is, see war as being fought - between the regular armed forces of states - for geopolitical or ideological reasons - in the form of battles, and - using state taxes

53. .. or does he see war as being: - between state and non-state actors - for identity - using the control of populations (e.g. their displacement), and - using predatory private financing

54. The modern state did not come into being until the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648; Thucydides was not talking about states in the modern sense, therefore, but about independent city-states (like Athens) and independent island-states (like Melos). this said, we can still apply the Kaldor criteria. first: the war involved the regular armed forces of both states (though in the case of Athens there were ships from Chian and Lesbos and heavy infantry from other allies and islands)

56. . second: the war was for geopolitical reasons (i.e., to fulfill the imperial ambitions of Athens); there were ideological differences and issues of identity involved but the geo-political reason was the main one. third: the war was waged using battles even though control of population was an issue, e.g., displacement (killing, enslaving and colonizing). four: the war was financed using the wealth of the states concerned

60. Kaldor sees “new” wars as being those of modern day globalization; Thucydides account could only be that of “old” wars, therefore, despite how “new” it seems (Kaldor does say that her categories are “ideal types”, that is, they represent differences in principle that might not always apply in practice); Thucydides’ significance is not that he wrote about “old” war (he could hardly have done otherwise) but because he was the first to describe “classical international relations realism”

61. “… ‘classical international relations realism’”

62. Remember how Thucydides said that there was a “necessary” and “natural” law of human nature that caused people to rule wherever they could and how the Athenians argued: “ … it is not as if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon it … [W]e found it existing before us, and shall leave it to exist for ever after us; all we do is make use of it, knowing that you, and everybody else, having the same power, would do the same …”?

63. What law did Thucydides think they were referring to? He says elsewhere that: “ … right, as the world goes, is only a question between equals in power …[That is t]he strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” So: Thucydides described the Athenians as being pessimistic about human nature and their pessimism as resulting in their might-makes- right perspective towards other Greek states

64. Later analysts came to similar conclusions; indeed, classical international realism is now seen as a central tradition in the history of world affairs, e.g.,. Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) was an Italian diplomat and a founder of political science. he wrote in The Prince (1513/1532) that “the ends justify the means” and that “it is better to be feared than loved”. he believed in the use of violence to stabilize a state and to eliminate its enemies

66. . this suggests that Machiavelli was also pessimistic about human nature and that he was most interested in promoting and protecting the integrity of the state (though this was not the “sovereign state” of post-Westphalian times, despite the fact that he was born after the Peace that first brought this particular way of ordering world affairs into being). n.b., the state did not become the key to ordering global politico-strategic affairs until the 20 th c.

67. . another example of a “classical IR realist” is the English analyst, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Hobbes was the first to translate Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War from the Greek into English. he later wrote, in Leviathan (1651), that the “state of nature” is a war of “all against all”, i.e., that without political communities men live in “constant fear” of “violent death …” and their lives, as a consequence, are “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”

69. . this suggests that Hobbes was also pessimistic about human nature and that he was also most interested in promoting and protecting the state (as he understood it). we now say “Machiavellian” to describe politicians who will do anything, good or bad, to get their own way. we now say “Hobbesian” to describe the “social contract” and the strong governments that prevent anarchy

71. In the 20 th century, the leading IR “realist” of this sort was Hans Morgenthau (1904-1980). Morgenthau wrote Politics Among Nations (1948, plus five more editions in his own life-time). in this book he outlined a classically realist view of world affairs, that is, one that was both.. pessimistic about human nature and.. defended the integrity of the modernist state

73. Why was Morgenthau so pessimistic?. firstly, he was a Jew who fled from Hitler to the U.S. in 1937 (via Switzerland and Spain). secondly, he believed an article written by a colleague (summarizing all the world’s cultures) that concluded that only one was truly peaceful.. as a result he described global affairs in self-help, balance-of-power, security- dilemma terms, - n.b., he did not do any other research (at least eleven other peaceful societies can be found in the anthropological literature)

75. Morgenthau’s work was followed by that of an abstract analyst, Kenneth Waltz (1924-2013). Waltz was an American political scientist who wrote a Theory of International Politics (1979). in this study he said the world had wars because it did not have a government, i.e., it was anarchic. as a result state leaders had to behave in self-help ways. this he called neo-realism (or structural realism)

77. . Waltz believed his approach was so abstract that he did not need to assume anything about human nature. he was wrong: e.g. why, in an un-governed world, would state leaders only choose self-help (that is, competition)?. why would they not choose mutual help instead (that is, cooperation)?. in short: they do both (i.e., they are both pessimists and opportunists, and not only the first, as Waltz assumes but does not say)

79. . Waltz is called a “defensive [IR] realist”. this is because others take a more “offensive” approach. notable in this regard is the work of John Mearsheimer (1947- ). Mearsheimer sees an ungoverned state system as one that compels leaders to maximize their power, that is, to pursue peace by gaining as much power as possible

81. All of these analysts are “classical” IR realists who see the world in terms of “old” wars, i.e., in terms of states that use their powers as members of systems- of-states that are without government. they see states pursuing their interests using their (military and diplomatic) powers. imbalances and balances of powers, and. regular resort to violence to defend state interests (or to promote them, e.g., in an imperial way)

83. These analysts tend to highlight. the existence of standing armies and other military forces. how these forces are funded from state finances. how they are used to fight for geopolitical ends and. how the fighting consists of set-piece battles where one side wins and the other side loses

85. They tend not to highlight. the use of irregular military forces, e.g., mercenaries. wars about identity. the displacing of whole peoples, and. the financing of wars by non-state means

87. Though the 20 th c. “classical” IR realists lived at a time of the globalization of states, markets, and ideas about the nation, the self, and global social movements; though they were familiar with radical changes in communications (the computer and the cell-phone) and transport (the container); though they were familiar with questions about gender and the environment finding their way onto the global agenda; they remained markedly old-fashioned about the nature of war

88. This is why “classical” IR realism, though one of the dominant approaches to world affairs today (and one of the dominant approaches in the past as well) is not enough. it is also why we need a new approach based on the distinction between “old” wars and “new” wars. this lets us talk about the ways in which the world has changed and continues to change

89. This the basis of Kaldor’s complaint, which is part of an effort to bring “classical IR realism” up-to-date. as noted earlier, Thucydides cannot be blamed for not knowing about contemporary globalization and not talking, therefore, about “new” wars in Kaldor’s sense (though he does anticipate aspects of her definition). Machiavelli and Hobbes cannot be blamed either. 20 th century analysts can; this is Kaldor’s point; in the light of her work look at the next picture

91. Do you think this an “old” war or “new” war soldier?. If so, why?. If not, why not?

93. … and I hope to see you next week