1. MAINE MALL PLANNING EXERCISE 2014

2. OBJECTIVES CONDUCT RAPID ASSESSMENT OF THE SCENE EVALUATE THE MAINE MALL COMPLEX AND IDENTIFY A SAFETY AND ACTION PLAN IMPLIMENT AND USE THE ICS SYSTEM FOR A HAZ MAT OR MCI RESPONSE PRE PLAN SITE TO ESTABLISH A TREATMENT AND TRANSPORT LOCATION FOR AN EVENT AT THE MALL COMPLEX EVALUATE THE MOST LIKELY RISKS TO THIS COMPLEX

3. OTHER LOCATIONS WAINWRIGHT FIELDS SCHOOLS OUTSIDE CONCERT VENUE WORKPLACE (FAIRCHILDS, SOUTHBOROUGH, TEXAS INSTRUMENTS) MAINE YOUTH CENTER

7. UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Complex Operating Environment for First Responders During Emergency Responses-Shopping Malls The September 2013 al-Shabaab attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, killing 67 people, underscores the need to understand and plan for the complex operating environment in today’s shopping malls. The physical attributes of shopping malls create formidable security challenges

8. 1.Common characteristics—open access, friendly/leisurely atmosphere, and crowds carrying bags/packages—are inherent vulnerabilities. 2.Size and multiple access points makes it very difficult to manage the population of the Mall 3.Victim and or Patient access needs to be coordinated with Law Enforcement through the cleared unsecure area

9. Understanding the terrorist attack planning cycle can help first responders recognize preoperational activities. Terrorist attack planning and preparation generally proceed through several stages, although the details, sequencing, and timing may vary greatly and change as operational circumstances evolve. The stages that are often observable – such as pre-attack surveillance, training, and rehearsals – offer potential opportunities for first responders to disrupt plots or deter attacks.

10. UNSECURE CLEARED/ SECURE / UNSECURE May be multi-level Elevator Multiple Entrances/Exits Multiple Entrances/Exits Staff areas not open to the public Shared commercial and/or government office spaces Unrestricted attached or interior parking garages/lots Open areas with benches, food courts, plants, trash Receptacles Sewage and waste systems Electrical systems, telecommunications, plumbing, water systems Delivery and pickup areas not open to public Heating, ventilation, air-conditioning (HVAC systems) Fire alarm, fire suppression systems, security systems Stairs

11. CLEARED/UNSECURE AREA Initial law enforcement sweep complete; attacker(s) return possible; possible blast/structural damage - fire, smoke-unexploded IEDs remain a concern SECURE AREA Cleared by law enforcement, security measures in place, area monitored

12. ACTIVE/UNSECURE AREA Unrestrained attacker(s), high risk to first responders and civilians

14. MEDICAL CONSIDERATIONS: Can rapidly overwhelm local hospital surge capacity requiring ongoing coordination of existing resources (bed capacity, consumables, specialty, burn, surgical services) Victims will likely include pediatrics, the elderly, and those with special needs Triage will complicate evidentiary and forensic collection requiring close coordination with law enforcement Protect the safety of civilians in the active/unsecure area Perform rapid initial sweep by law enforcement of entire area Establish and monitor secure areas (command posts, treatment & transport areas, resource staging areas, personnel rehabilitation sites)

15. Command / Control What we can control Our response Resources requested Setting outer perimeters What we cannot control Criminal’s actions Self evacuations All of the exits

16. Preoperational Surveillance Roll Call Release – 9 July 2010 Almost any criminal act—from a purse-snatching to a violent extremist bombing—involves some degree of preoperational surveillance. This is a common denominator, whether a threat is from common criminals, a violent extremist group, or a lone offender.

18. detected. Possible indicators may include: (U//FOUO) Photographing objects or facilities that would not normally be photographed. (U//FOUO) Individuals or vehicles loitering in sensitive areas with no valid reason. (U//FOUO) Having maps or blueprints of a facility or structure with no valid reason. (U//FOUO) Unusual or prolonged interest in security personnel or measures, entry points, access controls, or perimeter barriers. (U//FOUO) Persistent questioning of security or facility personnel through personal contact, telephone, mail, or e- mail. (U//FOUO) Observing drills, exercises, and reactions of security inspectors to possible threats such as unattended packages or vehicles. (U//FOUO) Staring at and then averting gaze away from personnel or vehicles operating in secured areas, or displaying other anxious behaviors—such as retracing steps. (U//FOUO) Monitoring radio scanners and recording emergency response times. (U//FOUO) Mapping routes, timing traffic lights, and monitoring traffic flow in or near sensitive facilities. (U//FOUO) Unexplained fire alarms or 911 calls, which may be attempts to observe emergency response. (U//FOUO) Discreetly using still cameras, video recorders, binoculars, or note-taking and sketching at sensitive sites. (U) Additional considerations: (U//FOUO) Bulky clothing inconsistent with the weather might indicate an effort to conceal weapons or explosives. (U//FOUO) Abandoned clothing, strollers, or baggage in crowded areas, trash bins or restrooms. (U//FOUO) Unusual interest or inquisitiveness (which appears out of context) about mall operating procedures, shift changes, fire alarms, security systems and information on upcoming events or efforts to gain access to restricted areas, such as staff entrances, delivery areas and emergency exits. (U//FOUO) Suspicious insider activity by mall employees, such as theft of staff badges or uniforms, loss of security communications equipment, presence of unfamiliar cleaning personnel or other contract workers. (U//FOUO) Attempts by a vehicle driver to enter restricted areas or leave a vehicle unattended near the mall or in a heavily trafficked area. (U//FOUO) Unfamiliar companies or unscheduled inspections, maintenance/service, or deliveries involving alarm systems or infrastructure components. (U//FOUO) During a larger event, family reunification efforts will be required early in the incident. (U//FOUO) Commonly available online information such as hours of operation, store locations, ingress and egress points, make identifying and disrupting activities associated with the terrorist planning cycle challenging to detect.

19. CRITICAL ASSETASSET CHARACTERISTICS LOCATION OF CRITICAL ASSET 1. Main Entrance6 main entrances made of glass and steel frame. 2 entrances are major bus stops. One is a promotional entrance that allows cars and boats to enter mall. 10 additional entrances to mall exist through anchor stores, and an additional 8 service court entrances also exist and are open during normal business hours. Entrances are located on all sides of the mall. Mall only has one level. 2. Food CourtLocation in the Mall that is most populated and dense, especially during the holiday seasons and on the weekends from 1100 – 1300 hours. Food Court is located on the Southeast corner of the mall directly adjacent to the inner road that surrounds the mall. Cars can approach with 10 feet of the food court, which has a glassed main entrance. 3. General Public35 to 40 thousand persons visit the mall every Saturday and Sunday. Crowds increase upwards of 75,000 on weekends and during the holidays. The public are in every area of the Mall, inside and out. 4. HVACThere are over 120 HVAC systems on the roof of the mall. The food court has 3, 20 ton, HVAC systems that allow cool or warm air pumped into the food court. All 120 HVAC systems are on the roof of the mall.

20. RELATED THREAT STREAMMETHOD OF ATTACK ASSETS VULNERABLE TO METHOD 1. AviationCrash of a small plane into mallEntrances, Mall Roof/HVAC, Food Court and General Public 2. Bombings/Explosives/ArsonCar or truck-bomb driven into food court; Suicide bomber; accelerant- borne fire Entrances, HVAC, Food court, General Public 3. Biological MaterialRicin, Anthrax, botulism spores placed into the HVAC systems that feed the food court HVAC system, General Public, Food Court, Entrances 4. Chemical MaterialChlorine could be introduced into the HVAC system HVAC system, General Public, Food Court, Entrances 5. MaritimeN/A 6. Nuclear/Radiological MaterialDirty bomb detonated inside or outside of Mall General Public, HVAC, Food Court, Entrances 7. Sabotage/Hazardous MaterialsGas lines could be broken to allow the food court to flood with natural gas and detonated The 235 gallon diesel tank that fuels backup generator could be sabotage to create a large fire. HVAC, Entrances, Food Court, General Public 8.Cyber AttacksN/A 8.FirearmsSmall or large caliber, “active- shooter” weapons attack inside or outside mall property and/or hostage or non-hostage, armed barricaded incidents. Food Court, General Public

21. MALL SECURITY RESPONSE PLAN Escalating threat levels and suggested property responses have been developed. Threat levels are identified as Level 1, Level 2, Level 3 and Level 4. Level 1 being the lowest, and Level 4 being the most severe. THREAT LEVEL 1 - Credible information has been released indicating there is a general risk of terrorist attacks. Given the current threat to the United States and the public nature of shopping centers, we will maintain at minimum status of “Threat Level 1” until further notice. THREAT LEVEL 2 - Credible information has been released indicating there is a non- specific threat of a terrorist attack. THREAT LEVEL 3 - Credible information has been released indicating there is a specific threat of a terrorist attack. THREAT LEVEL 4 - Credible information has been released indicating that plans are being carried out to attack a mall in the United States or an attack has just occurred. HSAS RED Threat levels may increase or decrease based on information released from Federal, State, local authorities or other credible sources. Threat levels may vary from one Region of the Country to the next depending on the specifics of the information. Mall teams who learn of local threats that may change the current threat level should contact the Vice President of Security. Please be prepared to identify the source of the information.

22. Maine Mall Area Population 22,846

24. EMPLOYEES 53,533

25. WHO’S IN CHARGE

26. PLANNING OBJECTIVES Assemble all Response Disciplines Respond as a “Community” Think about “logistical” issues Awareness of role of other responding agencies Encourage relationship building

27. INCIDENT COMPLICATORS STATE CRIME FEDERAL CRIME CRIME SCENE DISASTER AREA

28. ASSUMPTIONS The local community will be on its own for a minimum of 6 hours. The FBI may be the only federal asset considered a part of the local emergency response. The possibility of multiple targets may impact whether federal assets will be immediately available.

29. OUTER PERIMETER Fairly Quick to Set Use Main Cross Street to Allow for Dispersing of Traffic Allow Enough Space for a Buffer Zone with Inner Perimeter Keep Streets Accessible for Emergency Vehicles

30. INNER PERIMETER Much Slower to Gain Full Control Will Contain Both First Responders and Citizens May Need to Evacuate to Gain Full Control and Set Hard Perimeter

31. RESPONSE PRIORITIES SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY DEVELOP PROPER ICS PRIORITIES LOCATE EQUIPMENT AND COMMAND POST EARLY IN THE INCIDENT REQUEST RESOURCES STAGE INCOMING UNITS AND ASSIGN AN INDIVIDUAL TO ACT AS A MANAGER OF THE BRANCH

32. Most possible scenarios

33. Explosive Device Backpack Car bomb Natural Gas Explosion

34. Individual with a Weapon Shooting Event Hostage Situation

35. Haz Mat Event Odor Investigation Pepper Spray Gas Leak White Powder Chemical Agents Radiological Biological B-NICE Multiple Patients General Sickness

36. TRIAGE In Path of Escape from Incident Most Victims will Self Evacuate Pre-Plan with Medical Community

37. Food Court Entrance

38. View of Food Court

40. JC Penney Bus Stop

41. Unguarded Entrances

42. Mall Entrance Next to Sears

43. Best Buy Entrance

44. Service Court

45. Maine Mall Corridor

47. Maine Mall Entrance Next to Macy’s

48. ICS Chart INCIDENT COMMAND OPERATIONS CHIEF EMS BRANCH PRIMARY TRIAGE SECONDARY TREATMENT TREATMENT OFFICER LOADING OFFICER HAZ MAT BRANCH RECON GROUP 1 RECON GROUP 2 UTILITIES GROUP DECON GROUP RIT STAGING BRANCH PERSONNEL POOL AMBULANCE STAGING APPARATUS STAGING HAZ MAT STAGING POLICE STAGING PLANNING CHIEF LOGISTICS CHIEF FINANCE CHIEF PIOLIAISON SAFETY OFFICER

49. Tactical Objectives Establish Command and do a very quick initial size up Review ICS Chart Establish a Medical Branch (assign someone to run it) and set up MCI Plan (SPFD SOG 844.10) Set up staging areas (create a Staging Branch Manager) Ambulances Fire Apparatus Manpower Assign the Operations area and Treatment/Transport area (which should be different from each other) Assign Recon teams to enter mall to check for victims, assess scene. (bring meters and digital cameras) Obtain access to security room for site camera control. Secure Utilities Secure scene (crime scene) Don’t forget about service courts (General Public is usually not aware of them allowing easier FD access)

50. Issues/Challenges Large number of walking wounded Traffic issues Departing traffic will exacerbate existing traffic issues Arriving traffic (parents) will clog incoming arteries which will delay emergency responders Limited initial manpower and command staff Establishing a perimeter Accountability Securing utilities (gas) as there are around 120 individual HVAC units

51. Pre-designated Staging Areas Incident at Food Court and/or vicinity Command and Operations in parking lot 5 by old Filenes/Service Court 8 Treatment /Transport in parking lot 3 by Chuck-E-Cheese Incident at Center Court vicinity Command and Operations in parking lot 6 by Service Court 7 Treatment /Transport in parking lot 5 or 4 depending on where victims are exiting from Incident between Macys and Center Command and Operations in parking lot 6 by Macys Treatment /Transport in parking lot 1 or 6 depending on where victims are exiting from Incident between Sears and Center Command and Operations in parking lot 3 by Sears Treatment /Transport in parking lot 2 or 3 depending on where victims are exiting from

52. Predestinated Staging Areas