1. Nuclear Safety & Security in the DPRK Sharon Squassoni Senior Fellow & Director Proliferation Prevention Program Asan Institute “The 2012 US-North Korea Nuclear Deal and A Comprehensive Approach to the Denuclearization of North Korea” Seoul, March 22, 2012

2. www.csis.org | Outline  Status and concerns regarding DPRK nuclear safety & security  Obstacles to and objectives for cooperation  Some specific initiatives 2

3. www.csis.org | Status  North Korea has a full nuclear fuel cycle  Uranium mining, fuel fabrication, conversion, enrichment, reactors, reprocessing  Is building a light water reactor  Has never come into full compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty  IAEA monitoring conducted under Agreed Framework; initial declaration of nuclear material never verified.  Withdrew from the NPT in 2003  Has not been a member of the IAEA for decades 3

4. www.csis.org | Ramifications  Almost a decade in isolation from international norms, cooperation  Not a member of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, ICSANT  No transparency = no opportunities to learn about best practices in nuclear safety & security 4

5. www.csis.org | Obstacles to Cooperation  Verifying a halt in activities, dismantlement, disarmament & coming into full compliance with the NPT could take years.  Expansion of commitments (e.g., to missile testing) makes full compliance even more difficult.  Sanctions under UNSCR 1718 limit what can be provided  Bar assistance to DPRK nuclear program 5

6. www.csis.org | Is there room for assistance on safety & security?  Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines prohibit exports to countries that are not NPT members  But IAEA engages in technical cooperation projects with states that are not NPT members but are IAEA members – India, Pakistan, Israel  Some countries have made exceptions for limited assistance on safety and security  U.S. assisted India before 2008 (NRC visits)  U.S. assisted Pakistan in a limited fashion on nuclear security  If done at all, needs to be done carefully and incrementally 6

7. www.csis.org | Objectives of Cooperation  Improve transparency  Improve nuclear safety and security without assisting DPRK military capabilities  Facilitate negotiation process by encouraging two- sided cooperation in limited areas that benefit all 7

8. www.csis.org | Some possible steps on nuclear safety MeasureAffectingShor t- term Medium -term Long- term Prerequisite Talks on nuclear safetyNuclear safety XParties willing to engage with DPRK on nuclear safety Nuclear safety missionsNuclear safety XRejoin IAEA, pay dues Sign & Ratify : Convention on Nuclear Safety Conventions re: Nuclear Accidents Code of Conduct on Safety of Research Reactors Code of Conduct on Safety/Security of Radiological Sources Nuclear safety XNone Join World Association of Nuclear Operators Nuclear safety XCommitment to transparency & peer reviews (reactor does not have to be operating) Join World Nuclear AssociationPeaceful uses of nuclear energy XEst. of private nuclear entities Join INMMPeaceful uses of nuclear energy XNone 8

9. www.csis.org | Some possible steps on nuclear security MeasureAffectingShort- term Medium -term Long- term Prerequisite Sign & ratify CPPNM and amendment Nuclear securityXNone Sign & ratify ICSANTNuclear securityXNone Joint CSSPFM, Waste Management Spent fuel, waste safety XNone Join WINSNuclear securityXNone Remove HEU spent fuel from IRT reactor Nuclear securityXRussian agreement, funding Convert IRT reactor for medical radioisotope production Nuclear securityXIAEA safeguards; lifting of sanctions for provision of LEU fuel; funding source 9

10. www.csis.org | Potential initiatives  Nuclear Safety  Materials – radiological source safety  Facilities – e.g., peer reviews  Workers, safety culture – WANO membership?  Nuclear Security  Materials – removal of HEU spent fuel from IRT- 2000; conversion of fuel to LEU  Facilities/sites  Security culture 10

11. www.csis.org | Nuclear Safety  Plugging into IAEA Nuclear Safety Action Plan – kinds of things DPRK could request  Assessments of safety (e.g., “stress tests”)  Peer reviews  Emergency Preparedness Review Missions  National regulations – Integrated Regulatory Review Service of IAEA  OSART missions  Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (for states new to nuclear power) 11

12. www.csis.org | Nuclear Security  Removal of HEU spent fuel and eventual conversion to LEU fuel of IRT-2000  No technical barriers; several precedents (Libya, US, Russia, Vietnam, Uzbekistan)  Enhance nuclear security and safety by removal of spent fuel first  Political plus – could be announced around 2014 Nuclear Security Summit; would take about 2-3 years to complete and at least $2M.  Conversion assumes  Progress toward disarmament  Return to NPT, full-scope safeguards 12

13. www.csis.org | IRT-2000  Longer term projects – LEU conversion, instrumentation & control upgrade, SNF disposition  Potential activities  Participation in RERTR, Research Reactor Fuel Management conferences, IAEA symposia  Training, fellowships at similar reactors that have converted or upgraded I&C  Potential applications (1-4 years after LEU in place)  Isotope production (e.g. Mo-99)  Education & training  Neutron Activation Analysis  Silicon Transmutation Doping  Neutron Radiography  Neutron Scattering 13

14. www.csis.org | Proliferation Prevention Program @ www.csis.org ssquassoni@csis.org 202 775-3293 Contact information 14