PHIL/RS 335 Divine Nature Pt. 2: Divine Omniscience

Back to the Summa  The issue that animates Aquinas in this question of the Summa is the compatibility of contingency with God’s knowledge.  The contingent is that which is neither necessary nor impossible, but which could or could not be.  This is an issue because the doctrine of divine omniscience appears to either be contradicted by contingency or to make contingency impossible.  Aquinas is primarily concerned to address the first of these problems; the second is addressed mostly backhandedly.

The Objections 1.God’s knowledge is necessary and as such, the objects of his knowledge are necessary, but that rules out the possibility that God’s knowledge is of future contingent things. 2.Any conditional statement of God’s knowledge (If…then…) is also necessary and thus God cannot know the truth of any contingent conditional statement. 3.No future contingent thing can be necessarily known, but everything known by God must necessarily be, so God cannot know any contingent future thing.

Aquinas’s Solution  Aquinas’s response to to the possible contradiction between the necessity of God’s knowledge and contingency should be familiar.  He insists on a distinction between senses of contingency.  An event may be contingent inasmuch as it is considered independent of any causal chain, just as it is.  An event may be contingent “as it is in its cause,” that is as incompletely causally determined.  Aquinas insists that God knows both, but not as we do (in the temporal unfolding or the causal relations).  God’s knowledge is sub species aeternitatis (10c2-11c1)  In other words, the development of causal relations which we experience in time, are known by God in the present (there is no future or past for God)

Davison, “Divine Knowledge”  Davison is more directly concerned with the second of the issues noted above: Does divine omniscience rule out contingency (and thus, human freedom).  Davison begins with a few presuppositions.  Knowledge = Justified True Belief (where the question of what justifies a belief is an open question).  Is this how God knows? I have to have a reason for having my true belief, but does God? This is of particular concern when the knowledge is about the world.  Freedom is typically understood as a lack of compulsion. This could be true in one of two ways.  My act could be causally undetermined (incompatibilism).  My act could be causally determined, but not in a way that undermines my freedom (compatibilism).

Omniscience and Compatibilism  Clearly, a compatibilist theory of freedom is consistent with the doctrine of divine omniscience.  But, is compatibilism defensible? Doesn’t the concept of freedom require the possibility of alternative actions, precluding the possibility of determination?  Given the determinateness of past events, and the causal force of the laws of nature, no alternative future is possible. If P & Q are necessary and P & Q imply R, R is necessary.  One important reason to deny compatibilism is the possibility of moral evaluation. Responsibility seems to require freedom. I can’t be blamed if I didn’t freely choose my act. But if I’m causally determined to act, can I be said to choose freely, and if not can I be blamed (or praised) for the things I do?

Omniscience and Incompatibilism  Holding on to an incompatibilist account of human freedom seems to require denying God’s omniscience.  Consider: If God knew/knows that at this moment you would be sitting in class, then how could you be said to freely choose to be here?  One way to answer this is suggested by Augustine (14) who distinguishes knowing from causing. For Augustine, knowledge does not equal determination.  However, as Davison highlights, there’s something very odd about this distinction. If God knows something is going to happen, doesn’t it have to happen?

Is God Fallible?  Another possibility stressed by the incompatibilist references the incompatibility of knowledge and error. If you know something, you can’t be wrong about it.  One way out of the incompatibalist’s dilemma is to suggest that God’s foreknowledge of your acts is fallible. That is, God might believe that you would be sitting here now, but God could be wrong about that. You could have chosen differently.  Obviously, this is an alternative that will be unattractive to the traditional theist, so it seems we must conclude that either we are not free or God doesn’t know everything.

What about Aquinas  As we say above, Aquinas tries to defuse this problem by locating divine knowledge outside of time.  As Davison suggests, though this solves certain problems, it doesn’t seem to speak directly to the dilemma posed by human freedom.  Additionally, there are reasons why theists and non-theists alike are appropriately suspicious of this claim.  How can God do things in time if he is out of time?  The atemporality of God seems inconsistent with biblical depictions of God.

Omniscience and Providence  Another concern that emerges in this discussion is the relationship between omniscience and God’s providential nature.  Presumably, God can act in such a way to preserve us from harm. But if God knows we are going to come to harm, then his providential power is useless.  Molinism is an attempt to respond to this by distinguishing different types of knowledge.  Natural Knowledge refers to knowledge of necessary truths over which God has no control.  Free Knowledge refers to knowledge of contingent truths over which God has complete control.  Middle Knowledge refers to knowledge of contingent truths over which God has no control.  Middle Knowledge is knowledge of possibilities, and given this sort of knowledge, God can providentially arrange things so that certain types of eventualities will not occur.  As Davison notes, this solves the problem, but only at the cost of introducing another difficult question: how does God get middle knowledge.

An Open Future  In the face of these problems, some Theists have tried to hold on to God’s omniscience in a limited sense.  Advocates of the Open future view build off of the concept of Middle Knowledge to argue that while God knows all of the possibilities, he’s fuzzy on the details.  This seems to leave open the possibility of an incompatibilist treatment of freedom, while still preserving a sense of God’s omniscience.  However, traditional theists disagree with the limitations imposed by the view.