UNEP 26/4/04 1 The fishing capacity problem and its management David Agnew 47 Princes Gate, London

UNEP 26/4/04 2 Definitions and measurement OVERCAPACITY is, for a given resource condition, the situation where the amount of fish that can be caught over a period of time by the fully utilised (unconstrained) fleet is greater than required to ensure a target level of sustainable exploitation. C t = q.E.B t B t+1 = p(B t ) + R t - C t –using CPUE, E, B characterise q for fleets –Estimate maximum possible Cmax –Cmax should be <= YMAX

UNEP 26/4/04 3 Causes of overcapacity Non-maleable capital Open access creates individual incentives Government intervention (subsidies) – in and out Overseas subsidies – export of capital in access agreements Technology developments – effort creep Management systems –That encourage capital stuffing/race to fish –With intrinsic boom/bust cycle mismatches Unstable management reference points – MSY

UNEP 26/4/04 4 Example – North sea cod Subsidised building

UNEP 26/4/04 5 Unstable management systems Arctic cod Management by output control (TAC) assumes full knowledge and compliance Output management does not usually track capacity (or q) YMAX should be limit not target reference point

UNEP 26/4/04 6 Consequences Economic waste Resource overexploitation Capital transfer – exporting the problem IUU Discarding, highgrading, blackfish Overcapacity problems often negate all other management attempts, eg ecosystem based management

UNEP 26/4/04 7 Management of capacity IPOA –Efficient transparent and equitable management of capacity by 2003 (!) or 2005

UNEP 26/4/04 8 Incentive blocking Limited entry Non-domestic capacity Buy back Gear and vessel restrictions, catch limits TACs Easy to implement, particularly suited to mixed developing country fisheries Combinations of limited entry & TAC work but require monitoring Encourage competition and race to fish – likely to end up here again!

UNEP 26/4/04 9 Incentive adjusting ITQs ITEQ individually transferable effort quotas Taxes & royalties Territorial user rights to fish (TURF) Saving (rather than recapitalising) supra-normal profits Inspire responsibility/ stewardship Remove incentives to overcapitalise Complex to implement

UNEP 26/4/04 10 Conclusions Monitor and continually adjust capacity Move away from YMAX brinkmanship Change management approaches to deal with boom- bust Subsidies …. Refs: Report of the technical working group on the management of capacity, FAO fish tech papers 386 & 409.