Chapter 4: Security Policies Overview The nature of policies What they cover Policy languages The nature of mechanisms Types Secure vs. precise Underlying.

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Chapter 4: Security Policies Overview The nature of policies What they cover Policy languages The nature of mechanisms Types Secure vs. precise Underlying both Trust Computer Security: Art and Science © Matt Bishop

Security Policy Policy partitions system states into: Authorized (secure) These are states the system can enter Unauthorized (nonsecure) If the system enters any of these states, it’s a security violation Secure system Starts in authorized state Never enters unauthorized state Breach of security Occurs when a system enters an unauthorized state Computer Security: Art and Science © Matt Bishop

Confidentiality X set of entities, I information I has confidentiality property with respect to X if no x  X can obtain information from I I can be disclosed to others Example: X set of students I final exam answer key I is confidential with respect to X if students cannot obtain final exam answer key Computer Security: Art and Science © Matt Bishop

Integrity X set of entities, I information I has integrity property with respect to X if all x  X trust information in I Types of integrity: trust I, its conveyance and protection (data integrity) I information about origin of something or an identity (origin integrity, authentication) I resource: means resource functions as it should (assurance) Computer Security: Art and Science © Matt Bishop

Availability X set of entities, I resource I has availability property with respect to X if all x  X can access I Types of availability: traditional: x gets access or not quality of service: promised a level of access (for example, a specific level of bandwidth) and not meet it, even though some access is achieved Computer Security: Art and Science © Matt Bishop

Policy versus mechanism A security mechanism is an entity or procedure that enforces some part of the security policy. e.g. a corporation’s policy indicates that all transactions related to a specific product must be completely confidential. Only Alice and Jenny are allowed to perform the transactions on behalf of the clients The data is tape backed-up everyday and the tapes are kept secure in an off-site location. Computer Security: Art and Science © Matt Bishop

Policy Models Abstract description of a policy or class of policies Represents a particular policy or set of policies Computer Security: Art and Science © Matt Bishop

Types of Security Policies Military (governmental) security policy Policy primarily protecting confidentiality Commercial security policy Policy primarily protecting integrity Confidentiality policy Policy protecting only confidentiality Integrity policy Policy protecting only integrity Computer Security: Art and Science © Matt Bishop

Integrity and Transactions Begin in consistent state “Consistent” defined by specification Perform series of actions (transaction) Actions cannot be interrupted If actions complete, system in consistent state If actions do not complete, system reverts to beginning (consistent) state Computer Security: Art and Science © Matt Bishop

Role of “trust” Confidentiality policies No trust in the object itself (can the object be believed?) Policy dictates whether or not the object can be disclosed Integrity policies Indicate how much an object can be trusted. How is the level of trust assigned? e.g.: new version of software is obtained High integrity (trust the vendor) Low integrity (not tested on local system) Medium integrity (trust the vendor, but also test on local system) Integrity policies more dependent on the “trust” factor. Computer Security: Art and Science © Matt Bishop

Trust When one understands the assumptions the security policies, mechanisms, and procedures rest on, then one gets a good understanding how effective those policies, mechanisms, and procedures are. Computer Security: Art and Science © Matt Bishop

Trust in Formal Verification Gives formal mathematical proof that given input i, program P produces output o as specified Suppose a security-related program S formally verified to work with operating system O What are the assumptions? Computer Security: Art and Science © Matt Bishop

Types of Access Control Discretionary Access Control (DAC) individual user sets access control mechanism to allow or deny access to an object Identity-based access control (IBAC) Mandatory Access Control (MAC) system mechanism controls access to object, and individual cannot alter that access Rule-based access control Originator Controlled Access Control (ORCON) originator (creator) of information controls who can access information Computer Security: Art and Science © Matt Bishop