Critical Theory and Philosophy “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it” Marx, Theses on Feuerbach

2 Critical Theory and Philosophy Philosophy considers itself an independent discipline concerned solely with an analysis of “the structure of reality” (5). With Critical Theory, the task of explaining the structure of reality is to be accomplished by explaining “the totality of man and his world in terms of his social being” (ibid.). Critical Theory is not to be thought of as a philosophy, even though its concerns have been about both philosophical and social issues.

3 Critical Theory and Philosophy Critical theory is concerned with human happiness (flourishing), through transforming the material conditions of existence (5). Its goal is to arrive at a “rational organization of society … by analysis [i.e. a critique] of economic and political conditions in the given historical situation” (ibid.). Can such a rational organization of society—i.e. one in which human flourishing available to all— be realized in any historical situation?

4 Critical Theory and Philosophy The ‘rational organization of society’ is not a theoretical endeavour; rather it is to be brought about by the “free creation of liberated individuals” (6). There are two issues: First, the realisation of this goal—the realisation of Reason—is a matter of doing, and not merely thinking. Second, why is it important for Marcuse to emphasize that the realization of such a society is brought about by the “free creation of liberated individuals ”?

5 Reason and Philosophy For Philosophy, Reason is to provide “the ultimate and most general grounds of Being” (6). On this view, the external world—Reality— appears only as a material substratum, which is not yet rational because it resists Reason. The goal for Philosophy is to overcome the opposition between Reason and Reality by rendering “the structure of the world … accessible to reason, dependent on it and dominated by it” (6).

6 Reason and Philosophy In bourgeois philosophy, Reason took the form of “rational subjectivity” in which “man, the individual, was to examine and judge everything by means of the power of his knowledge” (6). Give an example of philosophical projects that would fall under this description? E.g. Kant’s discussion of synthetic a priori propositions

7 Reason and freedom In these philosophical endeavours, there is a presupposed relation between the concepts of Reason and freedom: “such examination and judgement would be meaningless if man were not free to act in accordance with his insight and to bring what confronts him into accordance with reason” (7). Isn’t this Kant’s idea of achieving maturing— dare to use one’s own reason?

8 Reason and freedom Problems with such a notion of ‘freedom’. First, Marcuse claims that this freedom is only a semblance of being free (7). Why? Actual transformation is not necessary, because individuals can “become rational and free within the established order” (ibid). Second, this ‘freedom’ is individualistic: “Reason and freedom become the tasks that the individual is to fulfill within himself” (italics added, 7).

9 Implications of the concept of ‘freedom’: what about necessity? That Reason and freedom are connected doesn’t mean that there are no material obstacles. How does philosophy deal with the idea of an ‘obstacle’? By recognizing material obstacles as such, external conditions become “truths of necessity” (7). E.g. when “from the start, [the cripple] always posits his needs, goals, and actions only as the needs, goals, and actions of a cripple” (ibid).

10 Reason and necessity What are some of the difficulties with the idea of ‘truths of necessity’? 1. The problem of rationalisation—think about the example of marginalised and oppressed groups 2. The problem of making no demands of the world—do the external conditions change on this view of necessity?

11 Implications of the concept of ‘freedom’: is it an individualistic task? Marcuse points out that realising reason and freedom within oneself means “the subject is rational only insofar as it is entirely self sufficient. All that is ‘other’ is alien … and as such primarily suspect. … Self-sufficiency and independence of all that is other … is the sole guarantee of the subject’s freedom. … Relating to the other in such a way that the subject really reaches and is united with [‘the other’] counts as loss and dependence” (7).

12 Implications of the individualistic task How plausible is the view that a person is rational only if he is entirely self-sufficient? First, is the position empirically correct? Are there such self-sufficient individuals? Second, conceptually, how do we become rational persons? Do we emerge fully formed like Aphrodite from the sea?

13 Philosophy and the realisation of Reason How does Reason in bourgeois philosophy establish a “community in which the rational subject participates with other rational subjects” (8)—i.e. achieve a “common life in a common world” (ibid)—when it starts with self-sufficient individuals? Only in thought. Reason is “pure” because it is disconnected from the external world: so for Marcuse, “the individual is surrendered in its untruth” in bourgeois philosophy (9).

14 Critical Theory and the realisation of Reason For Critical Theory, Reason is realised when a “rational organization of mankind” is achieved (6), i.e. “the creation of a social organization in which individuals can collectively regulate their lives in accordance with their needs” (9). “The philosophical ideals of a better world and of true Being are incorporated into the practical aim of struggling mankind, where they take on a human form” (9). When this is achieved, there is no need for philosophy.

15 The predictive value of Critical Theory Recall, critical theory is concerned with human happiness (flourishing)—to arrive at a rational organization of society through transforming the material conditions of existence (5). A possible objection: What if the ‘predictions’ made by critical theory do not materialize? Has critical theory been defeated? Marcuse: “Little as the theory’s truth is thereby contradicted, it nevertheless appears then in a new light which illuminates new aspects and elements of its object” (10).

16 Critical Theory and Science Wait a minute—what is a theory supposed to do? Make predictions, right. If the prediction is falsified, shouldn’t the theory be rejected? Logical form: 1. If T, then P 2. ~ P 3. Therefore, ~ T So does Marcuse commit a logical mistake in his comment on p. 10?

17 Critical Theory and Science First, the logical form of the argument—Popper’s idea of falsification—though valid does not give an adequate account of testing theories Theories are tested against a background of initial conditions and auxiliary hypotheses 1. If T and A, then P 2. ~ P 3. Therefore, ~ (T and A) = ~T or ~ A That is, either the theory is false or the assumption is false.

18 Critical Theory and Science Perhaps the assumptions made about contemporary society by critical theory isn’t precise enough … back to the drawing board. For some, this response is unsatisfactory … Because one can always go back to the drawing board (to save the theory at all cost) However, there is another response available. We will consider that next class.