NIST Voting Program Page 1 NIST Voting Program Lynne Rosenthal National Institute of Standards and Technology

NIST Voting Program Page 2 Today’s Discussion  Overview of Activities  Tasks  NIST developed Test Suites  VVSG 2005 Revision  Threat Analysis on UOCAVA Voting Systems

NIST Voting Program Page 3 Tasks Standards Assist with comment resolution of VVSG ‘07 Recommendations Assist in producing VVSG 2005 Revision  Test Suites development  UOCAVA research Research - future voting systems innovations TGDC chair and provide technical support NVLAP lab assessments/re-assessments

NIST Voting Program Page 4 NIST Test Suites Set of Test Suites for VVSG Recommendations Different test suites for HFP, Security, Core functionality Public test suites promotes transparency, consistency, reduces costs Extensive reviews (critical) Beta review: experts, test labs, TGDC and election officials with expertise Public review: planned for March Updates/revisions due to comments, VVSG changes

NIST Voting Program Page 5 VVSG 2005 Revision Reviewed VVSG Rec. requirements for suitability for inclusion in a VVSG 2005 Revision Work with EAC on integrating requirements into Revision Resolve relevant VVSG Rec. comments Resolve issues of terminology and format/structure Adapt test suites

NIST Voting Program Page 6 UOCAVA Voting - Report Overview (1) Threat Analysis for UOVAVA Voting Systems Looks at using different transmission methods Postal mail, telephone, fax, , web-based Splits voting process into 3 stages Voter registration/ballot request (e.g., FPCA) Ballot delivery Ballot return

NIST Voting Program Page 7 UOCAVA Voting - Report Overview (2) Threat analysis performed for each transmission option at each stage Analysis based on NIST SP Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems Identified mitigating security controls, where possible Both technical and procedural controls Security controls taken from NIST SP Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems

NIST Voting Program Page 8 UOCAVA Voting: Initial Conclusions (1) Registration and Ballot Request Main concern: handling/transmitting sensitive voter information Threats to electronic transmission can be mitigated through technical controls and procedures Threats to and web-based system pose greater security challenges Blank Ballot Delivery Main concerns: reliable delivery, integrity of ballots Threats to electronic transmission can be mitigated through technical controls and procedures Electronic ballot accounting more difficult than with physical ballots

NIST Voting Program Page 9 Voted Ballot Return Main concerns: reliable delivery, privacy, integrity of voter selections Electronic methods pose significant challenges Fax presents fewest challenges, but limited privacy protection Threats to telephone, , and web voting more serious and challenging to overcome UOCAVA Voting: Initial Conclusions (2)

NIST Voting Program Page 10 EAC/NIST will define the scope of the next phase: Write guidelines for sending/receiving registration/request materials and blank ballots Develop high-level system goals and strategies for electronic ballot return Next Steps

NIST Voting Program Page 11 Recent Reports NIST Voting Site: vote.nist.gov A Threat Analysis on UOCAVA Voting Systems Guidelines for Using Color in Voting Systems Style Guide for Voting System Documentation Review of the gap between instructions for voting and best practice in providing instructions Guidelines for Writing Clear Instructions for Voters & Poll Workers

NIST Voting Program Page 12 Lynne Rosenthal National Institute of Standards and Technology