Is Sampled Data Sufficient for Anomaly Detection Ip Wing Chung Peter (05133660) Ngan Sze Chung (05928650)

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Presentation transcript:

Is Sampled Data Sufficient for Anomaly Detection Ip Wing Chung Peter ( ) Ngan Sze Chung ( )

Abstract Traffic Measurement in Network is important  Network management  Anomaly detection for security analysis Detect all packet trace?  The most accurate  Consume network resources  Affect normal traffic Router ARouter B Monitor Sampling a point-to-point link

Abstract Sampling Technique  Conserve network resources  How many samples?  Sampling techniques vs Anomalies detection algorithm

Abstract Introduction Background and Methods Impact of Sampling on Volume Anomaly Detection Impact of Sampling on Portscan Detection Conclusion and Future Work

Introduction Aim  To study the impact of sampling on anomaly detection Objective  To study 4 existing sampling techniques  To study 3 common anomaly detection algorithm  To simulate the result by inputting the sampled data to detect the anomalies  To evaluate the impact of sampling on anomaly detection algorithm

Background and Methods Sampling Volume Anomaly Detection Portscan Detection Trace Data Methodology

Sampling Random packet sampling  Sample a packet with a small probability r < 1  Classify sampled packets into flows based on source/destination, IP/port, protocol  Flow terminated by timeout (1 min), or explicit TCP semantics (FIN)

Sampling Random packet sampling  Simple to implement  Low CPU power and memory requirement  Inaccurate for flow statistic

Sampling Random flow sampling  Sample a flow with a small probability p < 1  Improve accuracy for flow statistic  Classifies packet into flows first  Prohibitive memory and CPU power

Sampling Smart sampling  Sample a flow of size x with a probability p(x)  Determined by threshold z (e.g. z = 40000)  Bias towards large flows Flow 1, 40 bytes Flow 2, bytes Flow 3, 8196 bytes Flow 4, bytes Flow 5, 532 bytes Flow 6, 4000 bytes sample with 100% probability sample with 0.1% probability sample with 10% probability Where z is a threshold that trades off accuracy

Sampling Sample-and-hold (S&H)

Sampling Sample-and-hold (S&H)  Flow table lookup If found, flow entry gets updated by all the subsequent packets once it is created in S&H table If not found, flow entry created with a probability p (e.g. p = 1/3 on previous case)  Sampling biased toward “elephant” flows

Volume Anomaly Detection Detect Network traffic anomalies (e.g. DoS attack)  Abrupt changes in packet or flow count measurements  Induces volume anomalies Discrete wavelet transform (DWT) based detection  Proved to be effective at detecting volume anomalies

DWT-Based Detection Applies wavelet decomposition on packet or flow time series Detect volume change at various time scale 3 steps  Decomposition  Re-synthesis  Detection

DWT-Based Detection Decomposition  Decompose original signal to identify changes  DWT calculate wavelet coefficient high pass filter low pass filter original signal

DWT-Based Detection Re-synthesis  Aggregated into high, mid and low bands  Low-band signal  slow-varying trends  High-band signal  highlight sudden variations  Mid-band  sum of the rest

DWT-Based Detection Detection  Compute variance of high and mid-band signals over a time interval  Deviation score =  If deviation score is higher than a predefined threshold are marked as volume anomalies local variance global variance

Portscan Dectection 2 online portscan detection techniques Threshold Random Walk (TRW) Time Access Pattern Scheme (TAPS)

Threshold Random Walk (TRW) 2 Hypothesis H 0 : a source is a “normal” host H 1 : a source is a scanner Rationale: A normal host is far more likely to have successful connection than a scanner which randomly probes address space.

Threshold Random Walk (TRW) Hypotheses testing on sequence of events To determine which hypothesis is more likely let Y = {Y 1, Y 2,..., Y i } represent the random vector of connections observed from a source, where Y i = 0 if the i th connection is successful and Y i = 1 otherwise

Threshold Random Walk (TRW) Likelihood Ratio: When the Likelihood Ratio crosses either one of two predefined thresholds, the corresponding hypothesis is selected as the most likely. requires ~6 observed events to detect scanners successfully

Threshold Random Walk (TRW) TRWSYN - backbone adaptation of TRW Backbone traffic usually uni-directional Difficult to predict “failed” / “succeeded” connection TRWSYN oracle: Marks single SYN-packet flows as failed connection Detect TCP portscan ONLY

Time Access Pattern Scheme (TAPS) Access Pattern Observation:Scanner initiates connections to a larger spread of  destination IP addresses (horizontal scan)  port numbers (vertical scan) That means, ratio γ between distinct IP addresses and port number is larger for scanner.

Time Access Pattern Scheme (TAPS) Hypotheses test, similar to TRW. Single packet flow  failed connection Each time bin (say i), for each source, compute ratio γ, compare with predefine threshold k. Event variable Yi = 0 if γ<k 1 if γ>=k Update Likelihood Ratio

Trace Data 2 Links in Tier-1 ISP’s Backbone network  2 OC-48 links between backbone routers on West Coast and East Coast  BB-West: Large percentage of scanning traffic  BB-East: Large Volume Collected by IPMON

Methodology 4 sampling schemes use different parameters Require common metric for fair comparison We choose: Different in:  Memory requirement  CPU utilization Percentage of sampled flows

Methodology Note:  Although fixed percentage of sampled flows  Smart sampling & Sample-and-Hold bias towards Large flows

Impact of Sampling on Volume Anomaly Detection Volume Anomaly Detection Result Feature Variation Due to Sampling

Detection from the original trace

Total 21 abrupt changes from original trace No. of detection ↓ as sampling interval ↑ Random flow sampling performs the best Smart sampling & Sample-and-hold drops much faster No false positive in detection

Feature Variation Due to Sampling Difference in performance on detection  Most volume spikes caused by a sudden increase in small packet flows  Random flow sampling is unbiased by flow size  Others are biased by large flows  Smart sampling and Sample-and-hold designed to track heavy hitters  Poor performance compare to packet sampling

Feature Variation Due to Sampling No false positives  Simply, spike in samples must have existed in the original trace  Not an artifact of sampling  Sampling only ↓ no. of detection and not cause any false detection

Feature Variation Due to Sampling No. of detection ↓ as sampling interval ↑ even in random flow sampling Technique based on no. of sampled event and local variance Hypothesize sampling introduces distortion in variance Success Fail

Feature Variation Due to Sampling Sampling introduce distortion in variance  Sampling scale down original time series by a fraction of p  Assume variance = and average rate =  New scaled-down variance  Sampling involves removal of discrete point  i.e. Sample original point process binomially  Total variance Binomial random var.

Feature Variation Due to Sampling  Total variance removal of discrete pt. scaled-down variance > 70% when N = 500 Affect Detection !

Impact of Sampling on Portscan Dectection Metrics Desirable to have HIGH R s and LOW R f+ Focus on Success and False Positive Ratio (because R s +R f- =1)

Impact of Sampling on Portscan Dectection Challenge: Determine true scanners Final list of scanners manually generated by Sridharan (in Impact of Packet Sampling on Portscan Detection) as the ground truth Less interested in absolute accuracy Relative performance as a function of sampling scheme and sampling rate

TRWSYN under Sampling R s and R f+ ratios for the BB-West trace as functions of effective sampling interval for all four sampling schemes

TRWSYN under Sampling Random Packet Sampling  As base case for comparison Success Ratio R s Initially increases slightly for small N (seems advantageous) Drop off for Large N

TRWSYN under Sampling False Positive Ratio R f+ Follows similar behaviour as Rs  but Larger scale  Increases 3 times when N from 1 to 10 Random Packet Sampling  As base case for comparison

TRWSYN under Sampling 2 key effects of packet sampling Flow-reduction  Number of flows observed reduced Flow-shortening  Multi-packet flows reduced to single packet flows Recall: TRWSYN algorithm Single SYN packet flow  connection failure  potential scanner

TRWSYN under Sampling Small sampling interval Flow-reduction  slight impact  High R s Flow-shortening  substantial impact  ↑single packet flow Impact:  Scanners’ multi-packet flows initially missed  shortened  Detected  Increase R s  Regular multi-packet flows  shortened  “Detected”  Increase R f+

TRWSYN under Sampling Large sampling interval Flow-reduction dominates Fewer decisions (detections) R s and R f+ decrease

TRWSYN under Sampling 3 Flow sampling schemes Decision based on entire flow  No Flow-shortening  Flow- Reduction dominates the impact Exception: Sample-and-Hold  Mid-Flow-Shortening  Decision only made on SYN packet flows  Introduce NO False Positive

TRWSYN under Sampling Both R s and R f+ decrease almost monotonically as N increases R f+ lower than packet sampling

TRWSYN under Sampling In terms of R f+ Flow sampling >> Packet sampling In terms of Rs, Random Flow Sampling > Random Packet Sampling > Smart Sampling > Sample-and- Hold Cause:  Bias towards Large Flows  Suffer more from Flow-reduction

TAPS under Sampling Critical parameter: Time Bin For each sampling scheme, each sampling rate, Use Optimal Time Bin  Maximize R s  Increasing function of sampling interval  True for both Packet sampling and Flow sampling schemes

TAPS under Sampling Results of portscan detection with TAPS for Trace BB-West

TAPS under Sampling R s decreases as sampling interval increases Random Flow Sampling performs the best Random Packet Sampling performs as well as the remaining 2 Flow sampling schemes Cause:  Bias towards Large Flows  Tend to miss small (critical) flows

TAPS under Sampling Random Packet Sampling  R f+ intially increases due to Flow-shortening  Then drop off at large sampling interval due to Flow-reduction Flow Sampling schemes  No/Minor Flow-shortening Low R f+ Monotonically decreases with sampling interval

TAPS under Sampling TAPS uses address range distribution for detection Insensitive to the 4 schemes No distortion introduced Low R f+ e.g. Random Packet Sampling yields 1/10 of R f+ by TRWSYN

Conclusion Random Flow Sampling  Performs the best  Prohibitive resource requirement Random Packet Sampling  Suffers from Flow-shortening Smart Sampling & Sample-and-Hold  Bias towards large flows  Perform poorer than Random Packet Sampling in volume anomaly detection

Conclusion All 4 sampling schemes Degrade all 3 anomaly detection algorithms In terms of R s and R f+ Sampled Data Sufficient for Anomaly Detection?  Remains an Open Question