Network Embedded Systems Technology (NEST)

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Presentation transcript:

Network Embedded Systems Technology (NEST) Extreme Scaling CONOPS & Sites Al Sciarretta CNS Technologies, Inc asciarretta@unconventional-inc.com

Focus Problem: Colombian Oil Pipeline 500 miles ELN (National Liberation Army) Our focus has been turned to a particular narco-terrorist target, the Cano Limon Pipeline in Northern Colombia. There are two big leftist groups in Colombia with an incentive to keep the country in chaos. The ELN and the FARC are both extremely active in this area, and both have been responsible for a number of pipeline attacks. The yellow in the picture is the ELN, and the orange. The pipeline is about 500 miles in length, which is Boston to Washington type of distance. Incidentally, pipeline protection is a big problem in the US as well, and is of current interest to DHS. There are about 300,000 miles of pipeline in the US and the US has only about 3M square miles, so there is one mile of pipeline in every 10 square miles. Although much of the pipeline is buried, it comes out of the ground frequently at unmanned, unguarded locations. FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) Cano – Limon Pipeline

Incidents/Year Incidents/Year 260 260 Year Year 1990 1995 2000 260 100 200 180 87 160 128 300 1990 1995 2000 260 100 200 180 87 160 128 300 Pipeline attacks continue to grow, reaching 260 in 2001. This basically means that the terrorists are fortunately still taking of weekends and holidays. Year Year 350% Growth from ‘97 to ‘01

The attacks are primarily in the eastern 100 miles, which is coincidentally the section which is operated by a US subsidiary of Occidental Petroleium. Each outage day represents about $1.5M in lost revenue, so there is a huge financial incentive to solve this problem. The red dots represent pipeline punctures, and the green represent pipeline dents, so every attack is not successful in terms of stopping flow. This inset chart shows the altitude…..the pipeline travels over some very mountainous areas, b ut a large fraction of the distance is in triple canopy jungle.

Surveillance of Long, Linear, Static Structures CONOPS Primary Effort Surveillance of Long, Linear, Static Structures Problem: Too vast an area for limited personnel resources (e.g., mobile guards) Hostile actions: Destruction (including explosives) Damage to pumps and transformers Stripping of copper power lines Operational Need: Reliable automated surveillance to detect movement in security zone FY04 Experiment: Sense movement of personnel and/or vehicles toward the pipeline Track the movement and the stop/start of movement Pipeline Damage in Iraq

Detection and tracking of vehicles Detection and tracking of personnel CONOPS Primary Effort Detection and tracking of vehicles Pipeline Mobile Patrol 20 km Pump Station Detection of unknowns ? Pipeline Guard Force Alerted Security Zone Detection and tracking of personnel 1 km Reaction Force

CONOPS Related Efforts "The use of small-arms fire and RPG attacks, command detonated IED's, and mortar rounds continues to increase; especially the frequency of attacks which utilize command detonated IED's daisy chained together, buried or hidden along roads and highways," L. Paul Bremer III IED = Improvised Explosive Device NEWS RELEASE HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND 7115 South Boundary Boulevard MacDill AFB, Fla. 33621-5101 Phone: (813) 827-5894; FAX: (813) 827-2211; DSN 651-5894 November 24, 2003 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE TASK FORCE “ALL AMERICAN” SOLDIERS DISRUPT ATTEMPTS TO EMPLACE IED AL FALLUJAH, Iraq—Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 16th Mechanized Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division, attached to 82nd Airborne Division, killed three enemy personnel emplacing an improvised explosive device last night at approximately 8:30 p.m. The soldiers were conducting a patrol along the intersection of Highway 1 and Highway 10 when they observed two individuals digging a hole in the median. A sedan arrived shortly after. Three personnel exited the car and began walking towards the two individuals digging. One of the individuals from the sedan was carrying a large object to the hole.

CONOPS Related Efforts Similar Long, Linear, Static Structures Surveillance of Supply Routes: Detect potential ambush sites: Personnel w/shoulder fired weapons (e.g., RPGs) IEDs FY04 Experiment: Sense movement of personnel/vehicles toward supply route, and then: They remain near a point They remain for a while and then leave Sense suspicious movement on the road Enemy Observation Point (OP) Wire to OP IED IED

CONOPS Related Efforts Similar Long, Linear, Static Structures Border Surveillance: Detect illegal border crossings: U.S. Customs Military operations in Iraq FY04 Experiment: Detect movement of personnel/vehicles across area adjacent to a border

Experiment Sites Characteristics Relatively flat, open area No forests Easier to survey/mark off 1 km x 20 km site Easier to deploy/recover sensors Easier for observers to see large section of experiment site No forests No large physical obstructions (e.g., buildings) to line-of-site communications Small obstructions (e.g., small rocks) okay Relatively good weather (little rain, light winds, etc.) Sensors can stay out for days Military base Site can be guarded Sensors deployed on day 1 and remain in place until end of experiment (days later) Potential for personnel to support deployment/recovery of sensors

Experiment Sites Candidate Sites Naval Air Weapons Facility, China Lake Being used for DARPA SensIT effort (Feb 04) 150 miles NE of Los Angeles Encompasses 1.1 million acres of land in California's upper Mojave Desert, ranging in altitude from 2,100 to 8,900 feet Varies from flat dry lake beds to rugged piñon pine covered mountains. Weather should be consistent Summer will be hot

Experiment Sites Candidate Sites Other Sites Fort Bliss, TX (near El Paso, TX) Nellis AFB (near Las Vegas, NV) NAS Fallon (near Reno, NV) Marine Corps Air to Ground Combat Center, 29Palms, California Eglin AFB (near Pensacola, FL)

Next Steps (not in sequential order) Discuss CONOPS with potential users Determine metrics Technical Operational Identify experiment data collection and logistical needs Develop Extreme Scaling Experiment Plan Ensure compliance with Extreme Scaling Integration Plan Conduct experiment site assessment Select site and coordinate/schedule resource needs Implement experiment plan