EGEE is a project funded by the European Union under contract IST-2003-508833 Grid Security Incident definition and format Yuri Demchenko, AIRG UvA JSG.

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Presentation transcript:

EGEE is a project funded by the European Union under contract IST Grid Security Incident definition and format Yuri Demchenko, AIRG UvA JSG Meeting, October 4,

JSG meeting October 4, Outline Background Grid Security Incident definition Proposed Incident Description Format Summary and next steps Additional information Goal: Provide initial information and establish common language/terminology as a basis for further cooperative development

JSG meeting October 4, Background - EGEE JRA3.4 documents Framework for establishing Incident Response Capability  Joint document with OSG/JSG/LCG/EGEE (presented by Bob Cowles) Grid Security Incident definition and exchange format  Ongoing development, current version presented as milestone Dictionary of the Computer Security and Incident Response terms (more than 100 terms) response-00.doc

JSG meeting October 4, Grid Security Incident (GSInc)  Computer Security Incident – general definition  Grid Security Incident - specifics  Grid/OGSI/OGSA threats analysis Based on Web Services threats analysis –Summary is provided at the end of this presentation –Extended analysis is available in the JRA3.4 Milestone document  Format for Grid Security Incident description As an extension to the IODEF (Incident Object Description and Exchange Format) developed by IETF INCH WG

JSG meeting October 4, From Vulnerability to Incident Vulnerability -> Exploit -> Threat -> Attack/Intrusion -> Incident Vulnerability is a flaw or weakness in a system's design, implementation, or operation and management that could be exploited to violate the system's security policy Exploit is a known way to take advantage of a specific software vulnerability Threat is a potential for violation of security, which exists when there is a circumstance, capability, action, or event that could breach security and cause harm Attack is an assault on system security that derives from an intelligent threat Incident is a result of successful Attack

JSG meeting October 4, Computer Security Incident A computer/ITC security incident is defined as any real or suspected adverse event in relation to the security of a computer or computer network. Typical security incidents within the ITC area are: a computer intrusion, a denial-of- service attack, information theft or data manipulation, etc.  An incident can be defined as a single attack or a group of attacks that can be distinguished from other attacks by the method of attack, identity of attackers, victims, sites, objectives or timing, etc. An Incident in general is defined as a security event that involves a security violation. This may be an event that violates a security policy, UAP, laws and jurisdictions, etc.  A security incident may be logical, physical or organisational, for example a computer intrusion, loss of secrecy, information theft, fire or an alarm that doesn't work properly. A security incident may be caused on purpose or by accident. The latter may be if somebody forgets to lock a door or forgets to activate an access list in a router.

JSG meeting October 4, Incident – any specifics for Grid? Grid Security Incident definition  Depends on the scope and range of the Security Policy, ULA, or SLA  Should be based on threats analysis and vulnerabilities model  Should be based on Grid processes/workflow analysis GSInc definition is a base for GSInc description format  What information should be collected and how to exchange and handle it Requirements to Events logging and Intrusion detection  Common format is a basis for community wide statistics and coordinated response  Incident statistics provides feedback for the Security Policy improvement

JSG meeting October 4, Grid Security Incident vs Grid Security Event Security Incident is a result of successful attempt/attack  Attempt generates security event Examples of Grid specific security events  Few sequent failed logins – far too common event everywhere What is the threshold?  WSDL probing and SOAP port scanning  Patterns of suspected private key compromise  Patterns of suspected AuthN/AuthZ security tokens compromise  Attempt to access sensitive information  Credit limit probing Event is an issue for Intrusion Detection – Incident is an issue for Incident Response

JSG meeting October 4, Types of GSInc and audit events (1) Security credentials compromise (e.g., private key, proxy cred)  patterns of credential usage  broken chain of PKC/keys/credentials  copy is discovered in not a proper place  originated not from default location  sequent fault attempt to request action(s) PDP/PEP logging/audit Remaining problems  How to define at the early stage that a private key has been compromised?  May require credentials storing (not caching) and adding history/evidence chain to credentials format X.509 credentials are not capable of this Note: Audit/log events together with related data can be also referred to as an Evidence

JSG meeting October 4, Types of GSInc and audit events (2) Attempt to access sensitive data/information with lower level of privileges  Access log, system log Credit limit on resource exhausted  Few unsuccessful attempts to run actions with unmatched credit  Access log Web Services based Security Incidents  Application server log  Security services log  Etc.

JSG meeting October 4, GSInc description format Can be based on IODEF currently being developed by IETF INCH WG -  XML based format compatible with IDMEF (for IDS)  Top level element – Incident  Incident data in EventData element - Incident/EventData Elements extended or added  EventData/Record/RecordData - extended  EventData/System/XMLWebService - new  EventData/System/Principal - new

JSG meeting October 4, IODEF top level elements EventData Element where the Grid Security Incidents data can be placed in RecordData Element

JSG meeting October 4, Principal Element

JSG meeting October 4, XMLWebService Element

JSG meeting October 4, Summary and next steps Current Grid Security Incident definition provides a basis for discussion and cooperation between software developers and operational security teams  Continue with Grid/OGSI/OGSA threats analysis  Provide requirements for logging to most software modules Proposed GSInc description format based on IODEF can provide a common Incident reporting format for OCST and GOC’s/ROC’s  Continue with GSInc format definition based on documented Grid Security Incidents Need contribution from and cooperation with GOC’s/ROC’s

JSG meeting October 4, Additional information Tools for Intrusion Detection and Incident Reporting Top ten Web applications Vulnerabilities from OWASP Web Services threats IODEF top level elements datamodel

JSG meeting October 4, Tools for Intrusion Detection and Incident Reporting Intrusion Detection automation  Snort with IDMEF support (by Silicon Defense) Benefits in simple integration, information exchange and easy outsourcing Implemented also by CERT/CC in their AirCERT distributed System More information - Incident Handling  Mostly proprietary systems with growing move to standardisation of exchange format based on IODEF  IODEF Pilot implementation CERT/CC AirCERT Automated Incident Reporting - and JPCERT/CC: Internet Scan Data Acquisition System (ISDAS) - eCSIRT.net: The European CSIRT Network -

JSG meeting October 4, Top ten Web applications Vulnerabilities from OWASP A1 - Unvalidated Input A2 - Broken Access Control A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management A4 - Cross Site Scripting (XSS) Flaws A5 - Buffer Overflows A6 - Injection Flaws A7 - Improper Error Handling A8 - Insecure Storage A9 - Denial of Service A10 - Insecure Configuration Management Reference -

JSG meeting October 4, Web Services threats Web Service interface (WSDL) probing Brute force attack on XML parsing system Malicious XML Content External Reference attacks SOAP/XML Protocol attacks Underlying transport protocol attacks Extended analysis is provided in the JRA3.4 Milestone document -

JSG meeting October 4, Web Services threats analysis (1) Web Service interface (WSDL) probing  WSDL describes the methods and parameters used to access a specific Web Services, and in this way exposes Web Service to possible attacks Brute force attack on XML parsing system  XML parsing is a resource and time consuming process. Maliciously constructed XML files may overload XML parsing system Malicious XML Content  XML documents may contain malicious parsing or processing instructions (XML Schema extensions, XPath or XQuery instructions, XSLT instructions, etc) that may alter XML parsing process  Malicious content that may carry threats to the back-end applications or hosting environment

JSG meeting October 4, Web Services threats analysis (2) External Reference attacks  This group is based on the generic ability of XML to include references to external documents or data types. Poor configuration, or improper use of external resources can be readily exploited by hackers to create DoS scenarios or information theft. SOAP/XML Protocol attacks  SOAP messaging infrastructure operates on top of network transport protocols, uses similar services for delivering and routing SOAP messages, and therefore can be susceptible to typical network/infrastructure based attacks like Denial of Service (DoS), replay or man-in-the-middle attacks. Underlying transport protocol attacks  These are actually not related to XML Web Services but directly affecting reliability of SOAP communications.

JSG meeting October 4, IODEF top level elements

JSG meeting October 4, EventData where the Grid Security Incidents data can be placed

JSG meeting October 4, RecordData Element