Lecture 3: The nature of epistemic justification

The tripartite analysis of knowledge In the last lecture we drew the tentative conclusion that knowledge is: True Justified Belief In this lecture we will investigate the justification condition. What makes a belief justified?

Epistemic versus other kinds of justification Epistemic justification is the kind of justification that turns true belief into knowledge. Epistemic justification is different from moral justification Suppose I have the true belief that “People who treat others well are happier than those who mistreat others.” Suppose further, that my holding this belief makes me a better person (morally speaking). The mere fact that my belief is morally justified in this way does not turn belief into knowledge. It is also different to pragmatic justification Beliefs are pragmatically justified if and only if they help me to achieve my goals. Suppose I hold the true belief that “I am not the worst mathematician in the class”, and that this belief gives me the confidence I need to do my best in maths class. The mere fact that it helps me achieve one of my goals does not turn this true belief into knowledge.

How are beliefs justified? In this lecture, we will briefly consider three theories on the justification of belief. These are: Coherentism Foundationalism Foundherentism

Coherentism According to coherentism, each of the beliefs in a person’s belief-system is justified the fact that it fits into the overall system. Examples to support: My belief that “The earth is round” is supported by my beliefs that: Ships disappear over the horizon as they sail away from shore. The Earth has been photographed from space and appears round. And supports my belief that: If I set off in a straight line from my current position on the Earth’s surface I will eventually end up back at my starting point.

Problems with coherentism If the coherentist is correct, then the process of building a justified belief system is like filling out a cross-word puzzle whilst ignoring the clues. The words fit together but there need not to be any connection to anything external to the puzzle itself.

Foundationalism Beliefs are justified by their relations to something other than beliefs. These other things (whatever they are) form the foundations of our belief systems. What could these other things be?

Rationalism versus empiricism What is the “something other than a belief” that justifies a belief? Rationalism says that beliefs are justified by reason (i.e. by thinking about stuff). OK, my mathematical and logical beliefs do appear to be based on reason, but my beliefs about the physical worlds are surely not based on reason alone. Empiricism says that all knowledge is ultimately justified by experience. OK, my beliefs about the physical world are based in experience, but surely my beliefs about mathematics and logic are not. This debate fits into the discussion of ways of knowing.

Problems with foundationalism Most beliefs – even the ones that are directly supported by experience – are (also) justified by their relations to other beliefs. If foundationalism is correct, it’s like we’re filling out a crossword without knowing how many letters each entry should contain, or what any of the intersecting entries are.

Foundherentism Our beliefs are justified by how well they match-up with experience and reason, and by how well they fit in with everything else we believe. In order to have justified beliefs, we need (metaphorically speaking) to take notice of both the clues, and the intersecting entries.

Special case 1: Testimony Is testimony a good basis for belief? Can I know that a statement S is true based on somebody telling me that S is true? A possible answer: In addition to receiving the testimony, I need to have a justified belief that the source of the testimony is reliable. How could such a belief be justified? Because it fits into my belief system, and my belief system fits my experience?

Special case 2: Divine Revelation Religions such as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are called “revealed religions”. This means that – at least for their adherents – they are composed of truths that have been revealed to humanity via a divine source. If I believe, for example, that Jesus is the son of God, based on (1) a belief that the New Testament says so, and (2) a belief that the New Testament is the revealed word of God, can I be justified in this belief? Couldn’t my belief in the revealed nature of the New Testament also be justified (by testimony, perhaps?)

Special case 3: Experience Suppose I have a lot of beliefs about chemistry based on the testimony of Bob. Surely I am only justified in these beliefs if I know (or at least have a justified belief) that Bob knows what he is talking about. If I want to know if Bob is a reliable source of information on chemistry, I need to do more than just ask Bob, right? I could find out by asking someone other than Bob if Bob is reliable, or by directly comparing the information I get from Bob to some other source of information on chemistry.

Special case 3: Experience We all have a lot of beliefs that are based on experience. Surely we are can only justified in these beliefs if we know (or at least have a justified belief) that experience accurately reflects the reality of the world around us. If I want to know if experience is a reliable source of information on the world, I need to do more than just ask experience, right? Can I find out if experience is reliable by directly comparing the information I get from experience to some other source of information about the world? What would this be? Could I find out by asking someone? Wouldn’t this just amount to collecting more experience?

Journal entries for this week Scientifically minded people usually take their beliefs about sub-atomic particles to be better justified than a religious person’s beliefs about God. Given that scientists cannot actually see sub-atomic particles, is this view correct?

Discussion questions for this week What is the difference between moral, pragmatic, and epistemic justifications for beliefs? In what subject areas does rational insight seem to be the central “way of knowing”? In what subject areas does experience seem to be the central “way of knowing”? Does our reliance on experience amount to mere faith? Or are we justified in trusting our senses?

Reading for next week Dombrowski et al, Theory of Knowledge Course Companion … Read the section “Knowledge claims: tests for truth” (pages )