2011/12/20 1 Tongbo Luo, Hao Hao, Wenliang Du, Yifei Wang, and Heng Yin Syracuse University ACSAC 2011.

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Presentation transcript:

2011/12/20 1 Tongbo Luo, Hao Hao, Wenliang Du, Yifei Wang, and Heng Yin Syracuse University ACSAC 2011

Agenda  Introduction  WebView  Threat Models  Attacks from Web Pages  Attack from Malicious Apps  Case Studies  Conclusion 2011/12/20 2

Introduction  WebView - enabling smartphone and tablet (both in Android & iOS) apps to embed a simple but powerful browser inside them WebView  Two Web's security infrastructure are weakened  Trusted Computing Base (TCB) at the client side Trusted Computing Base (TCB)  Sandbox protection implemented by browsers 2011/12/20 3

Introduction  Two objectives of Sandbox:  Same-Origin Policy(SOP) Same-Origin Policy(SOP)  Isolate web pages from the system and isolate the web pages of one origin from those of another 2011/12/20 4

WebView(1/4)  WebView is a subclass of View, and it is used to display web pages  It enables apps to interact with the web content through its APIs  From apps to web pages  From web pages to apps  three types of interactions  Event monitoring  Invoke Java from JavaScript  Invoke JavaScript from Java 2011/12/20 5

WebView(2/4)  Event monitoring 2011/12/20 6

WebView(3/4)  Invoke Java from JavaScript 2011/12/20 7

WebView(4/4)  Invoke JavaScript from Java 2011/12/20 8

Threat Models  Attacks from Malicious Web Pages 2011/12/20 9

Threat Models  Attacks from Malicious Apps 2011/12/20 10

Attacks from Web Pages(1/3)  Through holes on the sandbox  all pages loaded in the WebView can call the same interface  DroidGap DroidGap  Still need permission 2011/12/20 11

Attacks from Web Pages(2/3)  Through Frame Confusion 2011/12/20 12 Public class CameraLauncher{ public void failPicture(String paramString){

Attacks from Web Pages(3/3)  Through Frame Confusion 2011/12/20 13

Attack from Malicious Apps(1/3)  JavaScript Injection  Event Sniffing and Hijacking 2011/12/20 14

Attack from Malicious Apps(2/3)  JavaScript Injection  Android app can inject arbitrary JavaScript code into the pages loaded by the WebView component.  Extracting Information From WebView 2011/12/20 15

Attack from Malicious Apps(3/3)  Event Sniffing and Hijacking  WebView exposes an umber of hooks to Android apps, allowing them to intercept events, and potentially change the consequences of events.  redirct URL 2011/12/20 16

Case Studies  The goal is not to look for malicious or vulnerable apps, but instead to study how Android apps use WebView.  Usage of WebViewUsage of WebView  Usage of the WebView Hooks Usage of the WebView Hooks  Usage of addJavascriptInterface Usage of addJavascriptInterface  Dex2jarDex2jar 2011/12/20 17

Conclusion  In our on-going work, we are developing solutions to secure WebView  The goal is to defend against the attacks on WebView by building desirable security features in WebView. 2011/12/20 18

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