IETF 65, Dallas, TX1 Introduction to SSP Jim Fenton 22 March 2006.

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IETF 65, Dallas, TX1 Introduction to SSP Jim Fenton 22 March 2006

2 IETF 65, Dallas, TX SSP – The Name Originally “Sender Signing Policy” “Sender Signing Practices” probably a better name Avoids over-use of the word “policy” More descriptive and less prescriptive – this is the intent But SSP is really correlated with Originator Address Should it be “Originator Signing Practices”?

3 IETF 65, Dallas, TX SSP – The Intent Suppose a verifier gets an unsigned message from example.com It would be helpful to know whether example.com normally signs their mail If it does, and this message isn’t signed, it’s “suspicious”

4 IETF 65, Dallas, TX Suspicious Used to describe messages that aren’t consistent with an originator’s signing practices Intentionally vague – doesn’t say anything about what to do Some legitimate messages will likely be suspicious Messages through lists that munge messages and don’t re-sign them It’s probably not good to over-react to suspicious messages Deleting them outright, without considerable experience

5 IETF 65, Dallas, TX Originator Address The address in the From header field i.e., the author of the message [RFC ] Not the Purported Responsible Address Absent a valid signature, there is no purported responsibility, as far as DKIM is concerned This has nothing to do with IPR issues!

6 IETF 65, Dallas, TX Third-Party Signatures Sometimes intermediaries modify message content Mailing lists do this a lot Some applications “legitimately” spoof addresses “Mail this article to a friend” Third-party signatures allow third parties such as these to take responsibility for the message Acceptance of arbitrary third-party signatures is arguably a huge security hole!

7 IETF 65, Dallas, TX Finding the SSP SSP is found using the origination address in the message example.com SSP is located at _policy._domainkey.example.com SSP lookup is not needed if a valid origination address signature is found SSP only offers information that is relevant in its absence

8 IETF 65, Dallas, TX SSP Policies …er… Practices* Symbol Proposed NameMeaning ~NEUTRALSigns some mail -STRONGSigns all mail !EXCLUSIVESigns all mail; third-party signatures should not be considered valid.NEVEREntity never sends mail ^USERRepeat query at user level * As of draft-allman-dkim-ssp-01

9 IETF 65, Dallas, TX Some SSP issues Questions about cryptic “SPF-like” syntax Suggested additional practices: “I don’t sign anything” “I don’t sign everything, but don’t accept third-party sigs” Concerns about not consulting SSP if valid OA sig Reporting address (r=) tag Localpart only (to avoid directing complaints elsewhere)? Is a reporting address even appropriate?