This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium This project is funded by the European Union Projekat finansira Evropska Unija Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Projekat realizuje Human Dynamics Konzorcijum PROTECTION ACTIONS IN EXTERNAL EMERGENCY PLANS Antony Thanos Ph.D. Chem. Eng.

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Protection Actions options  Shelter in place  Evacuation  Selection of protection actions must take into account :  Effects type  Zone definition (severity of effects)  Zones extent  Accident dynamics  Variability of wind direction (for toxics)  Area characteristics (presence of vulnerable places etc.)

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Shelter in place characteristics  Rather easily applied  Required proper warning to population especially for close areas  Very important the provision of information/training material to population around establishments during normal conditions, so that population is better prepared for emergencies, especially at early stages before official information/guidance is provided  Possibly the least risky action for areas not very close to accident

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Evacuation characteristics  Requires extensive coordination of multiple agencies for proper implementation oProvision on-time of transportation means oProtection equipment required for personnel involved, especially if attempted in close distance (as in toxic releases) oTemporary shelter locations with basic facilities (sanitary etc.) required to have been defined during planning at safe distance. Such shelter operation should be used for up to 6 hours. After, more permanent solutions (i.e. hiring hotel rooms or tent settlements) must be applied

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Evacuation characteristics (cont.)  Hard to apply. Harder or impossible to apply on-time if vulnerable places are involved (as for example, hospitals)  More easily applied on accidents with long duration, with the shelter in place as initial measure taken  Sometimes the only option, as for area within BLEVE radius, nevertheless, the risk of expression of BLEVE during evacuation (especially if not assisted) can read to increased casualties to people in the streets and to injuries/deaths due to fragments produced

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Evacuation characteristics (cont.)  Implementation of evacuation for toxics dispersion should take into account wind direction. Places for concentration of public during evacuation should be located in upwind or crosswind directions

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Emergency Zones definition example (Greece case)

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Accident effects type  Thermal radiation (pool fire, fire ball/BLEVE) oStaying out of site of flame (as for shelter in place or behind buildings) is effective, even in close locations oFor long duration accident (pool fire), shelter in place is adequate oBut you have to be out of flame envelope (out of fireball radius for BLEVE accidents) oEvacuation must be attempted, especially in early stage, only for potential escalation to BLEVE, with priority to fireball radius and then to Zone I extents

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Accident effects type (cont.)  Overpressure (UVCE) oZones typically defined for effects to structures oDefinition of overpressure thresholds should take into account type of structures encountered in country (wooden, concrete/brick constructions) oZone I is considered as highly critical, as collapse of structures are expected

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Accident effects type (cont.) Toxics dispersion oTime duration : variable depending on release type (continuous or “instantaneous”) oExposure requires being in open space oShelter in place can provide sufficient protection even for close distance, in case of no-prolonged releases and if no prior explosions have destroyed windows oProlonged releases (several hours) will lead to gradual increase of indoors concentration, requiring later evacuation actions

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Accident effects type (cont.) Toxics dispersion (cont.) oTypical immediate evacuation (if applied) must concern downwind directions oLater evacuation actions must extent to other wind directions, based on weather forecast, in order to cover wind direction variability

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Accident consequence extent  Very extended zones cannot be managed. Typical example the case of toxic dispersion oIf very low toxic thresholds are set (as for fractions of IDLH), zones can be extended to several kilometres (no protection actions can be realistically applied)  Liquid fuels tanks thermal radiation (pool fire). Rather limited extent : oZone I-III up to m, even for very large dike fires (D dike =150 m) oZone I-III up to m, even for very large tank fires (D tank =90 m)

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Accident consequence extent (cont.)  LPGs (BLEVE, pool fire, UVCE) oVery extended zones can be present depending on tank size, examples for BLEVE effects: oZone I-III= m, for 200 m 3 tank oZone I-III= m, for 1000 m 3 tank oZone I-III= m, for 5000 m 3 tank

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Accident dynamics  Accident escalation capability : oPotential of change in accident type : Example: pool fire engulfing LPG tank. In such cases, in EEP in the relevant category (pool fire), the first words said in relevant chapter is : In case that flames are in contact with LPG tank or Domino radius includes LPG tank, the evolution of accident to BLEVE should be taken into account

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Accident dynamics (cont.)  Accident development time frame. Quite import for BLEVE accidents, as the time from initial event (jet flame/pool fire) till BLEVE expression is limited (in the order of few minutes) and unknown.  Accident duration oExplosions time duration : very short (1 sec). Typically expected at early stage of accident before EEP is activated, no potential for protection actions. After initial explosion, ignition sources in site limit the probability of further explosions

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Protection actions and relation to emergency responders oZone I : ono emergency responders should not enter without protective equipment. Typically affects police and medical service personnel oZone II-III : for pool fires, emergency responders should not enter without protective equipment or they should remain for limited time and in behind structures, as zones definition is set for exposure time of 40 sec. Traffic control should be set outside Zone III.

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Protection actions and relation to emergency responders (cont.) oZone II-III : for toxic dispersion, emergency responders should not enter without protective equipment or they should remain for limited time, as zones definition is set for exposure time of 30 min. Traffic control should be set outside Zone III.

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Generic decision table related to protection actions for public Zone ΙZone IIZone III Protection actions Evacuation Shelter in place (if evacuation is not feasible) Shelter in place Evacuation (if necessary and feasible) Shelter in place (recommendation not order)

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Some comments for protection actions implementation  Initial protection actions should focus to Zone I and then gradually extent to Zone II, III  Special attention should also be provided to early warning of public within Zone I oDecision for evacuation should balance benefits and risk for exposed public  Evacuation (especially assisted one) most probably impossible to implement at early stage of accident. As a first step, shelter in place should be considered

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Some comments for protection actions implementation (cont.)  Special case : LPG BLEVE : Immediate evacuation up to BLEVE radius  Sometimes shelter in place cannot be implemented (e.g. campings). Then immediate removal of public (assisted or not) to closed spaces (nearby homes, industries etc.) should be implemented, preferably in updwind/crosswind direction in case of toxic dispersion

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Desired special infrastructures/features for industries or vulnerable places or within zones of evacuation  local shelters  personnel training  protective equipment  direct alert signal from establishment  dedicated phone lines

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Decision for protection actions  Typically the administration head in EEP (such as Prefect)  In specific type of accidents (rapid escalation) and in the vicinity of accidents it is necessary the Scene Commander to decide on initial protection actions oTypical example, accident that can escalate to BLEVE (quite limited time available for reaction)

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Example case 1: Liquid fuels depot, dike fire  Zone I/II/III : 59 m/ 103 m/ 147 m

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Example case 1: Oil depot (cont.) oZones extent very close to establishment oZone I (59 m) : Very limited, practically includes only establishment area, evacuation related only to personnel oZone II (103 m) : Very limited, practically includes only establishment area, approaches neighbour cement distribution centre with limited personnel and very few houses (around 5). Evacuation (even not assisted) rather easily applied. o Zone III (147 m) : Limited. Includes neighbour cement distribution centre with limited personnel and few houses (around 10). Even evacuation can be attempted.

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Example case 1: Oil depot (cont.) oDepot rather close to cable bridge with significant deck height (appr.60 m). Smoke produced could affect traffic under special conditions (E-SE very strong winds). Traffic to bridge could be stopped in such cases.

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Example case 2: LPG depot  Zone I/II/III : 300 m/ 460 m/ 640 m Vulnerable places Sports facilities Schools Elderly houses Public service Other Agencies Ministry Police Fire Brigade Health service Municipality office Army Other Road network Primary Secondary Other Agencies Ministry Police Fire Brigade Health service Municipality office Army Other Vulnerable places Sports facilities Schools Elderly houses Public service Other Agencies Ministry Police Fire Brigade Health service Municipality office Army Other

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Example case 2: LPG depot (cont.)  Fireball radius (Domino radius) includes establishment area and neighbour oil depot (Seveso site) oThis is the zone for immediate evacuation oSelected neighbour Seveso site personnel should remain in close distance (hidden indoors in near company buildings or behind buildings), in order to be ready to act in case of Domino effects

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Example case 2: LPG depot (cont.)  Zone I (300 m) otwo neighbour oil depots (Seveso site) omain railroad track ocheese factory oservice station of Municipality vehicles oMunicipality garbage collection service offices/vehicle parking oshooting club oone house

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Example case 2: LPG depot (cont.)  Zone I (cont.) oIf evacuation is attempted in Zone I, selected Seveso site personnel should remain in close distance oDirect alert should be provided to railroad traffic control centre for stopping railroad traffic.  Zone II (460 m) oSeveral neighbour industries/ companies oDue to the high number of industries, best, as a first approach, is the shelter in place

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Example case 2: LPG depot (cont.)  Zone III (640 m) oSeveral industries/companies in the area oApproaching village ends oMusic club included oShelter in place is the proper action

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Example case 2: LPG depot (cont.)  Zone II and III include the main highway of area. Traffic control measures must be applied beyond the end of Zone III at distance that does not bottleneck the whole area traffic so that access to site by emergency responders is feasible.  Zones I-II-III are below of one of the approach paths to near by airport (3.5 km east). Immediate alert should be provided to airport traffic control

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Closure  No magic recipe available for protection actions  Every case has its special features, due to the specific area characteristics  Affected area identification has very high value  Especially, the application of evacuation requires high judgement based on both : ospecific area characteristics (elements under potential evacuation requirements) oaccident dynamics, as observed by emergency responders.