J Jensen CCLRC RAL Data Management AUZN (mostly about SRM though) GGF 16, Athens J Jensen

CCLRC RAL GIN! Gimme Interoperability Now!! SRB ISLANDSRM ISLAND

J Jensen CCLRC RAL SRB - IANASRBE SRB is not SRM –Different aims, different users –SRB provides its own Data Grid AUCN: –Username/password –GSI for S commands (if compiled in) –Define id mapping… Access control replicated with data –Group permissions

J Jensen CCLRC RAL SRM Overview SRM is a file control protocol –GGF standard – GSM-WG –SOAP/HTTP over GSI sockets Something else does the transfer –WAN: Usually GridFTP –LAN: local protocol (RFIO, DCAP,…)

J Jensen CCLRC RAL Implementations Special ones – for specific tape MSS –JLAB, LBNL, CERN/RAL General purpose (usually to disk) –DPM from CERN/LCG, –dCache from DESY/FNAL, –StoRM from INFN

J Jensen CCLRC RAL SRM Versions Designers: –ACL not a major priority Implementers: –Listen to users (often) Users: –ACL not a major priority (HEP) Version 1.1 –Secure (GSI), but… –No functions for ACL Version 2.1 –Unixy +rwxrwxrwx –…POSIX

J Jensen CCLRC RAL Implementations provides SRM SRM1.1SRM2.1 dCacheYESNot seen yet DPMYES CASTOR1YESNO CASTOR2NOYES

J Jensen CCLRC RAL File Transfer Area Implementation LANWAN dCacheDCAPGridFTP DPMRFIOGridFTP CASTORRFIOGridFTP

J Jensen CCLRC RAL Local Protocols Traditional insecure versions… –Use Unix UID for authentication –No data confidentiality (encryption) Both RFIO and DCAP have GSI versions –Not always used by default –Need hostcerts for pool nodes –Dont necessarily encrypt –GSI/SSL negotiations slow

J Jensen CCLRC RAL GridFTP Implementations Use GSI authentication Authorise by DN, using gridmap files Dont encrypt data by default –Or large transfers would be slow

J Jensen CCLRC RAL DPM 1.5 Improved Security Integrated access control in nameserver –GridFTP, SRM, RFIO: consistent ACL RFIO –GSI only –No Encryption Performance vs confidentiality POSIX ACLs VOMS

J Jensen CCLRC RAL StoRM Security Requires ACL capable filesystem –GPFS (, ext3, ReiserFS,…) Being tested by INFN CNAF

J Jensen CCLRC RAL CASTOR 2 SRM Access control not implemented yet Will rely on CASTOR for ACL

J Jensen CCLRC RAL SRM Data Movers: Gaps Data movers must update ACLs when moving data –Support SRM 2.1 –Some copy as user (delegated) –Some as a service Not quite trivial –Data movers dont have special privileges

J Jensen CCLRC RAL Back Doors? File written via Grid can sometimes be read with local protocol –Or via SRM 1.1? Privileged (root/admin) access –Storage Filename is often random –Rarely a concern

J Jensen CCLRC RAL Conclusions GIN: Two Islands – SRM and SRB WAN protocols secure (sort of) –But no data encryption by default Increasingly, LAN protocols are secured Implementations are available (sort of) –SRM 1.1 is still widely used